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The Chinese government’s economic reforms over the last couple of decades have led to rapid 
economic growth for the country. However, many empirical studies on the post-Mao China 
show that the economic transition towards market economy is in large part actually propelled 
by active local governments, which are encouraged to make policy innovations in order to 
promote better local economic development. This thesis aims to offer an understanding on how, 
why and under what circumstances the local governments of post-Mao China - while still 
controlled by a one-party communist regime- are able to make policy innovations to deal with 
business operating under market transition conditions.
Theoretically, the phenomenon of local policy innovation can be analyzed with a framework 
involving three dimensions. First, local policy innovation can be seen to take place in order to 
respond to challenges presented by the changing macro development environments. Second, 
local policy innovation can be understood as a consequence of changing responsibilities and 
competencies between central and local governments. Third, local policy innovation may be 
related to the dynamics of local-central strategic interactions. Empirically, with the contextual 
approach as its chosen methodology, this theoretical framework is applied to two successful 
cases of innovation in Jiangsu province within the Yangtze Delta of post-Mao China: Kunshan 
Economic and Technological Development Zone (KETZ); and China-Singapore Suzhou 
Industrial Park (CSSIP). The history of these two national development zones identifies the 
former as a case of a ‘locally initiated project’ while the latter represents an example of ‘local 
implementation of a centrally initiated project’. In terms of types of local-central dynamic 
interaction, ‘state- intention to tolerate’, ‘ex-post state endorsement’, and ‘ex-ante state 
adoption’ were seen sequentially in the case of KETZ, while ‘marginalizing the local’, ‘local 
obedience’, and ‘local flexibility’ operated simultaneously in the case of CSSIP.
The thesis concludes that in post-Mao China significant local policy innovations were able to 
take place when localities encountered structural changes, including China’s reengaging with 
globalization, changing local-central relations, and serious territorial competition. Actions of 
local policy innovations were ignited by agents, across scales, whose self-interests were highly 
involved in local economic development in the context of asymmetric decentralization. More 
specifically, in the post-Mao China context of economic decentralization to the local combined 
with political centralization under the party, career-minded local officials utilized their 
decentralized ‘economic resources’ to strive for more development, which in turn became their 
‘political capital’ with the upper-level government to get themselves promoted.
CONTENTS
PART I: Backgrounds and Research Questions
CH 1: Perspectives on Local Policy Innovation in post-Mao China
CH 2: The Emergence of Development Zones as a Post-Mao Local Policy Innovation
PART II: Theoretical Framework
CH 3: Policy Innovation as Local Responses to Global Restructuring
CH 4: Local Policy Innovation and post-Mao China Asymmetric Decentralization
CH 5: Policy Innovations and Local-Central Dynamical Interactions
PART III: Methodology and Empirical Cases
CH 6: Research Design and Case Selection
CH 7: Policy Innovations in Locally Initiated Projects-
Case study of Kunshan Economic and Technological Development Zone 
CH 8: Policy Innovations in the Local Implementation of Centrally Initiated Projects- 
Case Study of China Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park
PART IV: Conclusion
CH 9: Understanding Local Policy Innovations of post-Mao China
Extended Contents
Part One: Backgrounds and Research Questions
CH 1: Perspectives on Local Policy Innovation in post-Mao China
1-1 Post-Mao Local Agents behind the China Miracle.................................................... 1
China economic miracle over past two decades.......................................................1
Local agents making policy innovations...................................................................2
1-2 Innovation: a Geographic Viewpoint...........................................................................5
The characteristics of innovation.............................................................................. 5
Geography of technology innovation: innovation system and spatial clusters 8
Summary: innovations across different scales........................................................12
1-3 Decision Making: a Perspective of Innovation........................................................ 14
Rational action, satisficing behaviours, and the communicative tu rn ..................14
Decision making as social learning......................................................................... 18
Summary: communication, learning, transfer and innovation..............................23
1-4 In Lieu of a Conclusion: Local Policy Innovation as a Focus.................................24
CH 2: The Emergence of Development Zones as a Post-Mao Local Policy Innovation
2-1 Two transitions: China vis-a-vis Russia................................................................... 27
Brief review on China economic performances..................................................... 27
China's rise in contrast to Russia's fall....................................................................29
Dual-track in China vis-a-vis shock-therapy in Russia..........................................33
Experimentalism and policy diffusion of dual-track reforms............................... 36
Compromised politics beyond dual-track reform.................................................. 39
2-2 Political Economy of Open Door Policy- a Spatial Perspective............................ 43
Policy of international trade and investment: from a ban to liberalization.......... 43
Political economy of special economic zones....................................................... 47
A pioneer: four special economic zones.................................................................49
2-3 Formation and Transformation of Development Zones.......................................... 53
Proliferation of development zones across China.................................................. 53
Expansion of the policy for national development zones..................................... 55
Evolution of ETDZ: locally initiated and centrally initiated................................ 57
2-4 Decentralization, Policy Innovation and Local Economic Development..............61
Institutional innovation in transition economies.................................................... 61
Rephrasing research questions................................................................................ 64
Synopsis of the thesis...............................................................................................65
Part Two: Theoretical Framework
CH 3: Policy Innovation as Local Responses to Global Restructuring
3-1 Entrepreneurial Localities and Entrepreneurial Governances.................................69
A typology of entrepreneurial localities..................................................................69
The emergence of local/urban/regional entrepreneurial governance................... 72
Structure of the chapter............................................................................................75
3-2 Global Restructuring: from Fordist/Socialist to Post-Fordist/ Post-Socialist 76
Regulation school: regimes of accumulation and modes of regulations.............. 76
From Fordism to post-Fordism............................................................................... 77
From socialist regime to post-socialist regime...................................................... 80
3-3 Macro Perspective of Responses: Localities in Competition..................................82
Background: new operations of spatial organizations at different scales............ 82
Territorial competition in the United States, Europe and China...........................85
Competition and policy innovation (or not)............................................................88
Market fragmentation: territorial competition, Chinese style............................... 89
3-4 Micro Perspective of Responses: Politics behind Self-Interest Coalitions............94
Local politics: elite or pluralist models...................................................................94
Growth machines and urban regimes in pursuit of self-interests..........................96
Multi-scale governances for local economic development................................... 98
Party-dominated politics: development coalition, Chinese style........................ 101
3-5 Conclusion.................................................................................................................106
CH 4: Local Policy Innovation and post-Mao China Asymmetric Decentralization
4-1 Decentralization and Local Economic Development.............................................108
A global tendency of decentralization................................................................... 108
Economic decentralizations with political de/centralization.............................. 110
Structure of the chapter.......................................................................................... 112
4-2 Decentralization in China: a History prior to 1978................................................113
From historical China until 1949...........................................................................113
Oscillation process: 1949 to 1978......................................................................... 114
Summary................................................................................................................. 116
4-3 Economic Decentralizations to the Local............................................................... 117
Administrative decentralization.............................................................................118
Fiscal decentralization of budgetary revenue prior to 1994.................................120
Fiscal reform in 1994............................................................................................. 123
Extrabudgetary and extra extrabudgetary revenues............................................. 125
Politics beyond economic decentralization...........................................................128
4-4 Political Centralization under the Party...................................................................131
Local leaders not elected but assigned.................................................................. 131
Mechanisms of personnel management................................................................132
Performance-based appointment system...............................................................134
Careerism and material bonus as incentives.........................................................137
4-5 Janus-faced Consequences of Asymmetric Decentralizations in China............... 139
Serious territorial competition, particularly resulting in uneven development.. 141
National stability.....................................................................................................143
Local policy innovation......................................................................................... 145
Local unsustainable development......................................................................... 147
4-6 Conclusion.................................................................................................................148
CH 5: Policy Innovations and Local-Central Dynamical Interactions
5-1 Local-Central Interdependence and Local Economic Development.....................151
Interdependence between central and local governments....................................151
Strategic interaction and local economic development........................................154
Structure of the chapter.......................................................................................... 156
5-2 Local-central Interactions in post-Mao China........................................................ 157
Non-constitution and de facto federalism.............................................................157
Local stock of political capital...............................................................................159
Local entrepreneurial leadership........................................................................... 161
Beyond strategic interactions: compromise and innovations.............................. 163
5-3 Typology for Locally Initiated Projects..................................................................166
State-intention to connive......................................................................................168
Ex-post state endorsement.....................................................................................169
Ex-ante state adoption............................................................................................ 170
5-4 Typology for Local Implementation of Centrally Initiated Projects.................... 171




Part Three: Methodology and Empirical Cases
CH 6: Research Design and Case Selection
6-1 Methodology Debate................................................................................................ 179
Traditional regional geography, scientific method, and contextual approach... 179
Qualitative-based case study..................................................................................183
Considerations for selecting cases in this thesis.................................................. 185
6-2 Selections of Case Studies.......................................................................................187
Yangtze Delta as a leading region in post-Mao China.........................................187
Suzhou in the Yangtze delta...................................................................................188
Brief on national zones in and around Suzhou.....................................................191
Role of locally initiated v.s. centrally initiated actions in national zones.......... 193
Brief on KETZ and CSSIP..................................................................................... 198
6-3 Data Collection in the Field..................................................................................... 202
6-4 Conclusion................................................................................................................ 206
CH 7: Policy Innovations in Locally Initiated Projects- Case study of Kunshan 
Economic and Technological Development Zone
7-1 Characteristics of Kunshan and KETZ Development........................................... 207
A change from the little sixth to the number one................................................. 207
Dramatic industrialization and economic globalization......................................210
Electronic and IT industry by Taiwanese investment..........................................211
Kunshan as ‘ little Taiwan’ ................................................................................... 212
Structure of the chapter..........................................................................................213
7-2 Policy Innovations in KETZ and Kunshan............................................................ 215
Establishing a development zone.......................................................................... 215
Implementing land-lease policy............................................................................ 219
Promoting export processing zone........................................................................ 222
7-3 Local-Central Interactions in Kunshan Development........................................... 227
Process of unauthorized but state-intentional connivance.................................. 227
Process of seeking for state ex-post endorsement................................................ 230
Process of persuasion for state ex-ante adoption................................................. 232
Compromises beyond central and local interactions...........................................234
7-4 Operations beyond Local Innovation Process in KETZ and Kunshan.................235
Economic decentralization with rescaling local-central relationship................ 235
Career paths of the local leaders........................................................................... 237
Territorial competition beyond policy innovation...............................................240
A coalition with Taiwanese investors for local economic development............ 242
Policy innovation and diffusion through Taiwanese investors...........................244
7-5 The Effectiveness of Policy Innovation.................................................................. 246
From complementarity to competition: Kunshan vis-a-vis Shanghai................ 246
Unbalanced development in Kunshan..................................................................247
7-6 Conclusion................................................................................................................ 249
CH 8: Policy Innovations in the Local Implementation of Centrally Initiated 
Projects-Case Study of China Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park
8-1 Characteristics of China Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park..................................251
Globalized performance as a role model of development zones........................251
IT and electronic-focus, mainly Europe/America sources.................................. 253
‘Foreign’ Suzhou- Singapore characteristics of infrastructure...........................255
A twisting cooperation between China and Singapore........................................257
Structure of the chapter..........................................................................................258
8-2 Policy Innovations: Transferring Singapore Experiences to Suzhou................... 260
Phenomenon of Singapore experiences in Suzhou..............................................260
New division of labour between CSSD and SIPAC............................................262
Crisis: budgetary and schedule overrun................................................................265
Crisis management: turnover from Singapore to Suzhou................................... 267
8-3 Local-Central Interactions in Suzhou during the CSSIP process......................... 270
The process of ex-ante state adoption at the start: Lee and the two Dengs 270
The process of marginalizing the local.................................................................272
The process of local obedience............................................................................. 275
The process of local flexibility............................................................................. 277
Internal conflicts within Suzhou and Beijing....................................................... 281
8-4 Operations beyond Policy Innovations................................................................... 283
Compromises between China and Singapore: same bed, different dreams 283
Economic decentralization.................................................................................... 285
Territorial competition and CSSIP development.................................................287
Career paths of Suzhou leaders............................................................................. 290
8-5 The Effectiveness of Policy Innovation.................................................................. 292
Transferring process from one way to return-round............................................292
Unbalanced development in Suzhou.....................................................................293
8-6 Conclusion................................................................................................................ 294
Part Four: Conclusion
CH 9: Understanding Local Policy Innovations of post-Mao China
9-1 Research Questions Reprised..................................................................................296
Review of research background............................................................................ 296
The framework of research questions...................................................................299
Outline of research design: two national zones in Suzhou................................. 300
Structure of the chapter..........................................................................................302
9-2 Structure in Change..................................................................................................303
China re-articulation with the world..................................................................... 303
Changing local-central relationship...................................................................... 306
More competition among local governments.......................................................309
9-3 Agents in Actions...................................................................................................... 311
The importance of local officials and cadres........................................................311
Strategic behaviours of making policy innovations............................................. 314
9-4 Summary: Asymmetric Decentralization in post-Mao China...............................317
Decentralization as an intermediate dimension................................................... 317
Ambiguous property right vis-a-vis ‘federalism, Chinese style’ ........................319
Advantages and limitations of asymmetric decentralization.............................. 323
9-5 Coda: Expanding Research Agenda........................................................................328
Diffusion of local experiences and geography of personnel management 328
Local isomorphism as a common observation in China and the west............... 332
Appendix and References
Appendix: Information about the Interviewees............................................................ 338
In KETZ and Kunshan........................................................................................... 338
In CSSIP..................................................................................................................338
Suzhou and Other regions in Yangtze Delta.........................................................339
Reference.........................................................................................................................341
List of Tables
Table 1-1: Average annual growth rate in China and other economies................................ 1
Table 1-2: Understanding the geography of innovation.......................................................11
Table 2-1: The economic performance of China from 1980 to 2004..................................27
Table 2-2: Change in economic structure from 1980 to 2004.............................................28
Table 2-3: FDI and trade from 1980 to 2000 (unit: US$ billion)........................................ 28
Table 2-4: Employment structure by sectors in China and Russia..................................... 33
Table 2-5: Composition of employment by types of organizations in China and Russia..33
Table 2-6: Dual-track pricing in industrial goods, retail sales.......................................... 35
Table 2-7: Dual-track change in non-farm employment (unit: million person)...............36
Table 2-8: Dual-track in decollectivization of production team .......................................38
Table 2-9: Dual-track in decollectivization of production team in selected provinces...38
Table 2-10: Misallocation of capital in state-owned enterprise in 2002.............................40
Table 2-11: Market-oriented and conservative economic programs in comparison..........41
Table 2-12: Export and Import from 1950 to 2000 (unit: billion RM B)............................44
Table 2-13: Two stages in China’s open-door regime.......................................................... 46
Table 2-14: Policy clusters involving more vis-a-vis less opening-up............................ 48
Table 2-15: Performance of FDI and trade liberalization in Shenzhen............................ 52
Table 2-16: Numbers of development zones in 2002 by province..................................... 54
Table 2-17: National development zones in China in 2002.................................................56
Table 2-18: Timeline of establishment of national development zones until 2002........... 57
Table 2-19: Foreign investment in post-Mao China by regions in selected year............... 57
Table 2-20: Growth rate of selected economic performances in 2003 ............................... 58
Table 2-21: ETDZ by granted or established year until 2002..............................................60
Table 2-22: Numbers of centrally or locally initiated ETDZ project until 2002............... 61
Table 3-1: The comparison of entrepreneurship at the firm and locality levels................ 69
Table 3-2: Articulation between a regime of accumulation and a mode of regulation 77
Table 3-3: Characteristics of Fordism and post-Fordism.....................................................78
Table 3-4: Changing urban processes in transition and advanced economies................... 80
Table 3-5: Inter-provincial trade and foreign trade in selected regions (1980-1992)........91
Table 3-6: Concentration ratios of the automotive industry................................................93
Table 4-1: Decentralization prior to 1978........................................................................... 114
Table 4-2: Fiscal reforms in post-Mao China..................................................................... 121
Table 4-3: China’s cyclical reforms in the 1980s................................................................130
Table 4-4: Main bureaucratic ranks..........................................................  134
Table 4-5: Weights for performance evaluation..................................................................136
Table 4-6: Janus-faced consequences of ‘asymmetric decentralization’ .......................... 141
Table 4-7: Central government’s fiscal positions and inflation........................................ 144
Table 5-1: Differential between local performance and central plan for attracting FDI in
Guangdong and Shanghai.............................................................................................175
Table 6-1: Comparison between qualitative and quantitative research............................ 184
Table 6-2: Selected indicators of main sub-regions in eastern China in 2003.................187
Table 6-3: Selected development indicators by regions in the Yangtze Delta in 2003.... 190
Table 6-4: Economic performance in Suzhou as a percentage of Jiangsu....................... 191
Table 6-5: Selected economic indicators in selected regions in 2001 ..............................192
Table 6-6: Selected economic indicators by sub-regions in Jiangsu in 2001 .................. 193
Table 6-7: The importance of FDI by sub-regions in Jiangsu in 2001 .............................193
Table 6-8: Contribution of trade and FDI by development zones to Suzhou..................194
Table 6-9: Selected indicators in national zones in Jiangsu in 2002................................ 196
Table 6-10: Composition of 65 interviewees..................................................................... 204
Table 7-1: Economic performance of KETZ and Kunshan.............................................. 208
Table 7-2: County-level cities in Suzhou in selected items and years............................. 209
Table 7-3: Structure of GDP in Kunshan in selected year................................................ 210
Table 7-4: FDI and trade by county-level cities in Jiangsu in 2003................................ 210
Table 7-5: Taiwanese FDI structure in Kunshan up to 2002 by sector............................ 212
Table 7-6: Performance comparison between KETZ and national zones in 1989.......... 219
Table 7-7: Comparison in infrastructure cost and fiscal revenue in KETZ.....................222
Table 7-8: Preferential policy in EPZs in general.............................................................. 224
Table 7-9: Export in KETZ and EPZ..................................................................................227
Table 7-10: Performance comparison between KETZ and national zones in 1989........229
Table 7-11: Party secretary of Kunshan since 1989...........................................................239
Table 7-12: Jiangsu vice governors’ (as of 2005) local experiences................................ 240
Table 7-13: numbers of Kunshan honourary citizens by nationality............................... 243
Table 7-14: Comprehensive indicators for ‘moderate better-off’ society in 2000.......... 248
Table 8-1: Economic performance of Suzhou City Area and CSSIP............................... 254
Table 8-2: Investment source of CSSIP and KETZ by 1996............................................255
Table 8-3: Numbers of companies and employees joining central provident fund........257
Table 8-4: Accumulated infrastructure expenses in CSSIP and KETZ............................ 265
Table 8-5: Stake holders in the China consortium of CSSD.............................................274
Table 8-6: Infrastructure cost and fiscal revenue in SND by year....................................280
Table 8-7: Singapore overseas industrial Parks in 1998................................................... 284
Table 8-8: Party secretaries of Suzhou since 1994............................................................291
Table 8-9: Selected indicators by regions in the Yangtze Delta in 2003..........................293
Table 9-1: Geography of personnel movement of China’s local leaders.........................331
Table 9-2: Analytic framework on local policy isomorphism..........................................334
List of Figures
Figure 1-1: Speed of doubling income and industrialization by selected countries............ 2
Figure 1-2: Social practice and learning cycle...................................................................... 20
Figure 2-1: The relative growth rate of GDP by regions in 1978-97.................................. 29
Figure 2-2: GDP index (1989=100) in selected transition economies 1990-1999............ 31
Figure 2-3: Structure of chapters of the thesis...................................................................... 66
Figure 4-1: Decentralization in the world in 1970 (upper) and 2000 (down)................... 109
Figure 4-2: Transition of decentralization............................................................................I l l
Figure 4-3: Budgetary revenue of the centre and the local (unit: billion RMB)...............122
Figure 4-4: Revenue share of the central government, 1982-2000....................................123
Figure 4-5: Extrabudgetary revenue since the 1980s..........................................................127
Figure 5-1: Typology in locally initiated projects............................................................... 167
Figure 5-2: Typology of local implementation of the centrally initiated projects........... 172
Figure 6-1: GDP per capita from 2nd and 3rd sectors by cities and regions....................... 188
Figure 6-2: Cities and regions in the Yangtze Delta...........................................................190
Figure 6-3: Jiangsu province in relation to China............................................................... 191
Figure 6-4: Key development zones in Jiangsu province.................................................. 195
Figure 6-5: The locations of KETZ, CSSIP and SND........................................................199
Figure 6-6: Map of Suzhou Administration........................................................................ 200
Figure 7-1: Performance of export and GDP in KETZ...................................................... 227
Figure 7-2: Realized FDI in KETZ......................................................................................232
Figure 8-1: Comparative economic performance of KETZ and CSSIP........................... 252
Figure 8-2: Comparison of contracted FDI in CSSIP and KETZ..................................... 266
Figure 8-3: Total fixed Investment in CSSIP...................................................................... 269
Figure 8-4: A photograph of the signature ceremony in 1994...........................................275
Figure 8-5: Realized FDI and contractual FDI between CSSIP and SND........................279
Figure 8-6: GDP and fiscal revenue between CSSIP and SND.........................................279
C H A P T E R  O N E
Perspectives on Local Policy Innovation in post-Mao China 
1-1 Post-Mao Local Agents behind the China Miracle
China economic miracle over past two decades
The tremendous success of China’s economic reform over some 25 years has attracted 
worldwide attention. Post-Mao China can be regarded as a case of both relatively strong 
economic growth and rapid improvements in living standards. In terms of annual GDP 
growth rate, China averaged 10.1% and 10.7% in the periods 1980-90 and 1990-99 
respectively (Table 1-1). Only a few other new economies such as South Korea, Taiwan 
and Singapore had grown at a comparable rate (World Bank 1997). In terms of value 
added in different sectors, China also developed from 1980 to 1999 at an average speed 
of 5% in agriculture, 12.8% in industry, and 11.2% in service sectors. Those numbers 
were twice or even three or more times as high as the world average, showing that 
China had developed faster than most countries in the world (Table 1-1).
Table 1-1: Average annual growth rate in China and other economies





1980-90 1990-99 1980-90 1990-99 1980-90 1990-99 1980-90 1990-99
China 10.1% 10.7% 5.9% 4.3% 11.1% 14.4% 13.2% 9.2%
low-income
countries 4.4% 2.5% 3.0% 2.5% 5.4% 1.1% 5.7% 4.7%
high-income
countries 3.1% 2.4% -- 0.8% -- 2.6% - 2.2%
world average 3.2% 2.5% 2.7% 1.6% - 3.0% - 2.5%
Source: World Bank (2001)
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Moreover, China had doubled its income per capita every ten years since 1978 (once 
1978-1987 and again 1987-1996), compared to United Kingdom taking 59 years (from 
1780 to 1838) and United State 48 years (1839-1886) to double income per capita at 
equivalent stages in development (World Bank 1997). And China also took only 17 
years to reduce agriculture labour from 70% down to 50%. By contrast, Japan spent 59 
years (from 1870 to 1929) and the Philippines over 31 years (from 1950 to 1980) to 
reach the same goal (Figure 1-1).
Figure 1-1: Speed of doubling income and industrialization by selected countries
cyears to double per capita income





years taken to reduce agriculture labour from 70% to  50*/
0 10 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 7 0
Source: World Bank (1997)
Local agents making policy innovations
It is generally agreed that there has been a Chinese ‘economic miracle’ in successfully 
transiting from communist centrally-planned mechanisms to a quasi-capitalist market 
system. As the market economy and planned economy function on quite different 
ideological and operational bases, the new policies made during the transition towards 
market mechanisms undoubtedly faced some real risks and uncertainties of change. The 
successful transition which produced better economic outcomes, thus, involved radical 
innovations in policy on the part of the state, as well as rapid development within the 
private sectors. This process is the focus of the thesis, which argues more specifically
2
that local agents played a critical role in bringing it about. The aim of the thesis is to 
understand how against a background of centralized planning, local government 
agencies were so important in the Chinese transition to an open market economy.
One significant example is provided by Shekou Industrial District set up in 1979 to 
attract FDI within a restricted boundary. This soon became the prototype of four 
pioneering Special Economic Zones in Guangdong and Fujian. The idea for the Shekou 
district was originally proposed to the central government in Beijing by China 
Merchant’s Steam Navigation Company and Guangdong provincial government (Zhu 
2005). Without explicit permits from Beijing, in the early 1980s Guangdong also 
successfully pioneered a new format of joint venture with foreign investors, using 
existing properties as assets (Zhang 1994). Similarly, the decollectivization programme 
began with an experimentation by production teams in Anhui and Sichuan provinces in 
the late 1970s without any official approval from the centre (Chung 2000). Likewise, 
the rapid development of township and village enterprises in the early and mid-1980s 
started as a local initiative in Jiangsu. Privatization of small state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) was initiated in a few areas (such as Shandong province) and mass lay-offs 
from SOEs began in other regions (including Shanghai and Heilongjiang provinces) 
(Cao, Qian et al. 1999). These reforms reached great success and were launched locally 
rather than by the central government in Beijing. Despite differences among these cases, 
they show that policy innovations in post-Mao China’s transitions could be, and were 
often, initiated from the local level rather than only from the centre.
Local governments have promoted local economic development by flexible 
implementation of central policies. One instance involves Guangdong which was a 
powerful FDI recipient province accounting about half the total amount of FDI in China
during the 1980s. But the de facto FDI amount that Guangdong attracted at the time was 
often twice or even three times in excess of the official ceiling set by the centre (Li 
1997b). Another example involves the central regulations which said in the 1980s, that 
foreign factories were to produce only for the foreign market, while domestic 
enterprises were to function in a protected domestic market. However, Zhangjiagang, a 
county-level city under Suzhou in Jiangsu province, offered foreign investors access to 
the domestic market through joint-venture arrangements between foreign and domestic 
enterprises. Their products were far more competitive than those produced in domestic 
state-owned enterprises, as a result, Zhangjiagang gained capital, made profits and 
upgraded technology for local economic development faster and more easily than other 
regions (Zweig 1999).
To sum up, China has experienced a relatively successful national transition over the 
last two or three decades from a socialist and planning system toward a market 
economy. But as many empirical studies have shown, that transition has been propelled 
by the active and flexible roles played by local agents, who managed to make major 
policy innovations in order to promote better economic development (Oi 1995; Walder 
1995a; Zhu 1999; Wu 2000; Yeung 2000). Such policy innovations were pursued in 
various ways, including: introducing new projects; legally-ambiguous negotiations with 
investors; flexibly shifting resource allocations; creative interpretation of legal 
documentation; and pushing de facto implementation beyond de jure central regulations. 
The questions which have not yet adequately been addressed are why, how, under what 
circumstances, and by whom such local policy innovations to achieve better economic 
development would be made and institutionalized in a transition China, still controlled 
by a one-party communist regime.
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1-2 Innovation: a Geographic Viewpoint
The characteristics of innovation
The subject of innovation has attracted considerable scholarly attention from different 
fields of social sciences, both in general (Blaug 2000; Fagerberg 2004) and in relation 
to local economic development in particular (Malmberg 1997; Gordon and McCann 
2005). In the field of technology associated with a dynamic market economy, 
innovation was a focus of Schumpeter’s theory of entrepreneurship (Blaug 2000; 
Adaman and Devine 2002). He argued early in the 20th century that academia in 
Economics relied too much on static equilibrium analysis, and thus failed to offer a 
better understanding of how capitalism embedded in dynamic market processes could 
be an engine of change and growth in situations of uncertainty. Schumpeter asserted 
that the dynamic process in the real world resulted from a positive rate of interest 
generated by the so-called ‘entrepreneurs’, who observed new opportunities in markets 
first and then made innovations beyond the opportunities. By making innovations, the 
entrepreneurs destroyed the existing market equilibria maintained by incumbent firms 
and existing leading-edge technology products (Schumpeter 1934; Adaman and Devine 
2002). Defined as a novel combination of existing resources, innovation can involve the 
introduction of new technical methods, new products, new sources of supply and/or 
new forms of industrial organizations. In that sense, innovation is different from 
invention. The latter is simply a discovery of new technical knowledge, but the former 
involves its practical application to industry (Schumpeter 1934; Blaug 2000; Adaman 
and Devine 2002; Fagerberg 2004).
Three defining features of innovation can be characterized as: newness, improvement 
and the overcoming of uncertainty (Adaman and Devine 2002; Fagerberg 2004; Gordon
and McCann 2005). Fundamentally, in order to win in the dynamic equilibrium market, 
an innovation introduces qualitative difference from existing routines and practices. 
Innovations are able to introduce changes different from existing available programmes. 
Beyond this, the innovations must be demonstrated to have consequences which are 
superior to other alternatives and current situations. It is impossible to call anything an 
innovation if the consequences of their changes are merely to keep outcomes at status 
quo level or even getting worst. In addition, the innovation needs to involve a discovery 
of the unknown for which past or current experiences seem unavailable to provide 
suitable guidelines to overcome the uncertainties resulting from such an unknown. As a 
general proposition, we may say that all human beings, if  to different degrees, partly 
dependent on a context, are uncomfortable with uncertainty, even when they are 
prepared to take calculable risks. It means that innovation involves not only invention, 
but the task of transforming situations from uncertainty into more calculable, 
manageable and insurable situations. Thus, understanding how, where and when 
innovations actually occur involves addressing three questions: how novelty comes to 
be produced; how such novelties are evaluated and sorted so as to select improvement; 
and how inherent uncertainties get structured and managed in the successful cases.
From the perspective of the characteristics of innovation, three more points can be 
identified. At the beginning, one of the key dimensions of innovation is how radical 
they are when compared to the status quo. Continuous improvement can be 
characterized as incremental or marginal innovation, which is different from radical 
innovation; the latter involves the introduction of totally new types of machinery, or a 
bunch of innovation that together generate major impact to the status quo (Fagerberg 
2004).
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On top of that, regarding how to understand agents (firms, governments, organizations 
or individuals) behaviours when facing the conditions of uncertainty, there are two 
broad idea types of agent-environment framework: the adoptive attitude and the 
adaptive attitude. As to the former, in line with Darwin’s concept of evolutionism, the 
uncertain environment ‘adopts’ the agents that were passively better suited to the needs 
of the environment, even if the agents had no particular knowledge of these beforehand. 
Regarding the latter, the ability to gather and assimilate information increases the ability 
of agents to actively adapt themselves to the uncertain environments. In order to 
transform uncertainty to somewhat measurable risks, the adaptive behaviours are better 
for innovation (Gordon and McCann 2005).
Within the perspective of the adaptive model, there are two different roles in relation to 
innovation: there is a direct creation undertaken by ‘leaders’ or to be modelled after by 
‘followers’. Some agents who consciously innovate are called leaders; while some who 
copy the behaviours of others are called followers. The followers imitate the leaders 
because they perceive themselves to be at a relative information disadvantage. They 
tend to model themselves after examples in their fields that they perceive to be more 
legitimate or successful experiences, particularly when under uncertainty such as facing 
a problem with ambiguous causes or unclear solutions. Therefore, in order to overcome 
the uncertainties and risks to maximise the likelihood of their own success, the imitative 
behaviours of the followers are the safest ways to introduce new products or process 
and make the future better. In other words, imitation and copying can to some extent be 
understood as the ‘adaptive solution’ to the uncertainty in relation to innovation. As 
such, followers and leaders both can be regarded as innovators (Fagerberg 2004; 
Gordon and McCann 2005). All innovation involves some elements of borrowing and 
imitation, as well as building on organizations’ own current practices. And innovation
encompasses a spectrum of changes from those which are ‘new to the world’, through 
those which are new to the sector or the country, to those which are just new to the 
agents and activities involved. However some forms of copying are more positive and 
productive than others.
Geography of technology innovation: innovation system and spatial clusters 
As Doloreux, Shearmur et al (2001) note, the link between learning, institutional 
innovation and regional development can be interpreted in two distinct ways, in relation 
to technology deployed by private firms and in relation to public policy. The concept of 
‘institutional innovation at policy level’ is about how to be innovative while formulating, 
modifying and reformulating rules governing economic activities in order to improve 
the regulatory environments for further development (Gregersen and Johnson 2000; 
Smith 2000; Doloreux, Shearmur et al. 2001).1 And the concept of ‘institutional 
innovation at technology level’ suggests that the innovative regions are the environments 
where firms are at the forefront of techniques and procedures (Malmberg 1997; Morgan 
1997; Storper 1997; Gordon and McCann 2000; Doloreux, Shearmur et al. 2001). To 
make this distinction between policy innovation and technology innovation does not 
mean that innovations at these two levels are not interrelated. Innovation at policy level 
can provide a more supportive regulatory environment for firms and industries to make 
technology innovations. But it is also possible for innovation at policy level to have 
negative effects on innovations by introducing a set of institutions which destabilises the 
research and development activities of firms (Smith 2000; Doloreux, Shearmur et al. 
2001; Lagendijk 2001).
1 From the perspective of the policy making procedure, Gregersen and Johnson (2000) argue that the 
policy innovation process includes: how new and innovative concepts, data, and theories or new 
institutions can be developed to support production and reproduction of human and social capitals. It also 
relates how regional and local experiments in policy areas in need of reform can be stimulated, and new 
methods can be developed, or how to gradually try, test, evaluate, and establish new practices and routines 
of policies (Gregersen and Johnson 2000).
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Most existing research on innovation, however, pays much more attention to the 
technology dimension than to policy innovation (Doloreux, Shearmur et al. 2001; 
Lagendijk 2001). In this thesis, the emphasis of the focus is reserved. However, I shall 
start from the literature review on geography of technology innovation and draw out 
some insightful views to understand the concept of policy innovation. In so doing, I 
shall discuss two literatures on different but not mutually-exclusive aspects of ideas of a 
complex geography of technology innovation: one concerns the innovation system, 
whether at the international, national or regional scale; and the other is the impact on 
innovation due to spatial agglomeration and clustering.
In the first case, the concept of ‘innovation systems’ involves the set of relationships 
and the interactions between R&D laboratories and technological institutions on the one 
hand and the production system on the other (Lundvall and Maskell 2000). In contrast 
to Schumpeter’s concept of ‘creative deconstruction’, the innovation system is seen as a 
focus of ‘creative accumulation’ which emphasizes networks and institutions whose 
activities and interactions initiate, modify, accumulate and/or diffuse new technologies 
(Schumpeter 1975; Soete and ter Weel 1999; Breschi, Malerba et al. 2000).2
Three spatial scales have been considered: international, national and regional. At the 
international scale, researches have been synonymous with studies of formal R&D 
structures within multi-national corporations. The internationalization of innovation can 
be developed through cross-country joint ventures or overseas subsidiaries (Bunnell and
2 The concept of ‘creative accummulation’ is also known as the Schumpeter Mark II model in order to be 
distinguished from his concept of ‘creative deconstruction’ in his earlier works (or so-called ‘Schumpeter 
Mark I model) (Soete and ter Weel 1999; Breschi, Malerba et al. 2000; Adaman and Devine 2002).
3 However, it does not mean innovation can take place at these three sclaes. Bunnell and Coe (2001) 
mention the importance of scales at firm level and at individual level.
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Coe 2001), and/or international trade and foreign direct investment (Krugman 1979; 
Saggi 2002). However, despite international networks in R&D, multinational 
corporations’ innovative activities still took place, for the most part, in their home 
nations. The national innovation system literature contends that the structural and 
functional profiles of a nation determine its innovation capacities and related economic 
performances. Interactions between supply and demand are situated within nations, 
national polices and the role of cultural factors are identified as the key elements of 
national innovation systems (Lundvall and Maskell 2000; Bunnell and Coe 2001).
The regional innovation system approach does not disagree with the claims made in 
relation to international or national innovation systems, but simply pays more attention 
to the operations and effectiveness of innovation systems at a regional scale. One of the 
important pieces of empirical evidence supporting this approach is that innovative 
activities are spreading unevenly across most counties, which in many cases such 
knowledge-generated externalities seem to be geographically bounded within specific 
urban regions.4 From a combination of notions, on the regional side, including 
proximity, trust, and institutions and, on the innovation side, like dynamic, interactive 
and systemic processes, the approach is keen to explore what kinds of policies may be 
instigated by regional authorities to support and sustain regional innovation systems 
(Bunnell and Coe 2001; Cooke and Simmie 2005).
The other main dimension of writing about the geography of innovation is in relation to 
the concept of spatial clustering, promoted particularly by Porter (1990). The emphasis 
here is more on small-medium enterprises and the influence on their performances due
4 For example, in the United Kingdom, over 60% of such innoviations occurred in the London regions; in 
the United States, more than 60% of Japanese R&D laboratories located in just four cities and regions, 
namely, Boston, New York, Chicagom and south California (Cooke and Simmie 2005).
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to local sectoral specialization, sharing social and cultural capital among local economic 
agents, market/ non-market linkages involving inter-firm collaboration and competition, 
and networking with other local institutions (Rabellotti and Schmitz 1999; Fisher and 
Reuber 2000). The idea of clusters is associated with the concept of regional innovation 
system, but it does not mean that all clusters involve high-tech industries. Or that cluster 
theory simply focuses on innovation (though this is an inevitable aspect of the pursuit of 
competitive advantage, which is its focus). At least three different underlying models 
have been identified: first, pure agglomeration; second, industrial complex; third, social 
network, culture and institution (Table 1-2).
Table 1-2: Understanding the geography of innovation
Pure agglomeration Industrial complex Social network
Analytical
approach





rent appreciation in region
Stable trade within regions; 
specialization o f regions
Trust and interactions within 
regions
Example




High-tech infrastructure is 
also spatially-clustered, 
favours innovation and 
learning
Specialization of production 
favours innovation and 
learning
Trust and interactions within 
regions or through 
extra-local connections by 
nodes or flows o f elites 
encourage innovation
Source: modified from Gordon and McCann (2000)
The first model, coming from the neo-classical economic perspective, mathematically 
focuses on the chances of being established within large agglomerations in order to 
minimize transactions costs and maximize access to specialized information, skills and 
collaborations. Proximity is the key to accessing these resources (Porter 1990; Krugman 
1995; Barnes 2003).5 The second, based on input-output production analysis, refers to
5 Bamer (2003) argues that such neo-classical analysis has a long tradition starting from the German 
location school of von Thunen, Weber, and Losch that begins in the first part o f the 19th century and ends 
in the mid o f the 20th century, and followed by American spatial science dating from the mid 1950s and is 
in decline by the late 1970s.
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planned interconnections between small groups of complementing firms based in a 
region. Proximity is a convenience here, but collaboration in this case depends on 
essentially private relations between these firms (Gordon and McCann 2000; Lundvall 
and Maskell 2000). Third, drawing an idea from economic sociology, the social network 
model focuses on the way in which networks of trust are constructed by firms within a 
supportive local environment. Daily accesses and interactions among firms allow them 
to engage in learning-based competitiveness through networks of interdependency, 
formal institutions of learning, and common understanding (Amin and Thrift 1995; 
Morgan 1997; Storper 1997; Amin and Thrift 2000; Perrons 2001).6
Summary: innovations across different scales
This literature on the geography of innovation in relation to technologies and products 
deployed by private firms has so far not been applied to the issue of institutional 
innovation at policy level by public agencies. However, it offers a number of useful 
insights which could be applied to the investigation of policy innovations. First is the 
social network approach which takes up ideas from the Schumpeter Mark I model, 
about the significance of human and spatial relations to economic coordination in 
situations of innovation, characterised by changes and uncertainty. Variably discussed in 
terms of ‘un-traded interdependencies’ (Storper 1997), ‘institutional thickness’ (Amin 
and Thrift 1994; 1995; 2000), or ‘learning region’ by Morgan (1997), a shared idea is 
that innovation may be produced by sharing of tacit knowledge based on face-to-face 
exchange, embedded routines, habits and norms, local conventions of communications 
and interactions, reciprocity and trust based on familiarity, as a flexible alternative to
6 This approach can be understood as the key challenge to criticize the rationalist interpretation of pure 
agglomeration approach in relation to innovation (Amin and Thrift 2000; Bames 2003). I argue that the 
pure agglomeration approach based on the mathematically modelling method is ‘geographic economies’ 
rather than ‘economic geography’. However, some scholars distinguishin the two using the terms ‘new 
economic geography I’ and ‘new economic geography II’ (Perrons 2001).
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the formal routines of large competitors. From this perspective, the spaces of innovation 
need to be understood in terms of path dependent institutional relationship within places 
(Maskell and Malmberg 1999).
Second, innovation system research has come to emphasise the importance of linkages 
and interrelationships between and across spatial levels, from individual person/firm to 
local/subnational, national and global scales. Wider networks of actors may be crucial 
to regional level innovation developments, even in terms of the tacit knowledge 
transferred by extra-local connections and networks of firms and individuals involved in 
the process of innovation making and diffusions (Oinas and Malecki 1999; Bunnell and 
Coe 2001). Third, there is the notion of innovation spillover, with empirical studies 
showing that specific innovations can be spread between regions and places by many 
types of diffusions. These include formal patent citations, transmission of embodied 
innovations by trade between places and internationalization of R&D in subsidiaries 
and mergers, acquisitions as well as personally through individuals, acquisition of 
relevant skills, knowledge and know-how (Feldman 2000).
Fourth, a more specific research finding is that the diffusion of innovation can be 
channelled through linkages of agents cross scale. For example, in terms of mobility of 
individuals, the increasing interdependent development in terms of information industry 
between Silicon Valley of California and Taiwan can be attributed to a community of 
US-educated Taiwanese engineers who had transferred tacit knowledge of capital, skill 
and know-how between Silicon Valley and Hsinchu-Taipei by frequent movement 
between these two places (Saxenian 1999). In addition, in a case study of 
leather-tanning industry in Santa Croce and the city of London, Amin and Thrift (1992) 
also suggest the concept of ‘neo-Marshallian node’ in order to argue for the importance
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of a globally-networked collective brain as an interpretative community in the local 
industrial districts. This could be an important means of decentralizing the innovation 
process, an alternative to hierarchical channels of diffusion.
1-3 Decision Making: a Perspective of Innovation
Rational action, satisficing behaviours, and the communicative turn 
The social science literature on ‘policy and decision making* comes from quite different 
intellectual backgrounds than that of innovation, though again there are different 
approaches. On the one hand, there has been a focus on the logic of generalized 
‘procedures’ of policy making, some scholars try to identify various ‘steps’ in the policy 
process, from policy definition, policy formulation, policy implementation, to problem 
superseded and redefined, and policy outcomes, which are interrelated and 
interdependent (Hill 1993; Turner 2002). On the other hand, there has been an approach 
focused on how the policy process actually generates in different kinds of societal and 
governmental environments, with explanations including the pluralist viewpoint, 
neo-pluralist aspect, corporatist dimension, Marxist approach, and neo-liberal stance 
(Hill 1993; Turner 2002). Differences between the two approaches have been 
highlighted in the context of planning theory, which has been particularly concerned 
with issues of managing/steering development (Friedmann 1987; Healey 1997; 
Campbell and Fainstein 2003). It is possible to trace three particular types of emphases 
in planning theory relevant to the generation of innovative decision making. These are: 
‘rational and comprehensive’ actions, ‘satisficing or incrementalism behaviours’, and 
the processes of the ‘communicative turn’. I shall discuss each in turn to show their 
relevance.
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The ‘rational comprehensive’ model assumes that decision makers, by virtue of their 
expertise and experience, have clearly defined goals and enough time and a range of 
tools to make the so-called ‘correct’ decision by accessing full information of the most 
accurate and scientifically- plausible options (Friedmann 1987). In this model, policy 
agents become aware of a problem first, then posit goals, and carefully weigh 
alternative means. Finally, policy actors choose the best among these alternatives 
according to the estimation of the respective merits of each means and their costs 
(including transition costs). All data can be collected and calculated rationally with 
deductive logic, scientific analysis and value-neutralized ranking (Lindblom 1959). In 
order to identify and maximize unitary public interests through the scientific decision 
process, decision makers operate like scientists or technicians, free from constraints and 
special-interests (Friedmann 1987; Fainstein and Fainstein 1996). From this perspective, 
innovation is nothing special nor problematic.
The approach of ‘satisficing behaviours’ challenges the viability and desirability of the 
large-scale, complex and objective decision-making process generated by the rationalist 
model. Decision makers are unable to fully implement the process because of shortage 
of time, limitation of information particularly on alternatives, and difficulties in 
negotiating diverse interests of pressure groups (Lindblom 1959; Gregory 1989). Rather, 
agents operate within established culturally-specific practices and routines about 
familiar patterns of behaviours (Hall and Taylor 1996). In this approach, decision 
making is not looking for the optimum but for a satisfactory solution. And by choosing 
the first satisfactory alternatives, the decision making takes place at the margins. 
Lindblom (1959) calls this the ‘incrementalism’ approach. Policy actors make the 
decision by weighing the marginal advantages of a limited number of alternatives. They 
are not perfectly rational but entirely pragmatic to ensure that the new alternative can
function, cope with the demands of pressure groups, and deal with crises as and when 
they have arise (Fainstein and Fainstein 1996; Smith 2000). Innovation is either 
something to be avoided, or simply a set of incremental steps.
The ‘communicative turn’ shifted the conceptual ground to an interpretation of the 
relationship between ‘knowledge and action’ or ‘theory and practice’. The approach 
starts with a challenge that knowledge and value for planning and decision making do 
not have objective existence in the external world can it be neither discovered by 
scientific inquiry. Instead, knowledge for planning and decision making is derived from 
experiences and validated in practice (Friedmann 1987). From this perspective, 
‘communicative turn’ sees decision making as a process of facilitating community 
collaboration embedded in discourse constructing, consensus-building and policy 
formulating and implementing in daily practices. The development processes take many 
forms, from rational systematic analysis, to storytelling and expressive statement in 
words, pictures or sounds (Healey 1996; 1997). For example, Forest (1999) notes that 
story-listening plays an important role in policy making. By story-listening, policy 
actors can sometimes learn from past experiences that in turn provide planners and 
policy actors with relevant information which may matter for further decision making. 
Innovation is both central and problematic from this perspective; with no single method 
dominates it.
A package of these three dimensions offers a basis for a better theoretical understanding 
of innovation in relation to policy making. The ‘rational action’ approach argues that 
innovation involves prioritizing different alternatives and then choosing the best on the 
basis of rational evaluation. This involves a huge scope of tasks in searching for 
information and judging alternatives. It means that a more comprehensive set of
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information allows a greater ability to make judgements, and a higher probability of 
good decision making, including very radical changes if possible and necessary. The 
‘satisficing behaviour’ approach draws attention to the fact that decision making is a 
pragmatic process. If  decision making involves picking up the first satisfactory 
alternative rather than the best one, how innovative this is depends on how demanding 
the criteria of satisfactions are. Such a context entails that little incremental changes 
would be a consequence as long as the satisfying outcomes have been generated. As a 
result, decision making is as an evolutionary process of modifying at the margin.
Interestingly, ‘communicative turn’ seems to be an intermediate mode between ‘rational 
actions’ and ‘satisficing behaviours’,7 at least in terms of degree and scope of searching 
for alternatives. ‘Communicative turn’ notes that decision making is an interpretative 
process between knowledge and theory on the one hand and action and practice on the 
other hand. At the beginning, the turn does not disagree with rational actions, but 
clearly points out that the sources of looking for alternatives is not groundless but based 
on the interactions between theories and actions. On top of that, the turn addresses that 
the decision making process is based on the socially embedded communication in the 
routine and daily practices, the result of bounded rationality. It means that the 
‘communicative turn’ does not rule out the possibility of the first satisfying alternative 
and changing at the margin as a consequence of innovation.
7 This argument is also related to Hall and Taylor’s (1996) analysis on historical institutionalism. They 
argue that the decision making and institution building is based on the combination of the calculus 
approach and cultural approach. The former assumes that when making decisions or building institutions, 
individuals seek to maximize the attainment of a set of goals, given by a specific preference function, and 
the latter emphasizes that individuals turn to established routines or familiar patterns of behaviour to 
attain their purposes. To some extent the calculus approach can be understood as a form of rational choice 
theory, and the cultural approach is derived from sociological understanding of the importance of culture, 
communication, and so on.
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Decision making as social learning
As argued by Friedmann (1987), the approach of the ‘communicative turn’ can be 
regarded as a tradition of ‘social learning’, which could be traced back to several 
intellectual roots, including Dewey’s ‘learning by doing’, Marxism’s ‘the point of the 
philosophers is to change it’, and Mao’s ‘On practice’. Society is in a continuous 
process of transformation, making it necessary to develop social systems that can learn 
and adapt (Schon 1973; Argyris and Schon 1978). For example, Finger and Brand’s 
study (1999) of the Swiss Postal Service demonstrates that learning for change is 
necessary for public sectors since they have encountered survival pressure not only 
‘from within’, such as a domestic monitoring of citizens and politicians, but also ‘from 
above’, such as multinational corporations or organizations. Malecki (2002) also states 
that like private business, public sector agencies need to develop an absorptive capacity 
for innovation to scan the technical environment, select appropriate policy and 
accumulate knowledge for development during the course of policy R&D from external 
sources. From this perspective, the decision making process is not so much about the 
power struggle, or a process of collective puzzlement, rather it is the process in which 
different agents, including political parties, interest groups, and state bureaucracy and 
so on, are involved in continual analysis and deliberation in an attempt to build 
consensual solutions to policy problems (Hall 1993; Pemberton 2000).
Three points can be particularly made. First, there are different degrees of changes in 
relation to social learning, from marginal improvements to radical innovations. In a case 
study of British economic policy change from Keynesianism to monetarism during the 
1970s, Hall (1993) identifies three orders of policy change. The ‘first order’ change was 
related to ‘satisficing’ and minor adjustments to policies. The ‘second order’ change,
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occurring when satisficing failed, was characterized by re-tooling, limited 
experimentation and introduction of new policy techniques and alternative strategies 
without questioning the policies’ orthodoxy and their objectives. And the ‘third order’ 
change involved a more radical paradigm shift, including the hierarchy of goals and set 
of instruments employed to guide policy. Social learning at the third order was 
connected with an emphasis on cognition and the redefinition of interests on the basis of 
new knowledge which affected the fundamental beliefs and ideas behind policy 
approaches. It means that problems could be redefined, new interpretative frameworks 
could be developed, and even ideological transformations could be introduced if 
necessary.
Second, it is about the concept of a learning cycle, including a continuous process of 
error detection and correction (a learning loop). First, existing understanding (theory) is 
enriched with lessons drawn from experience and a continuing, inquiry directed into the 
nature, causes, and resources of old problems. Then, this new understanding is applied 
to continuing processes of action and changes in order to discard the structure and 
mechanisms developed around these problems. It means that practice (such as actual 
changes in action, strategy, theory and values) and learning (for example, understanding 
problems and intentions) are constructed as correlative processes (Figure 1-2) 
(Friedmann 1987). Schon and Argyris further identify two kinds of loop-learning in 
order to explain the difference between marginal improvement and radical innovations. 
On the one hand, the single loop learning involves the generation of new action 
strategies without questioning the existing governing values (namely, the first and 
second orders of changes in Hall’s definition), resulting in marginal changes. The 
double-loop learning, on the other hand, happens when the first loop learning fails, 
involving adaptation, modification, and even completely changes of the existing
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governing values themselves (the third order of change in Hall’s definition), with the 
radical innovations as a consequence (Schon 1973; Argyris and Schon 1978).
Figure 1-2: Social practice and learning cycle
actor’s cognitive aspects of learning, or the so-called theory 
A: actor’s experiential aspects of learning, or the so-called action 
Action I]: problems and intentions, mapping of cause-effect relationship 
Action I2: actual changes in actions, strategy or values, also actions influencing the environment 
Source: revised from Friedmann (1987)
Third, I would like to elaborate on social learning theory with the perspective of 
extra-local learning. Two basic ways of the learning process developed are introduced: 
learning from direct experiences and learning from the experiences of others (Yeung, 
Ulrich et al. 1999). Learning from direct experience means that organizations acquire 
knowledge and develop insights through their own actions and reflections. The most 
familiar case is trial and error. By directly performing a set of activities, and then 
reflecting on their action-outcome relationships, actors can gain knowledge and 
expertise for improving performance over time (Yeung, Ulrich et al. 1999). In contrast, 
learning from the experience of others means that organizations acquire knowledge 
without having to perform operations on their own. These cases include learning by 
observation or the diffusion of knowledge through consultants and educational 
institutions. By observing, scanning, benchmarking, and imitating the successful 
products, processes, and practices of other organizations, actors can gain insights into 
and develop ideas about their own products and processes (Yeung, Ulrich et al. 1999).
D: actor’s decision process
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By a comparative analysis of regulatory changes in the railways in Britain and Germany, 
Lodge (2003) argues that such two types of organizational learning sources for decision 
making could be applied to public policy issues. Britain drew lessons from its own 
previous experiences; while Germany learned from international experiences. The 
template adopted in Britain reflected previous lessons including past utility privatization 
and the popularity of the ‘regulation by competition’ doctrine, including vertical 
separation in organizational terms and the fragmentation of train-operating companies 
and rolling-stock and maintenance business. However, in Germany, the reforms 
reflected themes occurring in international railway reforms, aiming to reduce the 
financial burden and to enhance the commercial and competitive position of the railway 
operation (Lodge 2003).8
In terms of topics of local economic development, the concept of policy innovation by 
learning from the experiences of others has been theoretically developed and 
empirically noted. Theoretically, Rose (1993) explores a concept of lesson-drawing by 
public and private sectors which are based on a search in a systematic and 
comprehensive manner and reviewing policy in the light of experiences of others. There 
are five different forms of lesson-drawing. First, copying involves ‘enacting a more or 
less intact programme’ already in effect. Second, adaptation is similar but involves 
‘adjusting for contextual difference’. Third, hybrid- making consists of ‘combining 
elements of programmes from two different places’. Fourth, synthesis is to create a new 
programme by ‘combining some familiar elements of programs in a number of different 
places’. Fifth, inspiration is to use a programme elsewhere as ‘an intellectual stimulus to 
develop a novel program’ (Rose 1993). Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) suggest that
8 Lodge (2003) further discusses the importance of the institutional factors for the utilization of different 
sources for policy transfer, so what-he-called political-administrative nexus.
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institutional innovations at policy level are the conscious adoption of a public policy 
from another jurisdiction. It describes a process in which knowledge of institutions in 
one political system could be learned from the development of knowledge in another 
political system, namely, learning from the experience of others. It can be a transfer of 
cross-jurisdictions not only within the same country but also of cross-border regions 
between different countries (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000).
Empirically, the Britain public-private urban regeneration coalition is a case in point. 
The ‘Challenge Fund’, a key incentive used by the central government to generate 
formal as well as informal links between local governments and local business in 
Britain, is an urban policy innovation leamt/inspired directly from American Urban 
Development Action Grant by UK central government officials (Davies 2002). 
Similarly, Hassink and Lagendijk (2001) argue that the development of the Danish 
Co-operation Network Program was inspired by the Italian region of Emilia-Romagna. 
Also, in order to evaluate middle size firms, Duisburg of German adopted a policy 
program focusing on SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) strategy, 
which was learned from the neighbouring Dutch region. And, perhaps most widely 
applied example, in other to catch up with industrialization by establishing high-tech 
development, the concept of a ‘science park’ based on adapting the experiences of 
Silicon Valley has become a popular policy choice internationally, including ‘Silicon 
Glen’ in Scotland, ‘Silicon Isle’ in Singapore, and ‘Silicon Plateau’ in Bangalore 
(Hassink and Lagendijk 2001), with related examples in China too. Whether all such 
innovations are appropriate to regional circumstances- and thus represent real learning 
and successful local innovations- is a different matter, however, requiring further 
investigations.
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Summary: communication, learning, transfer and innovation
I argue that there are three important approaches to analyzing innovative decision 
making processes: ‘rational action’, ‘satisficing behaviours’, and the ‘communicative 
turn’. Of the three, the last is the most appropriate to understanding decision making 
processes in relation to policy innovation. From the perspective of the ‘communicative 
turn’, innovative decision making can be further understood as a learning cycle. In 
addition, inspired from organization theory, social leaning can be divided into two types: 
learning from past direct experiences or learning from the experiences of others.
Overall, these concepts are useful for us in understanding the relationship between 
policy making and innovation, for example, the role of ‘best practices’, a popular 
method of decision making for innovation (Gertler 2001). In terms of development 
policies and studies, best practices can be nourished in many ways, like so-called 
successful development cases endorsed by international society (e.g. Taiwan and South 
Korean as New Industrial Economies in East Asia), opportunities of ideas exchanges in 
international conferences attended by different policy agents and professions, successful 
practices promoted by international awards, 9 and certain profession-related 
organizations (particularly the Kennedy School at Harvard University). The ‘best 
practice’ approach indeed offers policy stakeholders innovative ideas on the range of 
possible alternatives by learning from other successful experiences (Loffler 2000).
However, it must be noted that there are different degrees of learning and transfer in 
terms of a dimension of policy agents’ intention. Ideally, there are two kinds of 
condition of intention: ‘voluntarism’ vis-a-vis ‘coerciveness’. As to the former, policy
9 The Best Practice Database as urban solutions is collected by the Together Foundation and 
UN-HABITAT (http://www.bestpractices.org).
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actors make a rational and comprehensive decision to systematically and voluntarily 
borrow from others. In contrast, concerning the latter, it is either because local agents 
are forced to make actions in order to respond to changing global structures, or because 
local agents are coerced to implement policies which are strongly promoted by 
relatively powerful external agencies. Most empirical cases are located in the spectrum 
of learning processes between ‘voluntarism’ and ‘coerciveness’ (Dolowitz 2000). From 
this perspective, two more points need to be identified. First, with the scale perspective, 
so-called ‘external agents’ can be understood as policy actors which are not in the local 
scale but other scales. It leads us, therefore, to consider the roles of national and 
international agents involved in local economic development (like central governments, 
foreign officials and investors, international organizations and so on). Second, 
coerciveness also means that there are some uneven power relations behind policy 
process. Thus, the political economy approach to understanding complicated processes 
of negotiation and compromises between policy actors across different scales needs to 
be considered when conducting researches.10
1-4 In Lieu of a Conclusion: Local Policy Innovation as a Focus
To sum up, the study of transition has recently attracted considerable scholarly attention. 
One of the key issues concerns the relationship between economic development and 
political transition, which can take quite different forms in particular contexts. For 
example, studies of post-Mao China indicate that powerful local states have developed a 
capacity to flexibly make policy innovations, like creatively control enterprises and
10 In planning theory, a normatie version of the political economy approach also argues that planners and 
decision makers should advocate the interests of the under-developed, the minorities, and the 
economically and the socially disadvantaged who suffer from the capitalist-dominant planning system- 
but positive analyses focus on the tendency for more powerful economic interests to prevail (Friedmann 
1987; Campbell and Fainstein 2003).
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intervene in resource reallocations, for better local economic development. What has 
not yet been documented or explained is how, why and when local governments, still 
controlled by the communist party, learn to deal effectively with profit-seeking 
businesses operating under market conditions. This academic gap, involving what I call 
‘local policy innovation in post-Mao China’, is the central concern of this whole thesis.
Certain common analytic dimensions for policy innovation have been identified from 
work with two different academic focuses: one relates to the geography of innovation 
(Section 1-2) and the other to decision making and planning theory (Section 1-3). The 
‘rational action’ hypothesis is found in both the decision making theory as well as 
innovative spatial cluster on the basis of neo-classical analysis (Barnes 2003). A 
sociological or cultural dimension is also discussed influentially in both types of study. 
Most importantly, these two kinds of literatures agree that both incrementalism (small 
modifications) and completely new (radical changes) can be regarded as innovations. In 
the study of innovation, both incrementalism and radical changes may be understood as 
cases of innovation as long as they involve some novelty combined with improvement 
as a consequence and uncertainty during the process. In planning theory, 
communicative turn (particularly related social learning model) identifies different 
degrees of policy making, from slight improvements without questioning existing 
frameworks to fundamental changes by reforming all governing variables.
In addition, research on the diffusion of innovation offers a supplement to understand 
why and how the process of learning from the experiences of others is important. In the 
study of innovation, leaders and followers can be distinguished by appreciating 
different ways of calculating risks when making innovations. The followers imitate the 
leaders because the followers understand that imitation is the safest solution in
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managing uncertainty in order to maximise the likelihood of their own success. From 
this perspective, policy innovation by learning from other places is one of the good 
solutions to reduce risks as a result of changes.
Although the existing researches on technology innovation and decision making have 
developed very insightful and informative knowledge to understand innovation in 
general and policy innovation in particular, they still pay relatively limited attention to 
local policy innovation, which is the main focus of this thesis. As aforementioned, many 
empirical cases have demonstrated the importance of local policy innovation and that it 
deserves more attention than it has received so far. Post-Mao China is a case in point. 
From studies of American cities, a number of entrepreneurship roles performed by 
urban officials have been identified, including to coordinate a plethora of participants 
and networks; to deal with the uncertainty of public policies; to promote private 
entrepreneurial vitality, to enhance skilled labour and high-quality human forces, to 
recognize available opportunities that have not yet been exploited; and to accomplish 
things in ways that have never been tried before (Garvin 1996; Jensen-Butler 1999). 
These existing theoretical and empirical studies unfortunately seem to take for granted 
that how local policy innovation can be made to happen the contextual factors it 
depends on, i.e. why, how, in which ways, under what circumstances, and by whom it is 
enabled. These comparative issues have received scant attention and still require further 
investigation particularly in relation to transition economies in an era of globalization. 
Discussion of some of the relevant contextual factors in relation to the development of 
China’s transition in general, and development zones associated with open door policy 
in particular, are offered in the next chapter before I explain my concrete research 
framework for analysing the central question in relation to die chosen empirical case 
studies.
CHAPTER TWO
The Emergence of Development Zones as a Post-Mao Local Policy Innovation
‘special treatments for special issues, new managements for new matters, the 
stances of policy unchanged with the implementations completely novel’ 
(te shi te ban, xin shi xin ban, li chang bu bain, fang fa  quan xin)11
2-1 Two transitions: China vis-&-vis Russia 
Brief review on China economic performances
Nationally, China has transformed dramatically over the past three decades. In terms of 
GDP at current price, China grew about 30 times in past 25 years, from 451 billion 
RMB in 1980 up to 13, 687 billion RMB in 2004 (estimated). GDP per capita was 
increased, from 460 RMB to 10,561 RMB in 2004 (estimated) (Table 2-1). In addition, 
the industrial structure changed radically. In 1980, 69% of employees and 30% of GDP 
were in agriculture; by 2004, its share was just 47% of employment and 15% of GDP, 
with manufacturing remaining constant while service industries grew rapidly, especially 
in employment terms (Table 2-2).
Table 2-1: The economic performance of China from 1980 to 2004
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004*
GDP (billion RMB) 451.8 896.4 1,854.8 5,847.8 8,946.8 13,687.6
GDP per capita (RMB) 460 853 1,634 4,854 7,086 10,561
Note*: Data calculated at current price, and data on 2004 are preliminary estimates 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook (2005)
11 The inscription was offered by Hu, the then PM of China, to Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SPZ) 
in 1984. By then there was some disagreement toward SEZ. By doing so, Hu intented to encourage the 
developmen of SPZ.
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Table 2-2: Change in economic structure from 1980 to 2004
1980 
I : II: III*
1985 
I : II: III
1990 
I : II: III
1995 
I : II: III
2000 
I : II: III
2004* 
I: II: III
Share of GDP 30:49:21 28:43:29 27:42:31 21:49:31 16:51:33 15:53:32
Share of employment 69:18:13 62:21:17 60:21:19 52:23:25 50:23:27 47: 23:30
Note*: Data calculated at current price, and data on 2004 are preliminary estimates 
Note **: The primary industry refers to activities regarding farming, forestry, animal husbandry and 
fishery; the secondary industry involves mining, manufacturing, utility, and construction industry; the 
tertiary industry concerns all other productive activities.
Source: same as Table 2-1
China’s industrialization was related to engaging globalization through FDI and trade 
(World Bank 1997). In terms of realized foreign capital (including foreign loan, FDI 
and other foreign activities), China attracted just US$ 4.8 billion in 1985, but US$ 64.1 
billion in 2004. Regarding the structure of realized foreign capital, FDI has played an 
overwhelmingly important role, from 37% of total foreign capital in China in 1985 up 
to 68.5% in 2000. By contrast, foreign loan became much less significant over time. 
Along with that is the growth of foreign capital as a share of GDP, from only 1.5% in 
1985 to highest 7.0% in 1995, and it was near 4% in 2004. Trade grew similarly fast. 
From USS 27.3 billion export and US$ 42.3 billion import in 1980, China’s trade grew 
to USS 593.3 billion of export and USS 561.2 billion of import by 2004. The share of 
trade in GDP terms grew from less than 25% in 1985 to more than 70% in 2004 (Table 
2-3). By 2003, China became the biggest FDI receipt country in the world as well as the 
4th and 3 rd export and import economy respectively.
Table 2-3: FDI and trade from 1980 to 2000 (unit: USS billion)
1985 1990 1995 2000 2004
Realized Foreign Capital 4.8 10.3 48.1 59.4 64.1
Foreign loan 2.5 6.5 10.3 10.1 -
Foreign direct investment 2.0 3.5 37.5 40.7 60.6
Others 0.3 0.3 0.3 8.6 3.5
'Foreign capital as of GDP 1.5% 2.7% 7.0% 5.5% 3.9%
Trade 69.6 115.4 208.9H 474.3 1,154.9
Export 27.3 62.1 148.8 249.2 593.3
Import 42.3 53.3 132.1 225.1 561.2
iTrade as of GDP 23% 30% 40% 44% 73%
Source: same as Table 2-1
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However, it does not mean that China had no economic development problems. Apart 
from continuous economic growth over decades, there had been many accumulated 
problems, such as corruption (Root 1996; White 1996) and bad loans in the state 
banking system (Lardy 1998; Lin, Cai et al. 2003); increased unemployment and 
income insecurity (Khan and Riskin 2001); losses of state-owned companies (Lin, Cai 
et al. 2003); and mounting environmental pressures (Cannon 2000).12 In addition, the 
economic transition in China was very geographically uneven. The relative growth rate 
of GDP per capita in coastal China was about 10-20% higher than its western 
counterpart every year before 1991, and even 40% or higher after 1993. The central 
region also advanced around 10-20% more than the west every year before 1997 (Bao, 
Chang et al. 2002).
Figure 2-1: The relative growth rate of GDP by regions in 1978-97
GDP per ca p ita  grow th rate (W e s te r n = l)
Note: the growth rate is a relative measure with the western regions as 1.0 
Source: revised from Bao, Chang et al. (2002)
China fs rise in contrast to Russia's fa ll
Like China, Central and East Europe (CEE) and Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS, former members of Soviet Union) had practised a communist and socialist 
political and economic structure before they started transition reforms. In the past,
12 Policy assessments about the development problems in China had been also mentioned in every year 
state report by Director o f the Planning Committee of the State Cuncil to National People’s Congress.
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politically, the operations in these countries were dominated by communist parties; and 
economically, the functions were based on state-planning with a very limited market 
system. While China started to change in the late 1970s, Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union only began their reforms in the 1980s and implemented more dramatic agendas 
particularly after the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The political transition, 
including liberalization of political control, general democratic election, and free media, 
involve replacing the single-party polity with liberal democracy and civic society. The 
economic transition, composed of price mechanism, trade liberalization, privatization, 
and marketization, aimed to quickly turn a centrally planned economy into a 
functioning market economy (Pickles and Smith 1998; Sokol 2001).
It is easy to identify two different outcomes of transition economies. Although the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was still the only dominant party, the outcome of 
economic transformation in China was relatively better growth and rapid improvements 
in living standards (Figure 2-2). In sharp contrast to China, however, the CEE and CIS 
experienced a severe recession during the initial phase of the transition. Some of these 
countries, like Poland, fortunately had grown at a fairly rapid pace since 1993; while 
others, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Slovak Republic, which also had 
been affected by the initial economic downturn, have now fully recovered and regained 
the level of economic output they had at the beginning of transition. Worst situations 
were witnessed in other CIS countries. By 1999, Russia had only recovered 80% of its 
1990 GDP level while Georgia had only recovered 50% (Figure 2-2). Accompanying 
economic hardship were political instability, social polarization, ethnic and religious 
fragmentation, crime and corruption, income inequality and growing regional disparities, 
even the collapse of whole political system, as with the break-up of the Soviet Union 
(Pickles and Smith 1998; Sokol 2001; Fedorov 2002).







There are many reasons to explain why China could go a different way from other 
transition economies. First of all, China did not have to cope with large foreign debt. 
With a policy of limited foreign borrowing in the 1980s, the figure of foreign debts as a 
proportion of exports in China stood at only 87%, compared to an average of 308% for 
other low income countries and 160% for middle income countries. From this 
perspective, China was allowed to remain completely independent in policy formation. 
However, in Russia, monetary expansion alongside fiscal crisis went a comprehensive 
failure to control imports in the 1980s, resulting in deterioration in the foreign trade 
position and a rise in the gross external debt. Therefore, Russia was forced to lose its 
independence and become subject to IMF conditionality (Nolan 1995; Walder 1995b). 
Secondly, rich overseas Chinese from Hong Kong and Taiwan played an important role 
as foreign direct investors in developing export-oriented industries and transferring 
knowledge of management and technology (Nolan 1993; Zhang 1994; Fan 1995a). By 
contrast, Russian expatriates did not make any significant contributions to their 
country’s transition.
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Third, China and Russia began their reforms at different stages of development in many 
dimensions. At the beginning, the planning system in Russia was colossal compared to 
that in China. The number of commodities subject to the central government’s 
allocation in Russia was from none in the late 1920s, to around 1,600 in the early 1950s, 
and up to an enormous 60,000 by the late 1970s. However, the number in China in 1978 
was just slightly higher than the 1957 level (only about 500). It shows that reform of the 
planning system in Russia would inevitably be more complicated than the initial 
reforms in China (Qian 1999b).
In terms of employment structure by sector, China was a peasant society at the start of 
Deng’s reforms in the late 1970s whereas Russia was an overwhelmingly urban and 
industrial system at the beginning of Gorbachev’s reform in the mid of 1980s (Table 
2-4). The average income per capita in China prior to reform was much lower than that 
in Russia. Moreover, in terms of employment structure by organization, only 18% of 
China’s workers were in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 1978, while the share in 
Russia was effectively 99% in 1985 (Table 2-5). Such structural difference also meant 
that there was no reserve of labour outside of the SOE sectors in Russia that could 
provide the engine of growth for a new non-state sector. In addition, the growth of the 
non-state sector effectively required the decline of the state sector which dominated the 
economy (Woo 1999b). Therefore, reforms toward market-oriented adjustment in 
Russia required shrinkages of industrial output, layoffs of SOE workers and wage cuts. 
Such tasks were more difficult, compared to the reforms in China which involved 
transforming from an agricultural to an industrial by releasing large number of labour 
from the rural to the urban sector and raising income of the peasants (Nolan 1993; 
Sachs and Woo 1994; Woo 1999b).
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Table 2-4: Employment structure by sectors in China and Russia
Agriculture Industry Construction Transportation Commerce Others
China (1978) 71% 15% 2% 2% 3% 7%
Russia (1985) 14% 32% 10% 10% 8% 26%
Source: Sachs and Woo (1994)












China (1978) 18.6% 72% 5.1% 4.3% 0.0%
Russia (1985) 93.1% 6.0% — — 0.9%
Source: Woo ( 1999b)
Dual-track in China vis-a-vis shock-therapy in Russia
Beyond these initial structural differences between China and Russia, there are major 
differences between China and Russia in the transition process: the former practised 
‘gradual reform’, whereas the latter carried out ‘shock therapy’.13 Shock therapy, 
regarded as a rapid move toward a system of market economy combined with plural 
democracy, was advised for most CEE and CIS states by western institutions and 
consultants. The basic proposition behind shock therapy was that market socialism 
could not take effect without the following preconditions- private property rights had to 
be established, prices should be determined by market forces, these should be full 
integration into the world economy, and implementation of democratic political 
institutions. It means that: economically, the market transition had to replace planned 
system suddenly and completely rather than gradually; and politically, economic 
reforms ought to have been put in effect simultaneously with the establishment of a 
liberal multiple-party democracy (Nolan 1995; Pickles and Smith 1998).
13 It must be noted that shock theaphy vis-a-vis gradualism is not the only difference between Russia and 
China. The other crucial factor is the procedures of privatization and decentralization in relation to 
soft/hard budegt constaints to local governments (See Chapter Four, below).
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In Russia, the first contested elections took place in 1989. In February 1990 the 
Communist Party of Soviet Union formally ended its monopoly of power. On 1st 
January 1991, most prices were completely freed from government control. In 
November 1992, full current account convertibility was established for residents and the 
Rouble was allowed to float freely. Anew tariff structure was introduced in mid 1992 at 
just 5-15% for most products. By the end of 1994, it was estimated that 70% of state 
property had been transferred to private hands and 70% of workers were working in the 
private sectors. However, the results were a disaster. Apart from the decline of GDP, the 
export slumped to half from 1990 to 1994. Investment fell by 50% in just two years 
(from 1990 to 1992). The annual change rate of retail price was 98.4% in 1991 and then 
around 1,300% in 1992 and 1993. To sum up, these disasters together brought a 
collapse of living standards (Nolan 1995).
• Compared to the shock therapy in which reforms on all dimensions took place 
simultaneously in Russia, the path of ‘gradual reforms’ was followed in China. First, 
politically, with very limited democratization, all transitions were still entirely 
controlled by the CCP. Second, economically, transitions toward market system were 
pursued via a dual-track system with an unchanged plan-based track still operating in 
parallel with the deregulated market-based track, with the market track increasing in 
importance gradually over time.14
The strategies of dual-track reform can be shown in various formats, including sectoral 
reform, price deregulation, enterprise restructuring, trade promotion, foreign exchange
14 The concept of ‘dual-track’ post-Mao transition was applied to new development as well as the 
deregulation of old ones. For example, there are two parallel urbanization processes happening in 
Shenzhen since 1980: one as state-sponsored urbanization and the other as spontaneous urbanization 
(Wong, Shen et al. 2003).
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management; domestic currency issuance and land reforms (Nolan 1995; Sachs and 
Woo 1997a; Yeh and Wu 1999; Qian 1999a; Sachs, Woo et al. 2000; Lin, Cai et al. 2003; 
Yeh 2005). Take price reform as an example. Unlike Russia that freed most prices just 
on 1st January of 1991, China liberated prices gradually from a pure planned system to a 
mixture of planned and market-based and finally to a complete market function. Under 
the plan track, economic agents still set the quota and price of certain commodities as 
they did prior to 1978. Any production above this amount was free to be sold on the 
market at higher prices (Shirk 1992). In terms of the industrial goods market, the 
proportion of productions sold at plan prices fell from 100% in 1978 to 64% in 1985 
and 44.6% by 1990 (Table 2-6). Similar situations also happened with retail goods and 
agriculture products, taking about fifteen years of dual-track to transit from totally 
plan-based prices to complete market prices (Table 2-6) (Nolan 1995; Lau, Qian et al. 
1997).
Table 2-6: Dual-track pricing in industrial goods, retail sales
Items 1978 1985 1990 1996 2000
Industrial goods 
market*
at plan prices 
govemment-guild price 100%
64% 44.6% n.a. 9.5%
at market prices 0% 36% 55.4% n.a 90.5%
Agricultural
products*
at plan prices 94.4% 37% 25.0% 16.9% 9  7 0 /*
govemment-guild price 23.4% 4.1%
Z . /  / o
at market prices 5.6% 63% 51.6% 79.0% 97.3%
at plan prices 97.0% 47% 29.8% 6.3% 9  A O /Retail sales** govemment-guild price 17.2% 1.2%
Z .O  /o
at market prices 3% 53% 70% 92.5% 97.4%
Note: % of out value for * or sales for **;
Sources: Lau, Qian et al. (1997), Nolan (1995), and Lin, Cai et al.(2003); World Bank 
(2005a)
In addition, regarding enterprising restructuring, there was a dual-track of coexistence 
between state-owned enterprises and non-state non-agriculture sectors (Goldstein 1995; 
Opper 2001). In 1978, in terms of the ownership structure of industrial production, 
state-owned sectors contributed 78%. By 1992, this had fell to 48%, and the rest of 52%
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were shared by diversified types of ownerships, including collective ownership for 38%, 
the domestic private sector for 7% and foreign-owned companies for 4%, and others 
(like joint-venture) for 3% (Naughton 1994). In terms of non-farm employment, during 
the period from 1978 to 1994, jobs in the non-state sector increased from 48.9 million to 
204 million, while those in the state-sector also grew but only from 74.5 million to 112 
million, representing the growth rates of 400% and of 50% respectively. By the early 
1990s, 86% of growth was in the non state sector (Table 2-7).
Table 2-7: Dual-track change in non-farm employment (unit: million person)
1978 1985 1990 1994
State sector 74.5 89.9 103.5 112.1
Non-state sectors 48.9 107.9 152.5 204.9
Sources: Lau, Qian et al. (1997)
Even within the state sector, there was also a dual-track. Starting from 1980, while 
pre-existing employees maintained their permanent employment status, most of new 
hires in the state-sector were made under a more flexible market-style contract system 
(Lau, Qian et al. 1997). In 1994, of total 112 millions of employment in the state sector, 
28.5 millions (about 25%) were paid close to market wage rates, and some of them were 
even without state-provided housing (Lau, Qian et al. 1997). To sum up, in terms of 
ownership reform, China adopted a dual-track program to allow state and market 
sectors to evolve together, with increasing importance for the market sectors of 
activities and employment.
Experimentalism and policy diffusion o f  dual-track reforms
How should we understand the operations of post-Mao gradual reforms on the basis of 
this dual-track system? Broadly speaking, the so-called ‘experimentalist school’, which 
seems the dominant explanation of China’s transition, attributes its successes to the
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‘intentions’ of China leaders for evolutionary, experimental and incremental reform 
(Sachs and Woo 1997b). After Deng held office, China reengaged with the world 
economy on a basis of sequential trial-and-error involving experimentation in a few 
local areas or sectors. If these ‘beta’ experiments succeeded, such policies would be 
recommended and promoted to more areas and sectors, or even all provinces and 
sectors (Nolan and Ash 1995; World Bank 1997). This can be illustrated in the speech 
by Deng in 1987:
....In the beginning, two provinces [Sichuan and Anhui] took a lead [in the 
agricultural reform]. We worked out the principles and policies of reform on the 
basis of the experiences accumulated in these two provinces.... (Deng, 1987; cited 
from Nolan (1995))
In 1978, households in a village of Anhui province began to contract with the local 
government for delivering a fixed quota of grain in exchange for farming on a 
household basis. At that time, almost all of the production teams in Chinese rural areas 
still operated under the traditional collective farming system. The ‘decollectivization’ 
program was implemented in the dual-track way at the national scale. In 1980, only 
14.4% of production teams practiced decollectivization with the rest remaining on the 
old collectivized track. But three years later, decollectivization was implemented in 
most places (Table 2-8). Geographically, as early as 1980, Anhui had a majority 
production teams practicing decollectivization. Although the national average reached 
50% in 1981, there were still some provinces, such as Yunnan, Jilin, and Heilongjiang, 
far behind the national trend (Table 2-9).
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Table 2-8: Dual-track in decollectivization of production team
1980 | 1981 1 1982 1983*
Collectivization program 85.6% 50.0% | 21.8% 7.0%
Decollectivization program 14.4% 50.0% 78.2% 93%
Note*: data was up till August 1983 
Source: Chung (2000)
Table 2-9: Dual-track in decollectivization of production team in selected provinces
1979 1980 1981 1982
Anhui 10% 66.9% 84.6% 98.8%
Shandong "  2.4% 1 27.6% 55.9% 96.8%
Hebei** n.a. 1.0%* 65.0% 96.9%
Yunnan n.a. 22.7% 35.5% 91.7%
Jilin n.a. 1.0% 10.0% 30.0%
Heilongjiang n.a. n.a. 0.7%* 12.0%
Note*: the data for Hebei in 1980 was up till September, for Heilongjiang in 1981 was up till September. 
Note**: the data for Hubei refered to bao gan dao bu
Source: same as Table 2-8
The experimentalist approach was thus one of ‘policy diffusion’ from one pioneering 
region to others (Goodman 1997; Cao, Qian et al. 1999). This pattern of local 
experiment followed by diffusion to other regions can be found in many cases. For 
example, a practice of processing investment application in a one-stop service rather 
than making investors go to different governmental departments was pioneered in 
Dongguan city of Guangdong and then spread out to the rest of China (Zhang 1994). A 
type of cooperative joint venture for attracting FDI, a policy that allowed local 
governments to use existing properties as assets to establish joint operations with 
foreign investors, was also a creation of Guangdong province and later adopted by the 
central government in Beijing for other provinces (Zhang 1994). Another example is the 
privatization of small-and medium-sized SOEs in China in the mid-1990s that began in 
Yibin of Sichuan, Shunde of Guangdong, and so on. County officials had to take full 
responsibilities in coordinating all the related policies, such as changes in corporate 
governance, ownership structure, dealing with bad debts, and so on. But, based on their 
successful experience, the policy later was promoted to other regions by the centre in 
Beijing (Qian and Roland 1998; Cao, Qian et al. 1999; Woo 1999b).
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Interestingly, such diffusions of the so-called ‘successful’ experimentation were 
promoted not only by the central officials but also by policy agents at the local level 
(Eng 1999). In the late 1980s, the governor of Shaanxi province observed that the 
reason why Guangdong province achieved fast economic growth was because the 
markets in Guangdong were open to interregional trade. Consequently, in 1991, the 
Shaanxi provincial government released its control over 125 commodity prices and 
withdrew 12,289 tax offices. In the second half of 1991, the business tax collection of 
commerce dramatically increased by 20.1% over the same period of 1990. Later, other 
provinces established similar organizations to imitate Shannxi’s efforts, such as 
Jiangsu’s ‘market guidance and coordination council’, Guizhou’s ‘coordination team for 
market circulation reform’ (Montinola, Qian et al. 1995). From case studies in south 
Jiangxi, Murphy (2000) notes that returnees from relatively- developed regions to their 
hometowns used their coastal and urban experiences and resources to engage with the 
inner and rural local leaders in the ways of promoting better business environment and 
infrastructure. Their actions made these hometowns more conductive to business for 
local economic development than before. The dynamic roles played by returnee agents 
can be regarded both as one of information transfer and as one of entrepreneurship in 
rural localities where the local agents had been isolated from wider market and 
information linkages due to communist restriction from Mao to Deng. To sum up, the 
policy diffusions from pioneering regions to laggard ones can be understood as one of 
the key geographical consequences of the dual-track gradualist approach to reform.
Compromised politics beyond dual-track reform
However, the experimentalist interpretation fails to explain the negative impact of 
gradual reforms. For example, from the viewpoint of the experimentalist school, the
dual-track in enterprise restructuring resulted in a situation of improving productivity 
growth as well as sectoral allocation and production and investment without laying off 
employees (Sachs and Woo 1997b). Che (2000) argues that by providing both 
development of the remaining planned SOE sectors and that o f joining the emerging 
market in the non-state sectors, the dual track approach offered a relatively stable macro 
environment as compared with the collapsed Eastern European countries and Russia. 
This was called ‘reforms without losers’ (Lau, Qian et al. 1997). But in reality, 
state-owned companies continued to experience poor performance after reforms, at least 
relative to the non-state sectors. In the early 1990s, one third o f SOEs explicitly lost 
money, while another third made losses that were hidden by creative accounting. In the 
enterprise restructuring reform, the state-owned enterprises in general still had serious 
problems due to excessive investment in fixed assets with very low return rates (Sachs 
and Woo 1994; 1997b; Woo 1999a; Lin, Cai et al. 2003). The failure of the SOE reform 
can also be demonstrated using the disproportionate contributions to GDP relative to the 
allocation of loans. In 2002 SOEs created 65% of loans in China but only contributed 
25% of GDP and 17% of enterprises (Table 2-10). The experimentalist school seems 
unable to offer an explanation as to why the reformers would have ‘intentionally’ 
pursued such a questionable dual-track strategy of enterprise restructuring?
Table 2-10: Misallocation of capital in state-owned enterprise in 2002
% of Enterprises Contribution to GDP%
Share o f loans
%
State-own enterprise 17% 25% 65%
Quasi-private enterprises* 52% 45% 25%
. . . . . . . .  • I ' T n u i r . j n i ' i u . , " " !  i
Local small and middle-size 
private enterprises 31% 30% 15%i- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Note: * referring to foreign investment and large private enterprises 
Source: Mckinsey Quaterly, 2004 Special Edition China Today15
15 News website: http://www.mckinsevauarterlv.com/article page.aspx?ar=1483&L2=7&L3=8. 
downloaded on 2005/11/10.
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Therefore, it is better for us to look back at the political context during the post-Mao 
China period to understand the circumstances that promoted the dual-track gradualist 
approach to reform. One background was the factional politics of post-Mao China. 
There were at least two distinct attitudes to policies for transition: for market-oriented 
reformers and conservative-oriented reformers. 16 The first group consisted of people 
such as HU Yaobang, the PM of China 1977-1987, and ZHAO Ziyang, the PM between 
1987- 1989. The market-oriented approach of material incentives and promoting 
household responsibility was to replace the production-team cooperation system. 
Moreover, they were also more inclined to private sectors and decentralization to local 
governments. Such market-oriented economic programs were also favoured by 
intellectuals at the time (Table 2-11) (Lichtenstein 1991; Breslin 1996; Woo 1999a).
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■ Central planning with limited 
market activities, like birdcage 
economy
■ Market socialism, complete 
decentralization
chief instrument to 
motivate work effort






■ The medium is efficient 
compromise with ideology of 
egalitarianism
■ Household farming,
■ Small is beautiful
urban industrial 
sectors
■ Complete state ownership with 
central planning dictating all 
enterprise operations
■ Complete state ownership with 




■ Reserve industries for urban 
areas
■ Rural enterprises are acceptable 
if collectively owned and 
self-financed
service sector policy ■ Small private business are 
acceptable and central planning 
fro SOEs
■ Small private sector is 
acceptable and operational 
autonomy for SOEs
Source: from Woo (1999a)
16 Woo (1999a) argues that there is the third faction who insisted on a Maoist economic program. 
However, compared to the conversative-based and market-oriented programs, the Maoist program can be 
regarded as a very minor faction.
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On the other hand, CHEN Yun who represented a key supporter for the conservative- 
oriented economic reformers was the most important politician in charge of economic 
readjustment in the early 1960’s and again in the late 1970’s. By addressing the 
importance of a planned economy under the control of the centre, Chen argued that the 
aim of reform was to restore the ‘correct policies’, namely, to balance the economy and 
re-institutionalize the Leninist central bureaucratic command system. His concept can 
be clearly understood in terms of his famous theory of the ‘bird cage’:
‘We cannot hold the bird too tightly. If we do so, the bird will be suffocated. 
Therefore, we must allow it to fly, but only allow it to fly within a cage. If there 
were no cage, it would fly away. If we can say that the bird is the revitalization of 
the economy, then the cage is the state plan. Of course, the size of this ‘cage’ must 
be proper. This ‘cag s' per se must continuously be adjusted.*17
Hu and Zhao entered the office of chairman of CCP and PM of the State Council, while 
Chen was only the vice Prime Minister responsible for economic affairs in the early 
1980’s. However, no one can neglect the importance of Chen, particularly his associates, 
LI Xiannian and YAQ Yilin. Yao dominated the state planning commission while Li 
controlled the CCP propaganda apparatus (Fewsmith 2000; Saich 2004). Moreover, 
many party cadres in the state bureaucracy as well as the army were also supporters of 
Chen’s conservative-oriented economic programs (Woo 1999a).
Apart from the factional politics, the other important background was the consensus- 
based decision making process (Shirk 1993). After the political disasters of the 1960s 
and 1970s, the governing system was based on collective decision-making institutions 
in order to replace the over-concentration of power and the charismatic and patriarchal 
rule which characterized Mao’s China. Although Deng was well-recognized as the
17 News source: Eighty Years in the History of the Chinese Communist Party- 1982. 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5580/5581/20010612/487205.html.
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paramount leader who supported market-oriented programs, the highest decision­
making institutions, namely, the Politburo of CCP, still made decisions by consensus not 
by majority rule for many reasons. First, Deng and the market-oriented leaders were 
forced to unite with the conservative members of the rehabilitated faction in order to 
sack Hua Guofeng, the successor personally chosen by Mao. Second, Deng and 
market-minded reformers also needed to comfort factions in the army who saw 
themselves as the defenders of Mao’s legacy of nationalistic self-reliance in economic 
matters and state control of industries. Moreover, Deng himself would like to create a 
counterweight to the market-oriented leaders if necessary (Woo 1999a). Taken together, 
the reason why the gradualist approach of reforms on a basis of dual-track system took 
place at the beginning of the reform indeed was partly because of compromises of 
politics beyond the transition period in the 1980s.
2-2 Political Economy of Open Door Policy- a Spatial Perspective
Policy of international trade and investment: from a ban to liberalization
One of the most significant domains of policy innovation in post-Mao China with a 
geographic dimension has been that of industrial development zones. These have been a 
key element in the package of ‘open-door’ policies, referring to a process of 
liberalization in international trade and foreign investment since 1978, by which China 
is able to successfully play an important role in economic and political geography not 
only in Asia but also in the world.
Prior to 1978, China was effectively a closed economy. In the 1950s and 1960s, most of 
China’s trade and foreign investment flows were with the former Soviet Union, due to 
the barriers of the Cold War. After the break-down of Sino-Soviet relations in 1960s,
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China underwent a self-development policy and, therefore, was largely isolated from 
the world economy until 1978. Trade in Mao’s time just functioned as a balancing item 
for domestic supply gaps in key industrial sectors. Most of its exports were primary 
products, seen simply as a means to generate foreign exchange to finance necessary 
imports. Before 1980, the difference between export and import was always within 0.5 
billion RMB (Table 2-12). There were only twelve state-owned foreign trade companies 
that controlled all trade activities (Howell 1993; Wei 2004; Xu 2004). The ban on FDI 
and trade with the west was formally lifted in the wake of the visit of American
President Nixon in 1972, but a number of severe restrictions on FDI remained in place,
1 8including a ban on external financing of FDI projects.







1950 0.6 0.6 0.0
1955 1.4 1.7 (-0.3)
1960 1.9 2.0 (- 0.1)
1965 2.2 2.0 0.2
1970 2.3 2.3 (- 0.1)
1975 7.3 7.5 (-0.2)
1980 18.1 20.0 (-1.9)
1985 27.3 42.3 (-14.9)
1990 62.1 53.3 8.7
1995 148.8 132.1 16.7
2000 249.2 225.1 24.1
2004 593.3 561.2 32.1
Note: Data before 1979 were obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and the data since 1980 have 
been obtained from the General Customs statistics
Source: compiled by 1949-1999 China Statistical Data Compilation, All China 
Marketing Research Co. Ltd and China Statistics Yearbook (2005)
During the post-Mao period, China engaged with globalization through the 
liberalization of FDI and trade. It started with the passage of the law of ‘joint-venture’ 
in 1979, marking the start of lawful involvement with foreign investors. Later, China 
lifted the restriction on foreign ownerships. In addition, there was a more relaxed 
attitude toward central control of FDI projects like intentionally or/and unintentionally
18 Prior to 1978 the level o f FDI was so negligible that there was no data shown in the statistical records.
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allowing local negotiation of taxation and financing offers. Along with FDI 
development, another important feature was trade growth. Trade policy reform began 
with a decentralization of foreign trade management and liberalization of state control 
over trading activities (Fukasaku and Lecomte 1996). Starting from 1983, provincial 
governments were allowed to deal with joint venture applications whose investment per 
project was less than US$ 3 million. The upper limit was raised to US$ 10 million in 
1985 and then to US$ 30 million for certain coastal provinces in 1988 (Zhang 1994). 
The number of foreign trade companies grew from just 12 in 1977 to 1,500 in 1986, and 
5,000 in 1995. Grant licensing was also decentralized, so that by 1988 more than 60% 
(166 items) of it could be made by contracts with provincial authorities (Zhang and Zou 
1994).
The so-called open-door policy can be divided into two stages with 1994 as a watershed 
(Fukasaku, Ma et al. 1999; Qian 1999b).19 Before then, the open door policy was small 
scale, decentralizing part of the competencies to the local level, while still keeping 
certain controls in the hands of the central government in Beijing. The initial target 
activities were exported-oriented labour-intensive firms. After 1994, however, the scale 
and scope of the open-door policy was expanded, including the tasks of restructuring 
the state-owned foreign trade companies, lowering more industrial tariffs, reducing 
greater non-tariff barriers, opening up agricultural and service markets, unifying the 
foreign exchange management (Table 2-13) (Fukasaku, Ma et al. 1999).
19 1994 as watershed is related to a report ‘Decision on Issues Concerning the Establishment of a 
Socialist Market Economic Structure’, which was adopted by the Third Plenum of the 14th Party Congress. 
The report remarked for the first time that China announced to accept a market rather than planned 
economy. The document made four major advances, including a more rule-based system, building 
market-supporting institutions, procting property rights and ownership (Qian 1999b).
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Table 2-13: Two stages in China’s open-door regime
Before 1994 After 1994
Foreign trade 
regime
■ To decentralize trade powers to local 
governments
■ To reduce the scope of trade planning
■ To abolish export subsidies
■ To lower industrial tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers
■ To further decentralize more trade 
powers to local governments
■ To abolish mandatory export plans
■ To further reduce industrial tariffs and 
non-tariffs barriers




■ To create the foreign-exchange 
retention system
■ To establish foreign-exchange 
adjustment centres
■ To devalue successively official 
exchange rates
■ To unify official and market exchange 
rates





■ To welcome foreign investment
■ To introduce laws, rules, and 
regulations
■ To establish fiscal and other incentives
■ To further improve the legal 
environment





■ As a window and a bridge
■ As economic laboratories
■ As a vehicle for export expansion
■ To generalize preferential policies to a 
nationwide level
■ To grant foreign enterprises national 
treatments following the experiment in 
Shenzhen
■ To give priorities to capital and 
technology-intensive industries
Source: Fukasaku and Lecomte (1996) and Fukasaku, Ma et al. (1999)
By 2003, China was attracting US$ 53.5 billion in terms of contract FDI, overtaking the 
United State as the top FDI inflow country in the world. Also by 2004, China generated 
US$ 1,155 billion of merchandise trade consisting of US$ 593.3 billion of export and 
US$ 561.2 billion of import. The amounts of export and import were ranked as top five 
in the world. Annual growth rates in these reached 34% and 40 % respectively, making 
China the fastest trade-generating country in the world.20 In terms of share in foreign 
capital of GDP, FDI rose from a negligible level in 1980 to 5.5% in 2000. Similarly, the 
share trade in GDP was sharply raised from 23.6% by 1985 to 73% by 2004 (Table 2-3 
above). The importance of FDI for Chinese development can also be seen from an 
international comparison of the share of FDI in gross fixed capital formation. In 
1993-1997, this amounted to 15% for China; as compared with 6% in the United States 
(Huang 2001b). Internationally there started to be concerns that China’s dramatic
20 Website source: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2004_e/its04_overview_e.pdf.
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development was crowding out other developing countries in bidding for FDI. Trade 
conflicts between China and other countries occurred in WTO meetings more 
frequently than before. All these facts signalled a clear message about the success of the 
Chinese policy of FDI and trade liberalization during the post-Mao transition period.
Political economy of special economic zones
The idea of development zones was one of the key elements in the programmes of FDI 
and trade liberalization (Table 2-13 above) (Park 1997; Fukasaku, Ma et al. 1999). In 
China, the concept of a development zone covers all types of spatially restricted areas 
with preferential deregulation policies targeting foreign investments. Such spatially- 
bounded deregulation policies included tax breaks for export industries, lower tariffs on 
imports, duty free to imports aiming at producing exports, favourable terms for loans 
and credits and subsidies, higher foreign exchange retention rates, faster financial and 
legal approval, and employment policy in accordance with the employers’ performance 
(Phillips and Yeh 1989; Wu 1999; Chung 1999a; Demurger, Sachs et al. 2001). The 
inspiration behind the idea of development zones was the export processing zones in 
countries elsewhere in East and Southeast Asia that had launched their dynamic 
export-led industrialization by offering preferential policies exclusively for foreign 
investors without significantly opening-up their domestic markets.
However, the policy of development zones in relation to FDI attraction and trade 
generation was very controversial at the start. Two factions can be identified within the 
central government in Beijing, with different outlooks on open-door economic 
programs. On the one side, market-oriented reformers advocated greater openness and 
sought a quicker pace and a greater regional and institutional extent of opening up, as 
well as a diversity of forms, and a wider range of partners (Howell 1993). These
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market-oriented reformers argued that development zones favouring foreign investment 
and trade could help China in many dimensions: to attract foreign capital, to resolve a 
problem of shortage of domestic capital, to bring in new technology and management 
know-how, and to participate in the international division of labour in relation to the 
improvement of economic efficiency (Table 2-14) (Howell 1993; Zhang and Thobum 
1995).
Table 2-14: Policy clusters involving more vis-a-vis less opening-up
Lesser Opening Greater Opening
Recentralization of:
(1) right to approve foreign trade, foreign 
investment, foreign borrowing contracts
(2) rights to retain and use own foreign exchange 
earnings
(3) rights to engage in imports and exports
Decentralization of:
(1) right to approve foreign trade, foreign 
investment, foreign borrowing contracts
(2) rights to retain and use own foreign 
exchange earnings
(3) rights to engage in imports and exports
Restrictions o f (1)- (3) to limited areas Extension of (1)- (3) to areas over and above 
experimental sites
Decrease concessions offered to already open 
areas
Increase concessions to already open areas
Limited on countries to which China will open 
up
Expansion of external economic relations to 
more regions and countries
Delays in establishing Open Policy Institutionalization of Open Policy, namely, 
introduction of new laws and regulations at 
national and provincial levels in line with 
international practices
Delay in going ahead with new ideas Innovation in the forms o f Open Policy, such as, 
SEZs, land leasing and industrial parks
Imposition o f restrictions on imports Easing up restrictions on imports, especially 
materials used in export processing
Restrictions on tax and sales incentives to foreign 
investors like domestic sales
Tax and Sales incentives to foreign investors, like 
domestic sales
Projects cancellations and delays New contracts and projects
Source: Howell (1993)
On the other side, more conservative-minded reformers were against such great opening 
up. The policies they proposed involved less openness with a slower pace, narrow 
extent, restricted forms and fewer external partners (Howell 1993). From this 
perspective, they addressed the potential negative consequences of foreign investment 
and trade. They criticized that particular foreign tax concessions in specific areas were
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like the extraterritoriality of foreign power, or like ‘countries within the country (gou 
zhong zhi gou)\ And the policy that allowed wholly foreign owned subsidiaries to 
repatriate profits earned in China was seen as a regression back to imperialist 
exploitation. Moreover, for these conservatives, development zones were a route 
through which capitalism and western culture could bring ‘spiritual pollution’ and 
‘bourgeois liberalism’ into China (Table 2-14 above) (Crane 1990; Howell 1993). As 
argued earlier, the gradualness of post-Mao reforms was actually a response to political 
circumstances in Beijing so that the market-oriented reformers tried to take cautious 
steps by promoting the geographically-specific dual-track strategy, namely, 
development zones (Wang and Bradburg 1986; Sachs and Woo 1997b; Woo 1999a).
One more point is worth noting. Such factional politics between market- and 
conservative-oriented reformers created a spiral path for the open policy. In the period 
of cyclical upswings, like December 1978, early 1982, January 1984, mid 1986, 
October 1987, and mid 1990, social and political forces with an interest in more 
opening-up cooperated to push the policy forwards. However, the opening up brought 
economic disorder as a consequence. And then in the period of downswings, such as 
early 1981, autumn 1983, mid 1985, early 1987, June 1989, social and political forces 
with an interest in curbing the Open Policy launched ideological campaigning and 
demanded a weakening of opening up policies (Howell 1993). This overall trend was 
clearly upward, however.
A pioneer: four special economic zones
In the context of struggles between market- and conservative- reforms in the centre, it 
was unlikely that the market-oriented reformers could introduce the open door policy 
across China as a whole at the beginning. The designation of development zones in
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coastal regions thus became a necessary political compromise. The choice of locations 
for pioneering development zones reflected not only an economic calculation of how 
best to attract FDI, but also involved an ideological change in regional policy together 
with the power struggle within the central government in Beijing.
First, there was a change of regional policy after 1978. During the Mao period, national 
investments were concentrated in the interior regions of China, particularly in the 
so-called ‘the Third Front (san xiari) Region’, partly because of the ideology of the 
‘egalitarian principle’ and partly because of military considerations (Naughton 1988; 
Yang 1990; Ma and Wei 1997).21 Mao tried to reduce the gap between interior and 
coastal regions, as well as to build self-sufficiency in the inner regions in case of wars 
from either Russia or the Pacific. However, Deng’s famous instruction in the late 1970s 
was ‘Let some people get rich first’. The instruction was based on the 
then-controversial ‘ladder-step doctrine (ti du li lun)\ which regarded regions as like 
steps on a ladder. Coastal regions were on a higher step of the development ladder due 
to their locational advantages for the conduct of more liberal FDI and trade policies. 
Inland regions were geographically more remote with limited accessibility to outside 
markets. Hence, coastal regions, which face Pacific Ocean with 60% of China 
population, were much better than interior regions in attracting FDI (Fan 1995b). In 
other words, the ladder-step doctrine shows that since the reforms, regional policy had 
changed with economic pragmatism overriding egalitarian ideology and military 
concerns (Fan 1995b; Ma and Wei 1997). Moreover, most of target investors (from 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and overseas Chinese) were ethnic Chinese whose
21 To prepare for war, China was divided into three strategic fronts: The first front refered to the coastal 
and border areas that would be the first to be attacked in the war. The third front included the vast interior 
regions south of the Great Wall and west of the Beijing-Guangzhou railway, which were considered to be 
safe from bombing attacks from the Pacific Ocean. And the second front covered regions between the 
first and third fronts.
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ancestral families had roots in Guangdong, Fujian or other coastal Chinese areas (Zhang 
1994; Fan 1995a).
Politically, it was rumoured that the selection of the Guangdong province in particular 
was based on the personal relationship between the Guangdongese veteran YE Jianying 
and Deng Xiaoping with Deng rewarding Ye for his critical political support in the late 
1970s (Gao 1999).22 And CHEN Yun, a Shanghai native and the key leaver of the 
conservative, insisted that Shanghai should remain a model of socialist development 
(Saich 2004).23 There were also considerations of political stability, in that the central 
government did not want to risk a dramatic change in Shanghai because it was still the 
main industrial base and the cash-cow for the whole China (Sun 2000). Between 1949 
and 1983, as much as 87% of Shanghai’s revenue of RMB 350 billion was remitted to 
the centre, accounting for one-sixth of the national coffers (Wu 2000).
Taken these reasons together, in 1980 four special economic zones (SEZs) were selected 
to pioneer the development zone model, in Shenzhen (adjacent to Hong Kong), Zhuhai 
(adjacent to Macao), Shantou, and Xiamen (close to Taiwan). The first three were 
located in the Guangdong province and the fourth in the Fujian province. It shows that 
there was a dual-track liberalization of FDI and trade: the set of SEZs in Guangdong 
and Fujian was on a liberalization track while the rest of China was still on a socialist 
planning track (Park 1997; Wu 1999). And the selection process for SEZ locations was 
responding not only to economic circumstances but also to political factors.
22 YE Jianying, the native Cantonese and one of the ten supreme commanders in the CCP Long March in 
the 1930’s, was the pivotal person to arrest the Gang of Four. He also recommended Deng to be 
vice-premier of the government, vice-chairman of the CPC Military Affairs Commission, and chief of 
staff of the People’s Liberation Army in 1978. Without Ye’s support, Deng might have found it very 
difficult to regain these posts (Gao 1999).
23 CHEN Kuo Dong, then party secretary of Shanghai as well as a protegd of CHEN Yuan, also told HU 
Yaobang in 1984, the then PM of China, that ‘Shanghai was unwilling to be the pioneer of the world 
(Shanghai bu wei ten xia xiany (Gao 1999).
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SEZs successfully created job opportunities and attracted labour- intensive foreign 
investment projects (Wang and Bradburg 1986; Phillips and Yeh 1989; Park 1997; Wu 
1999). By 1994, foreign-related investment grew 900% in Shenzhen alongside an 
expansion of 700% of exports (Table 2-15). In 1994, Shenzhen with just 0.35% of 
China’s territory and 0.8% of its total population of China contributed around 15% of 
national exports, and attracted about 20% of national realized FDI over the past nine 
years (Yang 1997).
Table 2-15: Performance of FDI and trade liberalization in Shenzhen
1980* 1984* 1989*
Projects of foreign investment 142 555 620
Realized foreign investment ** 26.6 226.2 434.1
Export ** 11.2 196.9 4,338.5
Total Industrial Output *** 242.8 1437.4 10,028.9
Note*: the statistics includes only Shenzhen downtown city without county-level administration within 
Shenzhen;
Note ** and ***: unit for FDI and export as US$ million; and for export as million RMB 
Source: 1980-1989 Yearbook for China Special Economic Zones
Despite relatively good performance in the four SEZs, the balance of power still 
oscillated between market-oriented reformers and conservative-oriented reformers, 
resulting in cyclical fluctuations in the political fortunes of the SEZs (Crane 1990; 
Howell 1993; Gallagher 2002; Zhu 2005). Criticism was muted due to uncertainty about 
zone objectives and strategy at the beginning of 1979. By 1982, skepticism on 
ideological grounds grew. One of the disputes was related to economic irregularities and 
social disorders in the special economic zones, particularly in Guangdong. Related to 
that was the question whether the policy innovations occurring in the special economic 
zones were appropriate or not. The conservative reformers in Beijing even proposed to 
apply a brake on the special zone policy, which would have been a blow to the 
reformers both of the central government in Beijing and the local government in
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Guangdong (Crane 1990). In early 1984, criticism ceased after DENG Xiaoping paid a 
visit to Shenzhen and Zhuhai to encourage the development of four SEZs. However, 
complaints were brought to the fore again in 1985 with critics alleging that Shenzhen 
was earning more money from illegal domestic sales than from sales abroad, resulting 
LIANG Xiang finally leaving office in Shenzhen.24 The tone of retrenchment was 
weakened in 1986, but in 1987 an anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign was launched 
to attack open door reforms again (Crane 1990).25
2-3 Formation and Transformation of Development Zones
Proliferation of development zones across China
Although the policy process looked like an oscillation, the trend in ‘open door* policy in 
general and development zone policy in particular was making it more active, 
aggressive, more diversified and larger scale (Gallagher 2002). Nationally speaking, 
many development zones were established by different levels of administrations, from 
the central government in Beijing, to various provincial governments, prefecture-level 
governments, and county-level or even lower governments. Particularly thanks to 
Deng’s Southern Tour inspiring ‘bolder actions’ in early 1992, the number of 
development zones in China as a whole reached 1,951 by the end of the same year, 
while there had been only 117 one year before (Yeh and Wu 1999). According to 1993 
Land Administration Bureau Statistics, of the 2,800 zones in China, only 27% were 
listed as national or provincial level zones, meaning that about three-quarters of the 
development zones were projects undertaken by governments below the provincial
24 Liang was the first mayor of Shenzhen and the key architect to ‘dynamically’ build up Shenzhen SEZ. 
He was replaced by the State Council with the more cautious Li Hao, a member of the State Economic 
Commission (Crane 1990).
25 Anti-bouregeois liberalization coampaign tried to tighten central control over investment expenditure. 
Then PM LI Peng also warned of project cancellations (Howell 1993).
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levels (Cartier 2001a). Although some zones unapproved by the central government 
were forced to close during the austerity program in 1993 and 1994, more additional 
zones were restored or created by sub-national governments in the late 1990s and the 
early 21st century. The nationwide survey done by the central government in Beijing in 
mid 2003 shows that there were more than 5,000 zones in total, and 67.4% of them 
were developed by sub-provincial officials without any permission from any 
upper-level governments (Table 2-16).26
Table 2-16: Numbers of development zones in 2002 by province
Eastern Provinces Central provinces Western provinces
Beijing 470 Anhui 194 Chongqing 176
Fujian 269 Heilongjiang 100 Gansu 93
Guangdong 420 Henan 179 Guizhou 41
Hainan 92 Hubei 114 Ningxia 36
Hebei 63 Hunan 69 Sichuan 137
Jiangsu '475 Jiangxi 137 Qinghai 5
Liaoning 113 Jilin 73 Shaanxi 77




Zhejiang 758 Guangxi 77
Tianjin 143 Yunnan 81
Subtotal 3,903 Subtotal 999 Subtotal 762
Source: Decision Information for Leaders (ling dao ju e  ce xin xi) 2004/April, No. 15
These various zones, which enjoyed different scales of preferential policies 
(Demurger, Sachs et al. 2001; Zhang 2003), in general played an important role in 
attracting FDI and generating trade, transforming China’s cities and regions toward 
globalization and modernization. From four cases of High and New Technical Industrial 
Zones in Shenzhen, Shanghai, Xian, and Suzhou, Walcott (2002) argues that such 
technological- oriented development zones dominated by multinational corporations 
had become growth engines for the regions concerned leapfrogging them, in terms of 
contributions of exports, technology and management transfers, and the creations of
26 News source: Decision Information for Leaders (ling dao jue cexin xi), 2004/April (No. 15).
new jobs into the 21st century. Wei and Leung (2005) argue that development zones had 
shaped Shanghai as one of the most attractive places for foreign investment, making 
Shanghai an emerging global city, significant not only for China but also for the world. 
In many ^ aspects, development zones had clearly proved a successful and innovative 
strategy to transform Chinese regions and localities as they re-engaged globalization. 
However, serious competition among development zones in bidding for FDI caused 
many problems, for example, un-sustainable infrastructure financing in relation to the 
soft-budget constraints of local governments (Braunstein and Epstein 2002) and 
unexpected loss of arable lands to construction site and real estate speculation (Cartier 
2001b).27 Territorial competition among zones in bidding for FDI principally through 
preferential tax rebates has been already reported as ‘war between SEZs’ in the 1990s.28
Expansion o f  the policy fo r  national development zones
Of these zones, some were granted national titles of various kinds. From the mid 1980s, 
the central government in Beijing established many categories of development zones. In 
1984, it declared 14 places ‘coastal open cities’, giving them preferential policies 
granted earlier only to the special economic zones. In 1988, the central government 
further set up the first national zone focusing on high-tech industry in Zhongguancun of 
Beijing (Wang, Wu et al. 1998; Wang 2004). In the early 1990s, despite the political 
debate over whether or not special zones had to be cancelled (te qu bu te) (Yang 1997), 
preferential policies were extended to some inland regions. There were various types of 
national development zones, including economic and technological development zones 
(ETDZ), border economic cooperation zones (BECZ), high and new technology
27 The planned areas of all development zones by 2003 had expanded to 36,000 km2, more than the total 
amount of built-up areas of all cities in China.
28 For example, while central policy provided for a 3-year tax-free period, followed by 2 years at half 
rates, local governments might offer these terms for two 5-year periods, or even for two 10-year periods. 
News source: zhong kuo shi bao (based in Taipei), 2005/12/12; 2001/12/13.
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industrial development zones (HNTIDZ), tourist vacation zones (TVZs), bonded areas 
(BA), and Taiwanese investment Zone (TIZ), and Export Processing Zone (EPZ). By 
2002, there were 156 national zones plus 384 EPZs (Table 2-17).
Table 2-17: National development zones in China in 2002
Sub-total
Special Economic Zone 5
Economic and Technological 
Development Zone (ETDZ)* 54
High and New Technological 
Industrial Development Zone 53
Bonded Area 15
Border Economic Cooperation Zones 14
Tourist Vacation Zones 11
Taiwanese Investment Zone 4
Export Processing Zone (EPZ) 38**
Total 156**
Note*: ETDZ also include Shanghai Pudong New District, Shanghai Lujiazui Financial and Trade 
Distract, Suzhou Industrial Park, Ningbao Daxie Economic and Technological Development Zone, and 
Hainan Yangpu Economic Development Zone. These five were categorized as ETDZ but enjoyed more 
preferential policies than others.
Note**: export processing zones (EPZ) were required to be set up in existing national development zones. 
And the economic performances in EPZs were also reported in to the records o f the existing zones. 
Therefore, the total number of national zones omits the number o f EPZ
Source: modified from Zhang (2003)
In terms of the timeline of the establishment of these various national zones, in the 
1980s, 24 national development zones were established: 5 SEZs, and 14 ETDZs, 1 
HNTIDZ, and 3 TIZs. A more dramatic pace of development occurred in the 1990s, 
particularly after Deng’s southern tour in 1992. Central and local officials made bolder 
actions to promote economic development. In the 1990s, 116 national zones were set up, 
including 23 ETDZs, 52 HNTIDZs, 15 BAs, 14 BECZs, 11 TVZs, an 1 TIZs. Between 
2000 and 2002, a further 16 ETDZs and 38 EPZs had come into in operation (Table 
2-18).
29 Apart from these zones identified, there were also some policies to offer certain preferential policies 
to foreign investors, such as coastal open cities, coastal open areas, and open coastal belt in the 1980s, 
and capital cities o f inland provinces and autonomous regions (Demurger, Sachs et al. 2001). However, 
the operations o f these policies in effect were still based on the established development zones.
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Table 2-18: Timeline of establishment of national development zones until 2002
Sub-
Total






2002 East Central West
Special Economic Zone 5 5 0 0 5 0 0
Economic and Technological 
Development Zone (ETDZ) 54 15 23 16 33 10 11
High and New Technological 
Industrial Development Zone 53 1 52 0 29 14 10
Bonded Area 15 0 15 0 15 0 0
Border Economic Cooperation 
Zones 14 0 14 0 0 0 14
Tourist Vacation Zones 11 0 11 0 10 0 1
Taiwanese Investment Zone 4 3 1 0 4 0 0
total 156 24 116 16 96 24 36
Export Processing Zone (EPZ) 38 0 0 38 28 4 6
Note and source: same as Table 2-17
Within the general geographic unevenness of economic development in post-Mao China, 
the distribution of development zone was especially uneven. Compared with 96 zones 
(60% of the total) located in the east, there were only 24 zones in the middle of China 
and 36 zones in the west (Table 2-18). Such uneven distribution plus more liberalization 
and preferential treatments toward the east, locational advantages of the east in favour 
for export-oriented activities together explain why the 90% of FDI was located within 
coastal China (Table 2-19).




1983 92.9% 7.1% 1.1% 6.0%
1985 89.6% 10.4% 5.2% 5.2%
1990 93.2% 6.8% 4.0% 2.8%
1995 87.7% 12.3% 9.2% 3.1%
1999 87.8% 12.2% 9.2% 2.7%
Source: China Statistics Yearbook various years, author compiled
Evolution o f  ETDZ: locally initiated and centrally initiated
ETDZ and HNTIDZ were the two most common development zones. Of 53 HNTIDZ, 
the first was established in 1988, another 26 in 1991, a further 25 in 1992, and the final
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one in 1997. In terms of functionality, these were quite homogeneously focused on the 
so-called high-tech industry (Wang, Wu et al. 1998; Wang 2004). The span of 
establishment of the 54 ETDZ was more lengthy, with zones started in 1984, 1985, 
1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 2000, 2001, and 2002. And their 
functionality was more diverse, including labour-intensive export-oriented as well as 
high-technology industry. Moreover, in terms of GDP growth rate, while the national 
average was just 9.1% in 2003, the 54 ETDZ grew by 34.5%. Similarly, ETDZ also 
achieved a better growth rate in total industrial output than the national average, as well 
as in fiscal revenue, contracted and realized FDI, and especially for foreign trade (Table
2-20).






Total Industrial output 27.2% 38.40%




Contracted FDI 39.03% 27.31%
Realized FDI 1.44% 35.92%
Source: the same as Table 2-16
The process through which zones acquired national-level status is even more interesting 
than the fact that they were unevenly distributed. Among ETDZ, there were actually 
two distinct ways of becoming national-level zones. The first type involved zones 
directly decided on by the central government before any significant construction or 
business promotion in the zones occurred. But in the second type zones were first 
developed by the local governments, without permission of the central government, 
with national zone status only being granted some years later. In this case, there is a gap 
between built-year and listed-year in the record of zone development. The former case
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may be regarded as a type of ‘local implementation of centrally initiated projects’, 
whereas the latter may be understood as a type of ‘locally initiated projects’ (Pickvance 
1990).30
Overall, of the 54 ETDZs in China up to 2003, 29 zones belong to the first category, 
while the other 25 zones fall into the second category (Table 2-21). The balance 
between the types of locally initiated projects and local implementation of centrally 
initiated projects has been shifting over time. Most of the national zone projects in the 
1980s were from the category of ‘local implementation of centrally initiated projects’, 
as compared with half of these zones in the 1990s and only a small number after 2000. 
Indeed, there were only two national zones in the 1980s that were granted the category 
of locally initiated project. After 2000, however, this category dominated the whole 
national zone policies (Table 2-22). In terms of zone locations, all zones were located in 
the eastern regions during the 1980s. By contrast, between 2000 and 2002, only one 
locally initiated project was established in the eastern region with all other national 
zones in either central or western regions (Figure 2-3).
30 The distinction between ‘locally initiated policies’ and ‘local implementation of centrally initiated 
policy’ also reminds one of Pickvance’s theoretical framework (1990) on local policy variations by 
dividing into two kinds. The first concerns the scope for local authorities to determine their own policies, 
and the second is about the substance of central spatial policies and of local authority exploitation of 
areas of policy discretion.
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L** Name Granted year Establishedyear L**
Dalian 1984 E










Shanghai Hongqiao 1986 1982 E
Shanghai M inheng 1986 1983 E
Shanghai 1988 ECaohejing
Xiamen Haichang* 1989* E
Shanghai Qinqiao* 1990* E
Wenzhou 1992 E Fujian Fuching 1992 1987 ERongqiao
Weihai 1992 E Yinkou 1992 1988 E
Hainan Yangpu* 1993* E K unshan 1992 1985 E
Ninbao Daxie* 1993* E Shenyang 1993 1988 E
Nansha 1993 E H iaoshan 1993 1990 E
Huizhou 1993 E Chongqing 1993 1990 W
Dongshan 1993 E Chendu 1993 1990 W
Henzhou 1993 E H arbin 1993 1991 C
W uhu 1993 C W uhan 1993 1991 C




Xinning 2000 W K unm ing 2000 1992 w
Changsa 2000 1992 c
N anchang 2000 1992 c
Sbihezi 2000 1992 w
H uhehuote 2000 1992 c
Hefei 2000 1993 c
Zhangzhou 2000 1993 c
Xian 2000 1993 w
Kuiyang 2000 1993 w
Yinchuan 2001 W Nanning 2001 1992 w
Taiyuan 2001 1992 c
Lasa 2002 W Lanzhou 2002 1993 w
Nanjing 2002 1993 E
Note*: These five were categorized as ETDZ but enjoyed more preferential policies than others. 
Note**: L refers to the location o f the zone in the east (E), the central (C) or in the West (W) 
Source: Zhang (2003) and 2001 China Foreign Trade and Economic Development 
Yearbook
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Table 2-22: Numbers of centrally or locally initiated ETDZ project until 2002
local implementation 
of centrally initiated project Locally initiated projects Sub
total
total [Easter: Central: Western] total [Easter: Central: Western]
1980s 13ri3:0:01 2 [2:0:0] 15
1990s 13 [11:1:1] 10 [6:3:1] 23
00-02 3 [0:0:31 13 Tl:6:6] 16
Note: the numbers in the blanket refers to the locations of zones 
Source: author compiled
2-4 Decentralization, Policy Innovation and Local Economic Development 
Institutional innovation in transition economies
The key research interest of the thesis is the concept of ‘local policy innovation* with 
post-Mao China as its context. Compared to Russia and other post-communist 
economies implementing ‘shock therapy’ reforms, China’s gradual and incrementalist 
process has actually produced a more successful economic transition. Gradual reforms 
in China also can be understood as a dual-track system presenting a partial deregulation 
process, namely, a still planned track running in parallel with a market-oriented track 
with the market track increasing in importance over time. Moreover, the dual-track 
system was partly because of the experimental intentions of the leaders and partly 
because of a compromised politics between market-oriented and conservative-minded 
reforms. An incrementalist approach to policy innovation was more politically 
sustainable in the face of pressure from opposition forces (Wei 1997).
In addition, instead of changing all centrally planning systems in the nation as a whole 
suddenly, the incremental reforms in China were selective not only in the sectors from 
which they started but also geographically with a numbers of experimental locations 
(shi diari). From the viewpoint of these experimental locations, the reforms were 
completely novel and marked a sharp break with the past. However, from the
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perspective of China as a nation, the reforms were incremental in character because 
most places in China remained unchanged under the context of the dual-track policy. A 
good way of understanding the policy innovation process in post-Mao China is thus in 
terms of a ‘spatially selective* form of incrementalism, including incremental change 
concentrated in a geographical margin.
The policy of national development zones provides a good example to understand the 
issue of policy innovation. The idea of development zones was learnt from the many 
export processing zones in developing countries in the 1950s to the 1970s (Zhu 2005). 
By then, the paramount leader Deng was reported to have no problem acknowledging 
outstanding foreign experiences. The most famous cases which he mentioned publicly 
that China could learn from included Japan, the United States and Singapore (Naughton 
1993; Lee 2000; Gallagher 2002). There were particular intellectual impacts from the 
overseas Chinese diaspora- to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and elsewhere in South 
East Asia and North America- who have proved to be a valuable source of knowledge as 
well as of investment to be important bridges between China and the world (Walder 
1995b). For example, Taiwan’s experiences demonstrated the advantages of combining 
state planning with high-saving rates to achieve a successful structural transformation 
under a rule with limited democracy (Nolan 1993; World Bank 1997).
Scholars of latecomer or transition economies have argued that institutional and policy 
changes can be conceptualized as a search and learning process for new institutional 
structures of regulation (Nielsen, Jessop et al. 1995; Qian and Stiglitz 1996; Sachs, Woo 
et al. 2000). For example, learning from the experiences of others is one of the most 
popular processes in ‘latecomer economies'. The development of advanced countries 
involved a gradual evolutionary process from the simple pattern to the increasingly
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more complex and efficient ones by trying and leaming-by-doing from their own 
experiences. However, for the latecomer economies, development strategy could take 
advantages of mimicking these effective experiences from the developed countries that 
have already found efficient patterns (Sachs, Woo et al. 2000). With developing 
countries in Asia as case studies, Shimomura, Kohsaka et al. (1994) demonstrate that 
what Asian latecomer economies had done since the 1980s was to carefully overcome 
the uncertainty and risks of innovation by learning the effectiveness of an 
outward-oriented development strategy from the experiences of their predecessors, 
including Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.
In terms of transition economies, policy innovations suited for the new accumulation 
regime involve re-engagement with globalization, the embrace of market economy and 
even multiple-party elections. These transformations were different from the past of the 
socialist and centrally-planned systems prior to the 1980s and closer to that of their 
erstwhile adversaries: the western liberal democratic market economies. Scholars have 
shown that policy innovation in transition economies was actually involved an imitation 
or learning process from the experiences of these western countries. For example, with 
the case studies of reforms in Czech and Hungary, Jacoby points out that the European 
Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization actually acted as ‘institutional tutors’, 
implying that there was a hierarchical or one-way ‘learning and teaching’ relationship 
between knowledgeable westerners and pupils in Central and East Europe (Jacoby 
2001). Rivera (2004) uses Russia as example to show that a substantial number of 
transition elites were willing to borrow from foreign experience, particularly from 
models of western welfare capitalism, which was absolutely different from their past 
communist experience.
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To sum up, at the national scale, it is well acknowledged that policy innovation in China 
can be understood as both a learning process from the experiences of certain developing 
countries and an incrementalist process of improvement in geographically specific dual­
track reforms. However, what has not been properly documented is how and why policy 
innovations can be brought about at the local scale? Taking the process of developing 
national zones as an example, what kind of circumstances led local governments in 
post-Mao China to carry out locally initiated projects, or locally specific 
implementation of centrally initiated projects? How did policy innovations come into 
being and now were they put into effect in the formation and transformation of 
development zones?
Rephrasing research questions
The central question of the thesis is why, how, under what circumstances, and by whom 
the development zone policies as local innovations could take place and be 
institutionalized in the context of transition China- still controlled by a one-party 
politically centralized communist regime- in order to promote economic development. 
There are at least three different but inter-related dimensions of inquiries into the central 
question. To begin with, it is about the local responses to general political and economic 
restructuring. The main theoretical questions include: what are the changes and 
restructuring of macro political and economic background factors in terms of the regime 
of accumulation and the mode of regulation? What are the impacts of these changes on 
local economic development? Who are the key public agents dominating the process of 
local policy innovations associated with economic development? And why and how do 
they want to promote local economic development? And how do cities and regions act 
and interact under the context of territorial competition?
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Second, I further investigate the particular situation of local policy innovations in 
relation to changing local-central governmental structures. Still under one party control, 
did China, like most of other countries in the world, decentralize economically as well 
as politically? If not, what kind of special arrangement of political economy of 
decentralization took place in China? How did post-Mao China institutionalize certain 
economic as well as political incentives to encourage local agents to make policy 
innovations? What are consequences, including advantages and disadvantages, of such 
dynamic decentralizations?
Thirdly, with a lens of ‘local-central dynamic interaction’, questions are asked: how 
many kinds of local-central interactions associated with innovations can be identified? 
In each type, how do central and local policy agencies interact? Howe and under what 
kind of circumstances do these types operate and evolve? And what is the effectiveness 
of each mechanism? What are the commonalities as well as differences of these types of 
interactions?
Synopsis of the thesis
The aim of the thesis is to show how specific features of China’s dual-track approach to 
transition - including those leftover from Mao’s centralized China, have provided a 
particular stimulus to locally embedded innovations within governments and institutions. 
With development zones as a focus, the thesis offers an understanding of the various 
kinds of contexts through which different types of mechanism for local innovations can 
operate. Using the contextual approach as the main methodology, a qualitative-based 
case study design leads to a U-shaped structure for the thesis, moving from general 
issues to more specific ones, and then via the cases back to the broader concerns. I
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delineate research questions and general backgrounds as a start. By deepening at 
different but interrelated analytic dimensions on existing western and China studies, I 
am able to establish certain ideas to comprehend what are the likely factors (such as 
actors/ networks and so on) and how and under what circumstance these factors operate 
and evolve. Empirically, cases studies are qualitatively examined in order to make a 
concrete investigation into the multifarious contingent circumstances under which these 
factors perform, interact and influence each other, and what are the mechanisms and 
effectiveness of operations by these factors in the real cases (Sayer 1984).31 Finally, 
these empirical cases are followed by a return to the broad questions and discussion of 
certain empirical and theoretical implications as concluding remarks (Figure 2-3).
Figure 2-3: Structure of chapters of the thesis
■
Part I: Introduction
- on innovation and decision making 
(Chi) /rPart IV: Conclusion- empirical and theoretical implications (Ch9)- brief on post- Mao China situations 
and development zones (Ch 1&2)
- expanding research agendas (Ch9)
Part II: Theoretical Framework
- policy innovation as local responses 
to global restructuring (Ch3) i
I
Part III: Empirical Case Studies
- methodology and selections of case 
studies (Ch6)
- local policy innovation in connection 
with decentralization (Ch4)
- local policy innovation and dynamics 




- Kunshan - China Singapore 
Economic and Suzhou Industrial 
Technology Zone Park (Ch8)
(Ch7)
Source: author compiled
31 From my viewpoint, the importance of qualitative-based case-study approach followed by literature 
reviews is best explained by Sayer’s favourite example, a barrel o f gunpowder. By virtue of its contingent 
components, the barrel contains the necessary causal powers to produce an explosion. However, whether 
the explosion will take place depends on many contingent factors (like someone accidentally drops a 
match, or a soldier primes the pan of their musket, or simply being triggered by hot weather). It means 
that literature reviews can provide us with certain useful concepts o f key factors in the general contexts. 
However, these concepts still need to be examined and understood by real operations and mechanisms in 
specific contexts o f time and space (See Chapter Six, below).
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The thesis as a whole is therefore divided into four main parts. The first introductory 
part, including the previous and present chapters, has offered discussions to understand 
the most basic concepts of this thesis: innovation and decision making on the one hand 
and the history of development zones under the post-Mao China’s transition on the 
other hand.
The second part, Chapters Three to Five, offers a theoretical understanding to these 
three dimensions of research inquiry aforementioned. In Chapter Three, I explain the 
argument that policy innovation can be understood as a response to challenges by global 
economic restructuring. Particularly, I elucidate that there are two kinds of responses: at 
the macro level the response is that of the prevalence of territorial competition, while 
the response at the micro level is that of the operations of self-interest pro-growth 
coalitions. In Chapter Four, I turn to the argument that functional decentralization is the 
spur to local policy innovation in China as elsewhere. With a focus on the mechanisms 
of change in governmental structures, the local-central relationship in post-Mao China 
is described as ‘asymmetric decentralization’, namely, a combination of economic 
decentralization to local governments along with continuing political centralization 
under the party. Local policy innovation argued to be one of the key regional 
development consequences of ‘asymmetric decentralization’. Then, in Chapter Five, I 
examine the argument that local policy innovation is to be explained by the political 
dynamics of local-central interactions, with six types of local-central interactions being 
identified: ‘state- intention to tolerate’, ‘ex-post state endorsement’, ‘ex-ante state 
adoption’, ‘marginalizing the local’, ‘local obedience’, and ‘local flexibility’.
The third part, including Chapters Six to Eight, is designed for empirical examinations 
of the theoretical framework in connection with two successful cases in Jiangsu
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province within Yangtze Delta. The methodology and considerations for case selections 
are discussed in Chapter Six. Following that I present the examinations of two cases: 
the Kunshan Economic and Technological Development Zone (KETZ) in Chapter 
Seven and the China- Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (CSSIP) in Chapter Eight, 
using evidence drawn from ethnographic fieldwork in semi-structured interviews with 
local officials and investors, documentation collections, and statistical analyses. In the 
final concluding part, in Chapter Nine, the empirical findings are drawn together to 
address the central questions of the thesis, and some additional theoretical implications 
and further research agendas are outlined.
68
CHAPTER THREE
Policy Innovation as Local Responses to Global Restructuring
3-1 Entrepreneurial Localities and Entrepreneurial Governances 
A typology o f entrepreneurial localities
According to Schumpeter, the format of entrepreneurial production in relation to 
innovation can be categorized into five types, including new products, new technical 
methods of production, exploitation of new consumption markets, new sources of 
supply, and new forms of industrial organizations (Schumpeter 1934; Blaug 2000; 
Fagerberg 2004). Correspondingly, five types of entrepreneurial localities also can be 
theorized: new spaces of production, new methods or institutions for space of 
productions, new markets for space of consumptions, new financing sources for 
development, and new positions in the urban/ regional hierarchy (Table 3-1) (Harvey 
1989b; Jessop and Sum 2000; Wu 2003c).
Table 3-1: The comparison of entrepreneurship at the firm and locality levels
Schumpeter’s 
entrepreneurial firm ‘entrepreneurial locality’ examples
new products new spaces of production export processing zones; high-tech districts; military complexes
new technical methods of 
production
new methods or institutions 
for space of productions
introduction of marker system; skilled 
labours offered; internet facility; high 
speed customs services
new consumption markets new markets for space o f consumptions
gay areas; exotic places; entertainment 
spectacles; waterfront resorts
new sources of supply new financing sources for development
funds sponsored by outside, e.g. the 
centre or international organizations
new forms of industrial 
organizations
new positions in the urban 
and regional hierarchy
the capital o f Europe; regional 
financial centres in Asia or Europe
Source: revised from Harvey (1989b), Jessop and Sum (2000); and Wu (2003c)
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The first type refers to urban space for production, such as export processing zones, 
enterprise zones, technopoles and intelligent cities. In the case of Bristol in Britain or 
Boston in the United States, it is also about a military and defense complex that sustains 
a high-tech industry which contributes to local economic development. The second type 
describes installations of new physical and cybernetic infrastructures that employ are 
implied as new methods to exploit particular advantages of the space of production. As 
a form of social infrastructures, skill re-training programs as can be grouped into this 
category.
The third type details methods that enhance the quality of life, for example, new ways 
that create fresh spaces of consumption markets. It can refer to gentrification, cultural 
innovation, special consumer attractions (gay quarters, marinas, exotic restaurant and so 
on), new entertainment spectacle (sports stadium, post-modern architecture and alike), 
and festival and cultural events. The fourth type is about how to look for new sources of 
funds for development, from international organizations, different departments of 
central government and private sectors. Structural funds in the European Union and the 
public- private partnership regeneration programme in Britain are cases in point. The 
final type is related to a process of upgrading the status of a global city to become that 
of a gateway for different regions. Entrepreneurial cities reconfigure their status by 
serving as key control and command functions in global economy or international 
politics. For example, Hong Kong and Singapore have successfully built themselves 
into regional financial hubs in the Asia Pacific Area. Brussels upgraded itself from the 
national capital of Belgium to the continental capital of Europe, while Strasbourg also 
transformed itself from a small border town between France and Germany to the 
location of the European Parliament.
The set of categories for entrepreneurial localities offers a framework to understand the 
diversified cases o f local policy innovations in China. In terms of new spaces of 
production, various development zones were first created in Fujian and Guangdong 
provinces and then expanded nationwide in China. Concerning the category of new 
methods or institutions for spaces of production, the introduction of market systems to 
replace centrally controlled planning can be regarded as a case in point. As to creating 
new markets of space consumption, in Beijing, they built many sets of townhouses- a 
fashionable style of new up-market gated community for an ‘imagined’ globalization 
(Wu 2004). In Shanghai, with a slogan ‘yesterday meets tomorrow in Shanghai’s today’, 
Xintiandi also successfully transformed old traditional historical buildings into a unique 
complex of consumption and recreational spaces representing a cultural mixture 
between eastern and western lifestyles (Wu 2003b; He and Wu 2005).
In addition, in terms of new sources of funding supply, local development in Shanghai 
had successfully been financed by various channels of capital. Such channels included: 
budgetary revenue, land leasing, retained profits from public-owned industries, capitals 
from Shanghai stock market, state-directed credit allocation, and foreign direct 
investments (Zhang 2003). Concerning the process of redefining the hierarchy of the 
localities, ten provincial capitals and other five key cities were administratively granted 
‘vice- provincial status’ city in order to gain more legal, political and economic 
competencies to boost local development.32 Chongqing was further upgraded to the 
fourth provincial- level status directly under the centre in the late 1990s.
32 These vice-provincil-status (fit shengji cheng shi) cities were granted more economic autonomy and 
able to contact Beijing directly over certain economic activities, although they are still under the 
administration o f each province. Ten provincial capitals include: Shenyang, Changchun, Harbin, Nanjing, 
Hangzhou, Jinan, Wuhan, Guangzhou, Chendou, Xian. The other five are: Dalian, Qingdao, Ningbao, 
Xiamen, Shenzhen.
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The emergence of local/urban/regional entrepreneurial governance 
The phenomenon of entrepreneurial localities is mostly operated by local/ regional/ 
urban governances, whose operations and functionalities have been changed since the 
1970s. Traditionally, or at least until the 1960s, there had been two types of 
governmental functions- production and consumption, which generally ‘belonged’ to 
central and local governments respectively. Productive functions in connection with 
physical and social infrastructure for economic development used to be monopolized by 
central governments. On the other hand, consumption functions, including 
transportation, housing, recreation, cultural facilities, welfare payments and so on, were 
assigned to local governments. In other words, under the context of the so-called ‘dual 
politics’, while central governments focused on productive functions, local institutions 
tended to play responsive and redistributive roles in the provision of services for 
reproduction of the labour force (O'Connor 1973; Saunders 1986; Harvey 1989b; 
Harding 2005).33
Two significant changes since the 1970s can be noted. First, policy making is less 
dominated by the bureaucracy alone, but also involves self-organizing inter- 
organizational networks. The networks consisting of subsets of public and/or private 
groups and individuals are characterized as formal or informal public and private 
coalitions that work together to formulate and implement policies (Rhodes 1990; 1997). 
Instead of ‘governments’, authors such as Harvey uses the term ‘governance’ to cover 
such ‘public-private partnerships’ (Harvey 1989b). In terms of issues of
33 O’Connor (1973) theorizes the fiscal crisis taking place in the 1970s by dividing the public sector 
projects into three categories: social investment, social consumption and social expense. Harding, 
Saunders and Pickvance further argue that roughly speaking, the first one is related to the production 
function which was the main responsibility of national governments, and the latter two are associated 
with consumption functions that are in charge of by local governments (O’Connor 1973; Harding 2005).
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local/urban/regional economic development, various actors in the ‘policy networks’ and 
‘governance system’ roughly identified many empirical cases as follows: governmental 
officials, different arms of government, political parties, private firms of different size 
and in diverse sectors, unions and other labour organizations, non governmental 
organizations, religious institutions, the media, universities, cultural and sport facilities, 
self-employed professionals and so on (Logan and Molotch 1987; Harvey 1989b; 
Tickell and Peck 1996; Painter 2003). All these actors theoretically can operate and be 
linked across different spatial scales, depending on the specific contexts.
Second, along with the evolution from government to governance, there has been a 
challenge to the traditional division of labour between central and local governments 
since the 1970s in the context of much more intensive globalized competition, 
accelerated by the new international spatial division of labour. In advanced economies 
like America and West Europe, the shift accompanied domestic development crises, 
including de-industrialization, mounting unemployment, social disintegration, fiscal 
austerity, and allegedly declining power of the nation states. Therefore, local 
governances, even in quite different legal and political contexts, have taken a broadly 
similar direction beyond just offering social welfare and services to becoming 
increasingly preoccupied with active explorations of new ways to foster local 
employment and economic development. By doing so, localities sought to secure the 
most advantageous insertion into the changing international spatial division of labour in 
the world economy, such as to capture certain types of mobile capital and to fix local 
capital in place (Harvey 1989b; Mayer 1995; Porter 1995; Jessop and Sum 2000; 
Harding 2005).
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Different scholars have paid attention to such changes of local governances’ functions 
and roles. Harvey (1989b) introduces the concept of ‘managerialism’ and 
“ entrepreneurialism’ to analyze the changing roles of local governments. ‘Local 
managerial governances’ until the 1960s were mainly in charge of redistributive 
functions. However, since the 1970s, local governance have begun to actively engage 
economic activities, or the so-called phenomenon of ‘local entrepreneurial 
governances’. Discussions on the so-called ‘new regionalism’ propose that regions/ 
localities have become privileged geographical arenas for new forms of industrial 
expansion and political compromise under the globalized capitalism (Cooke and 
Morgan 1998; Scott 1998). Also with the concept of ‘new regionalism’, Keating (1997; 
1998) describes the shift from regional administration to regional governments as a 
doable process of re-composition of political spaces. On the one hand, regions become 
units increased horizontal integration in social, economic and political fields, and on the 
other hand regions become important actors in policy making, particularly in economic 
and cultural/identity affairs (Keating 1997; 1998). With case studies of regions in the 
US and Europe, Brenner (1999; 2002) argues that there is a process of rescaling and 
reterritorialisation of both socioeconomic and political-institutional spaces, enabling 
local/ regional agglomerations and territorial states to play an important role in the 
economic and political geography of globalizations- though there are questions as to 
how far and rapid this is actually taking place.
Scholars in China studies also emphasize that the local governments of post-Mao China 
have been heavily involved in local economic development. In a study of real estate and 
commercial government agencies in Tianjin, Duckett (1998) found a tendency for local 
governments to go into business with various agencies both to raise revenues and to 
provide employment opportunities. Such behaviours of direct involvement in business
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and profit-seeking by individual local state bureaus and their subordinate agencies can 
be regarded as representing a ‘local entrepreneurial state’ (Duckett 1998). Baum and 
Shevchenko (1999) distinguish this kind of state from the concept of a ‘development 
state’, arguing that the former may go into business independently or enter into 
partnership for profits, while the latter intervenes indirectly but innovatively in the 
economy, by helping domestic and foreign private investors to plan, finance, and 
coordinate local projects, providing better local infrastructures, and promoting 
co-operative economic relations with external agencies. From their perspective, the 
concept of ‘local development states’ refers to local governances able to create an 
environment conducive to growth while not themselves engaging in business for profits 
(Baum and Shevchenko 1999; Unger and Chan 1999).
Structure of the chapter
Despite different terminologies used in these researches on entrepreneurial localities 
and local entrepreneurial governances, these studies appear to highlight the recent 
phenomenon of local governments making policy innovations to promote local 
economic development, which is the theoretical focus of the thesis. Specifically, this 
chapter aims to investigate the relations between this phenomenon and change in global 
economic environments. The main argument of the chapter is that local policy 
innovations could take place and be institutionalized in order to respond to challenges 
presented by the changing macro development environments. Inspired by the 
Regulation School, the perspective of regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation 
is used to discuss the transformation of global economic structures since the 1970s. 
Two kinds of local responses to such global restructuring can be identified. First, at the 
macro level, I would illustrate the new operations of spatial organizations at different 
scales in general and the territorial competition between localities in particular. On top
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of that, at the micro level, I would attempt to explain the politics of local coalitions 
which make local policy innovation in order to pursue self-interests beyond local 
economic development.
Therefore, the rest of the chapter is organized by three main sections. First, a change in 
the regime of accumulation is a focus. New operations of spatial organizations at 
different scales during the transformation periods are discussed. In the second section, 
with the macro response as a focus, I would argue that competition between localities 
and regions become inevitable in order to strive for more chances and resources for 
better development under the context of global economic restructuring. Third, from the 
micro perspective of response, I would address that local entrepreneurial governances 
can be organized mainly by pro-growth coalitions between private business persons and 
public officials who are motivated to pursue their interests using the logic of collective 
action.
3-2 Global Restructuring: from Fordist/Socialist to Post-Fordist/ Post-Socialist
Regulation school: regimes of accumulation and modes of regulations 
According to the Regulation School, there are common social-political-economic 
characters of restructuring processes shared among different development contexts, 
including the role of social institutions in underpinning modes of economic 
development, as well as the historically and geographically specific nature of 
productions and reproductions. From this viewpoint, two dimensions for discussing 
these common characters can be identified: one is the ‘regime of accumulation’ and the 
other is the ‘mode of regulation’. The former refers to economic characteristics of 
capitalism during a particular historical period, namely, various identical types of
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coherent relationships between production, distribution and consumption in different 
time. The latter involves the dominant institutional and regulative forms of each period, 
including ensembles of state forms, social norms, conventions, customs, laws, political 
practices, and institutional networks. Formats in the mode of regulations aim to help 
normalize the process of corresponding regimes of accumulation (Table 3-2) (Tickell 
and Peck 1995; Goodwin and Painter 1996; Cho 1997; Swyngedouw 2003).
Table 3-2: Articulation between a regime of accumulation and a mode of regulation






















From Fordism to post-Fordism
Prior to the 1960s, western advanced economies were organized along the lines of the 
Keynesian-Fordism welfare state (Jessop 1994; Amin 1995; Tickell and Peck 1995; 
Jessop 1999b; Jessop 2002).34 The mass production of consumer durable and 
standardized goods was produced by assembly-line, rigid and dedicated machinery, and 
mostly semi-skilled workers. The exploitation of internal scalar economies 
corresponded with a relatively inflexible bureaucracy, whose major tasks were to 
strongly manage wage regulation in order to stabilize the labour supply and demand. 
Reaching full employment was a main goal of the state, and welfare programs were
34 Tickell and Peck (1995) also identify variant o f Fordism. Apart from classic Fordism in the USA, 
there are also many different types: flex-Fordism in West Germany; flawed Fordism in the United 
Kingdom; state Fordism in France; delayed Fordism in Italy and Spain; peripheral Fordism in Mexico 
and Brazil; racial Fordism in South Africa; primitive Tayorization in Malaysia, Bangladesh and the 
Philippines; and hybrid Fordism in Japan.
77
offered for the unemployed. In addition, the system operated mainly within domestic 
situations with the steady growth of macroeconomies and relatively limited global 
connections (compared to the periods after the 1970s) (Table 3-3) (Harvey 1989a; 
Jessop 1994; Pierson 1994; Painter 1995; Goodwin and Painter 1996; Jessop 1999b; 
Peck 2000).











enforcement o f work and work value
Production process
mass production of homogeneous goods
uniformity 
low-skill and low wage 
standardization 
large buffer stocks and inventory 
testing quality ex-post 
rejects and errors detected late 
rejects are concealed in buffer stock 
loss o f production time 
resource driven 
vertical and some horizontal integration 
cost reductions through wage control
Production process
small batch production 
flexibility
technically advanced
small batch production o f a variety o f product types 
no stocks
quality control part o f process 
immediate detection o f errors 
immediate rejection o f defective parts 
reduction o f lost time 
demand driven
quasi vertical integration sub contracting 
learning by doing integrated for long term planning
Economic and social regulations
Keynesian policy 
promotion o f full employment 
no job security 
progressive redistribution and social justice 
single task for each member 
payment per rate on the basis o f job criteria 
limited job training and learning experiences 
emphasis on diminishing worker’s responsibility
Economic and social regulations
monetarist policy
promotion o f private profit
dual markets o f job security (high-rank staff have)
privatized consumption and active citizenry
multiple tasks for each worker
personal payment by detailed bonus system
extensive on the job training and learning
emphasis on worker’s co-responsibility
O rganizational structure of governance
bureaucratic, 
centralized control 
limited local autonomy in program 
centralized service delivery authorities 
management by input controls and sanctions 
process and input orientation 
standardized programs
O rganizational structu re  of governance
flexible
centrally-orchestrated devolution, 
increasing local discretion over programs design 
wide variety o f  service providers 
management by output targets and incentives 
output and outcome orientation 
variegated programs
Source: compiled from Harvey (1989a); Peck (2000); Painter (1995) and Goodwin and 
Painter (1996).
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Since the 1970s, however, there was a shift towards post-Fordism associated with the 
Schumpeterian workfare state (Jessop 1994; 1999b). Partly because of the abandonment 
of the Bretton Woods agreement and partly because of technology development, there 
were more flexibility in international financial regulatory systems in general and rapid 
transmission of capital in particular, accentuating the growth of economy at the same 
time or reducing and undermining the basis for stable situations of development. Facing 
a rise of developing countries in Asia and in Latin America because of a new 
international division of labour, advanced countries in America and Europe had been 
forced to give up routinised labour-intensive sectors in order to concentrate on other 
new and high value-added sectors (Sayer 1985; Gilbert 2002). Firms outsourced 
standardized operations in order to retain high-skilled knowledge or R&D activities. 
Such new production systems are considered to be more flexible, involving versatile 
and programmable machines, quality and skilled labours, vertical disintegration, 
subcontracting strategic alliances and just-in-time production. In addition, the 
‘workfare’ system was created as a new form of accumulation regime on the basis of an 
appropriately flexible workforce and advanced communications technologies. The term 
‘workfare’- i.e. welfare + work-, rather than welfare, signifies work for welfare or 
work-oriented welfare.35 In other words, the emergence of Schumpeterian workfare 
state is characterized by more flexibility and permanent innovation as its emphasis on 
mobilizing social capital as well as entrepreneurialism (Table 3-3) (Harvey 1989a; 
1989b; Jessop 1994; Pierson 1994; Painter 1995; Goodwin and Painter 1996; Jessop 
1999b; Peck 2000; Jones and Jones 2004).
35 Workfare is based on reductions in eligibility, forms of compulsion, and increased monitoring of  
welfare recipients in order to make the unemployed ‘employable’ and job-ready through various job 
search training and education mechanisms.
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From socialist regime to post-socialist regime
To sum up, the regime of accumulation and mode of regulations in the west has 
experienced a fundamental shift since the 1960s from Fordism to post-Fordism. 
Transition economies in general and post-Mao cities in particular experienced 
comparable changes, although these were not exactly the same as the experiences of 
their western counterparts. There are some specific similarities between the 
transformation from Fordist to post-Fordist and the transition from socialist to 
post-socialist (Table 3-4). For example, both of them uphold a belief in the advantage 
of scale economies of industrialization, while changes in both represented as 
alternatives to manage crises in their respective accumulation process in face of 
internationalization (Wu 2003a; Wu and Ma 2005). And sub-national cities and regions 
were granted more powers to played a part in the transition process (Bennett 1997b). In 
general, socialist countries embraced state-led development, resulting in state 
monopolies over production, resource allocation along with distorted prices, an absence 
of foreign competition and the neglect or/and suppression of the private sector. As a 
consequence, the crisis of this regime of accumulation in the 1970s and 1980s included: 
poor economic performance, inefficient public sectors, weak governance, difficulties of 
rigorous planning and lack of effective incentives to mobilize subordinated units 
(Sutton and Zaimeche 2002; Wu and Ma 2005).
Table 3-4: Changing urban processes in transition and advanced economies
The socialist regime The Fordist Regime
extensive accumulation through economy o f scale
state-led industrialization Keynesian welfare state
ao redistributive Junctions o f states
H The post-socialist regime The post-Fordist Regime
C<3IS intensive accumulation through economy o f scope
H commoditization and spatial fix neo-liberalism and post-Keynesian
(export-orientation zones) workfare state
* marketization
entrepreneurial States
Source: from Wu (2003a)
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However, the more important difference, as Wu and other scholars further emphasize, is 
that under the context of cold war, industrialization in the socialist regime was 
characterized by economic isolation, military preparation, and state-led industrialization, 
with limited privatization and marketization (Szelenyi 1996; Wu 2Q03a; Wu and Ma
2005). These characteristics were radically different from those of the Fordist regime. 
Mao’s China in particular had forbidden most international trade and foreign direct 
investment. Industrialization during the 1960s and 1970s was highly built upon the 
‘Third Front {san xian)' region for military concerns. In addition, cities in socialist 
countries tended to grow more slowly than their Fordist counterparts due to the explicit 
anti-urban discourse. There was less urbanisation, namely, less urban population growth 
and less spatial concentration for the population (Savage and Warde 1993). More 
complicatedly, the regime of state socialism in the Mao’s China combined two 
contradictory instruments: restriction of rural-urban migration and suppression of urban 
consumption as anti-urbanism on the one hand; and privileges to urban-based residents 
and urban-based manufacturing systems, on the other hand (Lin 1998; Lin 2002).
Certain significant differences also need to be noted in the characteristics attributed to 
the post-socialist regime as compared with the post-Fordist one. In the post-Fordist 
regime, still staying in the market system, one dominating force in the shift to a more 
flexible economy was first to remove the standardized procedures and products to 
developing countries and then to develop new products on quality competitiveness 
based on appropriately flexibly workforces and advanced communication technologies. 
But, in post-Mao China, programs to cope with crisis resulting from the socialist 
centrally planned regimes were to introduce marketization, like price reforms and land 
use reforms. Along with the establishment of economic development zones and the
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liberalization of international trade and foreign investment, the adoption of 
export-oriented growth and integration into the global economy were also created as 
alternatives to sort out the crisis in the socialist regime (Wu and Ma 2005). Ironically, 
flexible production was a new type of accumulation in the western countries to cope 
with the challenges raised by developing countries that provided cheaper and 
semi-skilled labour as better environments for mass production under the new 
international spatial division of labour. And China, having opened up since the late 
1970s, was one of the key developing countries to accelerate this new international 
division of labour.
3-3 Macro Perspective of Responses: Localities in Competition
Background: new operations of spatial organizations at different scales 
In terms of issues of local economic development, the new roles and operations of 
spatial organizations at different spatial scales were also formatted in order to respond 
to the macro changes of global restructuring. At least three different but not mutually 
exclusive scenarios can be identified. First, while some scholars argue that national 
states facing challenges are still influential, others claim that state capacity is actually 
declining. The second scenario focus on more direct interventions from international 
organizations and the third one is about the emergence of local entrepreneurial 
governances. I start from the first.
For the first scenario, in few contexts, nation states still remain essential in the face of 
global competition because of their numerous roles in the economy, such as 
guaranteeing the rights of capital, creating conditions necessary for the global 
expansion of domestic capital, acting as collective capitalists in their own rights,
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regulating the global economy within and beyond their jurisdictions and performing 
key roles in the internationalization of politics (Yeung 1998). Empirically, using recent 
political developments in the UK as a case study, Jones and Jones (2004) further argue 
that an ideological form of neoliberalism by Whitehall in London can be a means for 
nation states to be differently re-engineered within the context of globalization and 
neoliberalism. In addition, the ‘challenge fund* organized by the central government of 
the United Kingdom had been a key resource to generate formal as well as informal 
links between local governments and local business (Davies 2002). Certain central 
state-articulated institutions also played an important role in regenerating local 
economic development, like the Welsh Development Agency (MacKinnon and Phelps 
2001), Dockland development project in London (MacLeod and Goodwin 1999b), and 
Britian’s Training and Enterprise Council in many localities (Jones 1998). All of these 
studies show clearly that the importance of roles of central governments in the local 
economic development process cannot be neglected.
However, compared to the Fordism period, the effectiveness of nation states in the 
post-Fordism period is much more arguable. There is no doubt that national states 
played a significant part under Fordism. Internationally, they had a strong capacity to 
set up independent monetary policy for their countries. Domestically, they centralized 
and consolidated governing powers to create a Keynesian welfare system and secure 
mass production and consumption (Tickell and Peck 1995). However, during the 
post-Fordism period nation states were seriously challenged by de-industrialization, 
fiscal crises, a rise of mass unemployment and unstable and volatile neo-liberal 
international financial and trade systems. Therefore, central governments were forced to 
cede power to other political and economic bodies (Pierson 1994; Tickell and Peck 
1995). From this regard, many scholars argue that there was a twin process of
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weakening state capacity: privatization to industrial organizations on the one hand and 
the transfer of power to other tiers of governmental bodies and non governmental 
organizations on the other. In terms of the latter, central state functions were transferred 
either upward to supranational organizations (such as European Union, NAFTA, WTO 
and so on) or downward to subnational states (regional bodies or autonomous regions) 
(Jessop 1994; Ohmae 1995; Swyngedouw 1997; 2003).
This trend figures in the second and third scenarios in terms of operations of other 
spatial organizations. The second scenario concerns international intervention into local 
and regional economic development. More supranational bodies and different sets of 
collective sovereignty started to involve themselves in local economic development in 
different degrees (Tickell and Peck 1995; Swyngedouw 1997; Scott 1998). For example, 
the so-called ‘acquis communautaire’ is the body of European legislation that candidate 
countries must accept before joining the Union (Radaelli 2000). The European Court of 
Justice is authorized to directly force local governments of member states to comply 
with certain European policies and directives, even bypassing their central governments. 
As such, Article 10 of the European Regional Development Fund provided an 
opportunity for European Union (EU) to legitimately establish their own pilot policy 
innovations in under-developed areas that were regarded as institutional ‘policy 
laboratories’ for the EU (Henderson and Morgan 2002). In addition, with Ghana as a 
case, Mohan (1996) concludes that external involvement by the World Bank in the 
1980s calling for fiscal accountability had a profound effect in the local political and 
economic development.
The third scenario involves much more important roles for cities and regions. Local 
states in cities and regions before the 1960s primarily played a regulatory function
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around social reproduction dispensing local welfare systems. During the transition 
period, however, cities and regions were forced to stand on the front line to sort out 
crises transmitted from the weakening national states. Local states had enhanced their 
economic roles by using powers and competencies available to influence the economic 
fortunes of their localities (Mayer 1995; Tickell and Peck 1995; Swyngedouw 1997; 
Wu and Ma 2005). Scholars identify typical development strategies deployed by local 
authorities after the 1980s as including: the attraction of inward investment with a 
variety of incentives; development assistances to local small and medium enterprises; 
infrastructure provision; and training and educations for labour reskilling (Mayer 1995; 
Jones 1998; Peck 1998; Painter 2003); and city marketing and selling (Ashworth and 
Woogd 1990; Levy 1990; Ward 1998).
Territorial competition in the United States, Europe and China
Along with the development of new operations of spatial organizations at different 
scales, I would specifically point out the dimension of inter-territorial competition, 
which is about the emerging importance of local entrepreneurial governance as 
territorial units in the context of global competition for attainment of resources, creation 
of jobs, and accommodation of investment projects (Harvey 1989b; Cheshire and 
Gordon 1995). The emerging global economy has produced an intensification of 
competition between firms for a share of growing transnational markets. In order to 
access new or expanded markets, the cross-border inter-firm coalitions of firms place 
increasing responsibility on regional authorities to ensure the availability and quality of 
local-bound complementary assets to attract the right kind of mobile investment 
(Agnew 2000; Dunning 2000). As a result of the significance of the strategies of mobile 
capital performing important roles in local economic development, there has been an 
increase in coordinated actions within regions to improve competitiveness vis-a-vis
other areas, particularly in bidding for mobile investments (Cox 1995; Rodriguez-Pose 
and Arbix 2001; Garcia-Mila and McGuire 2002), container port development and 
shipping industry (Hall 2003; Jacobs 2004), property markets (D'Arcy and Keogh 
1998), tourism, state or international funds (Cheshire 1999), and fairs and exhibitions 
(Rubalcaba-Bermejo and Cuadrado-Roura 1995) and so on.
It must be noted that historically speaking, territorial competition in America had been 
a permanent feature of local economic development since the colonial era of the 18th 
century. It is partly because of relatively weak federal power with strong local 
autonomy of states and partly because of development contests for the expansion of the 
western frontier. In Europe, territorial competition occurred in Renaissance Italy 
(competition between city states), and then disappeared from the 18th century until the
fliimid of the 20 century due to the rise of the national-state and the industrialization age. 
Territorial competition have taken place again since European integration after the 
1960s (Cheshire and Gordon 1995; Agnew 2000). Development of LaDefense as a 
‘Manhattan sur Seine’ was explicitly intended to attract corporate offices from 
competitor cities such as London and Brussels and New York. Lille also successfully 
secured the TVG connection to Brussels and the Channel Tunnel in order to create the 
opportunities for much more ambitious developments to serve a transnational market 
(Gordon 1999). Bremm (1995) also documents the territorial competition process 
operated by cities and regions in Germany during the twin process of Germany 
unification and European integration.
Such territorial competition also happens in the post-Mao China period. Many 
provinces, cities and regions of China tried their best to compete with others in accruing 
the greatest amount of resources, bargaining for the most favourable policy concessions
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and generating the highest rate of growth of the localities (Qian and Xu 1993a; 1993b; 
Montinola, Qian et al. 1995; Gore 1999). As shown in Chapter Two, the so-called ‘war 
of development zones’ in bidding for FDI by offering highly subsidized land is a case in 
point. Particularly for local government encouraged projects, the selling price of land is 
much lower than the development cost, even sometimes close to zero. Another example 
is the duplicate construction of infrastructure. There were five international airports in 
the Pearl Delta with a radius of 50 km, including Hong Kong, Macao, Shenzhen, 
Guangdong, and Zhuhai. Despite a designed annual capacity of 12 million passengers, 
Zhuhai international airport, which started operations in the early 1990s, had developed 
half million volume of passengers by 2000. Such reckless and irresponsible decisions 
resulted in a huge gap between construction cost and operation revenue, putting Zhuhai 
on the brink of bankruptcy (Lam 1999). Similarly, Wuxi airport, which was converted 
from a military airfield for civilian use, only has six flights a day serviced by one 
airplane. It is because there are four other airports within a radius of 140km, including a 
Shanghai airport.36 In terms of production, at least 19 (out of 30) provinces competed 
with each other by identifying the auto industry as a priority for the 1996-2000 national 
plan (the 9th Five-year plan) without considering the niches of localities and balanced 
development of the nation as a whole (Lu and Xue 1997).37 These reflect some of the 
risks of the local orientation of territorial competition as a bottom-up process, ignoring 
not only questions of spatial equality, but also the inefficiency of zero-sum policies 
(Cox 1995; Cheshire and Gordon 1996; Cheshire 1999; Agnew 2000).
36 News source: zhong kuo shi bao (based in Taipei) 2002/10/14; zhong kuo shi bao (based in Taipei) 
2003/02/22; South China Morning Post (based in Hong Kong) 2004/04/13.
37 Another 17 out of 30 developed the construction materials industry as a key industry for their 
economies. The electronic industry, machinery industry and metallurgy industry were also targeted by 15 
respectively.
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Competition and policy innovation (or not)
Scholars argue that territorial competition in relation to policy making for local 
economic development can be divided into two categories: growth-enhancing, and 
growth-depleting (Cox 1995; Kresl 1995; Cheshire and Gordon 1996; Cheshire 1999; 
Agnew 2000; Christiansen, Oman et al. 2002). The dichotomy can be traced back to 
researches on capitalist and industrial growth done by Storper and Walker (1989), who 
make an distinction between ‘weak competition’ and ‘strong competition’. The former 
targeted largely at the level of exchange, meaning that firms operating the strategies of 
weak competition seek out the best available raw materials, technologies and labour 
power at the cheapest price. Instead, the latter drives agents to revolutionize production 
in order to gain an edge on competitors, for example, to transform business practices or 
to do what has never been done and so on (Storper and Walker 1989). In other words, 
the former can be regarded as a process of ‘race to the bottom’, while the latter are 
more innovative and sustainable.
Departing from this point, local economic development policies for territorial 
competition also can be roughly identified as two groups. Qn the one hand, it is 
efficiency- enhancing strategy, or the so-called ‘strong competition’. Localities improve 
public goods and make innovations in upgrading their business-friendly environment 
and resource allocation. Such strategies include: cutting down local wasteful 
expenditure, labour training, fostering entrepreneurship, helping to start up new firms, 
offering business advice, reducing uncertainty, coordinating related resources, and 
constructing infrastructure. On the other hand is efficiency-depleting ‘weak 
competition’. In this case, cities and regions offer all manners of incentives to major 
corporations and similar concessions, such as pay uneven attention to non-investment 
projects, too much focusing on tax abatements (race to bottom), the low charge of or
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free provision of physical infrastructure, or in the forms of freeway interchanges and 
more general provision like airport expansions, aiming at attracting certain types of 
investment. For example, Garcia-Mila and McGuire (2002) document that different 
cities competed with each other by offering tax incentives when Boeing company 
decided to relocate its headquarter from Seattle. Dallas offered property tax abatements 
of US$ 10 million plus millions more in infrastructure and relocation costs, while 
Chicago and the State of Illinois teamed up to offer upwards of US$ 50 million in 
property and income tax abatements and other incentives. Similarly, the development of 
territorial competition in Brazil has seen states vying for FDI in the automobile sector 
since 1995, through with no significant increases in welfare either at the local or at the 
national level (Rodriguez-Pose and Arbix 2001).
Market fragmentation: territorial competition, Chinese style
A key difference between territorial competition in the west and that in China involves 
the degree of market integration. Territorial competition in west Europe occurred under 
the context of European market integration and free movement of materials, human 
resources, productions and mobile capital (Cheshire and Gordon 1995; Cheshire 1999). 
However, territorial competition took place in China along with a remarkable domestic 
fragmentation in production, capital and labour markets (Cannon and Zhang 1996; Lee 
1998; Wedeman 2003; World Bank 2005b).
Starting from the late 1980s, those goods and materials that were seen as important to 
the domestic provincial economy were either restrictedly imported or subjected 
formally or informally to high taxes (Montinola, Qian et al. 1995; Cannon and Zhang 
1996; Ma 1997; Wedeman 2003). In 1988, Hunan province, set up its own customs 
patrols to stop farmers from selling their pigs for higher prices available in the
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neighbouring province of Guangdong (Lu 20Q4).38 In terms of the flow of financial 
capital, the branch banks, which are often backed by the local governments, have tried 
hard to keep local financial resources within the locality. For example, during the Asian 
financial crisis, Fujian issued an order that no funds should be remitted out of the 
province (Gore 1999). In some extreme cases, provincial governments issued their own 
currencies in order to prevent their residents from purchasing goods in the neighbouring 
provinces (Huang 2001a). Shanghai and Guangdong had to use its hard-earned foreign 
currency to purchase rice, grain, fuel and raw materials from the world market because 
it could not get enough volume from the neighbouring provinces (Lee 1998; Sun 2000). 
Along with obstructing the flow of goods and capitals there was a lack of cooperation 
between provinces. For example, even under the push of the Shanghai Economic 
District Planning Office (SEDPO) (Shanghai jin  j i  qu kui hua bang kong shi) of the 
State Council established in 1985, there was no substantial cooperation in development 
between Shanghai and other neighbouring provinces in the 1980s. And the SEDPO was 
formally abandoned in 1988 (Cannon and Zhang 1996). Moreover, even until nowadays, 
the general Hukou system in connection with access to social welfares and public 
services is still being applied to China as a whole, restricting migrate across provinces
39and therefore reinforcing domestic labour market segmentations (World Bank 2005b).
One indicator of the local disintegration is the economic importance of provinces’ 
domestic (inter-provincial) and global (province-international) trade.40 During the
38 Other typical trade barriers include: export embargo, transport license, levy on exporting products, 
request for rewards in exchange for ‘export’, strengthened enforcement of production quota, integration 
of material supply with processing industry (Ma 1997).
39 Hukou system refers to China’s residency permit that technically requires an individual to live in the 
area designated on his/her permit.
40 There are other approaches to measuring post-Mao China’s economic fragmentation, such as the price 
approach (in terms of trend in price and rates of return convergence), the production approach (through 
examining the production structure across different provinces), and the business cycle approach (by 
understanding the correlation of business cycle among regions) (World Bank 2005b).
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post-Mao period, inter-provincial trade was at best stagnating in absolute terms, and 
falling sharply as a proportion of sales or GDP. And the declining importance of 
domestic goods in provincial absorption was replaced by growing shares of both 
international and intra-provincial produced goods. For example, foreign trade of total 
retail sale in Guangdong grew up from 15.7% in 1980 up to 67.4% in 1992, while its 
inter-provincial trade of sale got less and less. Parallels can be drawn in Shanghai and 
Liaoning (Kumar 1994) (Table 3-5). In addition, Poncet (2003; 2005) also confirms that 
there was a downward trend in the intensity of inter-provincial trade since the end of 
the 1980s. In other words, despite a simultaneous move of provincial competition with 
each other towards greater international trade integration, the provinces in general 
remained little integrated with each other between 1987 and 1997. This reflected both 
the rapid growth of foreign trade, and a tendency for domestic trade to become more 
heavily concentrated within provinces, as a result of growing protectionism. In addition, 
while whether or not regional protectionism to some extent declined over the past 10 
years is still arguable (Naughton 2003; Bai, Du et al. 2004; World Bank 2005b),41 new 
forms of protectionism embedded in the local affiliation of the judiciary and local 
government procurement practices have been found to further challenge the China’s 
domestic market integration (World Bank 2005a).
Table 3-5: Inter-provincial trade and foreign trade in selected regions (1980-1992)
1980 1985 1990 1992
Guangdong interprov. trade /total retail sale 41.4% r 32.8% 20.1% 18.4%
foreign trade /total retail sale 15.7% 28.0% 52.7% 67.4%
Shanghai interprov. trade /total retail sale 221.6% 125.1% 79.9% n.aforeign trade /total retail sale 76.8% 83.0% 100.7% n.a
Liaoning interprov. trade /total retail sale 50.0% 35.3% 44.8% 45.2%
foreign trade /total retail sale 49.6% 69.6% 65.5% n.a
Source: Kumar (1994)
41 For example, Naughton (2003) argues that inter-provincial trade was growing more rapidly than either 
provincial GDP or foreign trade between 1987 and 1992; similarly, World Bank (2005) also address that 
regional protectionism declined significantly over the past 10 years and Bai, Du et al. (2004) conclude 
that there have been a trend o f regional specialization o f China’s industries in the 1990s.
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Under the context of territorial competition and market fragmentation, there are some 
consequences. First, it is about overproduction in the wake of fragmented marketization 
(Cannon and Zhang 1996). According to China’s third industrial census conducted in 
1996, there is a 40% redundancy for textile products, 70% for air conditioners, and 75% 
for electronics products (such as wishing machines, refrigerators, colour TV sets, VCD 
and DVD players). Oversupply sometimes leads to price war. Shanghai’s Dazhong, one 
competitive automobile company, not only ramped up production in recent years but 
also significantly slashed prices in hope of grabbing a lion share of the market (Lu 
2004).
Second is the phenomenon of ‘miniaturization of investment projects’, referring to the 
situation whereby investment projects in post-Mao period tended to be of a sub-optimal 
scale.42 Therefore the projects inevitably became smaller relative to the size of Chinese 
economy (Gore 1999). For example, the biggest three companies in China’s automotive 
industry just only took around 40% of the whole market share. In contrast, there is a 
high concentration of the automotive industry in Brazil, Japan and Korea (Table 3-6) 
(Huang 2001a). In 1995, China had some over 120 automobile assembly-lines. 
However, the entire output in China as a whole is only 1.45 million volume, which is 
smaller than the output level of one single Japanese firm in 1969 (Toyota 1.47 million 
units) and about level of the Hyndai Motors in 1996 (1.3 million units) (Huang 2001a).
42 As the principle of regional economic self-sufficiency was one of key communist China economic 
policymaking concerns, miniaturization also happened to the pre-reform era. Therefore, there was no 
market pressure for firms to fully utilize economies of scale. Inner regions were promoted as a complete 
and self-sufficient system to develop the steel or auto industry. For example, the second Automobile 
Company, which was built in the mountains of Hubei with parts and assembly plants scattered over the 
mountainous regions, had poor transportation and coordination (Demurger, S., J. D. Sachs, et al. 2001).
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Table 3-6: Concentration ratios of the automotive industry
One firm Two firm Three-firm
ratio ratio ratio
Brazil 1970 56.1% 74.3% 91.2%
Japan 1975 33.7% 63.6% 72.8%
Korea 1986 71.3% 88.6% 97.9%
China 1985 19.2% 38.0% 43.0%
China 1998 14.7% 25.4% 34.4%
Source: Huang (2001a)
A third effect of the lack of regional integration is the isomorphism of industrial 
structures between regions. Gore cites the research done by Lin and his associates at the 
Investment Research Institute of the State Planning Commission to show the industrial 
structural similarity of China provinces (Gore 1999). Using the UN industrial 
Development Organization’s structural similarity coefficient, Lin’s research reveals 
extraordinarily high levels of similarity of regions within China, with an average value 
across provinces of 0.798. In terms of number of employees and output values, Kumar 
(1994) similarly finds out that the provincial indifference averaged about 0.8. The trend 
toward structural isomorphism seems to continue into the 1990s. In 1996, the structural 
similarity between the coastal provinces and central provinces was 0.935, while that 
between the central and western provinces was an astounding 0.979.43
Fourthly, regional fragmentation is also one institutional reason why the post-Mao 
China’s development so heavily relied on FDI.44 Regional economic fragmentation 
means that domestic firms were only able to invest within their respective regions. Such 
fragmentation strongly restricted the mobility of domestic private firms. As of 1998, 
Shanghai Automotive Industrial Corporation, the largest automotive firm in China was 
forced to remain in Shanghai. Instead, a small company from Hong Kong was able to
43 News sources: ren min ri bao (based in Beijing) 1996/12/04, cited from (Gore 1999).
44 The other institutional feature is the political pecking order o f Chinese firms. Local partners 
endeavoured to partner with foreigners to get certain fiscal advantages from a foreign joint venture 
(Huang 2003).
93
acquire 200 firms across nine provinces (Huang 2003).45 It prevents Chinese domestic 
firms from being more competitive than they could be otherwise. Such economic 
fragmentation also increased the bargaining chips of foreign firms because domestic 
firms could not freely move to other regions but foreign firms, even some of small size, 
were able to choose all projects throughout the country. Therefore, economic 
fragmentation made foreign firms more valuable than otherwise would be the case.
3-4 Micro Perspective of Responses: Politics behind Self-Interest Coalitions
Local politics: elite or pluralist models
Under the post-Fordism context, formal political powers still remain with sovereign 
states. However, their capacity to project power was weakened within their own 
national borders and challenged, even replaced, by other spatial governing bodies, like 
local states (Harvey 1989b; Swyngedouw 1997). These changes, of course, took 
different paths in different contexts, depending on cultural and political peculiarities of 
localities and societies. From the perspective of urban politics, it therefore leads us to 
reject the extreme structuralist interpretation, which claims that issues of agency are 
irrelevant, and to pay more attention to observing through whom change really 
happening at the local scale (Mollenkopf 1992). In contrast to the previous emphasis on 
macro and structural factors, the main issue in the section is to understand the political 
behaviours and motivations of the agents in the local development governance in 
relation to the politics of local economic development.
45 Another example is SHI Liwen, chairman of Shanghai Construction Group, the biggest construction 
company in China, complained at the March 2001 annual meeting of the National People’s Congress that 
his company often found it impossible to operate outside Shanghai because o f local protectionism. News 
source: Transition (based in Washington D.C.), 2001 July.
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LeGates and Stout (2002) identify two schools of thoughts on urban politics: the ‘elite 
model* and the ‘pluralist model*. The latter, which was academically popular during the 
1950s and 1960s, argues that decision making of local development was influenced and 
involved by different people from a variety of class and organizations with plural 
values and interests. Instead, the former argues that main development decisions were 
actually made by a small and interlocking group of elites consisting of key 
business-persons and members of established and socially prominent companies and 
families. The difference between the two models in relation to local development is 
whether it be controlled by one dominating value in order to collectively pursue elites’ 
self-interests (in the elite model) or be determined by several complementary and/or 
conflicting values (in the plural model) (LeGates and Stout 2002).
However, the explanations offered by the pluralist mode had been challenged by many 
scholars using the Marxist and political economy approach. From the perspective of 
social values, they criticize that many policy actors who proclaimed themselves as 
representative of plural interests actually had generally advocated policies that fitted the 
predispositions of the privileged and the upper classes instead of those of the rest of the 
population. For example, the so-called better urban planning usually only ended up at 
museums, churches and industrial parks, rather than hotdog stands, nightclubs or 
neighbourhood taverns, reflecting the view of city life by the elite class (Fainstein and 
Fainstein 1996). With a coal region in Belgium as a case study, Swyngedouw (1996) 
also points out that under the context of the so-called post-Fordism period, the local 
entrepreneurial governance in close co-operation with private capital was increasingly 
diverted by small elites who shaped the urban/regional fabric in its own image and 
fashion and defined the very content of restructuring process. Such elite-domination
was characterized with a decidedly undemocratic and authoritarian touch at supra and 
local levels with the systematic exclusion and even further disempowerment of 
politically and economically already weaker social groups (Swyngedouw 1996).
Growth machines and urban regimes in pursuit of self-interests 
Also, Cheshire and Gordon (1996; 1998) argue that territorial competition is a process 
through which groups, acting on behalf of a regional/local economy, seek to promote 
cities and regions as locations for economic activity either implicitly or explicitly in 
competition with other regions. The local elite willing to promote competition are those 
who had a strong motivation to engage in the process of territorial competition, 
including administrative staff and local agents with strong stakes in the local economy 
and the perception of the possibility to influence outcomes.
For example, in the context of the United States, the public-private coalitions in 
territorial competition had existed over many decades, and boosted more significantly 
after the 1980s. A group of business persons (typically involving the utilities developers 
and local chamber of commerce) coming together with local officials formulated and 
implemented policies designed to expand local economy because of ‘local dependence 
of knowledge* (Cox 1997; 2002). Utility companies are dependent on local knowledge, 
such as where and when electricity is needed and how to construct. Developers need to 
know their market and also to be known for marketing. Local chambers of commerce 
provide detailed development information to bring more agents together. Local officials 
need local economic expansion in order to be able to collect more taxes from local 
stores, real estate and incomes. In other words, such interdependence is motivated by 
self-interest among those agents involved (Cox 1997; 2002).
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Logan and Molotch (1987) also use the term ‘growth machine’ to understand cites or 
regions as the engine of economic development for the personal interests of certain 
local growth elites. Major participants in local growth machines were the local officials 
and private business persons in property investing, development and financing sectors. 
The private/public elite played an essential role in controlling their investment activities, 
even scrutinizing administrative details, for example, and the decision making process 
of urban planning (Logan and Molotch 1987). Therefore, these elites of local growth 
machines could collectively enrich themselves through the process of intensification of 
certain private lands for their personal interests. Due to paying relatively less attention 
to the public interests, local growth machine also to some extent made such 
development inherently unstable and short-termist (Tickell and Peck 1995).
Stone (1989; 1993) proposes that an urban regime was a specifically-defined coalition 
under informal arrangements with access to institutional resources in making decisions. 
These informal models of coordinating efforts across institutional boundaries are based 
upon mutual self-interests. Urban regime theory argues that the growth machine was 
just one of the many types of public-private local coalitions. The variety of regimes 
depends on how in a particular context key political actors tried to strategically pursue 
certain sorts of political goals of local development. These typologies of regime include: 
symbolic, welfare, corporatist, development, service-delivery, entrepreneurial, social 
reform, pro-growth market-led, middle-class progressive, and organic and so on (Ward 
1996; Dowding, Dunleavy et al. 1999; Pierre 1999).
To sum up, the motivations and incentives of policy actors in the local development 
coalitions are not just driven by public interest, but also how to maximize the particular
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interests or rents manipulated by key agents in the coalitions. In general, local 
government under pressures from certain local elites would favour specific firms rather 
than general ones. The activism of the local entrepreneurs is dominated by a small 
number of relatively big and leading firms or property owners. Without these parochial 
private sectors as seed crystals to initiate economic activities, the performance of 
regional development would be weaker.
Multi-scale governances for local economic development
However, agents acting in the local governances are not all located in the local scale. 
Local development in certain contexts depends upon ‘top-down’ processes by high- 
level authorities (Ward 1996; MacKinnon and Phelps 2001). The concepts of roles 
played by national state and international organizations in relation to local economic 
development are discussed here. First of all, MacLeod and Goodwin (1999a; 1999b) 
propose a concept of ‘the state as the site of strategies’. They argue that the state could 
favour some groups’ strategies over others when facing domestic development crises 
such development stagnation and uneven development. The access and giving of 
privilege could be based on some forces over others, some interests over others, some 
time horizons over others, and some coalition possibilities over others (MacLeod and 
Goodwin 1999a; 1999b). Furthermore, building on the concept of ‘strategic selectivity’, 
Jones (1997; 1998) develops a concept of ‘spatially strategic selectivity’ that the state 
specifically had a tendency to privilege certain places or regions through accumulation 
strategies and hegemonic projects. The processes of ‘geographically privileging’ 
include material and ideological forms within which high degrees of experimentation 
existed, the exact form being contingent on interest groups, and the mobilization of 
representational forces that ideologically supported such experimentation (Jones 1997; 
1998; Jones and Ward 2002).
Second, the new role of international organizations in relation to local economic 
development is related to the debate of changing a national state’s sovereignty. 
Traditionally, the sovereignty of national states was clearly defined such that foreign 
powers and resources could not intervene in the domestic political and economic 
, development of a country unless invited by the legitimate government. International 
organizations also might not intervene in local and regional development without the 
permission of nation states concerned. However, this traditional concept of sovereignty 
has been challenged (Taylor 2000; Jenkins 2002; Held and McGrew 2004).
For example, the Environment and Natural Resource Group of the World Bank was 
established to promote sustainable development in social, economic, and environmental 
dimensions by facilitating a learning dialogue and disseminating policy innovative 
approaches with local agents (Stone 2001). The Global Development Network, 
financed by the World Bank, is also designed to be a collaborative platform for the 
co-production of local, regional, and global knowledge on ‘best practices’ for local 
economic development (Stiglitz 2000). The Mega-City Project (MCP), a non-profit 
organization based in the United States, had also built field sites in eighteen largest 
cities in the world to identify and transfer urban innovations. With support by MCP, the 
Zabbaleen Environmental Development program in Cairo of Egypt has been 
successfully transferred to Manila of Philippines and Bombay of India, bringing about 
an appropriate adoption of new problem-solving and long-term relationship between 
regions and cities (Badsbab and Perlman 2002).
Apart from international organizations, consultant companies- including law firms, 
banks, planners and architects- also played an important role (Stone 2003; Sklair 2005).
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For example, international planning consultancies sometimes are able to offer direct 
influences to local governances about master planning, transportation or 
communication infrastructure (like massive airports), site planning and architecture 
design of headquarters for global business and public facilities (Olds 2001). In addition, 
some governmental and non-governmental organizations established are able to exert 
influences on local economic development of other countries. The International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC) in Canada (Stone 2003), Christian Aid in UK 
(Bashyam 2002), and Oxfam in UK (Dawson 2002) are cases in point. Taken together, 
at the heart of local economic development in the context of globalization are the 
significant roles co-played by international organizations, foreign governments, central 
states, local authorities, community associations and companies.
Theoretically, Cox (1998) provides the concept of the ‘jumping scale of politics’, 
referring to the idea that the complex-mixed connection of social agents at different 
spatial scales from the local to supranational spatial level is one of the new possibilities 
in resolving domestic development problems. Marks (1993) proposes a concept of 
‘multi-level governances’ to describe the dispersion of decision making across multiple 
territorial levels in the Europeanization process. Local governments and their 
connections with other foreign governments or supranational organizations are seen as an 
essential element in affecting the decision outcome. The multi-level governances can be 
in the form of multi-task jurisdiction or task-specific jurisdiction (Hooghe and Marks
2001). These researches also echo Scott’s research (1998) on an emerging hierarchy of 
political and economic reorganization. He argues that the current political reorganization 
of the world involves a fourfold hierarchy of governance relations, including the world 
regime, multi-national blocs, each sovereign state, and a large group of individual 
regions- with the global mosaic nowadays shaped by the mix-match and overlapping
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allegiance between regions, multiple sovereign states and multi-national blocs (Scott 
1998).
Party-dominated politics: development coalition, Chinese style 
In the post-Mao context, Chinese governments at various levels were much more 
development- oriented and committed to economic growth than their counterparts in the 
1950s and 1960s. Any anti-development interest groups still needed time to offer their 
alternative goals to the public. A type of local government-enterprise coalition was 
gathered collectively to convert more resources into local development (Zhu 1999). 
Local development governances in the post-Mao period also involved multi-scale 
actors apart from local agents. It can be observed from two different perspectives: one 
from the national scale and the other from the international/ global scale.
First, although the capacity of the centre was weaker in the post-Mao period than in the 
Mao era, it still remained relatively powerful (for example, as compared to their 
counterparts in transitional Russia and east Europe). As mentioned in Chapter Two, the 
centre initiated the ideological change from Mao’s principle of regional equality to 
Deng’s instruction ‘let some regions get rich first’ (Yang 1990). In addition, along with 
dual-track reform programs on the basis of geographic perspective, central policy in 
general and development zone policy in particular can be understood as reflecting the 
state’s concern of ‘spatially strategic selectivity’, privileging certain places to operate 
deregulations and marketization (Chung 1999a; Gallagher 2002). From this regard, the 
centre was to pursue a particular market-like, FDI-favoured, and export-oriented 
accumulation policy in selected places to strive for international competitiveness as 
well as to suppress counter-hegemonic (namely, conservative- oriented) factions.
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Second, regarding international actors, during the process of China’s resumption of its 
membership in international organizations (like the IMF and World Bank in 1980, and 
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) in 1988, and WTO in 2002), 
there have been certain degrees of harmonization between local economic regulations 
and laws by international organizations (Feng 1996; Mertha and Zeng 2005).46 With 
Beijing District Heating System Development as an example, Gan (2000) notes the 
process that the World Bank participated with the Beijing municipality government to 
build up the environmentally- friendly heating and gas system. In addition, with the 
case of Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone, Olds (1997) argues that the international 
design professionals had helped Shanghai readdress the conceptual imbalance in the 
early 1980s between closed information left over by Mao’s legacy prior to 1978 and 
modernize and advance ideals inspired by the experience of the western global cities.
However, beyond such similarity of local pro-growth coalitions, the political operation 
in post-Mao China was actually different from the western contexts. Despite 
administration reforms (Li 1998; Edin 2003a),47 there was limited political 
development, meaning that China was still a one-party control regime. The political 
reform can be traced back to the 1980s, when Deng introduced the so-called ‘checks 
and balances within CCP domination’- to separate the party from government on the 
one hand and to enlarge legislative authority on the other hand. Party committees at all 
levels ‘tried’ to remove themselves from the process of policy execution. The 
legislative body, the People’s Congress at each level, became a decision-making 
organization and ‘tried’ to play a powerful supervisory role in policy implementation
46 However, Mertha and Zeng (2005) also document that in some cases, rent-seeking behaviour by local 
officials threatens to be a major impediment in China’s ability to comply with its WTO commitments.
47 The administration reform in connection with a transformation of bureaucracy include a mandatory 
retirement program to replace revolutionary veterans; job classification system, recruitment by 
examination and performance evaluations for staff and so on.
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(Unger 1987; Chen 1999; Xia 2000). There were several cases showing that some local 
People’s Congress (legislature) had started to change images of ‘rubber stamp’ by 
contestation and competition with other political organizations.48 However, as a 
Chinese saying goes ‘party overrides law (dan dayu fa )' (Potter 1999; Guo 2000), the 
party still dominated administration, legislation, and jurisdictions (Potter 1999; Guo 
2000).
Under the context of one-party domination, several characteristics of political 
operations can be identified. The first is that a large part of the regulatory framework 
still consists of an array of party ‘documentations’ (wen jiari) of various kinds, aside 
from laws (fa lu) made by national and local legislative organizations. All kinds of 
documentations includes reason (daoli), direction (guiding), principle (yuanze), solution 
(ibanfa), plan (fang’an), decision (jueding), announcement (tongzhi), project (guihua), 
details (xize), opinion (yijian), and so on. These documentations played an important 
role in building consensus, formalizing personal preferences, and gaining ideological 
legitimacy. Wu terms it as ‘documentary politics’, which is one of the key 
characteristics of the Chinese Communist regime operation (Wu 1995). For example, 
the documentation to open fourteen coastal cities in 1984 is actually just in the form of 
the minutes of one meeting.49 Another example related to FDI also shows the 
superiority of documentations over the law. According to the 1979 Sino-foreign joint 
venture law passed by the National People’s Congress, salaries of joint venture 
employees should be determined by the boards of directors. However, the Ministry of
48 For example, under the 1982 version of amendment of constitution, the power of the standing 
committee of National People’s Congress was expanded not only to the enactment of law but also to 
supervise the work of the State Council and other administrative bodies (Xia 2000).
49 The minutes is ‘yan hai bu fen chen shi zuo tan hui chi yao (Minutes of meeting with some coastal 
cities)’, zhong fa  (1984), No.13, 1984/05/04. After, the General Custom of the State Council launched a 
policy of tax exemption toward the economic development zones, namely, ‘kuan yu dui shi si geyen hai 
gang kou kai fa  cheng shi de ruo ganyou hui zheng ce (Some preferential policies regarding fourteen 
coastal port and open cities)’.
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Labour still set up the upper limits as to how much those employees could be paid 
(Wang 2001).
Second, the domination of the party means that without agreements and consensuses 
from the party leaders, representatives from the administration (like county chiefs, city 
mayors or even provincial governors) might not have a final say in making policies and 
mobilizing administrative resources under their jurisdiction.50 Related to that, a group 
of local officials who can be the rule makers, the rule enforcers, the referees and the 
players at the same time are all under the party control (Sachs, Woo et al. 2000; Ma
2002). For example, public officials at local county levels in many cases were de facto 
owners of corresponding public-owned enterprises, which were the key development 
engines for local economic development. They were entitled to appoint and dismiss 
managers of those enterprises, to change or flexibly interpret the regulations in order to 
favour their investments, even to claim part of the profits (Oi 1995; 1998). Also 
because of the domination of the party without proper rule of law, there is very limited 
space for judicial independence and law enforcement. Related to market protectionism 
is that local courts have been found to unreasonably rule in favour of the interests of 
local enterprises, the phenomenon of so-called ‘judiciary localism’ (Ma 1997; World 
Bank 2005b).
Third, the dynamics of state-society relation is a matter of the politics of development
coalitions. In post-Mao China, state-society relations were shaped by a combination
between strict control and informal toleration (Perry and Selden 2000). On the one hand,
50 For example, as of September 2005, at the provincial level, more than 70% (23/of 31) of provinces 
cross-post the party secretary of provincial and the speaker of provincial People’s Congress to the same 
guys. According to the constitution of the People’s Republic o f China, the legislature is the top state 
apparatus at each level representing the people’s voices. Through cross-posting solutions, the party can 
control the administration and juridical systems. Internet source: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-02/20/content 476046.htm
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the post-Mao state set out the boundaries of individual liberties and strict political, 
ethnic and religious divides. The imprisonment in December 1998 of the leaders of the 
newly-established Chinese Democratic Party and the harsh repression of the falun gong 
are cases in point.51 On the other hand, semi-official organizations, particularly 
business associations or entrepreneurial organizations at the local level, were allowed to 
collectively perform on behalf of their members and the state. Their functions cover: 
building an ideological channel, enabling consultation in policy-making, coordinating 
sectoral policy, regulating the market, shouldering social welfare responsibility, 
drawing support from the state, and so on (Howell 1994; Nevitt 1996; Zhou 2000). But 
it does not mean that such non-public associations were able to be like their western 
counterpart playing an independent and influential role in the decision making process. 
Pearson (1997) identifies the asymmetrical power relations between state/official and 
society/ businesspersons. The state has legitimated certain interests outside the 
party-state in an attempt to unleash powers of societal groups toward the state’s own 
goals. With the Xintiandi land development process in Shanghai as an example, He and 
Wu (2005) reveal that even though private sectors were key capital providers, their 
influences over local governances were negligible. The public sectors at different levels 
still controlled the direction and pace of urban redevelopment through policy 
intervention, financial leverages, and governance of land leasing and so on.
Fourth, there are contradictory attitudes to the local economic development between 
foreign and domestic businesses, with the former being actively counted while the latter 
is still subject to abuses of power. With property rights as a case study, Zhang (2006) 
argues that such ‘abuse of administrative powers’ under one party-state control applied
51 falunggong, a meditation exercise of mind and body, has been the focus of international controversy 
because China has banned the group for its illegal activities and began a nationwide suppression since 
1999.
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unevenly to investors and domestic individuals of land owners. Although there were 
some cases reported for investment dispute resolutions, China still performed better 
than other countries in terms of the firms’ confidence and satisfaction with regulatory 
interpretations and the judicial system (World Bank and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development 2006). It implies that internationally speaking, 
property rights to investors in China were effectively protected due to their expected 
contributions to local economic performances. However, property right security to 
individual farmers’ lands was relatively loosely defined. In the context of the one party 
control regime, local officials could intentionally label the land to be of public interest, 
and then abruptly negotiate with village committees, who executed collective powers 
on the behalf of individual farmers, and ended up paying minimal compensation (Zhang
2006).
3-5 Conclusion
To sum up, in this chapter, I start by arguing that the innovative policy for local 
entrepreneurial localities falls into five types: new urban space; establishing new 
methods of space production or consumption; and looking for new ways of funding or 
new ‘positions’ for development. These local innovations are institutionalized by local 
entrepreneurial governances in order to respond to the challenges presented by global 
economic restructuring. From the macro perspective of local responses, policy 
innovations should take place when localities were embedded in a framework of inter- 
urban/regional competition for the attainment of resources, creation of jobs and 
accommodation of mobile investment. From the micro perspective, it requires local 
policy actors to initiate collective actions through the pursuit of their own political and 
economic interests in order to achieve development policy innovations.
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Against this general background, the chapter emphasizes the differences between the 
western cases and the situation of post-Mao China (Lin and Wei 2002). Like the 
western experiences (mainly represented by the United States and West Europe), China 
underwent a mode of regulation and a regime of accumulation in change associated 
with crisis in the context of globalization. In China, there are also groups of 
self-interested policy actors dominating the local economic development process. 
Territorial competition within China in bidding for mobile investment took place as 
well. However, there are clear differences between the western and Chinese contexts. 
For example, the mode of regulation change in China was not from Fordism to 
post-Fordism but from socialism to post-socialism; and a one-party-state dominant 
system, rather than public-private coalitions, tightly controlled policy making for local 
economic development. Finally, territorial competition in China involved free mobility 
only for foreign direct investment. Domestic capital, labour or products were relatively 
still difficult to move freely (in some cases increasingly so).
To sum up, in facing global restructuring challenges, local policy innovations can be 
brought about by the local governances whose elites are able to pursue self interests 
under the context of territorial competition. Despite different empirical cases focusing 
on policy innovations as local responses to global restructuring, one common claim 
shared among these researches is that substantial competences, responsibility and 
resources for local economic development had been- unintentionally or intentionally, 
implicitly or explicitly- dispersed already from central governments to institutions of 
local governances. Therefore, policy innovations in relation to local economic 
development can be understood as the consequence of such a governmental structure 
and powers in change. This phenomenon has been characterized as ‘decentralization’, 
which is the subject of the next Chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Local Policy Innovation and post-Mao China Asymmetric Decentralization 
4-1 Decentralization and Local Economic Development 
A global tendency of decentralization
Decentralization refers to the transfer of authority, responsibility and resources of 
public functions from central governments to subordinate governments (Dillinger 1994; 
Bennett 1997a; Litvack, Ahmad et al. 1998; Rodriguez-Pose and Gill 2003).52 The 
minimum common denominators cover powers and competences over planning, 
development strategies, education, the attraction of FDI, industrial policies, 
infrastructure developments, and so on. The trend of decentralization in the world can 
be conceptualized as two simultaneous movements since the mid 1970s: the 
introduction of devolution in those countries that previously employed highly 
centralized structures on the one hand, and an even greater decentralization in those 
countries whose regions already enjoyed some degree of autonomy on the other hand. 
In the 1970s, all but a few were strong central governments with sub-national 
governments being either weak or non-existent. Over thirty years, there had been 
different degrees and formats of decentralization taking place in the world. Out of the 
75 developing and transitional countries with populations more than 5 million, all but 
12 claimed have embarked on some forms of transferring political power to local units 
of governments in the 1990s (Dillinger 1994). In terms of newly independent states,
52 Some scholars argue that there are two dimensions of decentralization. One is in relation to an 
intergovernmental dimension, particularly with an attention to the dynamical interactions between local 
and central governments. The other is about a dimension from governments to markets, quasi-market, 
and non-governmental organizations (Bennett 1997a). In this chapter, I focus on the first definition.
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decentralization happened to former USSR, Yugoslavia, Eritrea. And certain previously 
centralized states underwent profound transformation in decentralizations, such as 
Belgium, Spain, and Italy. Along with that, more decentralization took place in the 
-already-federal economies like Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, India, the United States, 
Canada, and Australia. In terms of the global population, countries with various types 
of decentralization covered more than 50% of world population (Figure 4-1) 
(Rodriguez-Pose and Gill 2003)
Figure 4-1: Decentralization in the world in 1970 (upper) and 2000 (down)
Note: Red-High level of decentralization; Orange-M oderate decentralization; Yellow- Low or partial 
decentralization; Blue- Decentralization on paper
Source: handout by Rodriguez-Pose (2004).53
53 The course handout by Rodriguez-Pose (2004) for Course 413: Economic Development: Institutions, 
Networks and Evaluation at London School o f Economics and Political Science, London.
109
Economic decentralizations with political de/centralization
Decentralization can be divided into two inter-related dimensions, namely, political and 
economic. First of all, political decentralization refers to situations where political 
power and authority had been transferred to elected sub-national governments that are 
autonomous and/or fully independent of the devolving authority. Second, in terms of 
economic decentralization, administrative decentralization aims at the transfer of 
authority and responsibility to local governments while maintaining the hierarchical 
level of accountability on the one hand. Fiscal decentralization specifically focuses on 
financial and tax resource reallocation between the central and local authorities on the 
other hand (Litvack, Ahmad et al. 1998; Work 2002).
As discussed in the previous chapter, under the concept of ‘dual state’, central and local 
governments tended to make a clear division of labour during the Fordism era. While 
central governments played a role of economic and productive functions, elected local 
governments mainly shouldered the social welfare and redistribution functions 
(O'Connor 1973; Saunders 1986). During the post-Fordist time, economic 
decentralization which granted proactive local governments more powers and 
competences to deal with economic activities occurred in most western Europe 
countries (Bennett 1997a; Keating 1998). And the political decentralization went 
together with economic decentralization. For example, in Britain, the political 
devolution process from Whitehall in London to Scotland and Wales took place with 
the decentralization of economic and administrative powers over revenues and 
allocations of resources.54 Poland, Hungary and East Germany had also recently
54 Scholars who address that there are more competences granted to local governments during the 
devolution in the United Kingdom still differ over how much local autonomy do local governments hold 
because the state still played an important role in decision making on devolution. Such arguments can be 
shown in the research on the Welsh Development agency (MacKinnon and Phelps 2001a), and Dockland 
development project in London (MacLeod and Goodwin 1999b).
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followed the path toward political and economic devolution as a consequence of the fall 
of the Berlin Wall (Wollmann 1997). In Russia and Tajikistan carrying out ‘shock 
therapy’, general elections took place at the local levels in the 1990s. It means that the 
transition was from both economic and political centralizations to both economic and 
political decentralizations (Blanchard and Shleifer 2000; Avezov 2004) (Figure 4-2).
Figure 4-2: Transition of decentralization
' ' '  . economical 
political Decentralization Centralization
centralization Deng’s China] < Most socialist states
/  /  UK or Italy prior to 90’s
decentralization ............USA or Germany prior to 70’s
Russia and ECC in the 90s *
the west nowadays W-
Source: author compiled
China was to some extent different from the global trend of both economic and political 
decentralizations. Economically, administrative and fiscal decentralizations did widely 
take place in China after 1978, as evident by the fact that local governments gained 
more powers to handle trade, approvals for FDI, and budgetary and off-budgetary 
revenues and expenditures.55 However, politically, there was no significant sign of 
devolution happening in China which was still tightly controlled by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). As the ‘party controls the cadres’, local governments were not 
elected directly by the people but decided by upper-level governments mainly on the 
basis of their economic performance during their tenures. In other words, post-Mao 
China can be understood involving a combination of economic decentralization with
55 According to China’s administrative system, sub-national governments involve political and economic 
entities at four kinds of spatial scales provincial-level, prefecture-level, county-level, and township and 
town level (Ma 2005).
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political centralization (Figure 4-2), which I shall refer to as asymmetric 
decentralization.
Structure of the chapter
In the previous chapter, I focused on policy innovations as a local response to the 
stimulus of global restructuring. In this chapter, the focus will be on the significance of 
decentralization and responses to the stimulus of changing governmental structures. 
The main argument is that local policy innovations can be understood as a consequence 
of changing responsibilities and competences between central and local governments, 
and particularly of its asymmetric form in post-Mao China (Figure 4-2). More 
specifically, I argue that the phenomenon of local policy innovation reflects the 
significance of this asymmetry for career-minded local officials who utilize their 
decentralized ‘economic resources’ to strive for more development, which in turn 
becomes their ‘political capital’ with the upper-level governments to get them 
promoted.
Therefore, the reminder of the chapter is divided into four main sections. First is a 
quick review of the local-central relationship prior to 1978. The operations of economic 
decentralization and political centralization are demonstrated in the second and third 
sections respectively. Then, in the fourth section, consequences of ‘asymmetric 
decentralization’ are identified with two spatial scales: local and national. At a local/ 
individual region scale, there are mechanisms to encourage local policy innovations 
along with local unsustainable development. The other two consequences include: 
national stability and territorial competition at the national/ aggregate scale.
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4-2 Decentralization in China: a History prior to 1978
From historical China until 1949
The issue of the local-central relations has been one of the hottest topics throughout 
Chinese history. As early as the Qin dynasty (about 200 B.C.) and Han dynasty (about 
200 B.C. to 200 A.D), there were debates and power struggles over systems of 
commanderies (jun xian zhi) vis-a-vis system of counties ifeng jian zhi). The former 
refers to a unified and centralized political system with local administrative 
commanderies governed by the king of the empire. But the latter points to a 
decentralized system with each local administration belonging to different royal 
descendent families that held relatively independent authority and power (Hao and Lin 
1994). The rise and fall of different dynasties in Chinese history witnessed the various 
ways of handling central- local relationship between system of commanderies and that 
of counties.
In the early 20th century, partly because of the ailing state capacity of the late Qing 
China and partly because of aggressive western imperialism, these was a dynastic 
breakdown and imminent territorial dismemberment along with a rising movement for 
regionalism and federalism (Levenson 1967; Kuhn 1975; Hao and Lin 1994; Yang 
2003). Related to that was the wartime experience of CPP before 1949. There was the 
so-called ‘Yan’an tradition’ borne out of CCP’s guerrilla military knowledge from 
fighting against the Japanese and Nationalist army in the 1930s and 1940s. One of 
characteristics of the Yan’an tradition was a decentralized decision-making framework 
to encourage a policy of ‘doing the best implementation according to local conditions’ 
(yin di zhi yi) (Goodman 1994).
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Oscillation process: 1949 to 1978
After 1949, there was an oscillation between economic centralization and 
decentralization until the death of Mao (Unger 1987; Zhao 1994; Qian 1999b). During 
1953-57, the period of the First Five-Year Plan, China began to implement heavy 
industrial development. By doing so, the prices for products and essential materials 
were distorted by the centre. And resources and budget distributions were also 
centralized under the control of the State Planning Committee in Beijing. The number 
of enterprises subordinated to the central government increased from 2,800 in 1953 to 
9,300 in 1957; and the number of items in material allocation under central planning 
increased from 55 in 1952 to 231 in 1957 (Table 4-1) (Unger 1987; Qian and Weingast 
1996).
Table 4-1: Decentralization prior to 1978
1953 1957 Dec 1958 1963 1971-1972
the number o f materials subject to 
unified distribution by central 
departments
227 532 132 500 217
the number of enterprises under 
direct central control 2,800 9,300 1,200 10,000 2,000
the number of industrial products 
controlled by the State Planning 
Committee
55* 231 67** 370*** 49
decentralization- centralization ...... .........► ---• .......* ’— ...... ....... ..
Note*, ** and **: the data for the number of industrial products by the State Planning committee was 
that in 1952, 1959 and 1965 respectively.
Source: from Huang (1996b) and Nolan (1995)
In late 1957, Mao called for decentralization for many reasons. First, he deliberately 
deviated from the Soviet model after China broke up with Russia; and second, he also 
built up support by playing to the provinces (Shirk 1992; Zhao 1994). He argued that 
administrative decentralization would mobilize provincial initiative in accelerating
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economic development.56 Therefore, new system of ownership by local governments to 
people communes was introduced (Unger 1987; Zhao 1994). By 1958, the items of 
industrial products and projects originally administrated by central government were 
reduced drastically (Table 4-1 above). This is the first round of the centralization- 
decentralization.
Many provinces established their own self-sufficient industrial complex as a 
consequence of the 1957 decentralization, resulting in economic turmoil over 
production and inefficient resource allocation (Zhao 1994). Such self-sufficient 
development was followed by the Great Leap Forward (GLF) movement, which 
became economic and political disasters (Cannon 2004). The radical decentralization 
during 1957-1958 was the institutional basis of the GLF movement. Therefore, in the 
wake of its failure, China called for a restoration of economic centralization in 1959. 
Almost all large- and middle-sized enterprises, which had been previously transferred 
downward to local governments, were returned to the central government in the early 
1960s (Table 4-1 above) (Unger 1987).
But due to the considerations of the on-going Vietnam War and already-deteriorating
Sino-Soviet relations, most national investment, which was highly associated with
military construction through 1960s and 1970s, was again decentralized to the interior
regions of China, particularly in the so-called ‘the Third Front (san xian) Region’
(Naughton 1988; Ma and Wei 1997). In 1970, the centre asked each provincial
government to establish an independent and comprehensive industrial system. Local
56 In 1957 in his famous speech lun shi da guan xi(On the Ten Major Relationships), Mao pointed out 
the importance of decentralization. Mao argued: ‘Our territory is so vast, our population is so large and 
the conditions are so complex that it is far better to have the initiatives from both the central and the local 
authorities than from one source alone. We must not follow the example of the Soviet Union in 
concentrating everything in the hands of the central authorities, shackling the local authorities and 
denying them the right to independent action’ (cited from Qian and Weingast 1997).
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governments were given the freedom to invest in 19 non-industrial sectors, such as 
agriculture, cattle breeding, fishing, and transportation, and the like. In addition, 
authority over industries, for example, artificial fertilizers, cement, and coal, and so on, 
were also decentralized to the local and regional governments (Zhao 1994; Qian 1999b). 
By 1971, only 140 of the very largest factory complexes remained in central ministerial 
hands, compared with more than 10,000 factories in 1965 (Unger 1987). To sum up, in 
terms of the numbers of materials and enterprises subject to the control of the central 
government, there was a recentralization in the early 1960s and then decentralization in 
the 1970s. This was the second round of re-centralization and re-decentralization.
Summary
By the late 1970s, Mao’s China had already experienced an oscillating process of 
centralization and decentralization. There are three points that need to be made about 
this. First, the process of local-central dynamics in Mao’s period intertwined political 
and economic factors (Cannon 2004). In the late 1950s, Mao’s political motivation for 
decentralization was to build up his provincial supporters in order to counter his 
political opponents in Beijing (Bo 2000b). In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the 
other political concerns for decentralization was to establish self-sufficiency military 
preparations during the Cold War (Qian and Weingast 1996).
Second, despite the alternating phrases of recentralization and redecentralization, the 
overall trend was still toward greater economic decentralization, particularly compared 
to the vertically integrated system established in the early 1950s (Zhao 1994). In 1978, 
the share of industrial output of state-owned enterprises controlled by the centre 
remained less than half of the national total. More than 300 counties and municipalities 
set up small steel mills due to the then principle of self-reliant local industrialization.
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About 90% of counties built up agricultural machinery repair factories. The 
development of the local economy on the basis of such self-reliance, which was 
officially sanctioned and encouraged by the centre, in reality not only prompted many 
localities to further strengthen their economic capacities as well as eroded central 
planning and the centre’s power to control regional economies (Goldstein 1995; Qian 
and Weingast 1996; Qian 1999b).
Third, however, in terms of political concerns, China was still under the tight control of 
the central government in Beijing. In other words, prior to 1978, the rigid ideology of 
the centre with control over military and media had dominated policy and the 
decision-making process for local economic development, depriving local leaders of the 
incentives to risk their political fates for local interests. Unapproved changes would be 
stopped soon after they got found and the leaders of these jurisdictions were purged. 
As a consequence, uniform local compliance was general, strengthening of central 
control at the expense of local discretion (Zweig 1991; Hong 1997; Cao, Qian et al.
1999).
4-3 Economic Decentralizations to the Local
In China, the first and foremost process since 1978 was the devolution of government 
authority from the central to local level (Qian and Roland 1998). It must be noted that 
there was also a setback for recentralization after decentralization in the 1980s. The 
crackdown on dissent in the 1989 ‘Tiananmen Incident’ and its aftermath created a
57 For example, in the late 1950s, two local party secretaries, DENG Zili o f Zigong prefecture and 
ZHANG Fengwu of Jiangjin prefecture introduced new policies to abandon public canteens and to 
establish a contract system in rural areas. In the end, however, the implementations were halted and the 
leaders were purged (Hong 1997).
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reverse policy environment against decentralization. From 1989 to 1991 an austerity 
program to cool down the then overheated economy was tried. The idea of the 
possibility of ‘re- collectivizing’ agriculture was even discussed (Qian and Weingast 
1996).
Despite this reserved oscillation, however, at least two differences between the 
recentralization prior to 1978 and that after 1978 can be identified. First, Mao’s 
decentralizations maintained a continuing communist and centrally planned economic 
system. Prices were not decided by the market mechanism but set by central 
bureaucracy (Perkins 1988). By contrast, decentralization after 1978 went along with a 
process of marketization and deregulation, as shown in Chapter Two. The second 
difference is in whether or not there was local resistance as a consequence of such 
setbacks for recentralization. Previously, the turn to decentralization after 
recentralization was basically triggered by the central government in Beijing. However, 
after 1978, the new round of decentralization following the ‘Tiananmen Incident’ was 
partly due to Deng’s South Tour and partly because of strong disobedience and 
resistance from market-oriented local reformers. The recentralization of trade 
management and planned prices failed as most of the coastal regions refused to comply 
with the new policies (Hao and Lin 1994; Zhang and Zou 1994).
Administrative decentralization
The main effects of economic decentralization after 1978 can be identified as 
administrative and fiscal decentralizations in relation to greater economic autonomy. 
Administrative decentralizations in post Mao China covered many dimensions of 
economic activities, including investment, land use, and management of public-owned 
companies. For example, in terms of investment control, defined as review procedures
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and approval authority for investment, the items approved by the State Planning 
Committee fell from 41% of all products in 1981 down to 33% in 1990 (Zhang and Zou 
1994; Huang 1996b). Related to that, local governments were granted much greater 
powers to manage trade and FDI activities, which I have discussed in Chapter Two. 
And power over land use was also decentralized. Defining the purpose of land use and 
assigning land use rights had become primarily local government decisions. Land use 
right became saleable items after the 1988 amendment of the Constitution. As a 
consequence, local governments exerted influence on the pricing and transfer of land 
use right. And industrial and commercial land use had been subject to various newly 
imposed levies, including urban real estate tax starting from 1986, an urban land use tax 
from 1988, and a capital gains tax on land appreciation from 1994. These levies 
constituted a major source of local government revenue (Yeh and Wu 1999; Lin 2001).
In addition, in the early 1980s, more state-owned enterprises were delegated to local 
governments. By 1985, state-owned industrial enterprises controlled by the centre 
accounted for only 20% of total industrial output, while provincial and municipal 
governments controlled 45% and county governments 9%, and the rest 26% came from 
township enterprises (Montinola, Qian et al. 1995). Moreover, there was an increasing 
number of establishments of township and village enterprises (TVEs). In the case of the 
TVEs, local officials were de facto owners of TVEs with various types of bidding and 
leasing arrangement, acting just like entrepreneurs of local profit-seeking companies 
(Oi 1995; 1998; Edin2000).
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Fiscal decentralization of budgetary revenue prior to 1994
The fiscal local-central relationship during Mao period was modelled after the Soviet 
Union. Local governments remitted most of their taxes and profits to the centre and 
then received transfers for expenditures from the national budget according to 
expenditure needs approved by the centre (Tong 1989; Wei 1996). The limitations of 
such the centralized revenue collection along with inter regional budget transfer 
included: a lack of incentive for local fiscal efforts, excessive control of local revenue 
and expenditure by the centre, a lack of fiscal power for sub-provincial administration, 
and one-size-fit-all programs without taking account of regional differences (Tong 
1989). After 1978, fiscal decentralization was introduced as the most important 
big-scale transition reform package in China (Qi 1995; Solnick 1996; Oi 1998).58 Two 
stages of fiscal decentralization can be identified with 1994 as watershed.
The first stage of fiscal reform took place from the early 1980s until 1994. The package 
was characterized by the fact that the centre negotiated with each provincial 
government a fixed lump sum or proportion of its revenue that they had to hand over to 
the centre for the next several years, and then the provincial governments retained the 
remainder after fulfilling their obligations. The diversified contract-based schemes were 
applied to different provinces (Wei 1996; Bahl 1998; 1999; Bird and Wong 2005). For 
example, in the first run during 1980-1984, the central government in Beijing allowed 
Guangdong and Fujian to retain 100% of their above-quota revenues in order to support 
their pioneer reforms. By contrast, Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, three centrally 
administrative municipalities, were only allowed to retain small portions of their
58 Facing the uncertainty of transition, privatization is the main focus of transition in Eastern Europe and 
Russia and largely driven by the centre. Instead, major tasks of privatization in China were initiated by 
some local governments which gained greater economic powers after fiscal decentralization (Qian and 
Roland 1998).
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revenues (Table 4-2). Such fiscal contract system (chai zheng cheng bao zhi), also 
known as ‘eating in separate kitchens (fen zao chi fan)', basically applied to the 
relationship between provincial and their prefecture governments and the relationship 
between prefecture and county governments, and so on.
Table 4-2: Fiscal reforms in post-Mao China
Stage Period Change Policy of Fiscal Regimes
1980-1984 
fiscal Contracting 
System, ‘eating in 
separate kitchens’
■ Fixed rate o f remittance (Jiangsu);
■ Sharing specific revenue (15 provinces);
■ Ethnic minority system (8 provinces);
■ Metropolitan system (Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin);




■ Fixed rate o f total revenue retained by province (14 provinces)
■ Province retaining own revenues with receiving fixed quota 
from centre (13 provinces)
■ Province retaining own revenues with paying fixed quota to 





■ Basic sharing with growth (10 provinces and cities);
■ Basic sharing rate (3 provinces);
■ Incremental sharing (3 provinces);
■ Fixed quota with growth (2 provinces);
■ Fixed quota to state (3 provinces);
■ Fixed payment to deficit provinces (16 provinces and Cities)
stage II 1994-
tax sharing system ■ Tax-assignment system (all provinces)
Source: modified from Bahl (1998)
Two points are noteworthy. First, the ex post tax retained for the local in China was 
very similar to the ex ante plan contracted between the central and the local 
governments (Litwack and Qian 1998; Qian 1999c; Blanchard and Shleifer 2000; Jin, 
Qian et al. 2005). It means that the centre did not expropriate the rewards of unusually 
high local fiscal revenues. Before 1994, the revenues of the local governments grew 
much faster than that of the centre (Figure 4-3). But many provincial governments were 
still able to retain 100% of the addition to total local revenue, which effectively made 
them residual claimant. Such consistency between the ex-ante and ex-post situations 
was in sharp contrast to Russia, where the central government in Moscow continuously
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broke the contracts with the local governments and sought to renegotiate its tax 
agreements with regions (Litwack and Qian 1998; Qian 1999c). Increases in cities and 
metropolitans revenue were almost entirely offset by decreases in shared revenues from 
the regional governments. It meant that the shift between ex-ante and ex-post revenue 
sharing arrangements hindered local governments’ incentives for collecting tax as well 
as their provision of infrastructure for private business development (Zhuravskaya 2000; 
Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya 2003). From this regard, China’s fiscal reform offered a 
more ‘predictable’ environment in that local officials were motivated to collect more 
tax because they knew that they would actually be able to retain more after fulfilling the 
central quota.59
Figure 4-3: Budgetary revenue of the centre and the local (unit: billion RMB)
■ Central 
OLoc.1
n n  n n  n n  fl
MA  II 1 J
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97
Source: China Statistics Abstract (2002)
On top of that, the central state’s revenue raising capacities had been significantly 
weakened at this stage. By then, local governments were the tax collectors, levying 
taxes from taxpayers within their jurisdiction. In order to expand their local revenues, 
they made deals with local enterprises to hold back as much local funds as possible 
from central extraction (Wang 1994). The reasons why these businesspersons were
59 However, it does not mean that the centre was just willing to follow the number in the contract by then. 
Shirk notes that then fact that fiscal contract remained fixed somehow was also a compromised and 




willing to comply were also because local officials could help them to reduce tax 
revenue and look for more resources. As a consequence, local governments could just 
collect enough tax to fulfil basic quotas set up by the central governments, and set 
many reduced tax rates and granted ad hoc tax relief to enterprises in order to keep the 
wealth in the localities (so-cllaed ‘cang fu  yu min’) (Qian and Stiglitz 1996). For 
example, local officials in Guangdong in the early 1990s made such an ‘innovation’ in 
raising their budgetary revenue by the way that local enterprises were usually 
‘encouraged’ to pick up the tabs for certain public expenditures (Qian and Stiglitz 1996). 
In 1988, 10 billion RMB of national taxes were reduced in such ways (Zhang and Zou 
1994). The declining central revenue can be seen that the gap between central revenue 
and local revenues were getting bigger since reform started in the 1980s (Bahl 1998; 
Wang and Hu 1999). Before 1994, the central revenue only consisted around 20% to 
40% of the total revenue (Figure 4-3 above and 4-4).60
Figure 4-4: Revenue share of the central government, 1982-2000
Source: China Statistics Abstract (2002)
Fiscal reform in 1994
The second stage of fiscal reform started as an experiment in nine provinces, 
autonomous regions and separately-planned cities (ji hua dan lie shi) in 1993 before
60 However, fiscal autonomy was actually geographically uneven among provinces. Wedemen argues 
that without central subsidies, all but eight provinces still remained dependent upon the centre for 
budgetary subsidies in 1992 because they received ‘net transfer’ from central budget (Wedeman 1999).
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being finally implemented nationwide in 1994. The so-called ‘tax sharing system (fen 
suan zhiy  involved several changes. First, rather than a negotiated contract, the reform 
clearly divided the taxes into three distinct categories: central,61 local,62 and a shared 
value added tax (VAT) (Zhang 1999). VAT was introduced to become the major indirect 
tax to be collected by the centre and be shared by local government at a fixed ratio of 
75% to 25%. Second, the tax structure was simplified and tax rates were standardized 
and applied to all provinces. Third, tax administration was centralized in order to 
resolve the abuses remitting from the 1980s local governments’ de facto control over 
tax collection administration. Instead of entrusting local tax offices with the task of 
collecting virtually all taxes, the centre now established its own revenue collection 
agency. Discretionary power of subnational governments in this area became much 
more limited than before (Wang 1997; Bird and Wong 2005).
There were also certain political and economic background factors encouraging the 
centre to introduce new programmes. First, due to the uneven regional development 
over a decade, some officials from interior regions would like the central government to 
do more, such as reformulating fiscal policy, to establish better and fairer macro 
development environment. Second, in some cases the party secretary and province 
governor within a single provincial unit competed against each other. The lack of 
political cohesion within a locality tended to undermine the locality’s degree of 
autonomy, giving the centre an opportunity to intervene. And the central state still
61 Central revenue includes customs duties, the consumption tax, VAT revenues collected by customs, 
income taxes from central enterprises, banks and non-bank financial intermediaries; the remitted profits, 
income taxes, business taxes, and urban construction and maintenance taxes of the railroad, bank 
headquarters and insurance companies; and resource taxes on offshore oil extraction.
62 Local revenue consists of business taxes (excluding those names aboe as central fixed incomes), 
income taxes and profit remittances of local enterprises, urban land use taxes, personal income taxes, 
urban construction and maintenance tax, real estate taxes, vehicle utilization tax, the stamp tax, animal 
slaughter tax, agricultural taxes, title tax, capital gains tax on land, state land sales revenues, resource 
taxes derived from land-based resources, and the securities trading tax.
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possessed the most powerful resource, of appointment and removal of provincial-level 
leaders (Yang 1994).
Of course, the central government in Beijing made great efforts in order to implement 
the new fiscal program. In 1994, the then PRC president JIANG Zemin and then 
vice-PM ZHU Ronji took extensive trips to each province to convince individual local 
officials to accept the new reform. Zhu also strategically had one-on-one sessions with 
local chieftains rather than call a large meeting of the ‘warlords’ to avoid any possibility 
that the latter ganged up together on him (Yang 1994). A more important thing was the 
‘material exchange’. The central government in Beijing promised to guarantee the 
revenue level of provinces compared to the base year 1993 with the adoption of a 
special transfer payment mechanism to the provinces (shui shou fan huan) (Zhang 1999; 
Qian 1999c; Hsu 2000).63 In terms of budgetary revenue, after 1994 the centre 
successfully retained more fiscal and financial power than they did in the 1980s. The 
central revenue rose dramatically up to around 50%-60% of the total revenue raised 
(Ma and Norregaard 1998) (Figure 4-3 and 4-4 above).
Extrabudgetary and extra extrabudgetary revenues
However, the sharing of budgetary revenues was only one aspect of fiscal
decentralization under the period of post-Mao China. The other was the so-called
extrabudgetary and extra-extrabudgetary revenues (Bahl 1999; Zhang 1999; Wong and
Bhattasali 2003; Bird and Wong 2005). The extrabudgetary revenue referred to the
funds not arranged and managed by governmental budgets but self-raised and used by
63 The tax repayment mechanism consisted of the base-year revenue and revenue increases in the 
provinces. The former was die shortfall o f revenue suffered by an individual province under the new 
system in comparison with retained revenue in 1993; the latter represent 30% of any increases in the 
central government’s revenue from VAT and consumption tax in that province over the previous year 
(Zhang 1999). Also because of the tax repayment mechanism, Hsu (2000) argues that the fiscal reform 
after 1994 seemed not so successful in raising the revenue extractive capacity of the centre.
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various localities, governmental sectors, state-owned enterprises and institutions, within 
the limits of relevant administrative regulation. And the extra- extrabudgetary revenue, 
genuinely new in the Chinese public budgetary system appearing in the 1980s and 
exploding in the 1990s, concerns other funds self-raised by various local governments 
and their departments, without approval from the State Council, the Ministry of Finance 
and the State Planning Committee of central government (Fan 1998; Wong 1998; Ma
2000). 64 Even when cities and regions lost from the resharing of budgetary revenue 
after 1994, many of them managed to improve their resources through enhanced 
collection of extrabudgetary and extra-extrabudgetary revenue with legally-ambiguous 
or even illegal means of local taxes and fees.
Extrabudgetary revenue can be divided into two parts. The first involved a set of taxes 
that were controlled by the local government financial department, including public 
utility surcharge or urban construction and maintenance taxes. The second was the 
retained earning and depreciation funds of locally-owned public entrepreneurs (Bahl 
1998; Ma 2000). Such extrabudgetary funds could be as large as the formal revenues, 
making a complex system of ‘fiscal dualism’ (Wong 1998). Both the central and local 
governments had collected extrabudgetary revenues since the early 1980s. However, 
after 1994, the volumes of central extrabudgetary revenue and the proportion in its total 
revenue were dramatically decreased. By stark contrast, the local extrabudgetary 
revenue had a key role, growing in absolutely term and amounting to about 60 % of 
total local budgetary revenues in the late 1990s (Figure 4-5).65
64 So far scholars still make no consensus on the suitable terms for extra-extrabudgetary revenue. Wong 
(1998) and Fan (1998) use ‘off-budget (yu suan wai)’ to refer to extra-extrabudgetary revenue; but Ma 
(2000) terms ‘off-institutional (zhi du wai)' revenue as extra-extrabudgetary revenue and then combines 
extrabudgetary and extra-extrabudgetary revenue together as *off-budgetary’ revenue. Moreover, several 
other terms used for the same category, such as ‘out-of-system’, ‘unregulated’, ‘off-record’, or 
‘self-raised’, and ‘extra-establishment funds’ also can be found in the literature.
65 One point needs to be noticed that the importance of extrabudgetary revenue is uneven distributed
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Figure 4-5: Extrabudgetary revenue since the 1980s
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Note: the left is the total amount o f extrabudgetary revenue collected by the central government and local
governments. The unit is billion RMB. The right is the proportion of extrabudgetary revenue in terms o f 
budgetary revenue.
Source: China Statistics Abstract (2002)
Regarding extra-extrabudgetary revenue, five sources can be identified: social security 
funds, public contribution to local government projects, funds shifted from budgetary 
revenue and extrabudgetary funds, ‘little pots of gold’ (accumulating from the 
governmental business operated by various governmental departments and from illegal 
administrative charges), and self-raised funds and collected funds of township 
governments (Zhang 1999; Ma 2000). Ma (2000) tries to quantify extra- extrabudgetary 
revenue that total amount of extrabudgetary revenue in terms of local fiscal revenue in 
each year was estimated to be around 20% before 1993 and around 15% from 1993 to 
1998. To sum up, on the revenue side, the size, growth and increasing complexity of 
extra-extrabudgetary revenue corresponded to an erosion of central Beijing power to 
tax (Brean 1998).
across provinces. Lin (2005) finds out that in 2000, there are five provinces ( Shanxi, Beijing, Ningxia, 
Jiangxi, and Fujian) with more than 5% o f extrabudgetary revenue in terms o f GDP, along with seven 
provinces (Tibet, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Hebei, Tianjin, Hubei, Qianghai) less than 3%.
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Politics beyond economic decentralization
There are many reasons why a wide-range of decentralization in economic fields took 
place after 1978. First of all, after the disaster of the Cultural Revolution, some 
reformers in the centre viewed fiscal decentralization as a way for China to narrow the 
scope of state intervention and then head in the direction of a market economy (Wang 
1994). On top of that, from the late 1970s, in order to tackle the problems accumulated 
during the Cultural Revolution, China implemented many new social and economic 
programmes. Therefore the centre ran a huge fiscal deficit. In 1979 and 1980 alone, the 
total deficit reached RMB 34.8 billion, exceeding the total deficit in the previous 29 
years of RMB 24.8 billion. In order not to risk inflation, the centre did not print more 
bank notes. Therefore, the only one way left for the centre was to require localities to 
bear more financial responsibilities (Wang 1994). This is why the burden of fiscal 
expenditure was decentralized as well as revenues as local governments assumed 
greater responsibility for providing culture, education, science, health, housing and 
local infrastructure and so forth (Qian and Weingast 1996; Lee 1998; Zhang 1999).
In addition, such economic decentralizations offered material incentives to those local 
leaders who devoted themselves to transition policies. The material incentives, like 
salary, bonuses and fringe benefits, including luxury cars and travel and large expense 
accounts, were pegged to local public revenue. Under the new fiscal programs after 
1978, local revenue left after remitting to the central government could be used to 
sponsor housing projects, to increase bonuses, to provide various forms of local 
collective welfare, and so on. It means that in some cases the larger the volume of local 
revenues local officials collected, the more likely the local officials would personally 
benefit from fiscal revenue decentralization (Wang 1994; Li 1998). With a case study in 
Zouping in Shandong province, Morduch and Terry (2000) found that local officials
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had continued gaining benefits from die pace of reforms by taking advantage of 
preferential access to wage employment and productive assets involved with the 
operation and effectiveness of township and village enterprises. It means that there was 
a strong economic incentive for local officials making innovation to raise revenues for 
the local economy as well as for themselves.
Moreover, as discussed in Chapter Two, there was a power struggle in Beijing between 
market-oriented reformers and the conservatives. Any opening-up and quasi- market 
reforms took place in an oscillating process with cyclical fluctuations (Crane 1990; 
Howell 1993; Zhu 2005). Phases of reform and relaxation alternated with phases of 
relative restriction and retrenchment. The former can be called expansions of 
deregulation (fang); and the latter contractions (shou). For example, in the first run 
from 1978 to 1979, ‘criterion of truth’ debate, and democracy wall and the third plenum 
of the 11th central committee in 1978 were followed by the arrest of WEI Jingsheng, a 
famous dissenter, and the announcement of four cardinal principles. Further expansions 
and contractions took place in turn in the 1980s (Table 4-3). These cycles of reform 
expansion and contraction showed vividly the intensification of factional conflicts 
between market-minded reformers and the conservatives and requiring periodic 
personal intervention by Deng (Shirk 1993; Baum 1994).66
66 Of course, the factional politics was only one of the effective factors to explain the circle of expansion 
and contraction. Other factors, such as the aftermaths of the unexpected death of HU Yaobang, or the 
impact of the unexpected democratic movement in East Europe in the late 1980s, also have to be 
considered (Baum 1994).
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Table 4-3: China’s cyclical reforms in the 1980s
year/phase Key events
First round 
1978 (fang) ‘Criterion o f truth’ debate 
Democracy Wall
The 3 rd plenum of the 11th central committee
1978 (shou) The Arrestment o f WEI Jiangsheng 
Four Cardinal principles
Second round 
1980 (fang) Local elections
1981 (shou) Economic readjustment 
Bai Hua criticized
Third round 
1982 (fang) Consistution revised 
‘humanism’ and ‘alienation’ debate
1983 (shou) Anti-spiritual pollution campaign
Four round 
1984 (fang) Urban reform and ‘open cities’ 
Cultural and artistic freedom
1985 (shou) Economic retrenchment 
Critique o f bourgeois liberalization
Fifth round 
1986 (fang) Student demonstration
1987 (shou) HU Yaobang dismissed
Campaign against ‘bourgeois liberalization’
Sixth round 
1988 (fang) Neo-authoritarianism (late 1987) 
Administrative reform
1989 (shou) Economic reform frozen (late 1988) 
Tiananmen crackdown
Source: Baum (1994)
In order to win the power struggles, there were two strategies manipulated by reformers. 
One was the dual-track system, discussed in Chapter Two. The other, more relevant to 
the local-central relationship was a strategy of ‘playing to the local’. The leadership 
structure within the central committee of CCP enfranchised three major blocs: officials 
from the government and party in Beijing, from the provinces and from People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) (Shirk 1992; Marti 2002; Sheng 2005).67 Of the three, the
67 The package o f the three agents in CCP central committee is to some extent useful to understanding 
China’s politics. After the ‘Tiananmen Incident’, Deng was reported to have forged a negotiated alliance 
among these three. The PLA supported Deng’s reform agenda with a condition that the centre promised 
to finance continued military modernization. The provincial leaders who wanted to practice more market 
reforms were urged to offer more revenue to the central government for the maintenance o f social
130
provincial groups were the largest bloc within the central committee of CCP since 1978. 
In terms of the structure of the politburo of CCP Central Committee, the provincial 
shares held steady at around 14-20 % from 1985 (Sheng 2005). In order to strive for 
more support, market-oriented reformers in Beijing attempted to build supports for their 
initiatives by making coalitions with advocates of provincial reforms. By a strategy of 
‘playing to the provinces’, certain powers were devolved to the provinces rather than 
retaining them in the ministries (Shirk 1992). Consequently, the reformers in Beijing 
were unwilling to see that their reform- minded local allies became targets of critics by 
their conservative counterparts. The centre allocated more autonomy and power in 
order to help them tackle development problems. In certain policy cases, central 
officials even intentionally turned a blind eye to local discretionary acts carried out by 
their pro-reform allies (Cheung 1994).
4-4 Political Centralization under the Party
Local leaders not elected but assigned
By moving from the Maoist version of Marxist- Leninism to a pragmatic 
market-oriented approach, a shift in ideology undoubtedly had underpinned the reforms 
since 1978. For example, the rhetoric of socialism had been changed to ‘socialist 
market economy’ in November 1993. The new CCP chapter had been changed to allow 
capitalists to apply for memberships of CCP in the beginning of 21st century. However, 
there was the persistence of a very strong party-state at the central and local levels in 
China, referring to its penetration into the market and its dual roles as regulators and 
participants in economic production, capital accumulation and urban development (Ma 
and Wu 2005). Local leaders at all but village and township (and some county) levels
stability by the centre (Marti 2002).
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were assigned by the next upper government rather than elected directly by the local 
people. This is a major difference from most western and post-communist economies 
where political devolution or decentralization in recent years was to localities with local 
elections. In China, however, upper-level governments controlled the personnel 
appointments to the lower-level governments. It means that beyond economic 
decentralization, the centre politically still could manage local governments (Huang 
1996a; 1996b; Edin 2000).
Mechanisms of personnel management
As shown in Chapter Three, the significance of post-Mao China still being dominated 
by one-party communist control is that basically the party still overrides the 
administrative, legislative, and judicial systems. Party ‘documentations (wen j ia n f  
outweigh laws and regulations. Apart from that, the Leninist principle ‘the party 
controls the cadres (dang guan gan buy involved a unique personnel management 
system, namely, the nomenclature, which consists of two main mechanisms. First, there 
is a list of leading positions over whose appointments the Party exercises full control. 
Second, there is another list of those persons suitable to fill the positions, the so-called 
cadre reserve (Bums 1987; Heilmann and Kirchberger 2000; Chan 2004). Under the 
nomenclature system, the upper-level governments exercised authority over the 
appointments of party cadres and government officials, including promotion, dismissal 
and transfer. The appointment decision is based on a relatively systematic screening of 
the credentials and the past history and performance of the candidates under 
consideration. In 1984, there was a decentralization of nomenclature (bian zhi). The 
central committee of the CCP in Beijing kept the power of personnel management for 
the top two levels of the hierarchy (namely, the central and provincial levels), but not to 
posts below that. Similarly, provincial governments and parties only kept control the
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appointment for prefecture-level posts and decentralized their nomenclature power over 
county-level posts to the prefecture leaders (Huang 1996a; Tsui and Wang 2004).
Without local elections, there are several mechanisms of personnel management of
local leaders, including cross-posting, rotating and promoting to upper positions
(Huang 2002). First, cross-posting refers to a practice whereby an official was
simultaneously posted to two positions: one seat in the governmental position and the
other seat in party position. For example, provincial party secretaries double as the
politburo of central committee for CCP and speakers of provincial People’s Congress
(Huang 2002). Second, rotating is a practice whereby officials are shifted among
equally-ranked positions (Huang 2002; Edin 2003a). In China, four main bureaucratic
ranks can be identified: ministry (bu j i ), department (ting ji), division, and section (ke
ji). Each rank covers two to three echelons. In between are semi-ministry level (fu bu ji)
in the middle of ministry and department. And similarly, there were semi-department
(fu ting ji), semi-division (fu chu ji), and semi-section (fu ke ji)  (Table 4-4) (Lieberthal
and Oksenberg 1988; Yang 2003). Provincial governors can be rotated to be governors
of other provinces or ministers of departments in the State Council. Prefecture-level
party secretaries can be rotated to department heads in the provincial governments
(Huang 2002). Finally, there is related to the second, promotion of officials to
upper-rank positions.68 In most cases, the promotion involves a one-echelon upgrading,
such as from section level to semi-division level. But in some exceptional cases, these
may be two-echelon upgrading, such as from section-level directly to division-level; or
from department- level directly to minister-level (Huang 2002).
68 It also needs to be noted that the latest development in China is that some local governments are 
experimenting with the separation of cadre rank from place rank, for example, Guangdong practices a 
new system that chiefs of counties are able to be ranked as department scale (tingji) as political 
promotion, depending on their economic performance. As expected, such the new system very well 
stimulates cadres' enthusiasm for work of local economic development. News source: xin hua wang 
(Guangdong channel), 2005/08/19.
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Table 4-4: Main bureaucratic ranks
name party or government positions Echelon
- General secretary of CCP, or president, premier 1
-
Politburo members, politburo candidate 
members, vice president, vice premiers and 
state council member,
2-3
bu j i ministers, provincial party secretaries, 
provincial governors 3-5
tingji*
bureau chief (in the party and in the State 
Council), department head (in the provinces), 
and prefecture-level administration party 
secretaries and chiefs
5-7
chu j i division heads, county-level administration party secretaries and chiefs 7-10
ke j i section head, township-level administration party secretaries and chiefs 9-12
— Depute section heads, section clerks, ordinary clerks 9-15
Note: ‘tingji’ also covers bureaus in the party (ju ji)  or in the State Council (si ji) 
Source: from Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988) and Yang (2003)
Performance-based appointment system
Furthermore, through centralized nomenclature, personnel management is more or less 
performance-based. The significant roles of factions and tests o f loyalty to communism 
in the cadre-selecting process in China politics during the Mao period during the Mao 
period have been widely emphasised (Tsou 1986; Fewsmith 2000; Li 2001). However, 
since the late 1970s, the reformist leaders began to stress the importance of monitoring 
on-job performances. In a national organization work conference held in 1983, for the 
first time CCP started to discuss the importance of moving away from the subjective 
evaluations of political attitudes and work styles- which were now characterized as 
special measures for the Cultural Revolution- to greater weight to assessment of 
concrete economic achievements (Whiting 2001).
In order to perform the task of evaluating the local performance, the central government 
in Beijing first established two specialized institutions. One was the General Auditing 
Administration (GAA) in 1983 to audit investment and fiscal affairs of government
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agencies and firms. The other was the Ministry of Supervision (MOS) in 1987 to detect 
and discipline those officials engaging in illicit conducts. However, both GAA and 
MOS encountered difficulties in performing effective monitoring because of ‘dual 
leadership’. The central MOS and GAA set guidelines for local operations; however, 
they did not have authority over local personnel. The local MOS and GAA had resident 
inspectors to supervise and audit governmental behaviours but their budgets were borne 
by the very units they were sent to monitor (Huang 1996b).
Since MOS and GAA failed in the task of supervising and evaluating local performance, 
China tried another solution to gauge the competence of local leaders. In 1988, the CCP 
Department of Organization established official guidelines for an annual evaluation of 
party secretaries and government executives at the county and township level. Called 
‘target responsibility system’, the guidelines were an attempt to standardize and 
systematize evaluation of cadre performance on a wide range of functions at the local 
level) (Edin 2000; Whiting 2001; Edin 2003a; Tsui and Wang 2004). These used three 
main categories of indicators. First were economic measures including aggregate 
growth rates and per capita GDP levels, state taxation and local fiscal capacity, urban 
and rural living standards, agricultural production and agricultural development, state 
asset management, enterprise operation and development, infrastructure (like 
transportation, telecommunication, water, urban construction, and power stations). A 
second related social development and spiritual and civil conditions, including numbers 
of petitions to higher levels of governments, fertility control, social stability, education, 
culture, environmental protection. The third involved about party performance, such as 
ideological and political conditions, building a leadership team, building of a 
democratic appraisal meeting, and building of party grassroots organizations (Edin 
2003a; Tsui and Wang 2004).
Saich (2000) further notes that the performance indicators vary in priority, including 
both hard and soft targets. Soft targets cover the social development and spiritual and 
civil conditions, for example, the eradication of influence of falun gong or meeting 
family planning quota targets. But more important are hard targets, which primarily 
involve economic indicators. Whiting’s research on one county in Shanghai in 1989 
demonstrates the greater weighting given to hard targets (Whiting 2001). The indicators 
of township- and village- run industry and agriculture growth (hard targets) are more 
crucial in evaluation than that of party building, education, and family planning (soft 
targets) (Table 4-5).69
Table 4-5: Weights for performance evaluation
Items of performance Points
development o f township and village enterprise, 
including
-increase in gross value of industrial output, 
—increase in industrial profit,
—increase in profit rate in gross value of output, 
—township raking by profit rate on total capital 
—increase in total value o f exports
33
Agriculture
—sales to the state o f grain and vegetables 
-sa les to the urban markets o f pigs 
—sales to the state o f oil-bearing crops 
-sa les to the state o f leather and cotton
30
party building
—building o f party organizations 
-building o f party spirit and discipline’ 
—education of party members
21
Education
—completion rate for compulsory education 
-participation rate for worker training 
—scale of funds dedicated to education
9
family planning
—family planning compliance rate 7
Total 100
Source: Whiting (2001)
69 In my field trip, I was told that there have been seven key development indicators in relation to 
leader’s performances: GDP, fiscal revenue, industrial output, foreign direct investment account and 
items, total export and import, income per capita and employment rate. Interview Source: KO-06.
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In other words, local officials could no longer totally count on loyalty and trust as 
sufficient to ensure their promotion. What they needed was to be seen as technically 
and administratively competent in dealing with economic matters as demonstrated by 
measured outcomes for their own key indicators (Tan 2002). This mechanism shapes 
the relations between careerism and political incentives of local officials to make policy 
innovations to upgrade economic performance of the jurisdiction under their leadership.
Careerism and material bonus as incentives
Given this context of political centralization in relation to careerism, the greater 
economic development growth, the better chances there are for the local leaders to get 
promotion, along with increasing power and many tangible and intangible perks (Edin 
2003a; Zheng 2005). Quantitatively, with regression models of the relation between 
mobility o f provincial leaders and economic performances during their tenures, two 
statistical researches confirm the potential for careerism to provide political incentives. 
Bo (2000a) identifies that elite factionalism and localism of natives did not statistically 
explain the political mobility of provincial leaders but economic performances did. He 
further argues that provincial leaders with great records of contributing to the central 
coffers were more likely to be promoted than to be demoted. In addition, Li and Zhou 
(2005) also conclude that Chinese central government tended to terminate provincial 
officials who badly performed in local economic development. The higher the 
economic growth rates relative to the immediate predecessor, the less likely it was that 
provincial officials would be terminated.70
70 Related to that, there are other more ‘subtle’ ways of political promotion: one is cross-posting and the 
other administrative upgrading o f jurisdictions. The former refers to the appointment to new concurrent 
posts as promotion. For example, county leaders do not leave their post at the counties, but still move up 
one rank in the party hierarchy. The latter covers the practice of promoting the status of the whole 
localities in connection with expansion of tangible benefits. Counties upgrading to county-level cities 
(xian j i  shi) or prefecture cities upgrading to vice-provincial status are all cases in points (Edin 2003b,
Ma 2005).
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With a comparison of development in Jiangxi and Fujian around the 1990s, Tan’s 
research (2002) further addresses the greater importance of creating good economic 
performance records than of showing obedience to central policies. The history of 
Fuijan development and records of leaders’ career paths together show that the 
assertiveness in steering local economic growth around 1990, which actually played an 
important role in the take-off of Fuijian’s economy at the time, was a set of policies in 
sharp contrast to the current central austerity programmes. Although the local discretion 
obviously did not follow the central government’s policies, these leaders who were 
technically and administratively competent in dealing with economic matters, as 
expected, easily attracted the attention of upper-level governments and then gained 
promotion (Tan 2002). Moreover, based on a case study of Shaanxi province, Kwong 
and Lee (2000) argue that local officials were eager to make innovations in the form of 
tax concession or selective credit for more capable local enterprises. The selections 
were based on whether these enterprises could generate more tax and non-tax revenues 
to finance local expenditure obligations, absorb rural surplus labor and contribute to the 
provision of communal welfare to local residents, which were the key criteria for 
judging leaders’ economic performances set by the upper level governments (Kwong 
and Lee 2000). In other words, for local officials seeking career advancement, one of 
the strongest considerations is how to promote local economic development, regardless 
of obedience or disobedience to the central policies or regulations. Political conformity, 
which was the only important pre-reform criterion for promotion, has given way to 
economic performance and other competence-related indicators.
Top down evaluation also offered direct economic rewards/ punishments to local 
officials who succeeded/ failed in achieving or surpassing targeting performance
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numbers (Edin 2000; Saich 2000; Whiting 2001; Zheng 2005). For example, in 
February 1995, forty leading cadres from thirteen countries of Shanxi provinces were 
punished with temporary pay-cuts and published reprimands for failure to fulfil 
January’s economic targets (Gore 1999). With Puding county of Guizhou as case study, 
Wong (2000) offers a detailed account of how performance management systems 
motivated local officials promoting local economic development. Puding received a 
revenue growth target of 20% for 1997 from the fiscal department of Guizhou 
provincial government. To meet this target, the county finance bureau set contracts 
mandating annual revenue growth of 15%, 20% and 25% with its eleven subordinate 
townships and villages. Those meeting the targets would be given rewards of 
10,000-30,000 RMB; while the township leaders would receive 3-5,000 RMB as salary. 
However, those not meeting the targets would be penalized by equivalent amounts.
4-5 Janus-faced Consequences of Asymmetric Decentralizations in China
To sum up, there is no doubt that China has been successfully transformed from a 
communist centrally planned system to a global market-like economy. Along with that 
are increasingly important roles played by local governments in promoting 
development through the so-called economic decentralization, particularly focusing on 
fiscal revenues and taxations, investment and trade activities, land use, management of 
public-owned companies and so on. However, politically, operations of local 
governments are still controlled by the CCP. Upper- level governments appoint and 
remove of the officials and cadres at the lower levels with the performance-based 
personnel management system.
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I call such a combination of ‘economic decentralization to the local’ along with 
‘political centralization under the party’ ‘asymmetric decentralization’. The term 
‘asymmetric’ also refers to the concept that the centre (or upper level governments) 
actually still has in the upper hand. In terms of personnel management on a basis of 
performance-based appointment system at the township level, Edin (2003a) argues that 
state capacity, defined as the capacity to monitor and control lower level agents, has 
increased. The removal of YE Xuanping, the then Guangdong governor, is a case in 
point at the provincial level. YE, then Guangdong governor in the 1990s as a famous 
leading provincial figure who used to against the central policies, was forced to quit 
Guangdong governor in the early 1990s to the end (Gao 1999). A similar case also can 
be found from Bo’s research (2000b) on the case of CHEN Xitong, a former Beijing 
mayor, who felt he was worthier of being Deng’s successor than Jiang, then-China 
President, and sometimes blatantly challenged Jiang in the early 1990s.71 Chen was 
placed under house arrest and then charged as embezzlement. The charges of Chen’s 
corruption by the centre revealed the dynamic that while the strong local officials may 
defy the power of the centre, but the centre had to control these local leaders in order to 
command the whole country.
In this section, I argue that the concept of ‘asymmetric decentralization* can better 
account for several consequences of post-Mao’s regional economic developments. At 
least, four situations may be pointed out. At a local/ region scale, certain local 
innovations for better economic development were encouraged so that the local leaders 
were able to get the attention of the central government. However, with only limited
71 For example, in late 1994 Chen Xitong was reportedly that he told to his colleagues that the ‘core’ 
(means Beijing central government) is not bestowed; the ‘core’ is something you have to reply on for 
everyone to support you.
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functions of check and balance and little civil society participation under one party 
control, local governments could easily focus only on unsustainable development, or 
even worse, abuse their powers. At a national/ aggregate scale, relatively high fiscal 
decentralization did not cripple certain capacities of the centre because the centre was 
able to control the local governments in carrying out their investment preferences. But 
under such ‘asymmetric decentralization’, there was serious territorial competition 
resulting in uneven spatial development. These scenarios, which look contradictory or 
incompatible on the surface, can be better understood through the models of 
‘asymmetric decentralization’ (Table 4-6).
Table 4-6: Janus-faced consequences of ‘asymmetric decentralization’
bright side dark side
local / individual region scale policy innovation abuse of powers
national /  aggregate scale national stability* serious territorial competition
Note: * refers to the comparison to other transition or developing economies
Source: compiled by author
Serious territorial competition, particularly resulting in uneven development 
Decentralization is likely to trigger territorial competition. Theoretically, instead of the 
concerns of spatial equity by national top-down ‘regional policies’, territorial 
competition implies that successful places may be in a better position to gain more 
resources to apply to competitive activity and to keep their stakes larger. Therefore, 
there is a reasonable expectation that it would actually exacerbate spatial inequalities as 
a consequence of decentralization and territorial competition (Cheshire and Gordon 
1996; 1998). Empirically, despite different forms of devolutions and regional financing 
of Spain, Mexico and the USA, regions with highest GDP per capita enjoyed a greater 
capacity for expenditure than poorer regions did. (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill 2003)
141
China seems to provide a clear case of more uneven regional development as a result of 
serious territorial competitions and decentralization (Wei 1999; 2002a).72 There has 
been a positive relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional inequality 
since 1978. It can be elaborated into quantitative and qualitative aspects. Quantitatively, 
by the examination of Gini-coefficients and coefficients of variation for two key 
economic indicators GDP per capita and household income per capita, in the provincial, 
regional, urban, rural and urban-rural dimensions, Zhao and Tong (2000) find that the 
degree of spatial inequality in China has been rising since 1985 and has been 
exacerbated in the 1990s. However, Rodriguez-Pose and Gill (2003) report that while 
there has been a consistent growth in the share of subnational expenditure since 1980, 
regional inequalities in China fell from 1980 until 1990 and then rose again to similar 
levels during the following decade. Qualitatively, fiscal decentralization is associated 
with a decline in inter-governmental transfers to the central government and thus in 
redistribution by the centre (Wei 1996; Duncan and Tian 1999). Shanghai, one of the 
richest provincial-level municipalities, in 1993 turned over only about 8.5% of its GDP, 
and the net remittance of newly rich Guangdong was only 0.4% of GDP. Accordingly, 
subsidies to poor regions by fiscal transfer fell sharply (Wang and Hu 1999). Bird and 
Wong (2005) also argue that such inter-provincial transfers were dominated by tax 
rebates that favoured the rich localities, reinforcing the disequalizing characters of 1994 
tax sharing system itself.
72 However, it is noted that whether regional disparity has taken place in post-Mao period or not is still 
academically debatable. Wei argues the reasons why different researches come with controversial 
conclusions are because they use varying scales (such as inter-regions, inter-province, or intra-province), 
and indicators (income, industrial output and so on, or total amount or per capita) (Wei 1999; 2002a).
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National stability
Under the context decentralization, local governments were likely just to spend local 
revenues along with few restrictions on subnational borrowing, inevitably producing 
debts and fiscal deficits at both central and local levels and growing tensions between 
central and subnational administrations (Rodden 2002; Rodriguez-Pose and Gill 2003). 
Prud'homme (1995) also argues that decentralization in general makes it more difficult 
for central governments to stabilize macroeconomic fiscal situations. In the 1990s, 
Brazil lowered the share of the central taxes and gave the local states more freedom to 
set tax rates. As a consequence, the central government’s ability to conduct 
macroeconomic policies was reduced in following years (Prud'homme 1995). In 
addition, due to a lack of effective monitoring to subnational borrowing and the general 
absence of adequate local bankruptcy procedures, there has been a significant negative 
relationship between fiscal balance and fiscal decentralization in transition economies 
like Russia, Ukraine, Estonia, and Czech Republic (Dabla-Norris 2006).
However, such an unstable situation has not resulted in China, although the centre is 
fiscally weaker than other developing countries under the context of low share of 
central expenditure and revenue in terms of GDP. China performed much better in 
tackling inflation than the average of developing countries (Table 4-7).73 Huang (1996a) 
argues that given the unprecedented scale of economic and fiscal devolutions over 
decades, the reason why China still could maintain the national macroeconomic 
stability in terms of monetary centralization is because of political centralization, 
namely, Chinese local governments had carried out central investment preferences 
under political centralization mechanism. With shortening tenures and promoting
73 It should noted that some scholars argue that central fiscal capacity was not so weak as shown because 
such calculation did not take extra-budgetary and extra- extra budgetary revenues into consideration 
(Zhang 1999).
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frequent rotations of local leaders, the centre effectively controlled most (if not all) 
sub-national officials, who tended not to pursue major investment projects of their own 
(Huang 1996a). Control was increased after 1994 when the PM ZHOU Rongji took 
over the governorship of the central bank and centralized its monetary authority. After 
that, the Central Bank refused to grant credit allocation decisions to local governments 
(Qian and Weingast 1996; Ma 1997; Qian and Roland 1998; Cao, Qian et al. 1999).
Table 4-7: Central government’s fiscal positions and inflation
central expenditure* central revenue** Inflation***
China 10.2%  (1990-1991) 6.1 % (1990-1991) 12.9%  (1988-1993) 5 .3%  (1974-1993)
Developing countries 26.4%  (1985) 22.7%  (1985) 51.0%  (1983-1987)
Note: * and ** refer to share of GNP; and *** is measured by the growth rate o f GDP deflators
Source: Huang (1996a)
Similarly, from with a comparative study between Russia and China, Blanchard and 
Shleifer (2000) conclude that such political centralization counted for China’s relative 
economic success compared to Russia. They argue that the reason why China rose but 
Russia collapsed is because the former involved de facto  federalism with political 
centralization while the latter represented federalism without political centralization. 
Russia implemented local elections; therefore, it was difficult for the declining central 
government in Moscow to withdraw local governors who benefited from illegal 
rent-seeking and bribes by killing local economic development. By contrast, China 
carrying out fiscal decentralization with political centralization has been in a stronger 
position both to reward and to punish local administration, encouraging local economic 
development while reducing the risk of local capture (Blanchard and Shleifer 2000).
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Local policy innovation
In western cases, politicians are encouraged to make innovation in policy-making or 
implementation in order to win local elections and gain potential funding for this 
purpose, which is a key feature of political decentralization. Altshuler and Zegans 
(1990) argue that most competition in the public sphere is election-based, driving and 
inspiring many politicians to welcome new ideas. Voters needed effective government 
and expected elected politicians to demonstrate their energy and capacity by 
championing innovative ideas (Altshuler 1997). The more decentralization, the more 
participation of local civil society, local enterprises and local officials, the more likely 
suitable and diverse ideas are created for good governances and better local 
development as a result. In addition, local awareness of needs and opportunities and 
local involvement in strategy development also facilitated in searching for more 
solutions towards the particular policy problems and straightforwardly provided 
feedback on the effectiveness of the actions that are undertaken (Litvack, Ahmad et al. 
1998; OECD 1999; Bardhan 2002).
However, in China, without political decentralization in local elections, I argue that
local officials were still encouraged to make innovations in order to accomplish certain
economic achievements for their own political or material rewards. For example, along
with ‘hard budget constraints’ generally more applying to sub-national governments in
China(Dong 1998),74 as compared to ‘soft budget constraints’ in transition Russia
(Burawoy 1996; Dong 1998; Qian and Roland 1998), state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
with directors appointed by local governments were more likely to make bolder
74 According to the Budget Law that was passed by China’s People Congress in 1994 and took effect in 
1995, local governments must have a balanced budget. Local expenditures could not exceed revenue 
without special approval by the State Council or by some special legislation. Local governments could 
not issue bonds (Dong 1998). The key point is ‘balance’. However, the law did not regulate how to 
balance. It means that local institutions were able to spend more as long as they could ‘innovatively’ 
generate enough revenues.
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innovative decisions in the 1990s in reducing workers’ wages and bonus in case of poor 
performance than the enterprises with directors appointed by the centre. This also can 
explain why the privatization program of small SOEs was initiated by local 
governments rather than forced to be in place by the centre (Qian and Roland 1998; 
Cao, Qian et al. 1999)
In addition, cadres skirted fiscal and budgetary regulations in order to increase local 
development. Infrastructure finance is one of the best examples to show how local 
governments made innovative decisions for local economic development in post-Mao 
China, where the demands on capital for infrastructure construction are high but supply 
of budgetary revenue for construction is limited. With infrastructure finance in Gujiao 
of Shanxi as a case study, for example, Herrmann-Pillath and Feng (2004) find 
infrastructure being financed partly through bargaining with upper-tier authorities for a 
greater share of revenue, but also more innovatively, with ‘reverse 
Build-Operate-Transfer contracts’, privatisation of public services, government 
enterprise, sale of land use rights and public-private partnership. Various innovative 
decision-making bodies have also been established in some places in order to legitimate 
expenditure on public projects, such as creation of a financial committee of the local 
People’s Congress (in Qingde town of Zhejiang province), or a Board of Directors for 
Public Projects (in Shahe town of Guangdong province), comprising an selected group 
of the local elite (Fan 1998). In other words, the variety of programs and projects 
initiated at the local level enhanced flexibility in management of local public revenues 
and expenditures (Brean 1998).
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Local unsustainable development
In the western liberal democratic context, local economic development can be shaped 
by various pro-growth or anti-growth regimes, depending on the political mobilizations 
of different agents (Ward 1996; Cox 1998; Dowding, Dunleavy et al. 1999). However, 
‘asymmetric decentralization’ in China offered very limited check and balances because 
all administration, legislations, juridical systems, and media were under the control of 
CCP. In addition, due to very little political space for civil society, any 
anti-development interest groups still needed time to offer their alternative goals to the 
public, meaning that anti-growth or sustainable development policies were hardly 
evident (Zhu 1999). The absence of check and balance also means that economic 
activities by authorities may be purely wasteful and/or involve abuse of powers, as in 
the case of local ‘clientelist’ state or even local ‘predatory* states’ (Baum and 
Shevchenko 1999).75
In the former case, agents have formed ‘clientelist’ ties, favouring certain entrepreneurs 
who have better and ‘right’ connections (Yeung 2001). In Xiamen, Wank (1996) notes a 
type of patron-client relations between entrepreneurs operating trading companies and 
co-operative officials. The local officials provided the entrepreneurs with access to 
crucial information and resources, lowered the transaction cost of daily administrative 
chores and secured better terms for investment contracts, while in return, entrepreneurs 
offered officials material rewards or favours. Related to that is local protectionism to 
make full use/abuse of their administrative powers to assist enterprises under their
75 Baum and Shevchenko’s research (1999) suggests four kinds of officials’ involvement in economic 
activities crossing two dimensions. One dimension concerns whether or not agents are motivated to 
promote economic growth; and the other is whether or not agents have a direct stake in the economic 
performance of local enterprises. Therefore, the four interrelated types include: entrepreneurial, 
development (shown in Chapter Three), and clientelist and predatory.
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jurisdictions. This is because in certain places, local cadres could easily rely on market 
barriers to boost their short-term local industrial output and associated economic 
performances, which were linked the political promotion of local cadres. In the case of 
‘local predatory states’, local officials exacted illegal fees, levies, and fines from 
overburdened peasantry and investors (Baum and Shevchenko 1999; Lin 2005). The 
most common cases covered so-called the three arbitraries (san luan), arbitrary taxation 
(iluan shou fei), arbitrary fines (luan fa  kuan), and arbitrary apportionments or 
expropriation (luan tan pai), forcing local residents to contribute money, materials, and 
labours to local public works projects. By 1990, rural tax rates were close to 10-40% of 
farmers* income in some areas, compared with legal limits of 5% set by the central 
government in Beijing (Wedeman 2000).
4-6 Conclusion
Undoubtedly, there has been a global trend of economic decentralization over the past 
two decades, affecting China as well as western countries, with local governments 
being granted more powers to deal with local development issues. However, the 
restructuring of the local-central relationship in these two contexts has been quite 
different. In Europe, some powers of central governments have been conceded 
downward, but generally to democratic sub-national governments. In China, the 
political operation is still in the context of ‘political centralization under the party’, 
which involved two kinds of political features: first, party overrides all administrative, 
legislative, and juridical systems, and second, the leaders of local governments are not 
elected by the people but assigned by upper-level governments- with promotion and 
demotion linked to the economic-performance management strategy. The better the 
economic growth rates of a jurisdiction, the more likely its leaders are politically
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promoted or materially rewarded. I call this combination of economic decentralization 
to the local with political centralization under the party ‘asymmetric decentralization’.
The concept of asymmetric decentralization offers a better framework to explain the 
Janus-faced consequences of political economy of regional development, including the 
phenomenon of local policy innovations, which is the focus of the thesis. Four of these 
may be highlighted. First, at the national/ aggregate scale, asymmetric decentralization 
shaped China’s relatively stable transition, as compared to volatile economic and 
political situations in many decentralized developing and post-Socialist countries. 
However, secondly, because of ‘asymmetric decentralization’, there was territorial 
competition causing uneven regional development within China. Thirdly, and positively, 
at a local/ individual region scale, policy innovations were more able to be made 
through the system of careerism in the local officials who wanted to present better 
performance in order to get more attention from the upper-level governments. But, 
fourthly, there were also certain misuse of administrative powers, partly because of 
limited checks and balances within one party control, and partly because of a 
performance management system totally tightly focused on economic indicators.
In addition, it must be noted that within the general pattern of ‘asymmetrical 
decentralization’, there was a variety of local-central interactions across China as a 
whole (Goodman 1994; Segal 1994). From the case of agricultural decollectivization in 
the early 1980s, Chung (2000) has argued that there are at least three different types of 
local-central interaction, characterized as ‘pioneering’, ‘bandwagoning’ and ‘resisting’. 
The first, the ‘pioneering’ model, was found in Anhui where local implementers went 
far ahead of others in carrying out central policy. The leaders tended to maximize the 
leeway for provincial initiatives within the constraints of central policy. Second, the
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‘bandwagoning’ pattern was typified by Shandong, where local officials maintained 
extreme caution by not implementing central policy too fast or too slowly, though the 
leaders often became ardent implementers of economic reform after schemes were 
officially promulgated. The third is the ‘resisting’ model exemplified by Heilongjiang. 
Local implementers here did not fully comply with the central government but either 
delayed the execution of a given policy or bent it to serve parochial interests. The 
leaders were sceptical of market-oriented reform and still clung to some Maoist policies 
such as collectivized agriculture and the centrally planned system (Chung 2000). In 
addition, in terms of local-central dynamics, the formation and transformation of 
development zones also show that there are two different ways of being granted 
national title: locally initiated projects and local implementation of centrally initiated 
projects (see Chapter Two). Therefore, the perspective of a variety of local-central 
strategic interactions becomes particularly important to understand political dynamics 




Policy Innovations and Local-Central Dynamical Interactions
‘policies from the top and coping strategy from below’ 
(shang you zheng ce, xia you dui ce)
5-1 Local-Central Interdependence and Local Economic Development 
Interdependence between central and local governments
In China, local-central strategic interaction is embedded in a situation of 
interdependence between central and local governments, for two particular reasons. 
First of all, it is about a gap between policy formulation and policy implementation. In 
many policy domains, central governments could dominate in decision making but had 
limited executive powers and monitoring competences to follow how these polices 
were carried out, particularly for those involving local development issues. Therefore, 
central governments were to some extent ‘forcibly’ dependent on local institutions 
which had ‘sufficient’ delivery competences (as well as ‘responsibilities’, from the 
viewpoint of the centre) to implement those central policies (Rhodes 1986; Painter, 
Isaac-Henry et al. 1997; Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg 2000; Chou 2004). From this 
perspective, such interdependence is embedded in a sense that the (more or less 
exclusive) power to implement is the local governments’ most important source of 
‘autonomy’.
On top of that, there is the ambiguous status of local development policy in terms of the 
division of powers between central and local governments. In fact, there are three kinds 
of power: a centrally dictated policy zone, a locally dictated policy zone; and an
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overlapping policy zone between central and local governments (Zheng 2005). The first 
two refers to powers clearly and exclusively belonging to either central or local 
governments, such as, national defense and diplomacy for the former and social welfare 
for the latter. However, the field of local economic development is ambiguous, being 
neither purely dominated by the centre nor by the local, but with powers more or less 
shared between them. As mentioned in previous chapters, functionalities, 
responsibilities and competences of local institutions have been changed, substantially 
since the 1970s: from a passive role of social welfare distribution to a proactive role of 
being directly involved in economic development by all means. From this perspective, 
the powers that local governments are able to deploy are more than before, not only for 
policy implementation but also policy formulation. Since both local and central 
governments have several material and non-material resources which can be used to 
institutionally initiate policies and influence each other, this inevitably results in a 
situation of interdependence between local and central governments.
The concept of interdependence is useful to understand post-Mao China’s local-central 
dynamic relations. An old Chinese saying that goes ‘the sky is high, the emperors are 
far away (tien gao huang di yuan)' is exactly to the point. Due to the huge size of 
China’s territory and population (Greer 2004), as well as complex levels of central and 
subnational governments (Ma 2005), policy implementation has always been a 
challenging task both for most of dynastic China empires over the past thousand years 
and for Communist China after 1949. The post-Mao period particularly saw a great 
relaxation of restrictions to economic decentralization - with local governments able to 
operate with unprecedented power over local development issues. Many researchers 
argue that with a strong implementation bias, central policies either involved heavy 
bargaining and negotiation between central and local officials or, even worse, for the
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centre, were directly distorted in ways advantageous to local ‘implementers’ (Lieberthal 
and Lampton 1992). From this perspective, the post-Mao Chinese system is better 
understood as a ‘fragmented’ authoritarian regime. On the one hand, under one party 
control and without any political progress, China remains necessarily authoritarian, as 
compared to most western countries. On the other hand, since local authorities had 
powers to negotiate and bargain with the centre, such authority was nevertheless seen as 
highly fragmented rather than unified (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Lieberthal
1992).76
Moreover, the power struggle between market-oriented and conservative-minded 
reformers in Beijing created a certain political space for such interdependence, or 
so-called ‘reciprocal accountability’ between central and local governments (Shirk
1993). The different factions in Beijing to some extent each ‘occupied* certain places to 
practice their policies (Zheng 2005). For example, while Guangdong was selected for 
pioneer marketization and deregulation experimentation, Shanghai was unable to do so 
because it was the powerhouse held by CHEN Yun, the leader of the conservative camp 
(Saich 2004). Market reformers in Beijing did, on the one hand, have the right to 
appoint and remove officials and cadres at local level. With the so-called ‘asymmetric 
decentralization’ (discussed in Chapter Four), careerist local officials were encouraged 
to utilize their resources in order to operate the different strategies for development, so 
as to gain political capital and improve their chances for promotion. On the other hand, 
however, in order to compete with the conservatives for reform legitimacy, central 
reformers also needed the economic performances undertaken (either initiated or 
implemented or both) by their local counterparts. By deploying a strategy of ‘playing to
76 The ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ model refers to the fragmentation not only taking place between 
central and local authorities but also between ministries and departments within the centre (Lieberthal 
and Lampton (ed.) 1992).
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the local* (or for some scholars like Shirk, a kind of ‘political decentralization’),77 
reformist leaders in Beijing and in the coastal provinces formed coalitions to push 
through reforms (Gallagher 2002). In such a context, some of the local officials either 
became capable of forcing the central leaders to implement economic reforms in favour 
of local economic growth, or else took advantage of the central reformers who would 
be most likely to ‘intentionally’ turn a blind eye to those local innovations that are 
legally-ambiguous or even illegal. Those discretions resulting from such 
interdependence occurred on many occasions, for example, when the centre did not 
have any proper policies or when the policies of the centre did not satisfyingly meet the 
scopes and scales of development that local officials planned to do. To sum up, the 
interdependence between local and central governments is allowed by the political 
mechanism that gives local officials a say in decision-making at the central level.
Strategic interaction and local economic development
The best way to describe strategic interactions between central and local governments
in relation to policy innovation in China is with the saying: ‘policies from the top and
coping strategy from below’ (shcmg you zheng ce, xia you dui ce). The ‘interactive’
approach identifies local policy innovations as taking place in the context of
interactions between central and local governments each of which has several channels
available to influence the other (Painter, Isaac-Henry et al. 1997; Li 1997a). In the
context of post-Mao China, the centre has resources such as personnel appointment and
dismissal, propaganda, media, economic resources and policies, and military forces.
Instead, sub-national governments can substantially operate several decentralized
77 It should be noted that such a ‘political decentralization’ argument does not necessarily conflict with 
what I call ‘political centralization’ under the party because both o f them have different focuses. The 
main point of the ‘political decentralization’ argument is to explain the political mechanism in which 
local officials play a role in decision making at the centre. Therefore, it does not address the question 
under what kinds of circumstances are good behaviours rewarded or/and bad behaviours punished, which 
is the focus of the ‘political centralization’ argument (See Chapter Four above).
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powers, like to control policy implementation, to command large numbers of 
organizations and local economic resources, and to have multiple channels of 
communication with international markets (Zhao 1994; Breslin 1996; Li 1997a). On the 
one hand, there was the influence of central policies on local governments at different 
scales, resulting in local discretion exercised to varying degrees in responding to such 
influence. Qn the other hand, there were potential impact from the use o f such 
discretion upon the policies of the centre (Li 1997a).
For example, Gore (1999) concludes that there were channels of ‘fishing’ by the central 
government and ‘reverse-fishing’ by the provincial governments. ‘Fishing’ was a 
particular terminology to describe the way that central government intentionally left 
large funding gaps in their planned projects in order to motivate the localities to fill 
these gaps with their own local budgets when they bid for the projects to be 
implemented in their localities. It means that the ‘fishing’ can be understood as a 
strategy that central government used to remedy its weakened control over investment 
and to influence the investment behaviour of the localities. However, in reality, some of 
the provincial governments also deployed ‘reverse-fishing’ strategies to strive for their 
provincial interests. First, localities might persuade the central government to 
incorporate the locality’s own projects into the state plans, perhaps by intentionally 
under-estimating the cost of the project. Once the projects were under way, the locality 
might use various excuses not to foot its own share of the bill. Second, localities might 
lure the central government into a joint venture by putting some money into a project 
first. As soon as the centre got involved, it would find itself stuck with an ever-growing 
bill. Third, the bids of localities or local enterprises for the projects might leave no 
funds for operation costs. All these situations made Beijing face a dilemma: whether to 
pump in additional funds or to let the projects sit idle (Gore 1999).
In addition, on the basis of the interactive approach, there are two basic categories of 
local-central interactions in terms of policy process: one is top-down initiated and the 
other is bottom up. Regarding the former, the centre might initiate development policies 
but local governments might or might not completely obey them. I call this category 
‘local implementation of centrally initiated projects’. As to the latter, local governments 
were able to implement policies initiated by themselves rather than by the centre. I call 
this category ‘locally initiated projects’. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the route to 
becoming national-level development zones has provided a good case in point for both. 
In the former type, local governments implemented zones which were mainly decided 
and financed by the centre directly. In the latter type, local governments established 
zones without any permission from the central government, with national status granted 
some years later.
Structure of the chapter
After focusing on policy innovations as a local response to both stimulus of global 
economic restructuring (Chapter Three) and of transforming governmental structure in 
connection with responsibility and competence in change (Chapter Four), the focus in 
this chapter will be on the local-central dynamical interactions in relation to local policy 
innovation. The main argument is that local policy innovations are able to be 
institutionalized in the context of strategic interactions in the sense that both central and 
local governments act as institutional constraints on one another, while both exercise 
choice within the context of these constraints. Therefore, the rest of the chapter is 
organized by three main sections. First of all, a literature review on local-central 
interactions in relation to local economic development is offered. Second, I point out 
that the category of locally initiated projects includes mechanisms of ‘state-intention to
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tolerate’, of ‘ex-post state endorsement’, and of *ex-ante state adoption’. And in the 
third section, the category of local implementation of centrally initiated projects covers 
mechanisms of ‘marginalizing the local’, of ‘local obedience’, and of ‘local flexibility’,
5-2 Local-central Interactions in post-Mao China
The issue of local-central interactions in connection with the phenomenon of the 
post-Mao China’s local economic development has long been a subject of great interest 
to academicians, policy makers and China-watchers. At least three different aspects 
have been distinguished, relating to: first, the constitutional dimension; second, 
localities’ stock of political capital in the centre; and third, the entrepreneurial roles of 
local officials. In this section, I review these three approaches first and then elaborate 
their implications on dynamic local-central interactions and policy innovations.
Non-constitution and de facto federalism
According to the China’s Constitution, it is a unitary not a federal state. The State 
Council could define the specific functions and powers of local governments, nullify 
the policies and decisions of the local governments, impose martial law in the localities, 
and so on. However, the operational relationship between central and local 
governments was neither clearly articulated nor enshrined in the PRC’s Constitution. 
Therefore, in the absence of constitutional orders, local-central relationships become 
more a question of political dynamics than of constitutional rigidity. The dynamics is 
intensified in the context that there are no clear-cut legal systems under one-party 
control. As mentioned in Chapter Three, all kinds of documents (wen jiari) by party and 
governmental apparatus at both central and local levels played an important role in 
political operations (Wu 1995). Therefore, on the one hand, the centre might
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decentralize administrative powers in order to stimulate local enthusiasm and carry out 
policies that relied on local initiatives; but later on the centre might also launch a 
political campaign to recentralize the powers to rectify local discretions. On the other 
hand, the local government could also utilize localized competences, as well as political 
leeway left by such non-constitutional regulations, to devise strategies to cope with 
these changing central policies.
Economic powers of ‘special policies and flexible measures’ decentralized to 
Guangdong in the early 1980s are a case in point. These decentralized competences 
were only based on a couple of ‘documentations’ by the centre.78 Since it was not on a 
basis of constitution, the operations of such preferential policies could be suddenly 
changed by the central government in Beijing unilaterally (for example, when there 
were political struggles between market-oriented and conservative- minded reformers). 
In addition, Guangdong also use their own discretions to strive for their regional 
interests by neglecting interests of the centre (Cheung 1994; 1998). With the absence of 
constitutional bills, different provinces formulated various strategies to cope with the 
centre, which in return made different policy schemes toward varied provinces.
Some scholars even argue that China actually became a de facto federal country, the 
so-called ‘Federalism, Chinese style’ or ‘market-preserved federalism’, whose 
characteristics include the limitation of the central government’s control over the 
economy, fiscal and financial decentralization, authority of provincial, municipality and 
county governments in charge of economic affairs, competition among local
78 The key documentations include zhongfa (1979) No. 50, zhongfa (1980) No. 41 and zhongfa (1981) 
No. 27. These three documents formed the first package of the gist of ‘special policies and flexible 
measure {te shu zheng ce ling huo cuo shi)’ in Guangdong (Cheung 1998). None of them were added into 
the PRC’s Constitution.
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governments, and a degree of political durability built into the system (Montinola, Qian 
et al. 1995; Qian and Weingast 1996; Cao, Qian et al. 1999).79 In general, there was a 
concept of the ‘laboratories of democracy’ as observed in the federal countries.80 With 
the United States since the 1980s as a case study, Osborne (1988) argues that many 
progressive reforms to cope with the problems left over by New Deal were introduced 
in particular cities or states first and then gradually institutionalized at the federal level. 
In particular, territorial competition in the post-Mao period provides with a range of 
positive incentives to all levels of governments to make policy innovations in order to 
foster local economic development. To sum up, this ‘de facto  federalism’ argument 
implies that under the system of ‘federalism, Chinese style’, local governments were 
often regarded as ‘laboratories’ to pursue different policy experiments of development 
without risking the rest of China (Cao, Qian et al. 1999).
Local stock o f  political capital
From the second perspective, there are continual attempts to assess the localities’ stock 
of political capital in Beijing in relation to a range of local-central interactions. The 
political capital can be gauged by either informal relationship or formal arrangements. 
Informally, a province may be able to gain greater access or resources from the centre 
through personal connections between local and central leaders. Back to the Mao period, 
for example, provinces where there were hometowns of prominent central leaders were 
major beneficiaries of the ‘Third Front’ (Naughton 1988).81 During the reform period,
79 The wording ‘federalism, “Chinese character” ’ is because China’s situation is different from western 
federalism, where they typically root in an explicit system for protecting individual rights as well as 
implementation of democratization and political rights into their constitutional foundations. Clearly, none 
of these factors are presented in post-Mao China (Montinola, Qian et al. 1995).
80 Louis Brandeis, a Supreme Court Justice o f the USA, argued in 1932 that one of the happy aspects of 
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens chose, serve as a laboratory and try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest o f the country (Osborne 1988).
81 Examples include: Hunan was the hometown of Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi, Hubei was the 
hometown of Lin Biao and Li Xiannian, and Sichuan was the hometown of Zhu De and Deng Xiaoping. 
These provinces were major beneficial locations of the Third Front program.
159
the personal-oriented political capital in Beijing still played an important role in helping 
local economic development. In the early 1980s, LIANG Lingguang, then Guangdong 
Governor, successfully lobbied YANG Shangkun to persuade the People’s Liberal 
Army to open up the Shantou military airport. Prior to then vice executive chairman of 
the Central Military Commission, Yang, who had a good personal relationship with 
Liang, was former Guangdong secondary party secretary (Cheung 1998). The so-called 
‘Shanghai gang {shanghai bang)’ also refers to the local economic development of 
Shanghai taking advantage of a group of central leaders whose careers had advanced 
due to their political associations with JIANG Zemin, then president of China, when he 
was the mayor and party secretary of Shanghai (Jacobs 1997; Li 2001).82
Formally, localities’ political capital can be examined by the numbers of representatives 
coming from different areas in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 
or its politburo. On a basis of regressions relating state sector construction investment 
received by each province to their provincial representation on the CCP Central 
Committee, Su and Yang (2000) argue that from 1978 on, provinces enjoying greater 
representation on the CCP Central Committee had more political capital to participate 
in central policy making, and could translate this political clout into economic resources 
like construction investments. In other words, these researches imply that the more the 
political capital held in the centre by a sub-national jurisdiction, the greater the 
opportunities for local economic development.
82 It is worth to note that some scholars rejected the concept of the ‘Shanghai gang’ working on behalf of 
Shanghai. For example, Shanghai natives like CHEN Yun and QIAO Shi very seldom helped Shanghai 
marketization programs in the 1980s (Jacobs 1997).
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Local entrepreneurial leadership
The third dimension highlights the importance of entrepreneurial local leadership. The 
beginning of the reform period was politically uncertain and ideologically ambiguous in 
the absence of constitutional regulations. As a consequence, the transition evolved with 
an ad hoc rather than rule-based approach. However, in order to loosen ideological 
restraints, central leaders reduced the use of coercion, such as purges, labelling and 
demotions of local leaders who proposed different economic ideas. The effect was that 
the entrepreneurship roles of local officials (namely, the personality, commitment, 
vision and power of charismatic local leaders) were encouraged as means of giving a 
great push to interact with the central government so as to make certain local economic 
development programs efficient and effective (Qian and Weingast 1996).
Therefore, local entrepreneurial leaders were advised to have guts (dan liang) and 
courage (yong qi) to replace three fears (san pa) with three dares (san dan) in order to 
achieve certain ambitious local development projects. The fears include: fear for risks, 
for input, and for blame on mistakes; and three dares cover: dare to take responsibility, 
to put in resource, and to overcome hindrances to productivity growth (Lam 1999). 
Another saying, prevalent in Guangdong at the beginning, uses ‘traffic lights’ as a 
metaphor to vividly describe how entrepreneurial local leadership acted to promote 
economic development. Like traffic lights that have three signs: green, yellow, and red, 
local governments also treated central policies in three ways. For policies forbidden by 
the centre (meaning a red light), local officials did not stop and wait but made an 
innovative detour to secretly proceed with whatever they wanted to do. When facing 
policies that were arguable and had not been decided on (meaning a yellow light), local
83 The argument of ‘three fears’ and ‘three dares’ was by LIANG Weisu, Panyu party secretary of 
Guangdong province in 1987, tried to encourage local leaders to be more entrepreneurial in order to 
achieve the county’s ambitious objectives (Lam 1999).
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officials just ignored it and kept going. For policies which are legally approved by the 
centre (meaning a green light), local government rushed ahead in full swing for 
development. Despite differences among three scenarios, the common element is that 
many local entrepreneurial leaders were able as well as willing to make bold, flexible 
and innovative strategies in response to central policies, resulting in diverse types of 
local-central interactions.
This approach can also explain why places which shared similar ‘given’ geographical 
locations and ‘pre-given’ central preferential policies developed at different paces 
(Chung 1999a).84 With entrepreneurial leadership, locally initiated projects, not 
approved by the central governments, could be introduced. In addition, flexible and 
ambiguously-legal local implementations of centrally initiated projects were able to be 
carried out. With a comparative study between Qingdao and Dalian, Chung (1999b) 
argues that the cosmopolitan, open-minded, risk-taking leadership in Dalian was one of 
the key reasons why it could develop better than Qingdao. Addressing the question why 
Xiamen developed better than Fuzhou in the 1980s, Howell (1999) notes that the 
entrepreneurial drive of Xiamen officials took full advantage of special policies, in 
contrast to Fuzhou’s conservative and risk-averse counterparts who focused more on 
their ailing state-owned enterprises. In addition, from looking at Nanhai and Panyu in 
the inner Pearl River Delta, Lam (1999) argues that the market-oriented or 
conservative-minded attitudes of their upper governments were crucial factors in the 
degree of local economic development during the 1980s. The conservative approach of
84 ‘Given’ and ‘pre-given’ conditions along with ‘local entrepreneurial leadership’ are categories of 
factors that may shape local economic development. ‘Given’ nature factors refer to sub-provincial cities 
not being able to change their specific configurations, like scarcity or abundance of nature resources, the 
location advantages close to container ports and so on. ‘Pre-given’ category refers to administrative 
arrangements and target policies granted for local economic development, particularly preferential 
policies and special subsidies from the central government, which officially and legitimately allow the 
localities more autonomy to expand and organize their resources and attract more investment (Chung 
1999a).
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Guangzhou, which was Panyu’s direct upper government, worked against the growth of 
Panyu. Instead, Nanhai benefited considerably from the aggressive approaches of 
Foshan, its higher government.
Beyond strategic interactions: compromise and innovations
Of the three approaches to explaining the diverse local-central interactions, the first two 
can more or less be regarded as related to the structural dimension. The non­
constitutional argument addresses the operation of de facto ‘federalism, Chinese style’ 
structure. The absence of clear constitutional regulations on the division of labour 
between central and local governments made it easier for post-Mao local governments 
to devise their own strategies towards the centre. The argument in terms of localities’ 
political capital in the centre relates to the formal and informal structures of power 
distributions connecting the centre and the localities. Localities whose political capital 
is greater than others are able to deploy more types of local-central interactive strategies 
for economic development. In contrast to the previous two arguments focusing on the 
structural dimension, the third, entrepreneurial local leadership, pays more attention to 
the agency dimension by addressing the importance of flexible and entrepreneurial 
behaviours of local officials, who are willing as well as capable to innovatively 
mobilize their resources for better economic development.
These viewpoints each offer certain useful insights for understanding the complicated 
issues of local-central interactions in relation to local economic development. Together, 
they imply the need for an ‘interactive’ approach to analysis of the process of local 
policy innovation. Integrating structural and agent perspectives, the ‘interactive’ 
approach views policy changes and innovations, local- central relations, and local 
economic development in more dynamic and behavioural terms. Because both central
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and local governments had resources to institutionally influence and constrain each 
other, policy formulation and implementation in the post-Mao period were better 
characterized not in terms of ‘total victory or total defeat’ but as a ‘non zero-sum game’ 
(Li 1997a; Li 1998). The approach suggests that there is fixed balance between 
processes of central control and those of local flexibility or disobedience but continuing 
interaction. Discrete strategic interactions were deployed both by the centre and 
localities in order to communicate, persuade, bargain and concede with each other with 
regards to particular sets of policy issues. Despite the fact that during the post-Mao 
period overall sub-national autonomy had indeed expanded as a result of economic 
decentralization, a reduction in central imposition did not always result in increased 
local autonomy, and vice versa (Chung 1995; Edin 2003b).
The formation and transformation of fiscal reform since the death of Mao is a good case 
in point. Powers over local revenues and expenditures had been greatly decentralized in 
the tax contract system in the 1980s, raising local enthusiasm for economic reforms and 
eroding the central controls of national fiscal stability. However, in the interactive 
process, Beijing had still been willing and capable of balancing central preference and 
sub-national fiscal autonomy by many means. First, the centre decentralized several 
fiscal responsibilities to the local (Wang 1994; Zhang 1999), and second, the centre 
controlled fiscal transfer and subsidy (Wedeman 1999); third, the centre often 
readjusted downward provincial budgetary sharing rates (after the contracts expired), 
reclassified certain taxes, and appropriated some of the most profitable enterprises in 
like the automobile, petrochemical, shipping and such industries (Shirk 1992; 1993). 
Fourthly, the centre even institutionalized a system of ‘forced loans’, by which Beijing 
‘borrowed’ money from the provinces under a variety of pretexts but never paid it back 
(1995).
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However, local entrepreneurial officials also deployed negotiating strategies toward 
these central policies. For example, in the early 1980s, when prices of textiles were still 
administratively controlled, changes in these by the central government brought textile- 
producing localities to Beijing for compensation. Moreover, when shifting a factory 
from local management to central management, there was also a battle to recalculate 
revenue and expenditure shares. This was related to the varying negotiating power of 
different provinces (Shirk 1992; 1993). Similarly, while the 1994 big-scale tax sharing 
system, which was kind-of fiscal recentralization as compared to the 1980s 
local-central fiscal situation, can be seen as a direct reaction to the fiscal decline on the 
part of the central government, it must also be noted that the final version of the 1994 
new fiscal system was not the original one designed by the centre. During the 
experimental phase in several provinces and cities during the early 1990s, strong local 
resistance forced the centre to revise the program by taking more local interests into 
considerations (Zheng 2005). To sum up, policy changes and innovations are better 
understood as a matter of local-central negotiation and compromise interactions, than of 
a settled power distribution.
Moreover, from the viewpoint of policy diffusion, such strategic interactions and 
interdependence between central and local governments also produced a more secure 
policy innovation environment to overcome certain risks and uncertainties easily 
associated with the post-communist transition process. In order to ‘safely’ cross the 
river by touching stones {mo shi tou guo he), some policies that were promoted to a 
national scale by the centre had been previously tried out, or locally initiated, in some 
experimental locations. The practice of the one-stop service for allocating FDI (started 
from Guangdong) (Zhang 1994), the agriculture decollectivization program (started
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from Anhui) (Chung 2000), development zones (Gallagher 2002), and the privatization 
of state-owned companies (initiated from Sichuan, Guangdong, and Shangdong) (Cao, 
Qian et al. 1999) are all cases in point. From this perspective, policy diffusion of 
national promotion can be regarded as a central reaction to good performances of 
previous small-scale experimentations in different localities.
A famous story involves Deng’s comment when the Yangtze Delta with Shanghai as a 
core was officially opened up, with the announcement of the Pudong Project in the 
1990s, ten years later than Guangdong. He said that he regretted not opening up 
Shanghai earlier in the 1980s (Jacobs 1997; Saich 2004). Obviously, from the 
perspective of local-central strategic interaction, Deng’s feeling of regret reflected a 
simple central reaction to the profound (or at least relatively much better) economic 
achievements created in Guangdong. In addition, however, this reaction was also 
related to the power struggles in the 1980s when the centre used Guangdong’s 
experience to peacefully and convincingly defeat the conservatives in Beijing, who kept 
blocking Shanghai from opening-up. To sum up, the perspective of local-central 
dynamical interactions is a useful perspective to understand policy innovations in 
relation to post-Mao local economic development.
5-3 Typology for Locally Initiated Projects
The type of locally initiated projects refers to all kinds of projects that were neither 
initiated nor proposed by the centre. Theoretically, a typology of four mechanisms can 
be identified: ‘secret forever’, ‘state- intention to connive’, ‘ex-post state endorsement’, 
and ‘ex-ante state adoption’ (Figure 5-1). The ‘state’ I mention here is the central 
government in Beijing. These four mechanisms can be further grouped into two parts
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with a dimension as to whether there was any permission authorized by the central 
government when local officials actually conducted such policy innovations. The first 
two mechanisms were categorized as a group of unauthorized status, while the latter 
two as a group of authorized status.





(Mechanism o f  secret forever) *
Mechanism of state-intention to connive 
Mechanism o f  ex-post state endorsement
Mechanism of ex-ante state adoption
namely, become ‘local 
implementation o f  centrally 
initiated projects’
Note*: In terms of local policy innovation, the types of ‘mechanism o f secret forever’ and ‘mechanism of 
state inability to rectify’ are only theoretically possible but most unlikely to happen in reality
Source: Author compiled
However, the first one may need to be ruled out because while the scenario is 
theoretically feasible, it is practically almost impossible. The mechanism requires that 
local governments intentionally did not report to the centre when making innovations in 
new policies, and such innovations were kept secret forever. It means that such 
implementations of policies had never been found by any other agents, including the 
central government. However, if local innovation succeeded in making local economic 
development better, local regions would most likely want to make it well-known in 
order to get greater resources and investments from elsewhere. Moreover, local 
economic development issues also involved a group of people whose interests might be 
intertwined or even in conflict with each other. As a consequence, it is quite difficult to 
keep all participants silent all the time.
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State-intention to connive
The other scenario in the category of the unauthorized involves the central government 
refraining from using its capacity to prevent local government from proceeding with 
these innovations after these have been discovered. One famous case is the 
‘decollectivization experimentation’ right after the end of Cultural Revolution. Anhui 
stood in the forefront of the reform by being first to implement controversial 
decollectivization policies, before the central government in Beijing made a decision to 
endorse them. In 1978, a group of households in Fengyang county of Anhui province 
began in secret to contract with the local officials for delivering a fixed quota of grain 
in exchange for farming on a household basis. Eighteen households swore themselves 
to secrecy to keep the adoption of the new system from becoming known.85 Clearly, 
the reason why the decollectivization program was so controversial was because the
OiT
concept of decollectivization completely overturned the Mao’s communist ideology.
Their success was revealed to the public in 1979. By then, because there was no official 
endorsement from the centre, it was not surprising that the action of decollectivization 
attracted a lot of criticism from the conservatives. However, the market-oriented leaders 
intentionally turned a blind eye to the decollectivization innovation for many reasons. 
First, it was reported that Deng and other leaders in the centre had no concrete ideas of 
their own for rural reforms, but adopted a wait-and-see policy. Second, WAN Li, then 
provincial governor of Anhui, played an important role in insisting that the household
85 The ‘secrecy’ can be shown in that the group of households even swore an oath of loyalty whereby 
they promised to take care of the families in the vent of any team care being arrested for allowing the 
system to go ahead.
86 Prior to decollectivization, there was a national wide practice of collectivization movement since the 
mid 1950s. By then, on a basis o f communist ideology, the production team, which consisted of about 50 
households, was a basic unit for production and distribution. The commune had the authority for 
allocation quota for most of agricultural products. Such collectivization system had survived for two 
decades, resulting in a systemic crisis of shortage of food and falling productivity in the rural areas by the 
mid of 1970s.
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responsibility system was preserved. Even although a critical editorial appeared in the 
People* Daily?1 Wan still told local cadres not to waver from the experiments. In 
addition, Wan’s close relationship with Deng and HU Yaobang, then PM of China, also 
helped him persuade the central leaders not to openly act against such unauthorized 
practices (Chung 2000; Edin 2000).
Ex-post state endorsement
In the ‘authorized’ group, local innovations have been made by local governments 
initially and in the end got authorized status from the centre. Here I make a distinction 
between ex-ante or ex-post official recognition. Regarding *ex-post\ it means that local 
innovations received central endorsements some time after they had been implemented 
in the regions. For example, Auhiu’s decollectivization case had been offered the 
centre’s official approval two years after its unauthorized start (Chung 2000). Another 
example is Guangdong using collective assets as investment in joint ventures. At the 
beginning of reform, the centre did not allow any type of cooperative joint ventures. 
However, without any permission, Guangdong still successfully tried to use existing 
properties as an asset to establish joint operations with foreign investors. In the end, the 
centre endorsed such innovation and promoted it to other provinces (Zhang 1994). In 
terms of privatization of small or medium-size SQ E s, Zhucheng city of Shangdong 
started privatizing in 1992, followed by Sichuan, Guangdong, and Heilongjiang joining 
in privatizing SOEs since 1994. The centre sanctioned the privatization process in July 
1997, which means that the central’s ex-post endorsement only came after the programs 
had been extensively practised in the provinces (Qian and Roland 1998; Woo 1999b).
87 On 15th March 1979, People’s Daily (the so-called CCP mouthpiece) published a letter from the 
readers which severely criticized the work group based responsibility system for destroying the Maoist 
collective system of agricultural production.
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Ex-ante state adoption
Concerning the ‘ex-ante’ category, local governments recommended fresh ideas to the 
centre, and they executed these innovative policies only after the centre adopted their 
ideas. For example, during 1976 and 1977, several provinces proposed revenue-sharing 
experiments and persuaded the central government in Beijing to adopt their proposals. 
Jiangsu suggested a ‘fixed-rate responsibility’ to split the provincial revenues with the 
centre, with 58% for the centre and 42% itself, such percentages remaining unchanged 
for four years. Beijing allowed Jiangsu to experiment with this policy in 1977. By 1980, 
Jiangsu’s experiment was judged as a success in motivating the province to expand 
production and revenue as well as to contribute more revenue to the centre. Then, in 
1982, ten of the fifteen provinces originally on different fiscal programmes shifted over 
to the Jiangsu-style ‘fixed-rate responsibility’ (Shirk 1993).
The conversion of the airport of Qingdao from a military to a purely civilian role in the 
late 1980s is another case in point. In order to connect globally, Qingdao initiated the 
policy recommendation to convert the military airport. The recommendation was 
initially rejected by the State Council and the Central Military Commission. But YU 
Zhengsheng, then Qingdao mayor, was reported to have frequently flown to Beijing to 
persuade the central officials, and finally attained their approval to turn the military 
airport into a civilian one. Later, Qingdao again proposed to open direct flights to Japan 
and South Korea, since the investors of these two areas had generated more FDI in 
Qingdao than investors of other places. At the beginning the State Council disagreed 
with them, but after a series of persuasive efforts by Qiangdao, the centre adopted the 
proposal (Chung 1999b).
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Moreover, such mechanisms also can explain the interaction between Shanghai and the 
centre for key development projects. During the process of Shanghai initiating the 
Pudong project, local officials advocated the policy to the central government. After the 
central government adopted the idea, Shanghai further recommended details of the 
Pudong project to smooth the process of policy implementation. What Shanghai did in 
the policy process of Pudong development project was not to confront the central 
government, but to keep all procedures and implementation as fully recognized by the 
centre as possible (Li 1997b; 1998). From this perspective, the mechanism of ‘ex-post 
state endorsement’ and ‘ex-ante state adoption’ means that these projects were 
permitted by the state to become centrally initiated projects. The operations afterwards 
can be regarded as the cases of local implementation of centrally initiated projects 
(Figure 5-1 above).
5-4 Typology for Local Implementation of Centrally Initiated Projects
In relation to local implementation of centrally initiated projects, five mechanisms of 
the policy process can be identified: ‘local inaction’, ‘local flexibility’, ‘local 
incompetence’, ‘local obedience’ and ‘marginalizing the local’ (Figure 5-2). These five 
can be categorized into three groups, depending on the degree of discretion and 
involvement of local governments. The first two types refer to the situation of local 
discretion, meaning that local governments implemented the centrally initiated projects 
in many different scales and procedures. The following two types are regarded as a 
group of local compliance. In those cases, local governments conformed to the central 
government when they implemented the centrally initiated projects. And the last one 
means that the policy was implemented not by local governments but by some other 
agencies.
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Figure 5-2: Typology of local implementation of the centrally initiated projects
(Mechanism o f  local inaction)1"
} In the extreme case, it can be a locally initiated project; and then possibly followed by ‘state intention to connive’ or 
‘expost state endorsement’;
(Mechanism o f  local incompetence)*
Mechanism of local obedience 
Mechanism of marginalizing the local
Note: *Mechanisms of ‘doing nothing’, and ‘local incompetence’ cannot be regarded as policy 
innovation, because the outcomes of both patterns are neither new nor better.
Note: ** Pattern of creating new projects means the category o f ‘local initial projects’
Source: Author compiled
Of these five, two cannot be called means of policy innovation: one is ‘local inaction* 
and the other is ‘local incompetence*. The former means that nothing new would 
happen. The latter refers to situations where the outcome of policy implementation 
turned sour due to the lack of competent capacity in local governments. As 
aforementioned, there are three necessary criteria for an innovation: newness, better 
outcome and overcoming uncertainty. In the first of these two cases, there is no 
newness. In the latter, there are no better outcomes. I discuss the other three scenarios 
in turn.
Marginalizing the local
In the case of ‘marginalizing the local’, the central government directly implemented 
the policies in the locality, giving little or no roles to local governments. One of the 
most common examples involves the central governments setting up their own agencies 
in the localities in order to undertake particular activities. For example, after 1994 the 
central government set up its own taxation branches for collecting national- categorized 
tax. Prior to 1994, tax collection solutions, including the effective tax rates and bases, 








\  Implementation 
^  by other agents •
have the authority to alter the statutory rates and bases. Local governments offered 
varying degrees of tax concessions to enterprises and moreover, sometimes shifted 
budgetary funds to extrabudgetary funds, thus minimizing tax sharing with the central 
government (Qian and Stiglitz 1996; Wang and Hu 1999). After 1994, taxation power 
was centralized to the central government by limiting the involvement of the local or 
even excluding the local, that is, the pattern of ‘marginalizing the local’.
Similarly, since the late 1990s, several newly-centralized or centralizing institutions 
bypassing local officials have been established as a brand new phase of economic 
management and regulations in monitoring the economy, standardizing commercial 
practices as well as combating local protectionism. These new institutions can be 
divided into three types: administrative regulation (such as the China Taxation Bureau, 
Land Resource Bureau, the Administration for Industry and Commerce); financial 
services (like China Securities Regulatory Commission, China Construction Bank 
Auditing Department); and commodities management (for example, electric power, 
coal safety, and grain management) (Mertha 2005; Mertha and Zeng 2005).
Local obedience
In the category of local obedience, local officials basically just followed directions and 
policies of the central government. Studying inflation control in China in the 1980s and 
1990s, Huang documents that many local governments actually complied directly with 
the central austerity policies. For example, when the central government’s 
macroeconomic policy became tighter over the course of 1986 and 1987, LI Ruihuan, 
then mayor of Tianjin, announced a goal of reducing local fixed- asset investment by 
21.9%. In 1987, Li convened a rally attended by most municipal officials to create 
momentum for investment reduction. In October and December 1988, Tianjin
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government terminated or suspended about 130 local projects. These projects were 
budgeted to spend 869 million RMB in total, equal to 28% of the fixed-asset investment 
target originally set for 1988 (Huang 1996a). Another case is that in 1992, Shanghai 
obeyed the state policy to first abolish its administrative bureaus of industrial 
management and then handover the powers to different non-govemment-organization- 
based industrial-related associations in order to better coordinate market functions. The 
reason why Shanghai was willing to do so was reportedly related to the then vice PM 
Zhu, whose prior job was mayor of Shanghai (Unger and Chan 1995).
Local flexibility
In this mechanism, local officials tried to use their discretion to make adjustments to the 
central policies. Local officials are able to do this because they are at the front line to 
implement most of the policies delivered from the centre. One example is the difference 
between the de facto attraction of FDI and de jure ceiling of FDI allowed by the centre. 
In the 1980s and the 1990s, provinces were allowed to attract FDI with a certain de jure 
ceiling on the total amount set up by the central government. It means that provincial 
governments were theoretically responsible for ensuring that the actual amount of 
investment spent within the jurisdiction in a particular year did not exceed the ceiling 
regulated by the centre. However, there had been flexibility and/or disobedience in 
policy implementation; for example, in Guangdong and Shanghai provincial-level 
jurisdictions. An excess rate was defined in terms of the ratio of de facto additional 
investment happening in the provinces divided by the de jure ceiling granted by the 
centre. In both cases, the ratios were well over 100%, though the ratios for Shanghai 
were much less than those for Guangdong, where the ratios averaged about 240% 
(Table 5-1). It means that compared to Shanghai, Guangdong was much more flexible 
and apparently unconcerned about the necessity of obedience to central policies.
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1985 N.A N.A 15.6/5 .5 284 %
1988 25.4/13.0 195% 35.4/12.8 240%
1991 19.2/14.2 135% 41.3/23.6 175%
1992 29.8 /22.0 145% 82.5 /34.5 239%
Notes: the Unit is billion Yuan.
Note*: de facto means actual total investment happening in the provinces; de jure refers to the ceiling of 
total investment issued by central government.
Note**: The excess rate is the ratio o f de facto to de jure.
Source: Li (1997b)
In other words, local officials played a tremendously active role in circumventing the 
regulations imposed by the central government. Even where there were central 
regulations and policies, localities could try to implement them in ways more 
compatible with their interests, as many researches have shown. For example, foreign 
investors commonly complain that it matters less what the law says than what the 
persons sitting in the local government office who interpreted it would say (Yeung 2000; 
Lin 2001).
It must be noted that there are various degrees of scopes, procedures, and speed of local 
flexibility to centrally initiated projects (Chung 1995). In the situations of extreme 
degree of local discretion, local governments could bend (or ‘implement’) central 
projects by producing new kinds of projects completely different from what the centre 
wanted to promote. This scenario is understood as ‘locally initiated projects’, whose 
types of central local interactions are mentioned in the previous section.
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5-5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that the concept of local-central strategic interaction, 
which is embedded in the context of interdependence between central and local 
governments, is a good theoretical basis for understanding of the relationship between 
dynamic local-central interactions and local policy innovation. Six types of such local 
central strategic interactions in relation to local policy innovation have been 
distinguished. The package of six types not only reflects the influence of local 
entrepreneurial leadership but also relates to the phenomenon of de facto federalism 
operating in the post-Mao period. Of the six, only two can be understood as under the 
full control of the centre, namely, ‘marginalizing the local’ and ‘local obedience’. The 
other four types - of ‘state-intention to connive’, ‘state ex-ante adoption’, ‘state ex-post 
endorsement’ and ‘local flexibility’- have actually been manipulated by local officials 
with different degrees of discretion, in order to maximize autonomy from the centre. In 
addition, the different types of local-central interactions in relation to policy innovation 
also can be understood through the lens of the (formal or informal) political capital held 
by the centre. Related to the absence of constitutional rigidity, informal political capital 
held by local leaders in the centre is a key factor, explaining, for example, why Shantou 
in Guangdong province successfully persuaded the centre to adopt their idea of 
converting their military airports to civilian ones (Cheung 1998), and how Anhui could 
initiate the agricultural decollectivization program with the connivance of the centre 
(Chung 2000; Edin 2000).
One more point which needs to be borne in mind is that these six types are logically 
distinguished but empirically mixed. The whole policy process of any project, spending
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a span of time evolving different stages of policy development, can be better 
understood as a dynamic one involving local and central governments with a mixture of 
different types of local-central interactions. The case of the agricultural 
decollectivization program, which involved a type of ‘state-intention to connive’ to 
‘state ex-post endorsement’, is a case in point. Guangdong’s discretionary action to 
central government’s loan management policy of separating working capital and 
investment loans is one of the good examples. According to central policy in the 1980s, 
local governments were assigned different quotas of loans for particular purposes, with 
loan for infrastructure investment being most tightly controlled. Guangdong, which did 
not agree with the central policy, practised a strategy of putting investment loans into 
joint consideration with other types of loan. Other provinces which followed the loan 
separation policy found it difficult to finance infrastructure investment, whereas 
Guangdong managed to successfully develop facilities in the province. As a 
consequence, its success got endorsement from the central government later on, as was 
formally noted in a report by the State Planning Committee in 1993. The report further 
suggested that in the light of Guangdong’s experience, the centre should consider the 
existing policy rather than just tolerate Guangdong’s ‘illegal manoeuvres’ (Li 1997b).
To sum up, in this theoretical part of the thesis (Part Two), I elaborate three approaches 
to understanding local policy innovations: policy innovation as a local response to 
global restructuring (Chapter Three), local policy innovation as a regional development 
consequence of asymmetric decentralization (Chapter Four), and local policy 
innovation as an expression of strategic interactions between local and central 
governments (the present chapter). These three dimensions each indeed provides certain 
insightful viewpoints, such as: the self-interested pro-growth development coalitions 
embedded in territorial competition in the context of changing global economic
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environment since the 1980s; asymmetric economic and political arrangements of 
responsibilities and competences between central and local governments; and 
local-central dynamical interactions. Such a pack of theoretical viewpoints will be very 
useful (and also sophisticated enough) to aid our empirical analyses of the complicated 
process of formation and transformation of local policy innovations in post-Mao China. 
Before discussing the empirical cases in my field, the issue of methodology and 




Research Design and Case Selection
6-1 Methodology Debate
Traditional regional geography, scientific method, and contextual approach 
There are at least three approaches to understanding the relationship between space and 
development in social science in general and Human Geography in particular: one is 
‘traditional regional geography’, the second is the ‘scientific detachment’, and the third 
is the ‘contextual approach’. The first one, which has been the most longstanding 
tradition among the three, stresses the important role of observational works through 
the medium of boots-on field studies. In the 18th and 19th century, works in such 
approach were produced mainly by European explorers and travel writers. In the 20th 
century, such approach is still popular to understand the relationships between 
environment, local cultures and landscapes. In the belief that every place is unique, this 
approach covers two steps: first, researchers make observations out of curiosity about 
the visible and tangible places, and second, they register the observations on detail and 
composition of scene in order to go beyond the superficial appearances to explain the 
occurrences. This approach has suffered from several lines of criticisms- pervasiveness 
of occular-centralism, over reliance on description, and a focus on uniqueness limiting 
production or testing of ‘general’ theories, though such theories still serve to explain the 
unique cases (Gregory 2000b; Cloke, Cook et al. 2004).
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The second approach of ‘scientific detachment’, on the other hand emphasizes the issue 
of generality in relation to how to ‘scientifically’ establish and test theories when doing 
geographical researches. Integral to the quantitative revolution in social science since 
the 1950s, the ‘scientific detachment’ approach operates with an absolute conception of 
place, in which time and space are only treated as external containers or frameworks as 
neutral grids. Particularly in the form of ‘spatial science’, a fusion of (mostly) 
quantitative techniques is used in order to explicate the ‘basic and general spatial laws’ 
governing the organization of human behaviours and production across places on the 
earth’s surface. Instead of going out to the field, surrounded by sights and sensations, 
researchers adopting this approach tend to spend their time sitting in distant offices and 
laboratories to get statistical data and census surveys from public libraries and 
governmental offices. Then what they do is to control different variables by running 
statistics, mathematical interrogations, simulations and model- building.88 In other 
words, in order to discover universal and generalized truths, the detachment approach 
intends to establish a set of correlation between limited numbers of variables isolated 
from the larger context. However, the detachment approach faces certain challenges, 
like ignorance of causality and poor applicability of generalization to all cases (Barnes 
2000; Gregory 2000a; Yeung 2001; Cloke, Cook et al. 2004).
The third method, the ‘contextual’ approach, points out that the effectiveness of any 
universal grand theory is still constrained by specific time and space (or so-called 
particular contexts). Addressing a sensitivity of context that all theories are limited and 
partial, the contextual approach emphasizes that particularities of different contexts
88 The statistical methods include hypothesis testing using chi square, general linear, dynamic linear or 
non-linear model, and so on. The mathematical models involve social physics like gravity model, 
entropy-maximizing model, neo-classical economics like rational choice theory, and networks and graph 
theory in central place theory and transportation geography (Barnes 2000).
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cannot be read off from any formulations of a grand theory- through such a theory want 
to explain how and why context makes a difference. There might be several 
philosophical and methodological looseness if researchers applied the conclusions of 
these grand theories to all cases without carefully reviewing the applications of 
theoretical frameworks in particular contexts (Lovering 1999).89 Sayer (1985; 2006) 
also proposes a ‘critical realism’ concept, arguing that the objects contain within them 
necessary causal powers and liabilities to make things happen, but which are realized 
only under specific contingent conditions.
Therefore, from the perspective of the ‘contextual approach’, the grounding of 
observations is encouraged, in order to obtain a richer and more intimate understanding 
of various actors/networks in the researched fields (Rankin 2003; Yeung 2003). The 
researchers should conduct geographically- and anthropologically- specific research 
designs, namely, ‘in situ methods’- with attention to available kinds of explanation of 
processes. These ‘in situ methods’ can thus be divided into two stages. First, the 
researchers establish a set of analytic frameworks (for example, to identify potential 
actors and networks and to address their possible mechanisms and effectiveness) by 
literature reviews of existing researches. Second, the researchers make their own ‘in 
situ researches’ in order to improve the validity of explanations for the analytic 
framework (such as how, why and under what circumstances these actors/networks are 
able to operate, present and interact in different time and spaces). From this regard, the
89 The famous example addressed by Lovering (1999) is a case of the gap between the theoretical 
argument on new regionalism and its empirical application to local economic development in Wales of 
the United Kingdom. He argues that the most serious problem of the gap is because the conclusions of 
these existing theoretical researches were based on case studies conducted in economically dynamic and 
distinguished regions either in America or Western European, where there are ambitious leading firms 
working with active local officials in the context of limited central state interventions and few active FDI 
and domestic small and medium size firms. However, such kinds of situations are very different from 
those of more deprived regions in Western Europe like Wales- needless to say transition economies in 
general and post-Mao China in particular.
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approach can be regarded as a mediating solution between the ‘traditional regional 
approach’ and ‘scientific detachment’ approach. On the one hand, the approach 
recognizes the importance of universal principles (from the first stage mentioned 
above); but on the other hand, the approach realizes the potential significance of 
different contexts on the instantiations of the so-called general principles (in the second 
stage) (Gregory 2000a; Yeung 2001; Cloke, Cook et al. 2004).
The research design of this thesis actually is inspired by the contextual approach. As 
shown in Chapter Two, the chapters of the thesis are structured as a ‘U ’ shape, moving 
from abstraction to cases and back (Figure 2-4 above). This thesis is organized in four 
parts. Part One offers literature reviews, first of the debates on innovation, particularly 
in relation to policy or decision making (Chapter One), and then of the general 
background of post-Mao transition since 1978 (Chapter Two). Part Two focuses on the 
concept of ‘local policy innovation’ in post-Mao China by three analytical perspectives: 
policy innovation as local responses to global restructuring (Chapter Three), local 
policy innovation in relation to asymmetric decentralization (Chapter Four), and policy 
innovation as local-central dynamic interactions (Chapter Five).
Following an understanding of the contextual approach (Chapter Six), Part Three then 
performs the tasks of looking for how and under what circumstances these three 
analytic dimensions operate through whom and why, in the real empirical cases 
(Chapter Seven and Eight). The observations on these empirical contexts offer more 
details and particularities- specifically on the dynamics of strategic local central 
interactions- to support, modify, or challenge the general principles. The conclusion, in 
Part Four, draws out certain particular implications of the analysis, both empirically in
relation to post-Mao China’s transformation, and theoretically in terms of some further 
research agendas (Chapter Nine).
Qualitative-based case study
The contextual approach specifically aims to provide a contextualized examination of 
particular situations, which is the backbone of the case study method. By inductively 
rather than deductively examining the interplay of variables identified by the general 
principles, the case study can offer a more holistic understanding of mechanisms and 
operating in particular contexts. The advantages are of flexibility and emphasis on 
contexts, through there are some disadvantages such as inherent subjectivity and high 
investment and time requirements (Orum, Feagin et al. 1991; Sjoberg, Williams et al. 
1991; Yin 1994).
However, it must be noted that case study still can be operated by either qualitative- 
oriented or quantitative-oriented methods (Table 6-1). The former are proper for 
researches that focus more on interpretative, subjective, holistic and inductive ways to 
find out process-oriented and discovery-oriented explanations and explorations. By 
contrast, the quantitative method is more suitable for positivistic and objective 
researches conducted with deduction, outcome and verification-oriented procedures to 
control variables (Findlay and Li 1999; Becker, Dawson et al. 2003).
183
Table 6-1: Comparison between qualitative and quantitative research




v subjective research; 
v knowledge is constructed
v objective research; 
v research can be randomly designed 
and statistically observed.
Epistemology v research is different from case to 
case, so context is important
v the relationship between the 
researcher and the researched is 
dependent 
v categories o f the research can be 
adjusted and revised during the 
process o f research.
v research can be based on the
experimental setting, so context can 
be controlled by random, 
v the relationship between the 
researcher and the researched is 
independent 
v categories needs to be predetermined 
before conducting research
Methodology v intensive 
v inductive.
v the research process can be
observations first, then inducing 
hypothesis and after, examining 
hypothesis by additional 
observations, 
v in-depth, cultural-bounded, 




v all hypothesis needs to be 
established before research, 
v value-free, generalized hypothesis, 
and culturally centralized.
Data resource v primary Data: interview, participant 
observation, ethnography, action 
research, case studies 
v secondary data: dairies, letters, 
autobiographies, biographies, 
literary sources, official 
documentations, paintings, 
photographs, films, the second 
recordings.
v primary data: statistical surveys 
v secondary data: data archives, census 
data
v statistical analysis: descriptive 
statistics, correlation, regression, 
spatial statistics
Advantages v causality finding; 
v flexibility to identify unanticipated 
outcomes
v in-depth topic and rich information
v correlation findings, 
v research in more universal rules and 
standardized procedure 
v easy to access lots o f data 
v efficiency in time and resource.
Disadvantages v time consuming and expensive
v difficulty in generalization 
v too personal, easy to be influenced 
by the quality o f the researcher itself 
v the research outcome is easily 
influenced by interaction between 
the researcher and the researched.
v inflexibility to meet the new finding 
during research process, 
v too impersonal, 
v ignorance o f extreme or special 
cases.
Source: author compiled
It is clear that the contextual approach is more close to qualitative-based case study 
research. However, as shown, both qualitative and quantitative methods have 
advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, it leads us to use different sources and
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methods at various points in order to build on the strength of both types of data 
collection and to mitigate the weaknesses of qualitative approach (Findlay and Li 1999; 
Becker, Dawson et al. 2003). The qualitative-based case study approach involves two 
key requirements: analytically speaking, it should employ a process of triangulation 
between qualitative and quantitative methods, while technologically, it should prolong 
the process of data gathering on site, to conduct double checks with the researched, and 
to engage in peer consultation (Becker, Dawson et al. 2003). Yeung (2003) points to 
four more specific forms of triangulation between qualitative and quantitative methods: 
first, data triangulations with respect to time, place, person and scale; second, 
investigative triangulations among multiple observers of the same phenomenon; third, 
theoretical triangulation among multiple theoretical perspectives with respect to the 
same set of objects; and finally, methodological triangulations through between-method 
triangulation (dissimilar methods) and within-method triangulation (variations within 
the same basic methodology).
Considerations for selecting cases in this thesis
Qualitative-oriented case study should not proceed in a theoretical vacuum of simply 
looking for everything that is going on. Rather, from the point of selecting cases, the 
process should be driven by theory and by the basic features o f the research questions. 
The selected case studies are designed to illustrate main dimensions encapsulated in the 
theoretical frameworks (Orum, Feagin et al. 1991; Sjoberg, Williams et al. 1991; Yin 
1994). In the case of this thesis, the main analytic focuses include: innovation in 
general and policy innovation in particular in relation to local economic development, 
global restructuring, asymmetric decentralization, and local central interactions. Hence, 
the considerations for selecting cases include: firstly, coverage of the characteristics of 
innovation: newness, improvement as a consequence, and the process of overcoming
185
uncertainty. The policies to be examined have to be new at least to localities compared 
to their past and preferably in a wider context also, and the policies have to produce 
better outcomes as a consequence, and the policies have to involve some risks. Second, 
with a ‘maximum variance’ strategy (Przeworski and Teune 1970),90 the selected cases 
are chosen to represent as many different policy actors interacting during the policy 
development process and as many diversified types of local central interactions as 
possible. Third, to be doable in research terms, the cases are chosen on the basis of 
relevance and completeness of information available. In the selected cases, information 
is expected to be abundant, either available first-hand for researchers, or already 
documented in other published sources on the details of local policy innovation.
From this regard, it is expected that more diversified cases of policy innovation are 
likely to be found in so-called ‘leading development regions’. In any countries, these 
leading regions are more likely to have more relatively innovative policy cases than 
other economically lagging regions. These regions do not have prior domestic 
role-models, and have to initiate many regional/national policy innovations. In 
transition economies, leading regions are particularly likely to be in the forefront of 
innovations since the challenges of changes from a central planned economy to 
functioning market economy with price mechanism, trade liberalization privatization 
and marketization are so great.
90 In terms of comparative studies, at least two different solutions can be identified: one is to look for 
any regression relationship among cases, and the other is to maximize variance among cases. Related to 
that is the considerations of selecting cases. The former is to choose cases by controlling most of the 
similar dependent variables; but the latter is to search for cases with as much variance as possible 
(Przeworski and Teune 1970).
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6-2 Selections of Case Studies
Yangtze Delta as a leading region in post-Mao China
As stated, development zone policy in particular and policy of liberalization in trade 
and FDI in general can be regarded as one successful institutional innovation process to 
transform post-Mao China from a central-planned communist system to a global market 
economy. However, there was uneven regional development in the FDI and trade over 
the past two decades. Greater growth and more open economy in coastal China went 
along with slower and less open development in central and western China. Under such 
a background, it is understandable that coastal China can be regarded as a leading 
region able to demonstrate more representative cases in local policy innovation in 
relation to such development of economic globalization.
Geographically, eastern China includes 11 provinces. Yangtze Delta with Shanghai as 
its centre has become a worldwide economic magnet in terms of manufacturing and 
consumption markets. With 6% of the national population and 1% of the total area of 
China, the Delta contributed about 20% of GDP and took in 16% of state investment, 
generating around 30% of total trade and exports as well as attracting more than 30% of 
realized FDI (Table 6-2). In terms of non-agriculture sectors of GDP per capita, the 
Yangtze Delta is the highest among cities and regions in China (Figure 6-1). In many 
regards, the Delta is undoubtedly one of the leading regions in post-Mao China.
Table 6-2: Selected indicators of main sub-regions in eastern China in 2003





National 100% 100% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 1
.Yangtze Delta 5.89% 1.04% 18.3% 15.7% 28.2% 28.4% 33.8% 3.086784
Pearl Delta 2.04% 0.23% 9.1% 6.7% 34.1% 34.6% 28.5% 4.452628
Source: Decision Information for Leaders (ling dao jue ce xin xi), 2004/June, No.23
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Figure 6-1: GDP per capita from 2nd and 3rd sectors by cities and regions
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Suzhou in the Yangtze delta
There are 16 cities and regions in the Yangtze Delta, including Shanghai as 
provincial-status city, Ningbao and Hangzhou as vice-provincial-status, and other 13 
prefecture-level cities belonging to part of southern and central Jiangsu and part of 
northern Zhejing provinces (Figure 6-2). The city of Suzhou was the capital of the 
Prince of Wu (around 500 BC) and emerged as a military and economic centre for a 
vast surrounding area. With about 2,500 years of development history, Suzhou had 
already been known as ‘the paradise on earth’ for its scenery and tourist attractions. 
Over the past two decades of reform, Suzhou was further developed into one of the
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most dynamic and developed regions in China. In 2001 the American magazine 
Newsweek International ranked Suzhou as one of the nine global high-tech cities in the 
information age.91
In addition, quantitatively, by 2003, the amount of realized FDI injecting in Suzhou was 
almost the same as in Shanghai. In terms of international trade and GDP per capita, 
Suzhou triumphed all cities and regions in Yangtze Delta except Shanghai (Table 6-3). 
Qualitatively, the process of Suzhou’s continuously making innovations can be shown 
by a political slogan popular with many Suzhou leaders when I conducted fieldtrips- 
‘think of the menace when staying safe (ju an si we/)’.92 It means that the leaders at 
different levels in Suzhou were reminded to keep making policy innovations for further 
development because of a feeling of fear to be surpassed by other regions. To sum up, 
Suzhou was famous for continuously making innovations in promoting its local 
economic development, transforming itself successfully transform from an agrarian 
society to be a globally competitive industrial location.
91 Other eight global high-tech cities are located outside China: Oakland in California, Omaha in 
Nebraska, Tulsa in Oklahoma, Campina Grande in Brazil, Huntsville in Alabama, Akron in Ohio, 
Barcelona in Spain and Cote d’Azur in France. News source: Newsweek International (based in New 
York), April 30,2001.
92 The idiom was written by WU Zixu, who was a famous Suzhou-native general 2,500 years ago. Wu 
was killed and his head was even cut off by his emperor WU who did not accept the advice to think of 
dangers when the emperor just defeated the enemy Yue. It was reported that general Wu was very 
desperate but angry when he was died. Unfortunately, the emperor WU lost the war to the enemy Yue 
after 20 years. The local government in Suzhou is reported to even think to erect a statue of General Wu’s 
head with the angry face in one gate of the Suzhou old wall in the downtown to remind people the Wu’s 
famous wording: ‘think of the menace when staying safe’. News source: nan hua cao bao (based in 
Singapore), 2004/11/29; also interview code: KO-02; KQ-06; SO-02; YQ-04; YO-05.
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Table 6-3: Selected development indicators by regions in the Yangtze Delta in 2003
GDP GDP per capita Trade Export
Realized
FDI
Yangtze Delta 1,912.5 25,262 175.2 92.3 17.9
Shanghai 540.8 40,646 72.6 32.1 5.0
Suzhou 208.1 35,733 36.4 18.6 4.8
Hangzhou 178.2 28,150 13.1 8.5 0.5
Wuxi 158.1 36,151 9.7 5.2 1.7
Ningbo 150.1 27,541 12.3 8.2 1.3
Nanjing 129.7 22,858 10.1 6.0 1.5
Shaoxing 92.8 21,414 3.8 2.9 0.4
Nantong 88.7 11,356 3.9 2.5 0.2
Changzhou 76.1 22,215 3.9 2.7 0.6
Jiaxing 70.5 21,268 3.7 2.5 0.5
Zhenjiang 56.1 21,018 2.1 1.1 0.5
Yangzhou 55.9 12,368 1.5 0.8 0.3
Taizhou 50.5 10,021 0.5 0.4 0.2
Huzhou 42.3 16,454 8.9 0.7 0.4
Zhoushang 14.6 14,910 4.9 0.4 0.1
Note: unit for GDP is billion RMB, unit for GDP per capita is RMB, unit for trade, export and realized 
FDI is US$ billion
Source: Decision Information for Leaders (ling dao ju e  ce xin xi), 2004/June No.24
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B rief on national zones in and around Suzhou
Administratively, Suzhou is one of the prefecture-level cities in the south of Jiangsu 
province (Figure 6-3). By 2003, with 6% of the population in Jiangsu, Suzhou 
contributed 22.5% of GDP, 21% of fiscal revenue, 57.5% of trade, and 41% of FDI 
(Table 6-4). In terms of trade and FDI attraction, which can be regarded as the key 
functions of development zones, Jiangsu achieved better performance than Shangdong, 
Zhejing, and Beijing (Table 6-5).
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Source: http: //www.ibiblio.org and http://french.people.com.cn/map/iiangsu.html: and 
author modified







Suzhou/Jiangsu 5.9% 22.5% 20.8% 26.4% 40.6% 60.6% 55.2%
Source: Suzhou Almanac 2004
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Table 6-5: Selected economic indicators in selected regions in 2001
number 
of zones* Trade import export FDI
Jiangsu 475 51.4 22.5 28.9 7.12
Shandong 947 28.9 10.8 18.1 3.52
Zhejing
. ii ii.i iL .uiHnwiw.uiiiiui.iiijpiiini
758 32.8 9.8 22.9 2.21
Beijing 470 51.5 39.8 11.8 1.77
Note: unit: US $ billion
Source: number of zones is from Decision Information for Leaders {ling dao ju e  ce xin 
xi) 2004/April, No. 15; other data is from 2002 China Statistics Yearbook
However, such vibrant global activities in relation to FDI and trade were every 
unevenly distributed in Jiangsu. Historically, Jiangsu can be divided into three sections: 
the poor northern Jiangsu {su bei), the richer southern Jiangsu (sw nan) and the 
moderate central Jiangsu {su chung) (Figure 6-2 above).93 The economic condition of 
southern Jiangsu was strengthened after Ming dynasty (13-16 century AD) by 
industrialization in cotton and silk production. With the construction of railways and the 
emergence of Shanghai in the early 1990s, southern Jiangsu developed dramatically 
with the establishment of modem enterprises and industries. However, by then central 
and northern Jiangsu were still relatively less developed. The historical gap between the 
north and the south has been further widened by the coalescence of state policy, local 
agents, and foreign investment in the post-Mao period (Wei and Fan 2000; Long and 
Ng 2001). Particularly after 1984, along with the industrial reforms and open door 
policies in general and more favourable and flexible policies for the development of 
FDI and TVEs in particular, inter-county inequality had been further intensified, 
resulting in widening gap between southern Jiangsu and the rest of Jiangsu (Wei and 
Kim 2002). Therefore, by 2001 southern Jiangsu generated more than 59% of GDP of
93 Southern Jiangsu involves Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou, Nangjing, and Zhengjiang; central Jiangsu 
covers Nantong, Yangzhou and Taizhou, and northern Jiangsu includes Xuzhou, Huian, Yangchen, 
Liangyukang, and Suqian.
192
Jiangsu, attracted about 60% of fixed investment and around 90% of FDI in Jiangsu as 
a whole, and produced 85% of export and 70% of industrial output (Table 6-6). 
Moreover, the southern Jiangsu was also much more open and globalized than central 
and northern Jiangsu (Table 6-7).




South of Jiangsu 58.0% 55.8% 85.0% 69.7% 87.4%
Middle of Jiangsu 18.8% 17.5% 10.8% 16.0% 5.6%
North of Jiangsu 23.3% 26.6% 4.1% 14.3% 7.0%
Total Jiangsu 1000% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Jiangsu Statistics Yearbook (2002)
Table 6-7: The importance of FDI by sub-regions in Jiangsu in 2001





South of Jiangsu 9.5% 29% 85.7% 82.5%
Middle of Jiangsu 1.9% 5.9% 11.8% 11.4%
North o f Jiangsu 1.9% 4.9% 2.5% 6.0%
Total Jiangsu 6.2% 17.8% 100% 100%
Source: Jiangsu Statistics Yearbook (2002)
Role o f  locally initiated v.s. centrally initiated actions in national zones 
In terms of open economy, there were only little international trade and investment in 
Suzhou in 1990. After one decade, Suzhou had attracted US$ 4,800 million FDI and 
generated US$ 36,390 million for trade by 2002. Economic performance of trade and 
FDI in Suzhou were contributed by various zones, attracting 74% of its realized FDI 
and contributing 75% of trade. Moreover, among all development zones, national ones 
played a very crucial role. About 70% of FDI and 80% of trade in the record of 
development zones in Suzhou were produced by national zones (Table 6-8).
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Table 6-8: Contribution of trade and FDI by development zones to Suzhou
Realized Trade
FDI* Total* Export* Import*
Suzhou in 1990 11 188 155 33
Suzhou in 2002 (1) 4,814 36,390 18,521 17,869
All Suzhou zones in 2002 (2) 3,580 27,385 13,260 14,125
National zones in 2002  (3) 2 ,229 22 ,294 10,634 11,660
National zone o f  all zones (3 )/(2 ) 62.2% 81.4% 80.2% 82.5%
Zones as o f Suzhou (%) in 2002 (2)/( 1) 74.4% 75.3% 71.6% 79.0%
Unit: US$ million
Source: Suzhou Almanac (2003) and Suzhou Statistics Yearbook (2003)
There were eleven national zones in Jiangsu by 2000. In chronological order of gaining 
national zone status, they are Nantong Economic and Technology zone (called 
Nantong), Lianyungang Economic and Technology zone (called Liangyungang), 
Kunshan Economic and Technology (called KETZ), Nanjiang High Tech Zone (called 
Nanjing), Changzhou High Tech Zone (called Changzhou), Suzhou New District 
(called SND), Wuxi High Tech Zone (called Wuxi), Zhangjiagang Bonded Warehouse 
(called Zhangjiagang), China Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (called CSSIP), and 
Suzhou Tai Lake Tourist Zone (called Tailake (Suzhou)), Wuxi Tai Lake Tourist Zone 
(called TaiLake (Wuxi)) (Figure 6-4 and Table 6-9).94 Regarding the type of zones, 
four belongs to economic and technological development zone, and four to high and 
new technological industrial development zone, and two Taiwanese investment zones, 
and one bonded area. In terms of regional distribution within Jiangsu, one is in the 
northern part and the other in the central part and other nine are located in the southern 
part. In terms of locations, five zones are located in the administration of Suzhou, two 
in Wuxi, and four in Nantong, Lianyuangang, Nanjiang, and Changzhou respectively. 
And in terms of administrative status, one is of vice-provincial-level city status, eight of 
prefecture-level city status, and two of county-level status (Table 6-9).
94 The newest national zone in Jiangsu was Nanjiang ETDZ, granted national status in 2001.
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Figure 6-4: Key development zones in Jiangsu province
S H A N D O N G
l y u r i f l a n g
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Note: the zones shown do not include two national Tai Lake tourist zones, but cover other six zones that 
are not discussed in the thesis due to their provincial status or late granting year. The six are Taicang 
ETDZ (no 5), Changshu EDZ (no. 6), Nanjing HTP (no 10, granted at national level in 2000), Huai’an 
ETDZ (no 13), Xuzhou ETDZ (no 14), and Taizhou EDZ (no 15)
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Table 6-9: Selected indicators in national zones in Jiangsu in 2002


















Established-year 1984 1984 1992 1992 1992 1993 1994 1985 1988 1988 1990
List-year 1984 1984 1992 1992 1992 1993 1994 1992 1991 1991 1992
Type ETDZ ETDZ HNTIDZ BA TVA TVA ETDZ ETDZ HNTIDZ HNTIDZ HNTIDZ
Realized FDI 
(accumulated) 1,042.8 477.9 686.4 1,237.5 159.2 53.3 5,439.3 3,507.1 303.1 879.9 3,034.3
Export 321.5 94.4 2,262.8 116.1 4.5 12.9 2,252.7 3,652.3 145.5 162.5 4,302.2
Numbers o f foreign 
company 261 548 695 321 63 32 990 931 325 577 672
Numbers o f employee 
working in foreign 
companies
10,669 8,898 45,830 n.a. 1,584 1,800 42,018 120,768 6,500 20,237 76,149
Administration
Status Pref. pref. pref. County pref. pref. Pref County
Vice-
Prov. pref. pref.
regional central nothem south south south south south south south south south
Location Nan­tong
Lian-yun-





Note*: This table excluded National Nanjiang Economic and Technological Development Zone, which was locally established since 1992 but granted as national until 2001. 
Note**: Listed-year means the year that a zone was granted as national-level.
Note***: As to type, ETZ refers to economic and technology zone, HTIZ refers to high-tech industrial zone, BONDED refers to bonded warehouse, and TOUR means tourist 
and recreation zone. With regards to administrative status: vice-prov. means vice-province-level city (normally capital o f the province); pref. means prefecture-level city, 
county means county-level city.
Note****: Unit: total industrial output-million RMB; trade-million US dollars; company number-company; employee number-person.
Source: Jiangsu Statistics Yearbook 2003
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Of these 11 national zones, seven belong to the type of ‘local implementation of 
centrally initiated projects’, while four zones were categorized as the type of ‘locally 
initiated project’ (Table 6-9 above). Of the seven, Nantong and Lianyungang were two 
of the first fourteen national development zones established by the centre in 1984. 
Nantong and Lianyungang were sea-port and river-harbor cities located in central 
Jiangsu and north Jiangsu separately. Due to the location advantages, it is convenient 
for Nantong and Lianyungang to attract export-oriented foreign direct investment 
(Zweig 1999). In the early 1990s, a ministry-level National Science Committee (called 
NSC) started to foster hi-tech development by establishing several new national-level 
high technology zones. Wuxi was chosen to establish a national zone in the plan 
worked out by NSC in 1991.
Similarly, the concept of bonded warehouse was managed by the General Custom of 
the State Council (called the Custom). In 1992, China started to promote its tourist 
industry by establishing national tourist areas. Tai Lake, which is sounding by Suzhou 
and Wuxi prefecture-level cities, is one of the top tourist scenes in China. Therefore, the 
Suzhou Tai Lake tourist area and Wuxi Tai Lake tourist area were established under the 
support of the central government. After Deng’s 1992 tour, the Custom also began to 
look for new places to expand bonded warehouse plan. Zhangjiagang was chosen in the 
plan proposed by the Custom in 1993 (Zweig 1999). Finally, Suzhou Singapore Park 
was set up in 1994, after Singapore and China Beijing central government sign 
‘Agreement on the Joint Development of Suzhou Industrial Park on the Joint 
Development of Suzhou Industrial Park in Beijing’ in April 1994 (Yeung 2000; Pereira 
2004a). Although the superintending organizations of these zones are different, the 
commonness among them is that all of these zones made limited, if not said that
localities ought not begin any physical construction before being granted national status. 
In short, they were not decided by local governments independently but more or less 
followed the decision making of the central government in Beijing.
Regarding the second type, there is a gap between built-year and listed-year found in 
four national zones in Jiangsu (Table 6-9 above). KETZ was just a county-level 
government under Suzhou administration of Jiangsu province. In 1985, the officials in 
Kunshan decided to establish its own development zone in secret without any 
permission from either the central government of Beijing, provincial government in 
Jiangsu or Suzhou prefecture government. Fortunately, Kunshan zone was given a 
national title in 1992, becoming the first national-level zone to be administrated by a 
county-level government (Marton 2000; Wei 2002b). Nanjing Zone was started in 1988 
by the Nanjing government, the provincial capital of Jiangsu with a vice- provincial 
city status. Nanjing zone was granted as a national HNTIDZ in 1991. Similarly, 
Changzhou was established in 1988 and granted in 1992. Suzhou New District was 
established by Suzhou government in response to a policy o f ‘preserving old city of 
Suzhou by establishing new area (bao hu kuo chen kai fa  xing q u f  in 1990, and then 
granted as a national HNTIDZ in 1992 (Walcott 2002).
Brief on KETZ and CSSIP
As expected, more successful and representative experiences in policy innovation can 
be found in leading regions. Obviously, in terms of selected economic indicators for 
open economy like realized FDI, export, number of foreign companies, top three 
‘leading national zones’ in Jiangsu province include: Kunshan, SND, and CSSIP 
(Figure 6-5). All three are in the administration of Suzhou. While the former two 
belong to the category of ‘locally initiated projects’; the latter falls under the category
198
of ‘local implementation of centrally initiated projects’. The outstanding and 
representative performances between CSSIP and KETZ also can be shown by the 
comment by WANG Rong in 2005, the party secretary of Suzhou. Wang argued that the 
road of Kunshan (Kunshan zhi lu), and pro-business concept of CSSIP (gong ye  yuan 
qu de qin shang li nian) are two key talismans of local economic development in 
Suzhou.95





CSSIP, KETZ, SND& SHANGHAI East China
40 mill
4 0  kilometers
Source: modified from Walcott (2002)
KETZ, established by Kunshan local government, is the first development zone in 
Suzhou. Kunshan was one of the five county-level cities under Suzhou administration. 
These other four counties include: Changsu, Zhangjiakang, Tiachang, and Wujian 
(Figure 6-6). The economic performances in Kunshan in general and KETZ in
9 5
Another Suzhou talisman is the spirit o f Zhangjiagang (Zhangjiagan jin shen). News source: zhong 
xin wang (based in Suzhou), 2005/10/02.
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particular were highly contributed by FDI. Until 2001, foreign- related enterprises 
contributed 60% of fiscal revenue of Kunshan city as a whole, 75% of sales of total 
products in Kunshan, 85% of industrial investment in Kunshan, as well as 98% of 
export generated in Kunshan (Zhang 2002)96. Among these FDI, Taiwanese FDI played 
an important role. By 2002, Taiwanese investment took a share of 70% of FDI in 
Kunshan in total, and 14% of Taiwanese investment in China (Lee 2003). Moreover, at 
least three different stages of KETZ development can be identified: a stage of secretly 
establishing zone in the mid of 1980s, a stage of seeking for the endorsement from the 
central government in the early 1990s, and finally a stage of persuading the centre to 
adopt an idea of ‘export processing zone’ as a new production space since the late 
1990s.
Figure 6-6: Map of Suzhou Administration
Z h an g jlak an g
C h an g su
T a ich a n g
S uzhou  City A rea '• * "  
(chong qu) Pmgjtng xtangcheng
CSSIPSND
K u n sh an
C hanglang-^ §1
Source: modified from http://www.nanking.cn/nankingmap/sz/ovmap_sm.gif
96 The citation was authorized by ZHANG Lei, who was then CCP party secretary and mayor of 
Kunshan from 2000 to 2003. The article was published in the Qie Shi Magazine, which is one o f the key 
party propagandas of the centre.
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In contrary, CSSIP was established in 1994 directly under the administration of Suzhou 
government. CSSIP was one of the seven districts in Suzhou city area (cheng qu). The 
other six city districts include: Changlang district, Pingjiang District, Jinchang District, 
Wuzhong District, Xiangcheng District, and SND (Figure 6-5 above). It is only one 
decade that by the end of 2004 CSSIP had attracted over 1,800 foreign-invested 
enterprises, including 52 of the Fortune Top 500 Multiple National Companies, with an 
accumulative contractual foreign investment of US$ 20 billion and more than 7,000 
domestic companies with total contractual investment of RMB 50 billion.97 In contrast 
to Kunshan where FDI was quite dominated by Taiwanese investment, the composition 
of the sources of foreign investment in CSSIP is much diversified from USA, Europe, 
and Singapore and so on.98 Moreover, also different from the KETZ that was initiated 
by the Kunshan county government itself, CSSIP started with a high profile and heavy 
involvement between the central governments of China and Singapore. The operation 
of CSSIP was dominated by Singapore for the beginning seven years under the concept 
of ‘government- to- government cooperation project’. During that period, the local 
government in Suzhou was quite marginalized in terms of infrastructure construction 
and business promotion in CSSIP. While Suzhou seemed to obey the policies of the 
central government not to intervene in the Singapore-led project, it flexibly supported 
another national development zone, which is SND. From this regard, such flexibility 
can be regarded as a case of local discretions to the central policy of ‘CSSIP as the 
priority of the all priorities’.
97 CSSIP Investment Guide (2005), page 50.
98 CSSIP Investment Guide (2004), page 47.
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Taken together, KETZ and CSSIP can be seen as two of the suitable cases for us to 
understand the complicated and diversified operations of local policy innovations in 
connection with the issues of ‘local-central interactions’, ‘asymmetric decentralization’ 
and ‘macro and micro responses to global restructuring’. The focuses of the analysis 
include: what were the economic performances of these cases? Under what kind of 
circumstances did these two zones develop and evolve? How many different types of 
local-central interactions can be found in the cases and how to explain why and under 
what situations did these interactions take place? Apart from the central and local 
governments, how did the Taiwanese investors and the Singapore government, which 
are identified as key agents in the KETZ and CSSIP respectively, interact with other 
policy actors? What kind of roles and functions did these actors play in the process of 
local economic development, and why and how? Did these actors form certain types of 
pro-growth coalitions? If yes, how did these coalitions operate? What kind of economic 
powers were decentralized to local governments in these two cases and in what formats? 
What are the records of the career paths of Kunshan and Suzhou leaders? Is there any 
relationship between the economic performances of the zones and the careerism of the 
local leaders?
6-3 Data Collection in the Field
With the concept of qualitative-based case study approach, data collections for the 
thesis involve three different methods: first, semi-structured interviews; second, written 
sources; and third, statistics. First, many scholars have identified that a useful way of 
conducting research focusing on local-central interactions depended heavily upon 
intensive interviews (Lieberthal and Lampton 1992; Chung 1995). Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted in a series of field trips in order to collect the first hand
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information about selected issues in relation to policy innovation." The interviewees in 
my field works can be divided into three kinds of occupations. At the beginning, I did 
some interviews with local officials, the interviews topics cover: history of 
development, formation and transformation of development strategies at different 
stages, economic decentralization empowered by the centre, performance- based 
personnel management under the system of political centralization, infrastructure 
financing, policy innovation and transfer, territorial competition, the interactions with 
different policy actors (central officials, foreign investors or officials), general 
development in Suzhou and Yangtze Delta, and so on.
On top of that, I arranged interviews with businesspersons who were directly involved 
with investment in KETZ and CSSIP. The questions covered in the corporative 
interviews were more specifically on whether or not the regulatory environments for 
market-like business operation have been changed. If the answers were affirmative, 
how, and what, why and when? And how did they interact with local officials? What 
did they think the performances of local leaders? That is very important part for me to 
double check the information that I gathered in the interviews with local officials. Apart 
from interviews with officials and businesspersons, I also conducted other 8 interviews 
with scholars and consultants whose researches or businesses are widely related to 
planning and local economic development in Yangtze Delta. Partly because o f their 
indirect involvement to investment environments and partly because of relatively 
limited conflicts of interests (compared to local businesspersons and officials), the 
information gather from these professionals were very insightful too.
99 I went to China for interviews four times: June of 2001, December o f 2002 to January of 2003; 
September to October 2003; and July of 2005. Each time I stayed in Kunshan, Suzhou or Shanghai for 
two weeks to one month. And I also went to Singapore in December 2004. Moreover, I cooperated with a 
team led by Professor JOU Suching at National Taiwan University and shared interview information 
together. These interviews are recorded either by handwriting or by a recorder.
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64 interviews in total were completed. Regarding interviewee locations, in order to 
gather more information on the bigger backdrop of development and changes as well as 
to understand the similarities and differences between KETZ, CSSIP, Suzhou and other 
regions in Yangtze Delta, the interviews with both officials and businesspersons were 
conducted not only in KETZ and CSSIP but also in different counties, or cities and 
regions in Yangtze Delta (Table 6-10).









officials 10 8 16
businesspersons 8 6 8
Scholars and consultants -- 1 7
total 18 15 31
Source: author compilec
On top of that, several second-hand written materials were collected as supporting 
evidence to check the information from the fieldtrips. Such written materials can be 
categorized into two main groups: official reference and news sources (Chung 1998). 
As to the former, many kinds of biography, including dictionaries on ‘Who is who’ or 
‘Who was who’ and the website China Vitae (zhong quo ming ren lu, http:// 
www.chinavitae.com), are helpful to understand the background of local leaders in 
relation to their career paths. A series of chronologies, monographs and document 
compilations and gazetteers (di fang zhi) are also constructive because they are edited 
with a more specific issue-oriented focus (Chung 1998). Moreover, official research 
reports published by different departments in Kunshan and Suzhou local governments 
were also able to be collected either from local libraries or from official websites.
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Regarding the latter, there are local or national level journals and periodicals which are 
published by government offices or academic associations. Some daily political 
opinions could be found in the media, especially local media for local opinions and the 
national versions for central government’s ideas. Of course, foreign correspondents’ 
dispatches are also useful for us to understand how international journalists understand 
and evaluate the performances of these two economically globalized zones (Chung 
1998). Some of materials can be collected in the University Service Centre of the 
Chinese University of Hong Kong; and others could be gathered in the libraries and 
official published offices of Kunshan, Suzhou and Shanghai. In addition, thanks to 
digital technology, certain written sources also have been digitalized and can be 
accessed and surveyed with or without paid memberships though the internet.100
Third, statistical publications, including statistics yearbooks and a wide range of 
one-shot or non-periodic data compilations for particular sectors and issues, are useful 
as supporting evidence to ‘triangulate’ the different qualitative and quantitative 
arguments. These datasets of statistics were published by different related departments 
and bureaus in Kunshan, Suzhou, and Shanghai. Of all items in statistics, the most 
essential ones, of course, are related to economically globalized indicators such as FDI 
and trade and structure of FDI and trade by sources and by sectors. In addition, general 
economic performances such as GDP, real GDP per capital, annual growth rate of total 
GDP and GDP per capita, FDI, household income and others are also widely used to 
compare the economic development of CSSIP and KETZ.
100 The useful news database with paid membership include zhong kuo shi bao (based in Taipei), the 
Economist (based in London), lion he zao bao (based in Singapore), Far Eastern Economic Review 
(based in Hong Kong), South China Morning Post (based in Hong Kong). Thanks to the LSE library, 
China Academic Journals (http://china.eastview.com/), which is the most important and powerful 
database of academic and nonacademic journals in the People’s Republic of China, can be accessed for 
free in the LSE campus.
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6-4 Conclusion
To sum up, as compared to the ‘traditional regional geography’ approach and the 
law-seeking ‘scientific’ method, the contextual approach with a focus of qualitative- 
oriented case study is appropriately chosen as the main methodology for this study. The 
considerations for selecting the particular cases involved three concerns: coverage of 
the core characteristics of innovation; maximum variance among cases; and 
accessibility of information to relevant theoretical focuses of the thesis. From this 
regard, KETZ and CSSIP are suitably selected as two empirical cases- not only because 
they are both located in Suzhou, a prosperous city in the learning region of the Yangtze 
Delta, but also because the development of their history covers very diverse policy 
agents at various spatial scales and different types of strategic local- central interactions 
in relation to policy innovations. I will empirically examine the two cases in the 
following chapters respectively, starting with the KETZ case.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Policy Innovations in Locally Initiated Projects 
Case study of Kunshan Economic and Technological Development Zone
'Every locality is encouraged to learn from Kunshan to self-develop its own zone. After the zone 
has grown to some extent, the state will evaluate and then grant "the hat [of national title] " to
become a national development zone ,101
7-1 Characteristics of Kunshan and KETZ Development 
A change from the little sixth to the number one
Kunshan Economic and Technological Development Zone (KETZ) is located in the 
Kunshan county-level city under Suzhou prefecture-level administration of Jiangsu 
province (Figure 6-5 above). Locally initiated by the Kunshan local government in 
1985, KETZ was granted the national title in 1992 and now is one of the most 
prosperous and competitive national development zones not only in the Jiangsu 
province (Table 6-9 above) but also in China as whole (KETZ Administration Office 
and Party History Research Office of Kunshan CCP 2000; Beijing Institute of 
International City Development 2003).102 And thanks to great contributions by KETZ, 
economic performance in Kunshan is very outstanding (Table 7-1). By 2001 GDP per 
capita in Kunshan was RMB 37,837, which was the highest for a county-level city in 
Jiangsu, and even higher than that in Shanghai or Beijing (of 30,674 RMB and 20,329 
RMB respectively).103
101 The comment made by Li Peng, PM of China, July 1992. Chronology of KETZ, cited from (KETZ 
Administration Office and Party History Research Office of Kunshan CCP eds. 2000), page 443; also 
news source: ren min wang (based in Beijing), 2004/09/02.
102 According to a survey on ‘Top Ten Development Zone in China’ published in 2002 by Horizonkey 
(ling dian), one Beijing-based consultancy, Kunshan was the best among other nine zones including 
Beijing, Tianjin, Pudong, Shenzhen, Dalian, Huangpo, Chendu, Wuhan, Chongqin.
103 Jiangsu Statistics Yearbook 2002.
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Table 7-1: Economic performance of KETZ and Kunshan
Kunshan as a whole 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total Ind. Out* 4,584 5,070 5,894 7,818 14,925 20,665 25,180 27,706 22,372 26,513 30,583 33,245 41,480 50,091 74,593 104,353
GDP* 1,633 1,811 2,011 2,442 4,366 6,040 8,383 10,016 11,438 13,092 15,053 17,173 20,080 23,080 31,434 43,037
Realized FDI** 3 7 3 15 126 352 568 505 455 559 600 600 704 752 1,018 1,200
Export** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 193 341 554 777 1,089 1,263 1,545 2,034 2,494 4,323 7,215
Fiscal revenue* 120 123 132 123 168 303 442 511 602 737 861 1,272 2,013 2,736 4,152 6,625
KETZ 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total Ind. Out* 460 505 555 1,167 2,100 3,014 4,504 6,522 10,013 13,001 15,548 18,567 25,340 34,750 53,520 85,211
GDP* 110 122 143 308 552 772 1,420 1,862 3,038 4,147 5,603 6,502 8,458 11,327 18,038 27,228
Realized FDI** 0 2 1 7 44 129 251 328 379 351 374 334 385 375 564 475
Export** 20 12 24 65 100 150 200 303 427 701 869 1,196 1,582 1,986 3,652 6,310
Fiscal revenue* 5 7 8 7 60 61 121 118 227 293 377 594 890 1,772 2,253 3,462
KETZ of Kunshan 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total Ind. Out* 10.0% 10.0% 9.4% 14.9% 14.1% 14.6% 17.9% 23.5% 44.8% 49.0% 50.8% 55.8% 61.1% 69.4% 71.7% 88.9%
GDP* 6.7% 6.7% 7.1% 12.6% 12.6% 12.8% 16.9% 18.6% 26.6% 31.7% 37.2% 37.9% 42.1% 49.1% 57.4% 63.3%
Realized FDI** 4.3% 26.6% 31.3% 47.6% 34.6% 36.7% 44.2% 65.0% 83.3% 62.8% 62.3% 55.7% 54.7% 49.9% 55.4% 39.6%
Export** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 77.8% 58.7% 54.8% 55.0% 64.4% 68.8% 77.4% 77.8% 79.6% 84.5% 87.5%
Fiscal revenue* 4.0% 5.5% 5.8% 5.4% 35.6% 20.2% 27.4% 23.2% 37.7% 39.7% 43.8% 46.7% 44.2% 64.8% 54.3% 52.3%
Note: Unit for * as million RMB, unit for ** as US$ million
Source: Kunshan Almanac in different years; Annual Report on the Development of KETZ (2003)
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However, back at the end of the Cultural Revolution, Kunshan was just a rural economy. 
The primary sector represented over 60% of gross value production in 1977. Its 
industrial output was only RMB 331 million in 1983. Both records fell behind other 
counties of Suzhou (Table 7-2). As such, Kunshan was nicknamed ‘the little sixth (xiao 
liu ziy because its industrial output was ranked last among the six county-level 
jurisdictions of Suzhou (Yang 1991; Almanac Office of KETZ 2000; Wei 2002b).104 
Kunshan started as poor and over 20-25 years has become one of the top county-level 
jurisdictions in China. According to the list of ‘China’s Top 100 Economically-strong 
County-level Administrations (jing j i  bai qiang x ian)\ Kunshan was ranked 24th in 
1991, upgraded to the 9th in 1995 (Wei 2002b), the 5th in 2001, the 2nd in 2003, and 
finally to be the best in 2005.105
Table 7-2: County-level cities in Suzhou in selected items and years
agriculture as 














Kunshan 61. 6 % 331(6) 2.3 % 1,201 (1) 721.5 (1)
Changsu 44. 8 % 1,030(1) 2.9 % 951 (2) 180.8 (4)
Zhangjiakang 55. 7 % 883 (2) 2.3 % 602 (3) 198.0 (3)
Taichang 56. 5 % 508 (5) 6.0 % 602 (4) 116.9(5)
Wujiang 54. 8 % 604 (4) 4.8 % 504 (5) 328.3 (2)
***Wuxian 52. 4% 724(3) — — —
Note*: GVIAO means gross value of industrial and agricultural output. Using GVIOA instead of GDP is
because of constraints o f statistics database in the 1970s
Note**: The number in parenthesis means the ranking in Suzhou; in 1983
Not***: There are six county-level administrations under Suzhou; and Wuxian was demolished due to 
the re-division o f administration in 2000.
Source: Wei (2002b), Jiangsu Statistics Yearbook (2004)
104 The nickname of ‘the little sixth’ was quoted quite often during my fieldtrip in Kunshan, for example, 
KO-01, KO-02, KO-06 and KO-07.
105 The list was ranked by the National Statistics Bureau o f State Council. The data for 2001 and 2003 
was from Kunshan Statistics Yearbook (2004), page 303; and for 2005, xin hua wang (based in Beijing), 
2005/09/19.
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Dramatic industrialization and economic globalization
This sea-change came about through two structural transformations: dramatic 
industrialization and economic globalization. As to the former, the agriculture sector in 
terms of GDP dropped dramatically from 50% in 1978 to 5.6% in 2000; while 
manufacturing grew rapidly from 28.9% in 1978 up to 60 % in 2000 (Table 7-3). 
Regarding the latter, by 2003, Kunshan attracted US$ 1,200 million of FDI (Table 7-2 
above) and produced US$ 13.9 billion of trade (Table 7-4). The ratio of trade to GDP in 
Kunshan was 260%, and that of FDI to GDP was 23.1% (Table 7-4). The records mark 
Kunshan as one of the most industrialized and economically globalized county-level 
cities in China.106
Table 7-3: Structure of GDP in Kunshan in selected year
I II III
Output* % Output* % Output* %
1978 1.2 50.0 0.7 29.2 0.5 20.8
1990 4.5 22.4 11.4 56.7 4.2 20.9
2000 11.2 5.6 119.3 59.4 70.3 35.0
Note*: unit as million RMB
Source: Hwahui Planning Co. and EDS Planning Co. (2002)




(US$ million) Trade / GDP FDI / GDP
Kunshan 43,037 13,924 267.9% 23.1%
Changsu 47,500 2,708 47.2% 18.3%
Zhangjiakang 47,506 5,124 89.3% 11.6%
Wujiang 28,105 7,347 217.2% 9.7%
Taizhang 21,001 2,264 89.3% 11.6%
Source: Jiangsu Statistics Yearbook (2004)
106 In 2000, foreign capital as o f GDP in all China as a whole was just 5.5%, trade as o f GDP was only 
43% (Table 2-3). Kunshan’s records were around four times that of national average.
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Electronic and IT industry by Taiwanese investment
The characteristics of Kunshan’s development may be further analyzed by industrial 
sectors and by investment sources. As shown, FDI has been a key driving force to 
promote local economic development in Kunshan, and within this, Taiwan has been one 
of the most important sources since the 1990s. Although there have been some political 
disagreements between the central governments of China and Taiwan, still, 60% of 
Taiwanese overseas investment went to China by 2000. More than 1,000 Taiwanese 
companies have invested in Kunshan over the past 15 years. In 1997, there were just 12 
investment projects over US$ 50 million in Kunshan, of which 8 were from Taiwan.107 
By 2002, Taiwanese investment in Kunshan was US$ 4.5 billion, which was about 70% 
of FDI in Kunshan in total, and 14% of Taiwanese investment in China as a whole (Lee
2003).
In terms of industrial structure, by 1988 there were only three key industrial sectors in 
KETZ: cotton industry (mainly in glove production), mechanical industry (focusing on 
agricultural machines), and other light industry.108 However, by 2002, the top four 
industries in KETZ included: electronic and information technology (IT) industry 
(47%), light engineering (25%), mechanical engineering industry (12%), and chemical 
industry (7%).109 In Kunshan as a whole by 2004, electronics/ IT industry and 
precision engineering, together generated over 50% of industrial output. And about 9 
million laptop computers as well as 3.8 million digital cameras were produced in 
Kunshan in 2002.110 Taiwanese investment nowadays still focuses on electronic and IT 
industry and mechanical engineering industry. By 2002 the Taiwanese investment in
107 Kunshan Almanac (1994-1997), page 209.
108 Kunshan Almanac (1988-1993), page 17.
109 Annual Report on the Development of KETZ (2003), page 5.
110 2004 Kunshan Statistical Report on National Economy and Social Development.
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these two industries together represented about 60% of total Taiwanese investment in 
Kunshan (Table 7-5). In other words, the process of dramatic industrialization and 
economic globalization had placed Kunshan and KETZ among the biggest high-tech 
manufacturing sites in China (Shen and Hu 2003; Tang 2003).





electronic and information 
technology industry 21.1% 40.8%
mechanical industry 28.8% 19.3%
light engineering industry 22.1% 18.2%
textile industry 6.9% 6.5%
construction material industry 3.3% 3.3%
chemical industry 5.5% 3.2%
agriculture industry 2.3% 1.5%
investment consultants industry 4.1% 0.5%
Others 5.8% 6.6%
Source: Tang (2003)
Kunshan as ‘ little Taiwan’
Taiwanese firms in Kunshan had invested not only in manufacturing industry but also 
in service sectors. There were lively streets and a profusion of Taiwanese businesses in 
Kunshan. Dozens of restaurants served Taiwanese-style cuisine, and Taiwanese-style 
karaoke bars enlivened Kunshan’s nightlife. People also could tune into any of the 
roughly 40 Taiwanese TV stations that reach Kunshan.111 Moreover, there were also 
several civil facilities related to Taiwanese investors. Due to the difference of 
ideological education between Taiwan and China, there was a need to establish a 
complex-Chinese-based primary and high schools with Taiwanese textbooks as 
teaching materials in China for children of Taiwan businesspersons, managers and
111 News source: the Charlotte Observer (based in Carolina), 2003/11/19.
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engineers. In cooperation with Taipei city government, the school, which is the first one 
in the Yangtze Delta, was established in Kunshan in 2001.112 The first Taiwanese bank 
service in China was also set up in Kunshan in 2003. The Chunghua Commercial Bank, 
one of biggest commercial banks in Taiwan, opened a branch in Kunshan to serve 
Taiwanese investors with banking and accounting services in both China and Taiwan.113 
All of these activities had successfully generated more of a Taiwanese home 
atmosphere in Kunshan than in other cities and regions across China. Therefore, it is 
understandable that Kunshan could be called ‘Little Taiwan’, increasing its ability to 
attract more Taiwanese FDI.114
Structure of the chapter
To sum up, it is clear that Kunshan has successfully transformed from a planned and
agricultural economy to a globalized and industrialized platform within 25 years. In
terms of industrial sector and sources, this transformation was largely achieved in the
high-tech IT industry sector and by Taiwanese foreign investors. Institutionally, KETZ
played a very important role in enhancing industrial development and attracting
Taiwanese investment. Researchers have argued that Kunshan’s economic development,
like that in most other prospering regions in post-Mao China, can be understood as
outcomes of complicated process of triangulation between globalization, marketization,
and decentralization, benefiting from: favourable macro-contexts for development
provided by the centre; the locational advantage of being near Shanghai; the active role
of the local leadership; the expansion of global capitalism seeking cheaper labour and
markets; and industrialization triggered by active local publicly-owned enterprises
112 News source: ershiyi shi j i  jing ji bao dao (based in Guangdong), 2004/06/09; also interview code: 
KO-02, KO-06, KC-04.
1,3 Kunshan Almanac (2003), page 90; also interview code: KC-04, KC-06.
114 News source: Far East Economic Review (based in Hong Kong), 2001/07/05; 2001/12/06; the 
Charlotte Observer (based in Carolina), 2003/11/19; ershiyi shi j i  jing ji bao dao (based in Guangdong), 
2004/06/09; gong shang shi bao (based in Taipei), 2001/11/30; 2003/10/19. also interview code: KC-04.
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(Marton 1999; 2000; Wei and Fan 2000; Saich 2001; Wei 2002b). Other dimensions to 
be highlighted include: lower development costs in Kunshan than in other development 
zones (Monash International Pty Ltd 2003); technological innovation capacity in 
relation to industrial clusters of IT industry (Lai, Chiu et al. 2005); and economic 
security of Taiwan in relation to Taiwanese investment in China (Tung 2002; Chen
2004).
Relating these researches to my focus on the issue of policy innovations, this chapter 
aims to investigate the policy process in relation to the formation and transformation of 
different development policies, both in the ‘locally initiated’ KETZ in particular, and in 
Kunshan development more generally. The main questions include: what were the key 
stages in the history of Kunshan’s development; how many different types of local- 
central interactions can be identified; under what kind of circumstances did these types 
of interactions take place; how did mechanisms of economic decentralization and 
political centralization operate in the KETZ development process; apart from economic 
contribution, what other kinds of roles else did Taiwanese investors play in the Kunshan 
institutional innovation process; and how was their effectiveness altered by the 
institutional innovations?
The rest of the chapter is organized into four sections. First, three detailed cases of the 
policy innovations process, those of ‘establishing a secret zone’; ‘implementing a land 
lease program’, and ‘promoting an export processing zone’, are documented in order to 
understand why and under what circumstances these policy innovations took place. 
Second, local-central interactions during the period of Kunshan development are 
reviewed, focusing on the three types of interactions identified within the category of 
‘locally initiated project’, namely, ‘state-intention to connive’, ‘state ex-post
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endorsement’ and ‘state ex-ante adoption’. Third, wider factors relevant to the policy 
innovation are discussed, including those of economic decentralization, career paths of 
local leaders, and Taiwanese involvement in policy making. Finally, the consequences 
of policy innovations for the effectiveness of development in Kunshan are discussed in 
the fourth section.
7-2 Policy Innovations in KETZ and Kunshan
There are many instances of policy innovation during the development history of KETZ 
and Kunshan. The cases selected here are intended to characterize three key stages of 
economic transformation: the case of establishing secret zone, representing the stage 
from agriculture to industry (you nong zhuan gong); the case of implementing land 
lease policy, for the stage from domestic capital-based and inward development to 
FDI-oriented and outward growth (you nei zhuan xai); and the case of promoting export 
processing zone, for the stage from relatively low-tech to high-tech industry (you di 
zhuan gao).ns Each case is elaborated in this section.
Establishing a development zone
Until 1983, Kunshan was still a closed and rural county. The most important thing then 
was to promote rural industrialization for local economic development. In January 1984, 
WU Kechun, then chief of Kunshan county, summoned all cadres at the village level 
and above to organize a conference on economic development. The meeting reached an 
agreement on three transformations for development: from a purely agriculture 
economy to rural industrialization; from planned economy to planned market 
commodity economy, and from inward-oriented economy to outward- looking economy.
115 Interview code: KO-02; KO-06.
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After visiting Guangdong and Fujian, the two pioneer provinces for the opening up 
policy in the early 1980s, Wu proposed to build a new industrial area in July 1984. In 
February 1985, the project for a ‘New Industrial Area (gong ye xin qu, the original 
name of KETZ)’ , with a planned first phase of 3.75 km2, was approved by the Kunshan 
local People’s Congress without reporting to upper-level government (Almanac Office 
of KETZ 2000).
Developing KETZ in secret in the mid 1980s was a very risky strategy. The greatest 
uncertainty concerned ‘politics in Beijing’. The market-oriented and conservative- 
minded reformers in Beijing were struggling over the transition policies in general 
(Lichtenstein 1991), and opening-up policies in particular (Crane 1990; Howell 1993). 
The scope and scales of development zones were one of the heated issues involving 
power conflicts. Any progressive reforms, even granted by the centre, ran a risk of 
being punished because of political uncertainty. Kunshan and KETZ could be in an 
even worse position due to the secret status without any ex-ante endorsement by upper 
officials.
Kunshan strategically developed KETZ by exploiting a combination of two national 
policies together. One was the so-called ‘economic linkages at horizontal level (hen 
xiang jing j i  liang he)'(Ma 1997), while the other was ‘commercializing military 
enterprises in the “Third Front” (san sian qi ye jun zhuan min)’ (Fei 2000). These two 
were national policies in the early 1980s to deal with economic difficulties in the wake 
of the Cultural Revolution. During Mao’s period, for the considerations of communist 
ideology and military preparedness, on the one hand, the centre sanctioned localities to 
build up self-developed and self-reliant industries. At the same time, plenty of capital 
investment, mostly related to military preparation, was located in the safer ‘Third Front’
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in inner China (Ma and Wei 1997). However, after 1978, the centre called for a 
fundamental reorganization of industrial development at national scale. To begin with, 
the centre encouraged localities to exchange, co-invest or promote trades among one 
another, in order to expand supplies and demands for the economy. On top of that, the 
centre suggested that ‘Third Front’ enterprises should commercialize their products and 
technologies. For example, missile plants were instructed to apply part of their 
technology to making wash-basins and motor-bikes, either in the same factories or 
outside the ‘Third Front’, through ‘horizontal linkage’ (Kirkby and Cannon 1989).
These two policies were utilized by Kunshan to develop KETZ. Under a strategy of 
‘relying on Shanghai in the east and depending on “Third Front” in the west (dong yi 
Shanghai, xi tuo san xian)\ KETZ took advantage of its location (as one of nearest 
towns surrounding Shanghai)’ to welcome the domestic enterprises which were seeking 
for opportunities to expand or shift their production capacities. The first domestic 
investment in KETZ was a Kunshan plant of the Shanghai Jinxin Television factory in 
April 1985. By October 1985, there were more than 60 Kunshan enterprises co-invested 
or merged with another 70 factories from the rest China. O f these 70, 38 were from 
Shanghai.116 In addition, the Kunshan branch of Fonghua Refrigerator, one of 
manufacturing belonging to the former Ministry of Aerospace Industry, was relocated 
from Guiyang of Guizhou province to Kunshan. Other cases included Hongyan motor 
factory from Sichuan province, Jianghua electronic factory from Jiangxi province, 
Huangshi textile machine factory from Hubei province, and Hongshan ball bearing 
factory from Guizhou province (Yang 1991; Almanac Office of KETZ 2000).
116 News source: ren min wang (based in Beijing), 2004/09/02.
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At this stage, Kunshan leaders also mobilized their informal political capital in personal 
networking to attract inward investment projects. An example is when in 1985, one of 
the reasons why Sichuan Hongyan motor factory established a joint investment project 
in Kunshan was because of CHEN Shishun, then party secretary of the factory, who 
was originally from Kunshan. When he made a business trip to Shanghai, Chen planned 
to visit JIN Bian, who taught him in the primary school. Jin told the news of Chen’s 
visit to WU Kechun, then chief of Kunshan. Wu took this opportunity to invite Jin to 
invest in Kunshan. The first and second Kunshan textile factories were introduced by 
GONG Zhaoyuan, who was then economic consultant in the Shanghai city government 
and was originally from Kunshan. Gong introduced the business opportunity to Wu. 
Similarly, Shanghai Jingxing Television Factory was introduced to Kunshan by the 
connection of GU Ming, then vice secretary of the State Council who was also from 
Kunshan (Yang 1991).
Overall, compared to other national zones, Kunshan was relatively successful in 
developing the secret KETZ. By 1989, total industrial output in KETZ reached RMB 
500 million, significantly higher than the average for national-level economic and 
technological zones (Table 7-6).117 In absolute terms, KETZ could be ranked third, 
following Guangzhou (RMB 826.4 million) and Shanghai Caohejing (RMB 1,842.9 
million). In terms of FDI, however, by 1989 KETZ had received less than US$ 2 
million in contrast to US$ 25 million as the average per national zone (Table 7-6). It 
means that the great achievement in total industrial output at this stage was mainly 
contributed by domestic investments rather than FDI (Wang and Jiang 1999).
117 14 national zones together produced just RMB 5,699 million in total, equal to about 400 million per 
zone.
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single zone 407 24.92
Note: * refers to million RMB; and ** refers to US$ million
Source: China Special Economic Zones and Coastal Economic Technological 
Development Zone Almanac (1980-1989), Annual Report on the Development of 
KETZ (2003)
Implementing land-lease policy
A policy of charging land-use fees to investors was launched in 1988 in Kunshan, the 
first county-level jurisdiction in China to do so. Land had been state-owned property 
since 1949, but the central government in Beijing amended the Constitution in 1988 by 
adding provision for land-use rights to be legally transferred, with the Land 
Administration Act being changed consequently to provide a legal basis for a land lease 
market. Declaring that land should be recognized as a special commodity, the new act 
provided for the use right of the land to be separated from ownership, and be leased 
(Yeh and Wu 1999; Sun 2000; Yeh 2005). But the centre took the cautious step of 
allowing only a few cities to practice such a policy, on a trial base.
Kunshan proposed to Jiangsu provincial government to practice the land lease policy 
before the centre implemented it national-wide in order to respond to two development 
difficulties it was experiencing: a limited FDI attraction and a shortage of infrastructure 
financing. As we have seen, KETZ was poor in attracting FDI compared to other 
national development zones. In 1989, KETZ only attracted 1.73 million US dollars of 
FDI, which was 6% of the average for national-level zones (Table 7-6 above). 
Therefore, Kunshan tried to create some unique institutional incentives. One of them 
was the land property right. This was proposed to Kunshan officials by the first foreign
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investor in Kunshan, Miyoshu Haruo from Japan, when he was considering expansion 
in Kunshan, because he felt uncomfortable that his factories were situated on lands 
which were not legally leased to or owned by him. His proposal stimulated Kunshan to 
consider adopting the idea of land-lease policy which had just been promulgated by the 
centre.118 Another fact was that, since KETZ was developed in secret, without any 
substantial financial help from upper governments, a source o f cash was required to 
solve the problem of infrastructure financing. After successfully getting approval from 
Jiangsu, the first purchase of leasing a land lease in Kunshan for 50 years took place in 
April 1989.
However, there was an uncertainty over the implementation of this land-use policy, 
since it was arguably inconsistent with the communist principle that land ownership 
should be kept in the state’s hand and out of those of private (particularly foreign) 
investors. Some conservatives argued that the land-use fee policy involved a ‘forfeiture 
of sovereignty and an insult to the state (.sang quan ru guo)’ (Zhu 2005).119 Kunshan 
officials made painstaking efforts, however, to persuade local people to accept the idea 
of land-lease policy and practiced it carefully (Ji, Jiang et al. 2000).120 First, while 
transferring arable lands to industrial areas and then leasing to investors, Kunshan made 
an effort at converting of a certain amount of dilapidated lands into usable areas. 
Second, land lease policy was mainly applied to industrial rather than commercial 
developers. By 1994, 60% of leased land in Kunshan in general and 80% of those in
118 Interview Code: KO-01, KO-02, KC-01; also news source: xin hua wang (Shangdong channel), 
2003/05/20.
119 For example, Hainan provincial government proposed to deal a 70 year lease of 30 km2 in Yangpu 
with a Hong Kong-based land development company in 1989, two years after the Land Administration 
Act was amended. The project was highly opposed by some conservatives who accused Hainan leaders 
of ‘forfeiture of sovereign and an insult to the state*. Despite advocatory efforts following up, the whole 
project was only approved in 1992 (Zhu 2005).
The first author of the citation, JI Jian-Ye, was the then Kunshan mayor and Party Secretary from 
1997-2001. The article was published first time in Suzhou ri bao (based in Suzhou), 1990/10/23.
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KETZ in particular went to industrial projects. Third, Kunshan forced investors to 
return any lands which had been leased but could not be developed within a certain 
number of years. By September 1995, the use right of 30% of leased-already lands has 
been successfully forced to return to Kunshan local governments (Kunshan Association 
of Scholars on Landuse 2001).
With a lease price of 100 RMB per 1 m2 for 10,000 m2, the first purchase in 1989 
earned KETZ RMB 100 million. Compared to the normal fiscal revenue in KETZ of 
RMB 661 million in the same year, this single land lease project was equal to one sixth 
of budget revenue. The land-use fee policy applied to more townships and villages in 
Kunshan by 1992 and became one of the key sources for infrastructure finance. By 
1993, there were over 300 cases of land lease purchase covering an area of 38.4 million 
m2 in total, earning accumulated land use fees of RMB 1,649 million for Kunshan. The 
accumulated budgetary revenue from 1989 to 1993 was just only RMB 847 million. 121 
In KETZ alone, from 1990 to 1992 the accumulated land lease was RMB 340 million, 
compared to RMB 74 million as the accumulated fiscal revenue.122 By 1998, all lands 
in Kunshan were subject to the land-lease policy, making Kunshan the first county-level 
administration to do so.123 The importance of ‘cashing in’ on development by this land 
lease policy can also be seen in terms of the gap between fiscal revenue and 
infrastructure financing.
The infrastructure cost was only eclipsed by the fiscal revenue in total after 1996, 
clearly showing that a financial deficit so long as KETZ relied on conventional fiscal
121 Kunshan Almanac (1988-1993), page 494; and Kunshan Almanac (1993-1997), page 441; and 
Kunshan Almanac (1988-1993), page 152.
122 Kunshan Almanac (1988-1993), page 166.
123 Kunshan Almanac (1999), page 139.
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revenues to fund infrastructure construction (Table 7-7). Land lease income was the key 
means in the 1990s to cope with infrastructure financing requirements (Li 2000).124
Table 7-7: Comparison in infrastructure cost and fiscal revenue in KETZ
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97
infrastructure
cost 1 1 3 6 8 9 12 15 80 200 200 210 101 111
fiscal
revenue n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5 7 8 7 60 61 121 118 227 293
Note: unit as million RMB
Source: Annual Report on the Development of KETZ (2003)
Moreover, land lease was welcomed by foreign investors. For the first purchase, 
Kunshan advertised the news in many domestic and international newspapers. There 
were more than two thousand requests for application forms, and 11 companies paid a 
visit to Kunshan for investigation. In the end, five companies, one from USA, one joint 
venture, and three domestic companies, submitted applications. The name of Kunshan 
was therefore widely publicized domestically and internationally. By 1995, of 576 land 
lease projects, 168 were from domestic companies, while others were either from joint 
ventures between Chinese and foreign investors or from foreign companies (Hsu 1998). 
To sum up, land lease policy can be regarded as another successful policy to cope with 
the then Kunshan development troubles in relation to FDI attraction and infrastructure 
financing. Along with the granting of national status in 1992 (see below), KETZ and 
Kunshan were able to upgrade from inward investment to FDI-based development.
Promoting export processing zone
In the late 1990s, Kunshan was keen to promote the concept of ‘export processing zone 
(EPZ)’. The concept of EPZ involve a special enclosed area with a one-stop service
124 The author o f the citation was LI Quanlin, who served as mayor and party secretary o f Kunshan from 
1991-1996. Also Kunshan (1988-1993), page 152; also interview code: KO-02; KO-06; KO-09.
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supervised directly by the General Customs with substantial coordination between 
police, tax office, container port and airport authorities, Commodity Inspection, 
Department of Financial Affairs, banks, foreign trade custom declaration companies, 
and so on.125 Through computer systems networked between related departments and 
bureaus, the foreign companies established in EPZ enjoy a twenty-four hour clearance 
service with only a single application for documentation examination and commodity 
inspection.
All preferential policies tax exemptions that had been implemented in existing 
development zones would also be practised in an EPZ. Apart from that, there were 
some additional special treatments for investment inside an EPZ. First of all, companies 
investing there could enjoy more tax rebate, such as all capital goods being able to be 
exempted from custom duty and import-related taxes. Second, EPZ offered a more 
convenient business environment. Companies in an EPZ could freely transfer goods to 
other companies within the EPZ or between different EPZs without any restrictions.126 
Quotas and licenses were unnecessary inside the ETZ unless otherwise stipulated by the 
state, and the concept of ‘inside the boundary but outside the jurisdiction of the 
Custom’. That is to say, for a company in EPZ, there was no imposed requirement of 
bank deposit system, custom registration system, VAT or consumption tax on processes 
products; or trade quota and export license. Imported cargo through EPZ can be exempt 
from tariffs and other complicated local duties before being exported. Therefore, 
banking systems and records for deposits and logistics were also simpler and easier in
125 It must be noted that actually the first development zone with the naming o f ‘export processing zone’ 
in China occurred in Jinqiao of Pudong Project in Shanghai in the early 1990s. However, the basic 
functionality was just tax exemption by then. News source: Shanghai tongji (based in Shanghai),
2001/06.
126 For companies not in the EPZ, those products in different customs areas could not be transported 
directly. The only one policy was to export these products to Hong Kong and then import them again, the 
so-called ‘Hong Kong One Day trip (Hong Kong yi riyou). Interview code: KO-03; KC-02; KC-03.
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an EPZ than in other development zones (Table 7-8). To sum up, the EPZ system 
started from 2000 was the most preferential business environment offering the quickest 
custom service, the most favourite tax policy, the most convenient management, the 
most integral facilities, and the simplest procedures in reporting export and import 
goods.127
Table 7-8: Preferential policy in EPZs in general




■ Goods may be transferred freely between EPZ and other counties
■ No quota or license is necessary unless otherwise stipulated by the state
Exemption of 
import duty
■ All capital goods, such as machinery, equipment, moulds and spare parts 
for maintenance used for production purpose and machinery, equipment, 
construction materials, and office appliance for infrastructure 
development are exempted from import duty and import-related taxes
Bonded import 
materials
■ Raw materials, components, packaging materials and consumables used 
for the production of export goods are fully bonded
Record system 
with customs
■ Instead of bank deposit account and logbook, enterprises in the EPZ need 
only record with the customs
Fast logistics 
within EPZ and 
between EPZs
■ Raw materials and semi-fmished products can be transferred freely within 
EPZ.
■ Tax is exempted for products, machinery, and equipment transferred 
between EPZs
Tax exemption for 
Exports
■ Processed products for export are exempted from value-added tax
Tax refunded
■ Goods from non-EPZ companies in China that enter EPZ are deemed as 
exports of which domestically produced machinery, equipment, raw 
materials, components, parts, packaging materials, and reasonable amount 
of construction materials entering EPZ are eligible VAT rebates
Foreign Exchange 
Control
■ No verification and cancellation procedure of foreign exchange income is 
required for exported goods; no verification and cancellation procedure 
for foreign exchange payment to outside mainland China is required for 
imported goods
Tax for water and 
electricity
■ Enterprises of production nature within EPZ can enjoy VAT rebate for 
water, electricity, gas used for exported goods
Other incentives ■ Enterprises in EPZ enjoy the same preferential policies as those outside EPZ
Source: modified from ‘Keynotes for experimental EPZ in China {quart kuo jia  gong 
chu kou qu shi dian gong zuo yao dian)\ see Yearbook of China Special Economic 
Zone and Development Zones (2000-2001), page 52-54; also zhong guo hai guan 
(based in Beijing), 2002/June
127 News source: News source: zhong guo hai guan (based in Beijing), 2002/November. The news is a 
report of an interview with ZHAO Kuanhua, vice director of the General Custom, zhong guo hai guan is 
an official magazine published by the General Custom.
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Concerning the policy process, the concept of EPZ was not initiated by the centre at the 
beginning, but actually first proposed by Kunshan. The background to why Kunshan 
proposed the idea of EPZ to the centre was that there were two development 
bottlenecks in the late 1990s. First of all, the custom service failed in satisfying the 
demands of ‘fast delivery for import and export (kuai jin  kuai chu) ’ for high-tech 
manufacturing in general and IT products in particular. For example, the then customs 
could not meet requirements of the so-called ‘principle of 955’, namely, 95% of 
high-tech goods have to be produced and then transported within 5 days after the orders 
are placed.128 It means that the tardy custom environment became a problematic issue 
for Kunshan to upgrade itself from a low-tech production site to a high-tech 
manufacturing area.
On top of that, Kunshan still stayed at the lowest jurisdiction o f county-level 
administration, despite its most industrialized and economically globalized performance. 
The low status constrained Kunshan’s capacity of effectively upgrading custom-related 
business environments.129 Prior to the establishment of Kunshan EPZ, Kunshan custom 
representative office was under the customs offices of Suzhou, Nanjng custom office of 
Jiangsu, and the General Custom in Beijing. It took much time to pass the 
documentations level by level, or to wait for the General Custom to coordinate the four 
administrations to work out problems. But, the Songjiang development zone, which 
was right beside KETZ but located in the Shanghai jurisdiction, was under the direct 
management of the customs office of Shanghai government, one administrative level 
from the General Customs. There was no doubt that some investment problems could 
be more easily negotiated in Songjiang as a consequence.130
128 Interview code: KO-03; KC-02; KC-03.
129 News source: ersh iy i shi j i  jin g ji bao dao (based in Guangdong), 2004/06/09.
130 I was told a story about the advantage of the Shanghai administrative level. The interviewee
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Kunshan promoted the idea of EPZ and persuaded the centre to adopt the idea 
(discussed more below). Finally, Kunshan EPZ within KETZ was approved by the 
centre and went into operation from September in 2000. By then, Kunshan had reached 
five ‘number one’ records due to its well preparedness: the first place in China as a 
whole to propose the idea of EPZ, the first zone to prepare site planning and 
construction for EPZ, the first zone to pass the state’s examination, the first zone to 
locate investment, and the first zone to be in operation in generating trades.131 The 
establishment of Kunshan EPZ can be understood as a successful policy innovation to 
solve institutional and production difficulties. Under the EPZ policy, Kunshan was able 
to offer more efficient custom services. Moreover, Kunshan also built up direct links 
and contacts with the General Customs. Such links were further able to help Kunshan 
more efficiently to sort out new business demands and complaints.132
By the end of 2000, the total investment in Kunshan EPZ reached US$ 810 million, 
covering different industries such as electronic and electrical engineering, precision 
engineering, and optical mechanical engineering. By 2001, 15 EPZs across China in 
total accomplished US$ 900 million in trade, with Kunshan EPZ generating US$ 450 
million, around 50% of the national total.133 The Kunshan EPZ also produced great 
input to KETZ. In terms of export, Kunshan EPZ contributed 30% of export to KETZ
complained to the Shanghai mayor about the slower service of the Customs in Pudong airport after 
Shanghai moved its international airport from Hongqiao to Pudong. Then Shanghai mayor then 
negotiated with the General Customs in Beijing directly. Three days later the problems significantly 
improved. News source: zhong guo shi bao (based in Taipei), 2003/02/09; also interview code: YC-03.
131 Kunshan Almanac (2001), page 172.
132 One company invested in Kunshan EPZ wanted to import new machines that can operate in line with 
non-lead production procedures in order to comply with the latest European regulations. In order to do so, 
it needed to dispose of old machines that would not be qualified to discard because of the old Customs 
regulations. The company explained the problems to Kunshan officials who sorted out the problems in 
one week’s time. It may not be possible to happen before the establishment of Kunshan EPZ. News 
source: yuan jian za zhi (based in Taipei), 2005/December.
133 News source: http://www.yangtse.com/gb/content/2002-02/22/content_287208.htm.
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in 2002, and up to more than 50% in 2003 (Table 7-9). It is understandable why export 
and GDP in KETZ increased more sharply after 2001 (Figure 7-1).
Table 7-9: Export in KETZ and EPZ
2001 2002 2003
KETZ (1) 1,940 3,652 6,310
Kunshan EPZ (2) 180 1,157 3,257
Kunshan EPZ as of KETZ
(2 )/(I )
9.3% 31.7% 51.6%
Note: unit as US$ million
Source: Kunshan Almanac (2002) to (2004)
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Note: left axis as export (US$ million) and right axis as GDP (RMB billion)
Source: Kunshan Yearbook (2004); Annual Report on the Development of KETZ 
(2003)
7-3 Local-Central Interactions in Kunshan Development 
Process o f  unauthorized but state-intentional connivance
KETZ was established in 1985 without any reporting to the centre. Due to its secret 
status, KETZ had to be largely self-financed. As mentioned, the land lease policy 
played a crucial role in infrastructure financing in the 1990s. Apart from that, Kunshan 
officials developed KETZ by many economical and prudent ways, particularly at the 
beginning. First, Kunshan did not expropriate lands and property immediately after they 
publicized the plan of KETZ. In other development zones, much of infrastructure
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finance stayed idle in a land expropriation account before they found investors to pay 
the lease costs back. With a strategy of ‘rolling development (gun dong kai fa )', 
Kunshan officials only took an appropriate amount of lands and property in the 
locations specifically required by investors who decided to act. It means that Kunshan 
tried not to spend money too early on displacement compensation before the industrial 
lands were ordered by investors (Wu 2000).134 In addition, Kunshan offered a summer 
internship opportunity with limited payment to the civil engineering department at 
Tongji University to do survey practice. Later, they used the maps done by Tongji 
University to start planning and construction (Wang and Jiang 1999; Almanac Office of 
KETZ 2000).
Moreover, the location of KETZ was just beside the downtown of Kunshan with the 
strategy was to ‘develop a new district by relying on the old town (yi tuo lao cheng kai 
fa  xin q u f  (Yang 1991). Such a strategy was different from the locational practice of 
most national zones, which were settled in the outskirts of cities. The then convention, 
highly influenced by the experience of Shenzhen special economic zone, argued that 
development zones operating under market conditions should be far away from 
ordinary people in the downtown who had to stay within the planned and socialist 
environments (Lai, Zhao et al. 1992; Zweig 1999; Chung 1999b; Zhang 2003).135 The 
proximity between KETZ and the central downtown of Kunshan offered many 
advantages, however. First, to expand the existing infrastructure to KETZ from
134 The author of the citation was WU Kequan, then chief of Kunshan County and the key architect of
Kunshan development in the 1980s. The article was published for the first time in 1989.
135 When Qingdao established a national ETDZ in 1984, instead of choosing the eastern part of the city 
with better transportation and infrastructure support, the then leaders in Qingdao decided to set up in 
Huangdao, which was far away from the city proper (Chung 1999b). Dalian began its ETDZ at 
Maqiaoshi, which was 33 km from the centre of Dalian (Lai, Zhao et al. 1992). Similarly, Nantong built 
its zone far away from the city because the conservative leaders in Nantong wanted to prevent its 
pernicious influence from poisoning Nantong’s socialist nature (Zweig 1999). The location of KETZ was 
criticized since Kunshan people would be likely to be ‘polluted’ by western market ideas, such as the 
opening up policy.
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downtown was easier and cheaper than establishing completely new networks. Second, 
the location beside the downtown where the county government resided meant that 
there was no need to build a new administrative office specifically to serve KETZ. 
Most of Kunshan officials were able to take care of the operation of KETZ. Besides, 
people were more willing to go out of downtown to work in KETZ, making it easier for 
incoming firms to hire suitable local workers (Almanac Office of KETZ 2000; Wu 
2000). Overall, until 1989, Kunshan spent just RMB 27.1 million on infrastructure, 
only around 20% of the average cost for national zones (Table 7-10).136






Note: * refers to million RMB
Source: China Special Economic Zones and Coastal Economic Technological 
Development Zone Almanac (1980-1989), Annual Report on the Development of 
KETZ (2003)
Soon after the announcement, in January 1986 HAN Peixin took a business trip to 
Kunshan and was unexpectedly told of the construction of Kunshan New Industrial 
Area. Han, then party secretary of Jiangsu province, did not express strong 
disagreement immediately. Instead, he asked Kunshan leaders for details of the secret 
zone. After the trip, he encouraged other provincial leaders to pay a visit (Yang 1991). 
Therefore, more upper-level officials noticed Kunshan. In November 1987, ZHAO 
Zhiyang, then General Secretary of CCP, visited Kunshan and KETZ and offered his 
appreciation to Kunshan’s self-developing KETZ. From this perspective, KETZ was 
developed in a process that was unauthorized but with a state-intention to connive.
136 News source: ren min ri bao (based in Beijing), 1990/12/04.
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Process of seeking for state ex-post endorsement
Its great success in self-development (Table 7-6 and 7-10 above) gradually attracted the 
attention not only of upper-level officials but also heavyweight scholars and 
national-wide state media, including xin hua ri bao (based in Beijing), jie fang  ri bao 
(based in Beijing), and ren ming ri bao (based in Beijing).137 A famous economist 
XUE Muqiao and a sociologist FEI Xiaotung visited Kunshan and left their public 
affirmations (Yang 1991). However, the confidence based on the public affirmation and 
appreciation is just one side of the coin as to why KETZ and Kunshan government 
started to seek for support from the upper-level governments. The other side of the coin 
is that in terms of FDI attraction, KETZ was far below the national zones (Table 7-6 
above). Kunshan had to sort out the difficulty in attracting FDI. Apart from the 
incentives created by the land lease policy, whether or not zones operated legally and 
officially under state regulations was a typical consideration when foreign firms 
selected investment locations. Moreover, with Kunshan’s low county-level 
administrative status, foreigners had reasonably cast some doubt on whether or not it 
had enough competence to keep KETZ operating (Fei 2000).
The efforts to strive for upgrading to a national title started from the late 1980s. In 1988 
the name of ‘Kunshan “New Industrial District” ’ was authorized by Jiangsu to be 
changed to ‘Kunshan “Economic and Technological Zone” ’, the same name as a 
national zone. In both 1988 and 1989, KETZ was invited to attend conferences 
organized by the State Council focusing on issues related to national development 
zones. All attendees but KETZ were from the 14 national development zones. KETZ 
was the only locally initiated project without any support by the state. In the 1988
137 Chronology of KETZ, cited from (KETZ Administration Office and Party History Research Office of 
Kunshan CCP, Eds. 2000), page 422-423.
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meeting, JI Chongwei, attending on behalf of the State Council made a final remark, 
strongly calling for the national development zones to learn from Kunshan how to 
spend smaller budgets with better economic performance as a consequence.138 After 
that, there was a byword of ’14 (national zones) +1 (Kunshan)’ to describe the KETZ’s 
performance with its particular non-state-status. In 1989, Kunshan was administratively 
upgraded from a county to a county-level city.139 In January 1991, KETZ was selected 
by Jiangsu as one of the key development zones in Jiangsu. In June 1992, ZOU Jiahua, 
then vice PM, visited Kunshan and offered Kunshan his inscription ‘Kunshan 
Economic and Technological Zone’.140 In July 1992, Li Peng, then PM, further openly 
admired the performance of KETZ and encouraged other localities to learn from 
Kunshan. These inscriptions and appreciation to some extent represented unofficial 
state endorsement. Finally, in August 1992, the State Council granted KETZ national 
status.
Total FDI injections grew exponentially after Kunshan was granted the national-title in 
1992 (Figure 7-2 above).141 And the scale of investment project was also becoming 
bigger. From 1985 to August 1992, there were only six investment projects over US$ 
10 million per item. Only sixteen months after listing as a national zone, there were 22 
additional projects over the same ceiling, at the end of 1993.142
138 Chronology of KETZ, cited from (KETZ Administration Office and Party History Research Office of 
Kunshan CCP, eds. 2000), page 425-427.
139 ‘guan yu Jiangsu sheng she li Kunshan shi de pi fu  (Answer to Jiangsu province regarding 
establishment of Kunshan county-level city)’, min pi (1989) No. 8,1989/07/27. Kunshan Almanac 
(1988-1993), page 1-2.
140 The strategy of seeking for inscription from upper-level leaders was popular for post-Mao local 
governments to strive for more resources. Zhangjiangan, one county-level city under Suzhou, also used 
the calligraphy of Li Peng, the then PM of China, to lobby the officials in the State Council to grant 
national-level bonded warehouse (Zweig 1999).
141 Of course, I do not want to argue that FDI injecting to KETZ after 1992 was only because of its being 
granted as national-status. The macro context in China was also changed to be in favour to FDI after 
Deng’s Southern Tour in 1992.
142 Kunshan Almanac (1988-1993), page271-272.
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Note: unit as million US dollars
Source: same as Figure 7-1
One more interesting point is that outward-looking marketing and business promotion 
took place through the investor’s networking. In the late 1980s when attracting 
Japanese investors, Miuoshi Etsuo and Yagi Keiji, the first and second Japanese 
investors in Kunshan, were good friends. In the 1990s, several foreign investors were 
from Taiwan, in which many of them were through the connections of WU Ligan and 
his network. Wu, a Taiwanese national, invested in Kunshan in 1991 and invited LIU 
Jinbiao, the chairman of Giant, the world-known bicycle brand, to visit Kunshan. Liu 
introduced Kunshan to his friend Lo, whose factory was one o f supply chain for Giant 
(Yang 1991; 1996; Almanac Office of KETZ 2000).143
Process o f persuasion for state ex-ante adoption
As argued, Kunshan’s low administrative status was inconsistent with its strong 
economic performance. Such status made Kunshan unable to either improve customs 
services or to create EPZ alone without support from the state. In March 1997 Kunshan 
leaders proposed the idea of EPZ to CHEN Shunhuan, then vice director of Office for
143 Due to his contributions in introducing Taiwanese investment, Wu was o f be nicknamed as ‘Mayor of 
Taiwanese investors’. News source tai shen zazhi (based in Beijing), 1997/05; also interview code: 
KO-06; KC-01.
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Special Economic Zone at the State Council in Beijing. Unfortunately, the centre did 
not make an affirmative decision. However, Kunshan officials did not give up on the 
idea of EPZ but continued trying to persuade the centre. In March 1999, Kunshan gave 
a presentation on the concept of EPZ to a conference focusing on FDI and development 
zones. Kunshan’s speech drew the attention of the central government. WU Yi, then 
senior central official and the chairperson of the conference, ordered central officials to 
get involved and help. Afterwards, the General Customs organized visits by six groups 
to Kunshan.144 In late 1999, die General Custom chose Kunshan to open the first 
committee hearings on EPZ. In April 2000, the General Customs approved 15 
experimental zones as a pioneer trial, including Kunshan EPZ within KETZ. In 
September 2000, Kunshan EPZ was inspected and approved by the General Customs 
and was fully in operation during October. Overall, Kunshan officials were reported to 
have paid Beijing 84 visits in total in order to persuade and convince different 
ministries in Beijing (Kunshan EPZ Administrative Committee 2000).145
More interestingly, while Kunshan continued to persuade the central government to 
accept the idea of EPZ, they also made an effort to get the EPZ as ready as they could. 
A small area inside KETZ was selected as Kunshan EPZ. Certain preparations for land 
refilling, road construction, electricity and water supply, broad band communications, 
and standard ready-built factories as well as international marketing were also under 
way. Therefore, it is no surprise that Kunshan EPZ could be in operation almost 
immediately passing the inspection by the State Council (Kunshan EPZ Administrative 
Committee 2000).146
144 Kunshan Almanac (2000), page 118.
145 News Source: ershiyi shi j i  jing ji bao dao (based in Guangdong), 2004/06/09; and interview code: 
KO-03.
146 Kunshan Almanac (2000), page 105-106, Kunshan Almanac (2001), page 113-114, 171-172.
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Compromises beyond central and local interactions
Three types of local-central interactions emerged sequentially in the case of KETZ and 
Kunshan development. These are worth examining to understand |how and why central 
and local governments, each with their own lists of concern priority and different 
political resources managed to reach agreement on local innovations? I would argue 
that local policy innovation is a process in which different agents negotiate, with the 
outcomes reflecting trade-offs between both sides during the process with each side 
making use of the resources they have available.
The process of ‘ex-post state endorsement’ in Kunshan is a case in point. Despite 
granting Kunshan as the national zone, the state still did not provide the same rights to 
Kunshan as to the other national zones. The State Council agreed to KETZ in offering 
the preferential investment policies of 15% tax rebate to FDI investment, but did not 
allow Kunshan to enjoy the fiscal subsidy that the state had provided to other zones.147 
Generally speaking, the national- zone policy covers two main packages: FDI tax rebate 
policy on the one hand and financial subsidy to local governments on the other hand. 
Kunshan and the centre negotiated on the basis of their own considerations as to the 
importance of each package. Kunshan set the former as its first priority since at the time 
KETZ attracted very little FDI compared to other national zones. It could put the latter 
as a secondary consideration partly because it had established KETZ much 
economically than other zones (Table 7-10 above), and partly because the land-lease 
fees helped it to release the fiscal burden (Table 7-7 above).
147 'guan yu she li Kunshan jing j i  j i  shu kai fa  qu di pi fu  (Answer to an issue regarding establishment of 
Kunshan Economic and Technological Zone)’, kuo han (1992), No 104, 1992/08/22. Kunshan Almanac 
(1988-1993), page 2.
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The centre judged the application differently but gave a similar priority of 
considerations as Kunshan did. On the one hand, Kunshan’s economic performance had 
been utilized by the centre as a showcase and a role model to encourage other 
national-level development zones. The byword of ‘14+1’ clearly shows that the centre 
recognized the achievement done in KETZ. On the other hand, in the context of the 
process of ‘fishing’ by the centre and ‘anti-fishing’ deployed by the local (discussed in 
Chapter Five), the centre was very cautious toward projects that were initiated by the 
local governments first and then keen to get financial support from the state (Gore 
1999). In order to balance its appreciation of KETZ performance and keenness to avoid 
‘anti-fishing’ scenarios, ‘allowing FDI tax rebate but offering no state fiscal subsidy’ 
was a basic attitude of the central government. The attitude of the centre was just 
matched with the considerations of the local officials in Kunshan. To sum up, the tricky 
offer of ‘ex-post state endorsement’ in 1992 was an example to show that the outcomes 
of local-central interactions reflected acceptable trade-offs to match the concern of 
priority of each side.
7-4 Operations beyond Local Innovation Process in KETZ and Kunshan
Economic decentralization with rescaling local-central relationship
Economic decentralization refers to local governments being empowered with more 
competences over economic affairs. In this case, Kunshan actually gained more 
administrative and financial competences for promoting economic affairs than before, 
triggering better economic development. For example, in 1988, the centre agreed that 
an additional RMB 5 million in national tax base could be retained as Kunshan local 
revenue for infrastructure financing and economic development (Fei 2000). In March 
1992, KETZ was further authorized by Jiangsu with more economic competences such
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as the power to permit foreign investment projects up to US$ 30 million, which was an 
equal administrative power compared to those of other national development zones.148
I would argue that economic decentralization can be analyzed in the format of rescaling 
the administrative relationship between county-level and other upper-level governments. 
Traditionally, there was a hierarchy such that a county contacted prefecture-level 
officials first, who on behalf of the former communicated with the provincial and 
central governments. But in the context of economic decentralization, the boundary 
between county, provincial, and central governments was blurred in at least two ways. 
First, certain powers belonging to provincial or prefecture-level administrations were 
passed down to county-level administrations. In some cases, along with that is to 
upgrade a county to be a county-level city (Ma 2005). This is what is typically called 
economic decentralization, which also happened in Kunshan. But, secondly, the 
administrative procedures requiring county governments to submit their documents to 
upper-level governments via prefecture officials were also simplified, making the 
county able to contact upper-level governments easier than before.
Examples of such ‘jumping scales’ interactions between Kunshan and Jiangsu 
bypassing Suzhou, or even with Kunshan directly contacting the centre, can be easily 
found in the cae of KETZ and Kunshan. For instance, in March 1992 Kunshan was 
allowed to contact Jiangsu directly to apply for passports for officials’ business trips 
abroad, making it easy and convenient for Kunshan officials to go abroad for 
international marketing.149 Before, Kunshan officers needed to send their applications
148 'guan yu Kunshan kai fa  qu wen ti de tong zhi (Notice to an issue of Kunshan Development Zone)’, 
zu zheng ban fa  (1991) No. 6; and *guan yu jia kuai kai fa  qu jian she ruo gan wen ti de tong zhi (Notice 
to several issues on how to make development zones develop faster)’, zu zheng fa  (1992) No. 36; KETZ 
Administration Office and Party History Research Office of Kunshan CCP (eds) 2000), page 84-89.
149 'guan yu jia kuai kai fa  qu jian she ruo gan wen ti de tong zhi (Notice to several issues on how to
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forms to Suzhou. In October 2000, the Kunshan Customs was upgraded to be directly 
under the Nanjing Customs (Jiangsu level).150
Moreover, Kunshan and Beijing also established direct contacts. In 1992 Kunshan sent 
a representative to Beijing for the national title. ZHENG Huizhen, one of the vice 
mayors o f Kunshan then, stayed in Beijing for a couple of months to collect first-hand 
information on what the centre needed. One day Zheng knew that Beijing needed an 
official document authorized by Jiangsu to show provincial solidarity with their 
application for the national title. She phoned her colleagues in Kunshan the same day, 
Kunshan officials made a draft for Suzhou and Jiangsu top leaders to sign and faxed the 
document back to Zheng just the day after (Yang 1996; Almanac Office of KETZ 2000). 
In addition, in 1999, at the request of the centre, Kunshan drafted the first version of 
management regulations for an export processing zone (EPZ) (Almanac Office of 
KETZ 2000). Furthermore, in 2003 the ‘Handbook of Practicing EPZ {jia gong chu kou 
qu cao zuo shi wu)' was published by the General Custom as the only ‘textbook’ or 
so-called the operation manual in China for the practice of EPZ policy. But the 
‘Handbook’ was actually edited by Kunshan officials on behalf of the General Customs 
based on their experiences in Kunshan EPZ. 151
Career paths of the local leaders
In Chapter Three, I argued that local entrepreneurial governance was driven by the 
self-interests of the local elites. In the context of one-party control, performance-based 
promotion in relation to careerism is discussed as the other key dimension for
make development zones develop faster)’, zu zheng fa  (1992) No. 36. See footnote 148.
150 Kunshan Almanac (2001), page 171-172.
151 Kunshan Almanac (2004), page 87; Interview code: KO-03, also news source: Kunshan ri bao (based 
in Kunshan), 2004/12/14.
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understanding the mechanism of local institutional innovations. Of course, it is difficult 
to investigate whether the motivations of local officials making institutional innovations 
are really triggered by careerism. Grandiose reasons (like serving the people) would be 
most likely mentioned in public. However, we still can trace the careers paths of the 
leaders to understand the relationship between careerism and local economic 
development. Kunshan was dramatically changed from the ‘little sixth’ to one of the 
most globally industrialized counties. On the basis of this, the career paths of the 
leaders could be expected to be quite brilliant.
Actually, Kunshan leaders were promoted significantly after leaving offices in Kunshan. 
It is reportedly called as the ‘Kunshan phenomenon’.152 There have been five ex-party 
secretaries since 1989 when Kunshan itself was upgraded from county to county-level 
city (Table 7-11). The first of them was WU Kechun (1984-1991), one of the most 
important figures in developing in the 1980s, who was promoted to be vice director of 
Suzhou People’s Congress. He was also proposed as a vice mayor of Suzhou, but he 
turned this down due to health concerns, and retired from politics two years after at the 
regulation of age ceiling.153
152 News source: gong shang shi bao (based in Taipei) 2005/01/22; nan fan zhou mo (based in 
Guangdong) 2004/11/18; also interview code: KO-06; KC-04.
153 Interview code: KO-06; KO-07.
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Table 7-11: Party secretary of Kunshan since 1989
Party secretary tenure period in Kunshan Main positions after office Notes
WU Kechun 1984/06-1989/11
1989/11-1991/02
vice Director o f Suzhou People’s 
Congress; vice director of CSSIP
retired due to 
age ceiling
LI Quanlin 1991/02-1996/11 vice mayor and mayor of Yancheng, 
mayor of Changzhou; vice governor o f 
Jiangsu
ZHANG Weiguo 1996/11-2000/08 vice mayor and mayor of Zhengjiang; 








director o f department o f trade and 
foreign economy at Jiangsu province
two echelon 
promotion
Cao Xinpin 2003/05-present —
Note: Ji served as mayor of Kunshan from 1997/12 to 2000/08; Zhang also served as mayor from 
2000/08-2001/08
Source: author compiled
Wu’s successor was LI Quanlin, serving as the Kunshan party secretary from 1991 to 
1996, who was promoted to be vice mayor and mayor of Yancheng, and now is one of 
the vice governors of Jianusu. Similarly, ZHANG Weiguo, who succeeded Li, was 
promoted to be a leader in Zhengjian first and now is also a vice governor of Jiangsu. 
Yangcheng and Zhengjian were prefecture-level cities under Jiangsu. Jiangsu province 
was able to institute eight vice governors. Of eight incumbent vice- governors as of 
2005, the four with local experiences had worked in just three county-level jurisdictions 
in Jiangsu (Table 7-12).154 JIANG Dezhi was in Yangchong for 25 months, Zhang in 
Wuxian for 17 months and Kunshan for 47 months, and Li in Kunshan for 68 months. 
Kunshan is the only county out of more than 50 county-level administrations in Jiangsu 
to ‘produce’ two of their previous leaders to be vice governors.
154 Other four are either working in provincial-level (like HUANG Li and WU Renlin), academic 
positions (like ZHANG Taoling), or central posts (like WANG Zhang) prior to the current posts. 
http://is.gov.cn/gb/zgis/zpd/tszf/zfld/lbh/index.html. downloaded on 2005/11/01.
Table 7-12: Jiangsu vice governors’ (as of 2005) local experiences
County-level experience Prefecture-level experience
JIANG Dezhi Yangchong (25 months, 1994/10-1996/11) Wuxi (2000/08-present)
HE Chun — Xuzhou (2001/05-present)
ZHANG Weikuo Wuxian (17 months, 1990/08-1992/01) Kunshan (47 months, 1996/10-2000/08)
Zhejiang (2000/11-present)
LI ChunLin Kunshan (68 months, 1091/02-1996/09) Yanchen (1997/12-2000/12) Changzhou (2000/12-present)
Source: author compiled
After Zhang left, JI Jianye and ZHANG Lei assumed the office of Kunshan party 
secretaries successively. Ji was promoted to be the mayor of Yangzhou directly after 
Kunshan. Zhang serves as the director of Department of Trade and Foreign Economy of 
Jiangsu province. Ji and Zhang had exceptional promotions of two echelons in one step. 
Their upgrading was from division level (chu j i )  to department level (ting j i)  directly 
without serving in posts at vice department level (fu ting j i ) .155 Taken together, the 
records of career paths of leaders in Kunshan show the high correlation between 
leaders’ economic performance and their political promotions. One investor commented 
that the leaders worked so hard in making policy innovations for improvement of 
business environments and local economic development because they knew they could 
be promoted afterwards.156
Territorial competition beyond policy innovation
I argue in Chapter Three that territorial competition is the other dimension to be 
considered for an understanding of the policy innovation process. This is very relevant 
for Kunshan since there are many development zones nearby. By 2003, 1,390 zones 
were established by various levels of governments in Jiangsu, Shanghai and Zhejiang
155 News source: nan fang zhou mo (based in Guangdong) 2004/11/18; also interview code: KO-06; 
KC-04; KC-07.
156 News source: gong shang shi bao (based in Taipei), 2004/11/01; also interview code: KC-03; KC-06.
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(Table 2-16 above). Therefore, there was inevitably serious territorial competition 
between zones. Territorial competition between Kunshan and these other places also 
reflects the operation of ‘local protectionism’ within Yangtze Delta. Despite the 
geographical proximity of Kunshan to Shanghai, Kunshan belonged to Nanjing 
Customs of Jiangsu, which sometime competed with Shanghai Customs areas. It was 
reported that some Kunshan’s products were ‘obstructed’ by being labelled with a 
‘non-Shanghai’ icon and then transported and handled at a much slower pace than 
Shanghai products in revenge for a public appreciation by the General Customs of 
Nanjing Customs for being a more efficient service.157
In order to compete with other zones, Kunshan made a lot of effort to upgrade their 
business environment to be more attractive. Apart from the major policy innovations 
aforementioned, infrastructure standard in Kunshan was advanced. At the beginning, 
KETZ offered basic standards of infrastructure with five kinds of utilities and land 
refilling {wu tong yi ping). The five utilities included access to: electricity, roads, 
communications, water and sewerage. By 1989, KETZ raised its standard to seven 
utilities plus one land refilling {qi tong y i ping) by additionally offering access to steam 
and gas.158 Nowadays, nine utilities including optical fiber and internet are provided 
along with land-refilling. In 1996, Kunshan established a ‘foreign investor service 
centre’, coordinating different departments to provide a one-stop-shop service. In 1997 
Kunshan cancelled 73 items of fee and lowered the prices for another 44 items.159 In 
addition, in 1997 Kunshan launched a campaign ‘Never Say “No” to Foreign Investors’. 
In 1998, Kunshan applied a quota system with performance management in order to
157 News source: xin hua wang (Jiangsu channel), 2003/06/26.
158 Suzhou Almanac (1987), page 68-71; Suzhou Almanac (1990), page 655-659.
159 Kunshan Almanac (1994-1997), page202-203; (1999), pagell5.
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create more incentives for members of staff marketing Kunshan and attracting FDI.160 
Since 2001, Kunshan has even established the first county-level Bureau of Information 
in China in order to persuade the centre that they would have adequate local staff to 
manage an FDI investment involving CD ROM.161
A coalition with Taiwanese investors for local economic development 
The pro-growth development coalition is another dimension for understanding local 
entrepreneurial governance in relation to policy innovation. Due to the overwhelming 
importance of Taiwanese investments, it is understandable that Taiwanese investors 
played an important role in development coalition in Kunshan. The importance of 
Taiwanese investors can be observed not only explicitly in investment but also 
implicitly in the so-called ‘Honourary Citizenship of Kunshan (Kunshan rong yu shi 
miri)' and ‘Friend of Kunshan (Kunshan zhi you)\ which are certificates designed to 
show appreciation and affirmation of contributions to local economic development by 
foreigners. From 1996, Taiwanese took the majority of honourary citizenships (Table 
7-13). 162 A similar pattern applies to ‘Friends of Kunshan’, of whom by 1998 
Taiwanese were 9 out of 15, while in 2002 they were 3 out of 4 .163 These
160 Kunshan Almanac (1994-1997), page 134; Kunshan Almanac (1999), page 67.
161 In 2001, one world-wide blank CD ROM producer wanted to settle down in Kunshan. However, 
blank CD ROM is categorized as a sensitive material able to contain news and ideologies, according to 
the regulations by Department of Information (DOI) at the State Council. At beginning, the staffs in DOI 
refused to grant permission for investment. Kunshan made an innovation in establishing Bureau of 
Information in order to settle down the case. News source: er shi yi shi j i  jing ji bao dao (based in 
Guangdong), 2004/06/09; also interview code: KO-03; KC-03.
162 Main benefits to be ‘Honour of Kunshan Citizenship’ cover: to be invited as guests to present the 
local people’s congress and discuss the development strategy; to be invited as economic consultants for 
economic policies; and to be prioritized to sort out some business troubles; to be privileged to take 
precedence over others to enjoy the preferential policies; to be free of charge to visit three tourist 
attractions in Kunshan; to be free of charge to health check in the Kunshan government-owned hospital; 
to be free of charge to subscribe Kunshan government-owned newspaper; to unrestrictedly choose 
schooling for their children.
163 ‘Friends of Kunshan’ can enjoy all benefits of ‘Honour of Kunshan’ plus being special consultants to 
the mayor and party secretary and to be recorded in ‘Who is Who in Kunshan’ and Kunshan gazette. The 
numbers and nationalities of Friends of Kunshan are from Kunshan Almanac (1999), page 230-231, and 
Kunshan Almanac (2003), page 241.
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overwhelming ratios demonstrate how heavily individual Taiwanese were involved in 
Kunshan development.
Table 7-13: numbers of Kunshan honourary citizens by nationality
Nationality 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Taiwanese (1) 14 15 21 14 26 r 22 22 26 25 20
Japanese ~ 7 6 7 4 4 3 3 3 6 4
All others 14 6 5 9 5 9 7 7 6 6
Total (2) 35 27 33 27 35 34 32 36 37 30
Taiwanese (%) 
(1) /  (2)
40.0% 55.6% 63.6% 51.9% 74.3% 64.7% 68.8% 72.2% 67.6% 66.7%
Source: Kunshan Almanac in different years
In addition, there was another organized way to institutionalize Taiwanese influence in 
decision making in Kunshan. Kunshan was the first county-level city to establish an 
official association of Taiwan investors, namely, Kunshan Association of Taiwan 
Investors (KATI). KATI was the only business association in Kunshan to be invited as a 
guest organization to audit the annual mayoral report to the Local People’s Council 
since, starting in 1995.164 When hiring a consultancy company for the Kunshan 
Comprehensive Development Plan in 2002, the then Kunshan mayor requested KATI to 
organize a special meeting to gather the opinions over a draft plan.165 Regular 
bi-monthly meetings of a ‘Taiwanese Investor Salon’ were also organized by KATI and 
Kunshan officials focusing on the free consultant services on regulations of tax, 
environment protections, and the customs. Moreover, KATI hosted many domestic and 
international visiting groups on behalf of Kunshan officials, including local officials 
from China, and other countries who were interested in questions such as why and how 
Kunshan developed (Po and Pun 2003). When some teaching materials in the 
complex-Chinese-based high school and primary school in Kunshan were not allowed
164 News source: lian an guan xiyue kan (based in Beijing), 1997/12. The news is a report for an 
interview with ZHENG Huizhen, who was mayor of Kunshan from 1994 to 1997; also gong shang shi 
bao (based in Taipei), 2004/06/01.
165 Interview code: KC-04; KO-01; KO-02.
243
by the central government in Beijing, Kunshan and KATI again cooperated to persuade 
the centre to sort out the problems. 166
The geographical location of KATI also displays a ‘spatially’ special connection with 
Kunshan officials. KATI was located in the 9th floor of the same building of 
administrative committee of KETD, next to the Taiwanese Affairs Office of Kunshan 
Government (TAOKG), with which it shared some staff. KATI is further reportedly 
known as the unofficial ‘fifth’ set of leaders in Kunshan167- along with the four official 
sets of leading group at each level, i.e., Party, Government, the People’s Council, and 
the People’s Political Consultative Conference- suggesting the heavyweight influence it 
is perceived to have in Kunshan public affairs (Po and Pun 2003).
Policy innovation and diffusion through Taiwanese investors
As agued, there was a strong institutionalized relationship between Kunshan officials 
and Taiwanese investors. In this context, the perspective of diffusion and transfer of 
policy innovation offers another angle to understand the policy process for the EPZ in 
Kunshan. In this case, in order to persuade the centre, Kunshan was required to prepare 
enough information for the development of the proposals. One of the main resources 
for Kunshan to understand the operations of such EPZs was Taiwanese investors in 
Kunshan, who had experience of the more competitive customs management in Taiwan 
as well as having suffered from the dawdling and inconvenient customs services in
166 Taiwan and China had different concerns about the teaching materials. Taiwan insists that the content 
offered from the textbooks published in Taiwan can be only deleted rather than added. China declares 
that all icons and symbols related to Taiwan sovereignty, such as pictures of the national flag o f Taiwan, 
have to be deleted. Then Kunshan officials and KATI worked to import Taiwanese textbooks and then 
marked all sensitive icons and symbols in black. Interviews code: KC-04.
167 News source: shangye zhou kan ( based in Taipei), 2001/05, citied by Po, L. C. and N. Pun (2003); 
also interview code: KC-04.
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China since the 1990s.168 Those Taiwanese investors provided Kunshan officials with 
discourses and experiences about what was required for the latest development of 
global IT production system, such as ‘just in time’, ‘zero stock in supply’, the ‘955 
principle (discussed above)’, and so on.
Moreover, they further helped Kunshan officials to arrange a ‘leaming-cum-visiting’ 
tour in Taiwan. Starting from 1995, XU AN Binglung, a veteran Kunshan official, and 
other officials were arranged to visit Nantze export processing zone and Hsinchu 
Science Park to learn about the operation of IT manufacturing environment, including 
legal system and relating regulations, tax policy and structure of administrative 
organizations.169 Nantze and Hsinchu were two powerful zones in IT industry in 
Taiwan. In other words, Taiwanese FDI in Kunshan played an important role in helping 
Kunshan to connect with the latest knowledge of international IT manufacture 
requirements in the world. The significance of this visit was reflected symbolically in 
an act of naming, which is one of key ways to display connections between learning 
regions and their models (Lagendijk 2001).170 Two roads in Kunshan EPZ were named 
after Nantze and Hsichu as a reminder of this learning tour to Taiwan as well as 
appreciation for the help from Taiwanese investors as another selling point to attract 
more Taiwanese investment.171
168 Taiwan’s competitive custom service to meet international IT manufacturing standard also can be 
evidenced by the fact that Taiwan is producing 70% of international market in chip foundry services;
72% in laptops computer, 68% in LCD monitors, 66% in cable modems; 36% in semi-conductor packing 
service. News source: BusinessWeek (based in New York), 2005/05/16.
169 Local officials are reported to pay Taiwan a visit not only for visiting potential Taiwanese investors 
but also for learning operations and effectiveness of Taiwan Science Parks. News Source: er shi yi shi j i  
jing j i  bao dao (based in Guangdong), 2004/06/09; yuan jian za zhi (based in Taipei), 2005/December 
also interview code: KO-03; KO-02.
170 Naming strategy in relation to ‘modeling after’ can be exemplified in the way high-tech cluster 
strategies are almost inevitably associated with “Silicon Valley”, resulting in notions of Silicon Glen in 
Scotland, “Silicon Isle” in Singapore, and “Silicon Plateau” in Bangalore (Lagendijk 2001)
171 News: ershiyi shi j i  jingji bao dao (based in Guangdong) 2004/06/09; also interview code: KC-03.
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7-5 The Effectiveness of Policy Innovation
From complementarity to competition: Kunshan vis-a-vis Shanghai 
The story of Kunshan and KETZ shows that the local capacity has been upgraded 
through a series of local innovation processes. Local upgrading of capacity refers to 
more powerful administrative competences over economic affairs as well as to 
manufacturing capacity for high-tech productions. To illustrate this, I discuss the 
relationship between Kunshan and Shanghai.
In the 1980s and the early 1990s, Kunshan used to take an advantage of its position as 
‘nearest county to Shanghai’ as a selling point to attract not only domestic investors and 
technicians, but also FDI from Taiwan, Japan and other countries. Those investment 
capital and human resources which could not enter Shanghai would then like to choose 
Kunshan as the second best option. For example, it was reported that 90% of members 
in KATI went to Shanghai for a business feasibility study before they invested in 
Kunshan. But less expensive land prices, cheaper labour costs as well as geographic 
proximity to Shanghai were considerations leading these Taiwanese investors to finally 
decide to invest in Kunshan (Shen and Hu 2003). It means that there was more or less a 
hierarchical spatial relationship between Kunshan and Shanghai. Shanghai was superior 
to Kunshan, with the latter playing a complementary role to the former.
By the late 1990s, however, Kunshan was becoming a closer competitor to Shanghai. 
Thus, when Quanta International Limited, one of the biggest laptop manufacturers in 
the world, investigated its investment location in China in 2001, Kunshan competed
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with Songjiang of Shanghai.172 The idea of the EPZ and the improvement of customs 
service in Kunshan also shows that Kunshan tried to offer the similar business 
environment to Shanghai could do. In 2001 the General Custom selected only two 
pioneering EPZs to experiment more advanced custom supervision models. One was 
Kunshan EPZ and the other Shanghai Songjiang EPZ. 173 In 2003, Shanghai even 
formulated a policy to build up its manufacturing industry by establishing an industrial 
area in the outskirts of Shanghai. With the planed area as 173 km2 in total, the project 
was called as ‘173 project’. By lowering the business cost and offering efficient 
administrative procedures, Shanghai tried to compete in attracting FDI with other 
neighbouring development zones, in which one was Kunshan. There was a slogan 
saying ‘173 in order to chase Kunshan (yi qi san gan Kunshan) (Yu 2004).174 In other 
words, through a series of policy innovations for local economic development, Kunshan 
had successfully transformed its spatial relationship with Shanghai from that of a 
county-level complement to that of a global manufacturing competitor.
Unbalanced development in Kunshan
However, it does not mean such local policy innovation had no problems. As argued in 
Chapter Four, performance-based personnel management with a heavy focus on 
economic indicators along with limited check and balances or civil society involvement 
actually could produce much unsustainable development (Unger and Chan 1995). 
Despite great performance in the area of economic globalization, Kunshan did not 
develop equally in other respects (Wei 2002b; Po and Pun 2003). In terms of a 
comprehensive set of indicators for a ‘moderately better-off society (jdao kang she hui)\
172 Interview code: YC-03.
173 The new supervision models were related to the more complicated semi-products transfers between 
factories, for example, transfer from EPZ to bonded zone, to different EPZ or to other factories outside of 
any SEZ.
174 News source: nan fangzhou mo (based in Guangdong), 2003/06/11; also interview code: KO-02; 
KO-04; KC-04.
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Kunshan under-performed on certain items like disposable income of city and rural 
inhabitants, R&D as a proportion of GDP, and green coverage in city areas (Table 
7-14).
Table 7-14: Comprehensive indicators for ‘moderate better-off society in 2000
Indicators Unit Standard Kunshan Qualified
Economic Development Section
GDP per capita RMB > 24,000 70,184 O
II, and III sector o f GDP % » 9 2 97.7 O
urbanization % » 5 5 63.2 o
Registered unemployment rate % <5 2.4 o
Living Standard Section
Disposable income o f city habitants RMB » 1 6 ,0 0 0 13,034 X
Income o f rural habitants RMB » 8 ,0 0 0 6,819 X
Average of housing areas for city habitants ~m2 » 3 0 29.7 O
Average of housing areas for rural habitants m2 » 4 0 62 O
Roads to get to every rural villages % 100 100 o
Road area per city habitants m2 » 1 2 21 o
Telephone numbers per 100 household Set » 2 0 0 235 o
Computer numbers per 100 household set » 4 0 40 o
Entertaining cost as total consumption % » 1 8 18 o
Engel coefficient % <40 37 o
Social Development Section
R&D of GDP % >1.5 0.72 X
Enrollment rate of high school students % >90 98.4 O
Health system coverage % >90 96.7 O
Insurance coverage for city habitants % >95 98.9 O
Insurance coverage for rural habitants % >90 99.1 O
Satisfaction for public security % >90 92 o
Local self autonomy in city areas % >90 100 o
Local self autonomy for rural areas % >95 100 o
Environment Development Section
Green coverage in city areas % >40 36.8 X
Forest coverage % >20 10.8 X
Environment comprehensive indicators % >80 93.3 O
Source: Zhang (2004)
This clearly shows the weakness of a local innovation process focused exclusively on 
economic development and ignoring other important social and environmental issues. 
For example, the role of the planning department in the policy making process was 
relatively weak compared to the other departments focusing on economic development. 
Arable, residential or recreational lands could be easily changed to industrial purposes 
simply only at the request of investors. And in the 1980s and 1990s, peasants did not
get enough attention in the compensations programs and expropriation process 
compared to their industrial counterparts.175 To sum up, the so-called Kunshan 
experience was to some extent too economically focused on GDP and FDI promotion 
rather than socially and environmentally balanced to sustainable local development,176 
in ways that reflect the character of the innovation process as well as the broader 
circumstances of transition.
7-6 Conclusion
With the case study of Kunshan and KETZ development, this chapter has focused on a 
detailed history and the operations of policy innovation for local economic 
development in an example of a ‘locally initiated project’. Three diversified types of 
local-central interactions were found sequentially in the history of KETZ and Kunshan 
development. The category of ‘state intention to connive* can be used to characterize 
the initial development of KETZ in the 1980s due to the secret status of KETZ at the 
beginning. Then, ‘state ex-post endorsement’ occurred when KETZ was finally granted 
recognition as a national zone in the early 1990s. Finally, the story of Kunshan’s 
successful promotion of the concept of ‘export processing zone’ to the centre can be 
understood as the type of ‘state ex-ante adoption’. These processes also show when 
both the centre and Kunshan had their own lists of priorities and concerns, the outcome 
in terms of policy innovation reflected a trade-off between both sides after a real 
process of interaction.
In addition, from the perspective of ‘asymmetric decentralization’, economic 
decentralization meant that Kunshan became able to officially or unofficially contact
175 Interview code: KO-10; KC-07; YP-04.
176 News source: zhongguo jingyin bao (based in Beijing), 2004/12/18.
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either Jiangsu provincial government or the centre directly. With continuing political 
centralization, there was a brilliant record of career paths of local leaders in relation to 
the successful economic performances. Moreover, territorial competition with other 
development zones in Yangtze Delta was also a key factor triggering Kunshan’s efforts 
to keep upgrading its business environment. In the particular context that FDI in 
Kunshan were dominated by Taiwanese investment, a pro-growth coalition between 
Kunshan officials and Taiwanese investors played an important role in transferring 
policy innovations from outside to Kunshan. As to the effectiveness of policy 
innovation, Kunshan did manage to positively upgrade its local economic capacity. 
However, Kunshan dealt less well with the big challenge of balancing economic growth 
with the interests of local people and with environmental development.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Policy Innovations in the Local Implementation of Centrally Initiated Projects 
Case Study of China Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park
177'CSSIP is the priority among all priorities (zhong zhong zhi zhong) ’
178'A body with two wings, district in the west and park in the east (yi ti liangyi, tong yuan xi qu) ’
8-1 Characteristics of China Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park
Globalized performance as a role model of development zones 
China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (CSSIP) was established under the 
‘Agreement on Joint Development of China Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park’ (the 
‘CSSIP Agreement’) between both the China and Singapore governments in 1994. Prior 
to that, the location of CSSIP was just an arable land. There was limited construction 
and marketing before the ‘CSSIP Agreement’, meaning that CSSIP was a case of ‘local 
implementation of centrally initiated projects’.
From the perspective of economic globalization, CSSIP has developed dramatically 
over the past decade. Compare CSSIP and Kunshan Economic and Technological 
Development Zone (KETZ) for example. KETZ was established in 1984 secretly by the 
Kunshan county-level government and then granted status of a national zone in 1992, 
meaning that KETZ had a longer history of development than CSSIP did. However, the
177 The comment was made by JIANG Zemin, the then President of China, in December 1997. CSSIP 
Investment Guide (1998), page2; also news source: Straits Times (based in Singapore), 1997/11/27.
178 The comment was made as part of Suzhou Development Strategy in 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000).
It means that ‘a body’, a metaphor for Suzhou, is able to fly successfully only with two equally strong 
wings- one Suzhou New District (SND) in the west and one China Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park 
(CSSIP) in the east (Wu 1997), also news Source: gongshen shi bao (based in Taipei), 1995/05/15. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, both SND and CSSIP were granted status as national development zones 
(Table 4-10).
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economic performances of KETZ were soon surpassed by CSSIP (Figure 8-1). By 1996, 
just two years after the start, CSSIP had attracted more realized FDI than KETZ had. 
Two years after, by 1998, CSSIP generated more fiscal revenue than KETZ. After one 
more year, GDP in CSSIP overtook that in KETZ.
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Note: Unit for total industrial output, GDP and fiscal revenue is million RMB; and unit for realized FDI 
and export is US$ million
Source: Yearbook of Economic and Social Development for CSSIP (2002); and 
www.sipac.gov.cn/yqii/iifz/iizb: Annual Report of Development on KETZ (2003), and 
Kunshan Statistics Yearbook (204)
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The performance of CSSIP also can be seen in terms of its contribution to the 
transformation of the Suzhou city area. By 2003 CSSIP generated about 50% of the 
city’s industrial output and 36% of its GDP, as well as 40% of realized FDI, 35% of 
exports and 27% of fiscal revenue (Table 8-1). Due to CSSiP’s strong economic 
performances in many dimensions, the Chinese Association of Development Zone 
(CADZ) {zhong quo kai fa  qu xie hui) twice organized conferences focusing on 
‘learning from development experiences in CSSIP’: first 2001 and then in 2003. 179 It 
was the only one development zone show-cased by CADZ as a model for ‘learning and 
adopting’. To sum up, CSSIP can be regarded as one of the most successful 
development zones in China during the post-Mao period.
IT and electronic-focus, mainly Europe/America sources
In terms of industrial sectors, CSSIP had a strong representation of electronic and 
information technology, and precision engineering industry from its start. By 1997, 
these two industries occupied for 60% of fixed asset investment, growing to 66% by 
2004.180 In terms of investment source, in contrast to KETZ where there was only 
limited investment from Europe (5.5%), North America (5.5%) and Singapore (1.7%), 
by 1996 FDI that CSSIP had attracted more companies from North America (39%), 
Singapore (12%) and Europe (9.6%) (Table 8-2). By 2004, European and American 
investors still accounted for the biggest share (42%), following by overseas Chinese 
from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau (22%), and Singapore (18%), and Japan and 
Korea (13%).181
179 Chronology of Chinese Development Zones, edited by Association of Development Zone of China 
Website: http://www.cadz.org.cn/.
180 CSSIP Investment Guide (1997), page 20; (2005), page 50.
181 CSSIP Investment Guide (2005), page 50.
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Table 8-1: Economic performance of Suzhou City Area and CSSIP
Suzhou City Area 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total Industrial Output 33,261 37,022 35,685 n.a. 45,477 63,531 71,855 103,962 126,404 191,472
GDP 13,230 14,841 17,027 n.a. 22,020 26,641 33,542 61,856 72,715 101,050
Realized FDI n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,185 2,072 2,944
Export n.a n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,773 4,672 6,191 8,834 17,177
Fiscal revenue 1,448 1,652 1,915 2,327 2,705 3,701 5,802 9,163 12,662 17,269
CSSIP 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total Industrial Output 3,586 3,989 5,249 7,477 10,274 16,421 31,610 37,502 4,9025 89,797
GDP 1,132 1,357 1,962 3,274 5,029 7,440 13,048 18,015 25,170 36,510
Realized FDI 70 162 411 681 1,200 800 632 530 911 1,205
Export 0 6 72 165 295 634 1,510 1,652 2,552 5,960
Fiscal revenue 40 73 114 224 402 669 1,630 2,439 3,260 4,620
CSSIP % Suzhou City Area 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total Industrial Output 10.78% 10.77% 14.71% n.a. 22.59% 25.85% 43.99% 36.07% 38.78% 46.90%
GDP 8.56% 9.14% 11.52% n.a. 22.84% 27.93% 38.90% 29.12% 34.61% 36.13%
Realized FDI n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 44.73% 43.97% 40.93%
Export n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 22.86% 32.32% 26.68% 28.89% 34.70%
Fiscal revenue 2.72% 4.44% 5.96% 9.64% 14.87% 18.08% 28.09% 26.62% 25.75% 26.76%
Note: Unit for total industrial output, GDP and fiscal revenues are million RMB; and unit for realized FDI and export are US$ million
Source Yearbook of Economic and Social Development for China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (2002); and 
http://www.sipac.gov.cn/yqii/iifz/iizb ; and Jiangsu Statistics Yearbook (2004), (2003), (2002), (2000), (1999), (1997), (1996), (1995)
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Table 8-2: Investment source of CSSIP and KETZ by 1996
CSSIP KETZ
Europe 9.6% 5.5%
North America 39.0% 5.5%
Singapore 11.9% 1.7%
Note: data for CSSIP was fixed asset investment; data for KETZ was by realized FDI 
Source: CSSIP Business brochure (1997); and Kunshan Statistics Yearbook (1997)
‘Foreign’ Suzhou- Singapore characteristics o f  infrastructure
Along with the brilliant economic performances in quantitative terms, there was a 
distinctive Singapore characteristic to CSSIP. Singapore highly exerted their influence 
on infrastructure construction and business marketing at the beginning. The 
infrastructure in CSSIP was built to the so-called ‘Singapore/ international standard’, 
which is one of the key reasons why there were a great amount of FDI from Europe and 
America to CSSIP (Pereira 2004a). In terms of hardware infrastructure, CSSIP offered 
‘ready-built factories (RBF)’ for investors to reduce their start-up time and costs 
because they did not need to build their own factories. And the RBF were developed by 
Jurong Town Corporation, the key state-owned industrial land developer in Singapore, 
implying that the quality of RBF could be guaranteed. CSSIP also had its own power 
substations and water treatment plants. The scale and quality of the facilities were 
bigger and better than those in other zones. In 1997, CSSIP still generated less 
industrial output, GDP and export than KETZ did (Figure 8-1 above). But CSSIP itself 
had already built a water treatment plant with capacity of 15 ton per day and a sewage 
treatment plant with capacity of 10 ton per day. By contrast, by the end of 1997 in 
Kunshan, there were only a water treatment plant with capacity of 7 ton per day and a 
sewage treatment plant with capacity of 5 ton per day.182 Moreover, these facility lines 
in CSSIP were built underground at the beginning of construction. Such engineering
182 Suzhou Almanac (1998), page 51; Kunshan Almanac (1994-1997), page 131.
255
design and layout was not seen in other zones in China in the 1990s. 183 In addition, 
CSSIP was refilled 0.9 meter to protect against the 100-year worst flood record in 
Suzhou history. This prevented CSSIP from a damaging flood in 1997, where as other 
areas in Suzhou suffered quite seriously because these areas were constructed without 
any refills. 184
Apart from hardware infrastructure, CSSIP also offered certain unique ‘software’ 
infrastructures. The famous one is the ‘Provident Fund (PF) scheme’, which was a 
comprehensive social security scheme different from that in the rest of China (Pan, 
Zhou et al. 2000). Started in 1955 in Singapore, the Central Provident Fund (CPF) was 
one of its most important social welfare programs. CPF can be characterized with three 
features: first, it was a comprehensive program covering housing, medical care and 
retirement pension and so on; second, both employers and employees had to contribute 
to CPF monthly; third, each contributing employees had his/her own individual CPF 
account. In 1997, a PF scheme was introduced by Singapore in the CSSIP, the first such 
pension program of its kind in China. Prior to that, China’s pension system put most of 
the social security fund in a public account contributed by state-owned companies or 
public agencies (namely, danwei) and shared by everyone in the community. There 
were limited incentives for employees to work hard in the public pension pool. In the 
new PF scheme, in order to accumulate more in their individual deposits, employees 
were motivated to earn more income.185 Therefore, the PF scheme became an 
important selling point for companies to attract employees who wanted to participate in
183 Suzhou Almanac (1995), page 45; also interview code: SO-02; YO-04.
184 It is because the level of many lands in Suzhou areas, including the location of CSSIP, was lower than 
average. From the viewpoint of Singapore, the costly construction of refilling land became necessary. 
Suzhou Almanac (1995), page 48; also interview code: YO-04.
185 The numbers of how much percentage from monthly gross salary and how much contributing to 
individual accounts varied, depending on the economic situation of CSSIP. Interview code: SO-07.
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the PF pension scheme.186 The success of the PF program was endorsed by increasing 
numbers of joining companies and employees. By 2004, the PF project covered over 
3,000 companies and with around 162,000 employees (Table 8-3). Due to the 
Singapore-style characteristics, the CSSIP was nicknamed ‘foreign Suzhou (yang 
suzhou) ’, compared to the ‘new Suzhou’ in the Suzhou New District and ‘old Suzhou’ 
in the downtown of Suzhou city Area.187
Table 8-3: Numbers of companies and employees joining central provident fund
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Company 69 173 228 291 400 658 1,012 3,867
Employee 4,283 8,712 15,120 22,901 28,140 39,980 69,544 162,747
Source: http://www.sipac.gov.cn/yqjj/jjfz/jjzb/t20040223_4730.htm
A twisting cooperation between China and Singapore
CSSIP is the first and only large-scale international cooperation project between two 
governments in industrial estate and township development. At the beginning, 
Singapore dominated the infrastructure constructions and international marketing. 
Leaders from both countries endorsed CSSIP as an important international project. For 
example, in 1995 LEE Kuan Yew (Lee Sr.), then Senior Minister of Singapore, 
commented in public that Singapore would ensure the quality of CSSIP because 
Singapore’s reputation was at stake there. In the same year, ZHU Rongji, then PM of 
China said that what was learnt in CSSIP would make the five Special Economic Zones 
and Pudong New District better. In 1997, JIANG Zemin, then President of China 
promised that CSSIP was ranked as ‘the priorities among all priorities’ and must not be 
allowed to fail.188 However, due to the scheduling and budgeting overrun of
186 The PF scheme is exclusive in CSSIP. The other places in Suzhou implement more conventional 
social welfare system. Suzhou Statistics Yearbook (2003, page 410) clearly shows that the sum of social 
welfare insurance does not include CSSIP. Also news source: Far East Economic Review, 2001/12/06; 
and interview code: SO-01; SO-05; SC-07.
187 News source: ren min ri bao (based in Beijing), 2001/06/07; also interview code: SO-02; SC-01.
188 CSSIP Investment Guide (1997), page 23; also news source: Business Times (based in Singapore), 
1995/10/05; Straits Times (based in Singapore), 1998/11/27.
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China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Development Co., Ltd. (CSSD), the 
development company of CSSIP (see details below), Singapore and China officially 
announced in 1999 that the control and management of CSSIP would be handed over 
back to China in two years time. Lee Sr. even described the performance of CSSIP 
before handover as a ‘chastening experience’ to Singapore (Lee 2000).
In 2001, the local government in Suzhou took over Singapore’s role to take full 
responsibility for the development of the CSSIP. Under the Suzhou-led management, 
CSSIP has attracted renowned IC and semiconductor companies like Infineon, AMD, 
Hejian; and global leading TFU-LCD companies such as Samsung, AU, and Hitachi, 
and their suppliers, as well as famous electrical engineering companies like Emerson 
and Phillips.189 Moreover, CSSD continuously made profits for four years after 
handover, and plans for initial public offerings in the Singapore stock market or 
elsewhere during 2006.190 During the ten-year anniversary ceremony in 2004, both 
Singapore and China governments praised CSSIP as a successful project.191 In other 
words, behind the dramatic development of CSSIP was a twisting story from an 
ambitious cooperation between Singapore and China, to a disappointed record in terms 
of development schedule and deficits, and then back to a prosperous development 
future.
Structure of the chapter
As a case of ‘local implementation of a centrally initiated projects’, CSSIP involved 
three different parties: the central government in Beijing, the local government in
189 CSSIP Investment Guide (2005), page 51-53.
190 News source: er shiyi shi j i  jing ji bao dao (based in Guangdong), 2005/01/26; lian he zao bao 
(based in Singapore), 2005/03/21; Straits Times (based in Singapore), 2003/12/04; also interview code: 
SQ-06
191 News source: Straits Times (based in Singapore), 2004/06/10.
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Suzhou and the Singapore government. Given that the arable land had been transformed 
into one of the most important high-tech manufacturing sites for IT and the electronic 
industry only over one decade, undoubtedly the Singapore-style CSSIP was relatively 
successful in terms of economic globalization.
The story of the development of CSSIP have already been written in terms of either a 
dimension of a rough description on the development (Cartier 2001a), of technology 
transfer (Walcott 2002), and of the importance of local politics (Yeung 2000; Thomas 
2001; Pereira 2004a; 2004b). Here we particularly focus on it as a case of local 
implementation of centrally initiated projects (including an international partner) and 
examine the formation and transformation of CSSIP with the perspective of local policy 
innovation. The main questions include: through what institutional innovations were the 
so-called Singapore experiences able to transfer from Singapore to Suzhou? Why did 
the three main policy agents start up CSSIP? And how did they contribute to the policy 
innovation of CSSIP at different stages? Why did the Singapore experience become a 
crisis? And how did the three parties cope with the crisis? How many different types of 
local-central interactions can be identified during the process o f CSSIP? And how did 
the mechanisms of ‘economic decentralization to the local’, ‘political centralization 
under the party’ as well as ‘territorial competition with the other zones’ operate in the 
policy process of CSSIP?
The structure of the rest of the chapter is organized in four parts. In the first, the 
discussion focuses on the international cooperation framework of CSSIP in order to 
understand how the so-called Singapore-style infrastructures could be established in 
Suzhou. Second, with the perspective of local-central dynamics, different types of 
local-central interactions during the implementation of CSSIP over a past decade are
259
identified. In this section, I discuss three categories of ‘local implementation of 
centrally initiated projects’, those identified in Chapter Five as ‘marginalizing the local’, 
‘local obedience’ and ‘local flexibility’. In the third section, the progresses behind 
policy innovations in CSSIP are addressed, including the compromises between the 
concerns of different parties, the roles of economic decentralization and of the career 
paths of the Suzhou leaders. The effectiveness of policy innovations as a consequence 
of the CSSIP process is addressed in the fourth section.
8-2 Policy Innovations: Transferring Singapore Experiences to Suzhou
Phenomenon of Singapore experiences in Suzhou
The so-called Singapore experience was one of the most important characteristics in a 
package of policy innovations in CSSIP. Apart from the Singapore/international -style 
infrastructures mentioned, modem bureaucratic recmitment and training were 
introduced to Suzhou via Singapore. At the beginning, with the suggestions made by 
Singaporeans, the recruitment of Chinese officials to the administrative committee of 
SIP (SIPAC) was made open to a national-wide search. There were 2,500 applicants 
competing for 60 positions. The selection process was unique for the time, including a 
long series of examinations and psychological and physical tests, and oral interviews 
with Singaporean staff in CSSD.192
Moreover, Singapore systematically transferred the organizational software of 
economic development to China through the operations of the Singapore Software 
Office (SSO) on the Singapore side and Software Transfer Office (STO) as its Chinese 
counterpart. Through arrangements between SSO and STO, members of SIPAC staff
192 Suzhou Almanac (1995), page 47; also interview code: SO-01; SO-06.
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were enabled to take a series of mutual visits and training courses, including economic 
and labour management, urban design and town planning, environment protection, 
traffic management, housing and real estate development, social security, and so on. By 
1995, the training programs had covered 65% of SIPAC staff, while by 1996, 94% of 
SIPAC staff had entered the programs at least once or more.193 The Suzhou staff 
training and learning programs continued after the handover. By 2004, there were 88 
groups with a total membership 1,360 person involved in the training and learning 
programs.194 This staff training played an important role in establishing the so-called 
quasi-market regulatory systems. In 1995, some staff had never heard of the term of 
‘pro-business (qin shang)\ and mistakenly referred to ‘discrimination to business 
interests (qing shang)*.195 Through training programs as one of the key media, the 
concept of a pro-business stance has since been effectively installed into the Chinese 
staff of CSSIP and CSSD.
Two regulations related to the Singapore/international- standard infrastructure were 
transferred to CSSIP in 1995: one was ‘Environment Protection and Management in 
Relation to Construction Projects in CSSIP’ and the other ‘Urban Planning and 
Construction Management in CSSIP’. These two regulations were quite different from 
the then common conventions in China and much closer to the Singapore system. The 
planning-decision making mechanism implemented in CSSIP involved organizing a 
professional committee coordinated by the planning department of SIPAC and related 
experts. In most places of China at that time, planning departments of local
193 Suzhou Almanac (1995), page 48; (1996), page79; (1997), page 39.
194 The press note of the 7th meeting of Joint Steering Council between Singapore and China 
governments (JSC).
95 The responses of making mistake qin shang to qing shang reflected to the stem legacy of communist 
ideology by then. Even in the early 1990s, the heated debate in Chinese politics is still related to 
pro-socialist (anti-capitalist) or pro-capitalist. Pro-business attitude was just too close to the concept of 
‘pro-capitalist’. News source: Suzhou ri bao (based in Suzhou), 2005/05/17.
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governments were relatively weak and had very limited coordinating powers with other 
departments such as FDI business promotion, economic affairs exerting the dominant 
roles. The planning mechanism giving strong coordination powers to CSSIP was 
transferred from Singapore (Pan and Zhou 1999).196 In addition, a budget for master 
plans and action plans in CSSIP were built up by charging a fee of 0.15% of 
constructions costs whenever construction projects were permitted, since there were 
then no official budget lines in Chinese cities for making master plans and action plans. 
This policy was also adapted from the experience of Singapore (Pan and Zhou 1999). 
By 1999, there had been 37 regulations adapting Singapore experiences to the CSSIP
197situation.
New division of labour between CSSD and SIPAC
One of the most important reasons why the Singapore experiences could be transferred 
to Suzhou was because of the new division of labour between the development 
company (CSSD) and the administrative committee (SIPAC) of CSSIP. In 1993, the 
basic principle of division of labour between China and Singapore was that 
administration involving issues of sovereignty was kept in the hands of SIPAC, whereas 
economic management was assigned to Singapore.198 At that time, in national zones, 
such as the Tianjin and Shanghai Caohejing economic and technological development 
zones, development companies were wholly owned by the administrative committees. 
All development strategies and personnel managements of the former were thus 
controlled by the latter (Bao 2002). However, CSSD was a pure commercial 
corporation, under the control of the Singapore government for the first six years
196 In my field trips in CSSIP, an example that the current development land use in CSSIP is almost the 
same as the layout of the master plan 10 years ago was often cited not only by my interviewees in CSSIP 
but also those in other zones nearby who appreciated the strong planning coordination in CSSIP. 
Interview: SO-02; SO-06; YO-03; YO-04.
197 The press note of the 4th JSC meeting. Also interview code: SO-07; SO-08.
198 The statement by Li Peng, then PM of China. Suzhou Almanac (1995), page 34.
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(1994-2000). It had absolute powers to make development decisions of CSSIP, from 
infrastructure construction to business promotion, even to staff training for SIPAC. 
SIPAC, on the other hand, was an official arm of the Suzhou local government in 
charge of the administrative and sovereign affairs, including displacement of peasants 
and farmers, official documentations for investment procedures, and the administrative 
services. For example, SIPAC requisitioned land and then sold the lease of land to 
CSSD at a price set by the central government in Beijing (Pereira 2004b). All staff in 
SIPAC were of Chinese nationality. ZHANG Xinsheng, then Suzhou mayor, was the 
first director of SIPAC, holding both positions until he left Suzhou in 1997.
In contrast to SIPAC, CSSD was a company started from August 1994 with a registered 
capital of US$ 50 million, and a loan of US$ 100 million from international banks and 
around US$ 30 million from various other financial institutions in China for 
infrastructure development, operations and marketing costs (Fei 2000).199 In terms of 
stake-holding structure, CSSD was designed as a joint venture, with a Chinese 
consortium taking 35% and a Singaporean consortium holding 65%. The Singapore 
consortium was the Singapore-Suzhou Township Development (SSTD) and its Chinese 
counterpart was the China Suzhou Industrial Park Investment Co, Ltd (CSIPC). Of the 
11 members in the board of CSSD, 7 were from Singapore with 4 from China.
SSTD was composed of govemment-linked-company (GLC)-related companies and 
other Singapore and foreign companies, led by Keppel Corporation, a major GLC with 
shipyard background in Singapore.200 Most of them had wide experiences in
199 Suzhou Almanac (1995), page 36-37.
200 The members of SSTD involved: Centrepoint Properties Ltd, City Development Ltd, DBS Land Ltd, 
EDB Investment Pte Ltd, GE Capital Services, JTC International Pte Ltd, Keppel Land Ltd, KMP China 
Investments Pte Ltd, Liang Court Suzhou Investment Pte Ltd, Lum Chang (Suzhou) Investments Pte Ltd, 
Mitsui&Co. Ltd and Mitsubishi Corporation joint-venture, NTUC Co-operative Suzhou Investments Pte
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international commercial networks or ‘know-how’ relevant to development and 
marketing of CSSIP. For example, the Jurong Town Corporation was Singapore's 
leading industrial park developer, and the Economic Development Board was a chief 
ministry-level organization to promote Singapore's economic growth. It means that 
despite its commercial status, CSSD was actually directed by the Singapore 
government. It can be seen in the recruitment to senior positions in CSSD by senior 
members of the Singapore government or state bureaucrats.201 Taken together, 
Singapore ambitiously demonstrated to potential investors that by making available its 
nation’s efforts and resources, CSSIP was a ‘national project’ of Singapore in China.202
Such Singapore-led management brought certain achievements. By September 1994, 
only half a year after the project announced, 14 investment projects had been 
established and 80% of the initial area had been sold out. 6 of 14 were over US$ 15 
million per project.203 The growth also can be shown in comparison between CSSIP 
and other national zones. CSSIP was set up in 1994, which was 10 years later than the 
first 14 national zones that were established in 1984. By November 1998, the 
accumulated amount of contractual FDI in CSSIP was US$ 5,880 million with realized 
FDI as USS 2,546 million, which was dramatically ranked as the second and the third 
among all national zones (Xie 1999). SIPAC only required two-third fewer 
administrative staff compared to other zones. Zhu, the then PM, praised CSSIP in 
public as streamlined, co-ordinated, and highly efficient (Pereira 2004a). CSSIP also
Ltd, Pidemco B.V. China, Samsung Corporation, Sembawang Corporation Investment (S) Pre. Ltd, Shing 
Kwan Investments (S) Pte Ltd, Singapore Land Ltd, SLF International Pte Ltd, STIC Investment Pte Ltd, 
Sum Cheong (China) Pre Ltd, Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd, and Wing Tai Holdings Ltd. CSSIP 
Investment Guide (1997), page 16.
201 For example, LIM Chee Onn, the first chairperson o f CSSD, was a member of parliament in 
Singapore; CHAN Soo Sen, the first chief o f executive (CEO) of CSSD, was Singapore’s parliamentary 
secretary. David Lim, the second CEO of CSSD, was a member of parliament in Singapore as well as the 
CEO of the Port Authority of Singapore (Pereira 2004).
202 CSSIP Investment Guide (1997), page 23.
203 Kunshan Almanac (1995), page 50.
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attained successful achievements in countering corruption, which was one of the 
serious problems in China by then (Pan, Zhou et al. 2000).204
Crisis: budgetary and schedule overrun
However, the Singapore consortium countered difficulties, particularly in infrastructure 
finance. In terms of expenditure, the high-standard infrastructures were very costly. The 
accumulated cost to CSSIP involved 200 million RMB per km2 by 1994; and a further 
500 million per km2 thereafter. This compares with KETZ expenditure of less than 
RMB 100 million per km2 in the decade to 1998 (Table 8-4). Moreover, in terms of 
revenue, as an independent company, incomes for CSSD in the period up to 2000 
mainly came from land sale without subsidy from the public fiscal coffers.205 It was the 
reason why the price of industrial estate in CSSIP was at US$ 7.2 to 6.5 dollar per m2 
from 1994 to 1999,206 compared with US $3.6 dollar per m2 or even cheaper in 
neighbour development zones. In fact, the price in CSSIP was almost as high as in 
Shanghai (Thomas 2001).
Table 8-4: Accumulated infrastructure expenses in CSSIP and KETZ
Zone Year 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02
Area (km2) (1) 2 3 5 6.8 7.5 8.2 9.4 13.5 16
CSSIP
Cost (2) 
(million RMB) 400 1,666 3,986 4,232 6,096 7,001 7,827 8,943
11,490
Average (2)/(l) 200.0 555.3 797.2 622.4 812.8 853.8 832.7 662.4 718.1
Area (km2) (1) 15 19 20 20 14 12 14 16 24
KETZ
Cost (2) 
(million RMB) 730 940 1,041 1,152 1,264 1,394 2,360 2,963 4,627
Average (2)/(l) 48.7 49.5 52.1 57.6 90.3 116.2 168.6 185.2 192.8
Source: Jiangsu Statistics Yearboo c for various years
204 New source: Xinhua News Agency 1998/12; cited from Yeung (2000).
205 Interview code: SO-03; SO-04; SO-05; SO-06.
206 CSSIP Investment Guide (1995), appendix section.
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Even on this basis, the infrastructure finances of CSSD were thrown out of balance by 
the Asian financial crisis that began as a currency crisis in Thailand in 1997 but soon 
turned into a crisis for the productive economy of Asia and beyond. 207 Internally, 
existing factories and companies in CSSIP stopped expanding their operations, while 
externally, the weak global and regional economies reduced the number of potential 
new tenants, slowing the sales of developed industrial estate in CSSIP (Pereira 2004b). 
CSSIP only gained contracts for half as much FDI in 1997 as to in the previous year, 
and this situation continued until 2001. In contrast to CSSIP, KETZ was less injured 
during Asia Financial Crisis during 1997 and recovered from 1998, whereas it was 
2001 before CSSIP investment picked up significantly (Figure 8-2). The marketing 
record remained much better than all of the surrounding development zones, but with 
just US 7 billion reached by March 2000, it was far below the US$ 20 billion target in 
the original business plan (Yeung 2000).












■  CSSIP 
□  KETZ
Note: Unit for US$ million 
Source: same as Table 8-1
The direct impact was a huge delay of development, which was evidenced by 
rescheduled targets set in the meetings of China- Singapore Joint Steering Council 
(JSC). As the highest political body co-chaired by vice PM of both China and 
Singapore governments, JSC met annually to review the progress of CSSIP. According
207 Interview code: SO-01; SO-06.
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to the press notes of JSC meeting, in 1995 (the 2nd meeting) and 1996 (the 3rd meeting), 
the targeted schedule for CSSIP was to develop 8 km2 by the end of 1997, and further 
to complete the construction of 70 km2 by the end of 2000. There was no regular JSC 
meeting until 1999 (the 4th meeting), when the target was reset by the governments to 
one of finishing the first 8 km2 by end 2000.208 A consequence of this schedule 
overrunning was a trouble in profit making. CSSIP built expensive infrastructure of the 
so-called Singapore/international standards and relied on selling land as its main 
revenue source. Delayed development inevitably meant the need for CSSD to carry its 
losses. By 1999, it was reported to have been experiencing yearly losses averaging US$ 
23-24 million since 1994. And accumulated losses were expected to be up to US$ 90 
million by the end of 2000 if nothing changed. It was further reported that the 
Singapore consortium of CSSD had defaulted on its payment on a capital loan 
established at around US$ 10 million due for repayment in 1999.209
Crisis management: turnover from Singapore to Suzhou
Due to budgeting and scheduling overruns of CSSD, the Singapore and China 
governments signed a new ‘memorandum of understanding’ in July 1999 that they 
would exchange their shares of CSSD by the end of 2000. The Singapore consortium 
would decrease its share in CSSD to 35%, as the China consortium would increase its 
share to 65%. Two announcements were, however, made. First, Singapore would 
completely develop the 8 km2 before handover. And second, these would be ‘no 
change’ in the inter-governmental cooperation framework; in the essence of the joint 
venture; in the goal of developing the park; or in the guarantees given to all
208 The press notes of each JSC meeting were downloaded from http: www.sipac.gov.cn/yqjj/lsh-02.htm 
to http://www.sipac.gov.cn/yqjj/lsh-07.htm; also news source: Far East Economic Review (based in Hong 
Kong), 1999/07/08.
209 News source: South Morning China Post (based in Hong Kong), 1999/05/11; Straits Times (based in
Singapore), 1999/09/15; 1999/05/10; and zhongyang ri bao (based in Taipei), 2001/06/17.
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» 910investors. Both governments reassured investors that the new management would 
keep providing the same international level of services that investors had come to 
expect, through there were worries about the implication of losing the strongest selling 
point of CSSIP, the Singapore experience.211 This seems to have been reflected in a 
falling level of realized and contracted FDI in three years 1999- 2001 (Figure 8-1 
above).
On 1st January 2001, both sides ‘quietly’ exchanged their holdings of CSSD. The 
ceremony only involved some document signing without any fanfare or the presence of 
senior officials from either government. The implication of the shift of CSSIP to 
Chinese control after 2001 can be analysed in many dimensions. First, in personnel 
terms, whereas before handover, the chairperson and CEO of CSSD were Singaporeans, 
with 30-40 Singaporean staff, after handover, all Singaporean staff but three left.212 
The vice mayor of Suzhou now ‘tripled’ as the director of SIPAC and the CEO of 
CSSD, and the mayor/ party secretary of Suzhou doubled as chairperson of CSSD. 
Second, the Suzhou government started to involve itself strongly in the development of 
CSSIP. SIPAC participated in infrastructure construction for industrial lands. CSSD 
became one of the land development companies after handover. Nine Suzhou-based, 
even SIPAC-owned, companies were established or reorganized to produce 
infrastructure in CSSIP, comprising together the so-called ‘ten public-owned companies 
in CSSIP’ (yuan qu shi da gong si). 213
2.0 Interview code: SO-05; SO-08.
2.1 For example, Turrentine, the head of Emerson’s operations making compressors and motors in 2001, 
admitted in an interview that ‘[in 1999] there was a bit of nervousness at headquarters [in Sweden] when 
the local partners took the majority in the park’. News source: Far East Economic Review (based in 
Hong Kong), 2001/12/06.
212 News source: Far East Economic Review, 2001/12/06.
213 These companies were not absolutely new. For example, in July 1996, five wholly-owned 
-by-SIPEDC companies were established with a variety of focuses: including industrial development, 
technological development, tourist development, housing development, and infrastructure development.
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Third, with the involvement of these companies, residential projects were promoted for 
the first time, becoming a major source of profits for SIPAC.214 Apart from 
infrastructure and industry, the share of housing in CSSIP investment rose from about 
10% in 1997 up to more than 20% in 2004 (Figure 8-3). Fourth, and most importantly, 
in order to lower land prices, SIPAC started using the profits from the ten companies to 
cross-subsidize CSSD. Prices for industrial lands were lowered from US$ 7.2-6.5 dollar 
to around US$ 3.0 dollar per m2or even less after handover. However, for the account 
book of CSSD, the selling price was still reported as US$ 7.0 to 6.5 per m2. The 
difference between the de facto  price to the investors and the number reported in the 
account book was subsidized by the public budget of SIPAC. In CSSIP, this new 
strategy was called ‘developing industrial lands by subsiding from the development of 
commercial lands’ (yi shang bu gong). 215
Figure 8-3: Total fixed Investment in CSSIP
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industry 121 4,484 3,223 5,014 12,867
Source: author compiled from www.sipac.gov.cn/vqii/iifz/iizb
Interview code: SO-02; SO-03; SO-04.
214 News source: Far East Economic Review, 2001/12/06; also interview code: SO-02; SO-03; SO-04.
215 News source: zhongyang ri bao (based in Taipei) 2001/06/17; cai jingshi bao (based in Shanghai) 
2001/03/26; Far East Economic Review, 2001/12/06; also interview code: SO-02; SO-03; SO-06.
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Certain regulations and systems with Singapore characteristics were actually kept in 
place, and standards of infrastructure did not go down.216 The PF scheme was even 
expanded to more companies and employers (Table 8-2 above). Moreover, statistically, 
CSSIP grew gradually after 2001 not only in terms of realized and contracted FDI 
(Figure 8-1 and 8-2 above), but also industrial outputs, fiscal revenue and GDP (Table 
8-1 and Figure 8-1 above). Technologically, CSSIP is reported to have become one of 
the IC chip-making hubs in China. Apart from Samsung and Hitachi already operating 
there before handover, CSSIP now attracted Fairchild Semiconductor, Philips 
Semiconductors and United Microelectronics Corporation.217 Financially, CSSIP also 
passed the most crucial challenge, namely, making CSSD profitable. By the end of 
2001, CSSD for the first time made a net profit, of 7.6 million US dollars. By 2003, 
CSSD had profited continuously for three years, removing the accumulated loss 
completely and showing a gain of more than 12 million US dollars.218 The initial 
public offering for CSSD was also under way.
8-3 Local-Central Interactions in Suzhou during the CSSIP process
The process of ex-ante state adoption at the start: Lee and the two Dengs 
When theorizing the various types of local-central interactions in relation to policy 
innovation, one possibility to be identified was that local governments may initiate 
projects by persuading the centre to adopt their ideas. The beginning of CSSIP is a case 
in point.
216 News source: lion hezao bao (based in Singapore), 2004/06/09. The report is an interview transcript 
with Lee Sr. of Singapore; also interview code: SO-02; SC-02;SC-07; YO-04.
217 Also thanks to the labour-intensive manufacturing development of neighbouring zones (of course, 
including KETZ and SND) in the 1990s, a poor of skilled labours and supply chains for such high tech 
industry have been established. News source: Business Times (based in Singapore), 2002/03/12; 
2002/08/20; and Far East Economics Review (based in Hong Kong), 2001/12/06
218 The press notes of the 6th meeting of JSC (28th May 2002); and the 7th meeting of JSC (17th May 
2004).
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In late 1992, Lee Sr. of Singapore visited Suzhou. Zhang, the then mayor of Suzhou, 
mentioned to Lee an idea of using one tenth of Singapore’s foreign reserves to invest in 
Suzhou. Zhang promised that Suzhou could offer special treatment to the cooperation 
project. However, Lee Sr. gave a lukewarm response because he did not think local 
governments had the power to give Singapore a fresh site on which to build a miniature 
Singapore. Zhang did not give up the idea, however. Through his personal networks, he 
arranged for DENG Pufeng (Deng Jr.), a son of DENG Xiaoping (Deng Sr.), to pay Lee 
Sr. a visit in Singapore in late 1992. Deng Jr. mentioned the idea again. Back in Beijing, 
Deng Jr. also forwarded the idea to the office of Deng Sr. (Lee 2000). Then the central 
government in Beijing started to consider the project of Singapore investing in Suzhou. 
In April 1993, Goh, then PM of Singapore, paid a state visit to Beijing to discuss the 
proposals with JIANG Zeming and LI Peng. Jiang and Li were the then president and 
then PM of China. It was the first time that Singapore officially proposed the idea of 
cooperation.219 In February 1994 the State Council decreed the ‘State Council’s 
Approval on the Related Issues of CSSIP Development’ (CSSIP Approval),220 and 
China and Singapore signed the ‘CSSIP Agreement’.
In Chapter Five, I also argue that the ongoing process of a policy that was adopted by 
the central government after local governments’ lobby and persuasion can be 
understood as one which dynamically evolved from the category of ‘locally initiated 
projects’ to ‘local implementation of centrally initiated projects’. In fact after 1994, 
CSSIP experienced three types of local-central interactions in the category of ‘local 
implementation of centrally initiated projects’, namely, ‘marginalizing the local’, ‘local 
flexibility’ and ‘local obedience’. Each type is discussed as follows.
2,9 Suzhou Almanac (1994), page 33.
220 Suzhou Almanac (1995), page 30.
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The process of marginalizing the local
As mentioned, prior to 2001 the development of CSSIP was dominated by the 
Singapore-led CSSD. As a city state, Singapore enjoyed a one-scale structure without 
any experience of local-central interactions. However, China was a huge country with 
five scales: the centre, province, prefecture, county, and township and village (Ma 
2005). This is what some Singaporean scholars and political have called a ‘mismatch of 
scales’ (Yeung 2000; Thomas 2001). 221 Therefore, it is understandable that 
Singaporeans were accustomed to contacting the central government in Beijing directly. 
Such type of ‘marginalizing the local’ could be traced back to the beginning stage prior 
to 1994. In 1992 Lee Sr. did not believe that any local government like Suzhou could 
carry through any promise. He only had second thoughts about the project after Deng Jr. 
from Beijing paid a visit to Singapore and promised his help in Beijing. Later, during 
the period when CSSD suffered budgetary deficits, Singaporeans directly flew off to 
visit central officials in Beijing, even to contact the then President of China, before 
communicating with local officials to sort out the problems. But from the viewpoint of 
Suzhou officials, these actions were very inappropriate because the courteous procedure 
to resolve problems was to talk to the people on the spot first instead of their 
supervisors. It means that the Singapore’s approach of going directly to Beijing 
distressed the local governments and caused them to lose face 222
221 Lee Hsien Loong (Lee Jr.), then vice PM of Singapore and a son of Lee Sr., mentioned that Singapore 
underestimated the length of the chain of command between the centre and the locals, and the extent to 
which the locals have latitude. News source: Far East Economic Review (based in Hong Kong), 
1999/07/15. It is an interview transcript with Lee Jr.
222 Wang Pian, deputy director of International Business Institute at National University of Singapore, 
also challenges that the so-called Singaporeans’ understanding of mainland China’s culture, mentality, 
and business practices was sometimes worse than Americans’ and Europeans’. News source: South China 
Morning Post (based in Hong Kong), 1999/06/30.
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The marginalization of Suzhou can also be shown in a more direct way. Unlike 
personnel arrangement in most of administrative committee of development zones that 
are decided directly by the government of their own jurisdiction, the officials and 
employees of SIPAC were appointed by the Jiangsu provincial government (Pereira 
2004b). On top of that, the recruitment of SIPAC staff was pursued via a nation-wide 
selection. As a consequence, on the one hand, SIPAC officials were young and highly 
educated- 90% of staff had at least undergraduate degrees (Pan and Zhou 1999)- but, on 
the other hand, very few of them could speak or understand the local Suzhou dialect. It 
implied that staff in SIPAC were not really embedded in Suzhou. This is one of the 
reasons why some Suzhou officials called the staff in SIPAC outsiders (wai di ren) in 
relation to native Suzhou (Liao 2001).
The marginalization of the local also can be understood as a way of diluting Suzhou by 
more involvement from the centre, which can be evidenced by the changing structure of 
stake holders in the Chinese Suzhou Industrial Park Co., Ltd (CSIPC), the Chinese 
consortium of CSSD. CSIPC was initiated in 1994 by two Suzhou and Jiangsu 
sponsors- Suzhou Industrial Park Economic Development Co., Ltd (SIPEDC) and 
Jiangsu International Trust and Investment Corporation (JITIC). The former was 
organized by nine Suzhou-owned companies and the latter was a Jiangsu-owned 
company (Table 8-5). By then, CSIPC was a local-level middle-size company. 223
223 Suzhou Almanac (1995), page36.
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Table 8-5: Stake holders in the China consortium of CSSD




■  O rganized by tw o com panies: Suzhou Industrial Park Econom ic 
D evelopm ent C o., Ltd (SIPED C ) and Jiangsu International Trust and 
Investm ent Corporation (JITIC).
■  SIPEDC w as a join t investm ent by 10 Suzhou-based com panies: (1) 
Suzhou Security, (2 ) Suzhou G ood s A gglom eration, (3) Suzhou  
Investm ent, (4) Suzhou Industrial U nited Investment, (5) Suzhou  
H ousing, (6 ) Suzhou Trust o f  China C om m ercial Bank, (7) Suzhou  
Textile Import and Export, (8 ) Suzhou Trade, (9) Suzhou Econom ic  
Affairs General, (10) Suzhou M echanics Import and Export
■  Local-based small 





■  Apart from SIPEDC and JITIC, n ine additional 
central-govem m ent-ow ned com panies w ere invited to jo in  the m embers. 
The new  co llective  realized capital w as U S$ 72  m illion.
■  N ine additional com panies are (1 ) Trust and C onsultancy C om pany o f  
Bank o f  China; (2) China N ational Cereals, O ils and Foodstuffs Import 
and Export; (3) China Great Wall Industrial Corporation; (4 ) China O cean  
Shipping (Group) Company; (5 ) China Energy Conservation Investment 
Corporation; (6) China N ational Chem icals Import and Export 
Corporation; (7) China Central Television; (8) China H uaneng Group; (9) 
China N ational Technical Import and Export Corporation
■  China Agricultural Bank Finance C o., Ltd jo in ed  in late 1998
■  Suzhou capital was 
diluted; and 
CSIPAC w as a 







■  Apart from the existing  tw elve  com panies, there are tw o more 
Suzhou-based com panies becom ing members o f  the China consortium  o f  
C SSD
■  Tw o more Suzhou-based com panies are: (1) Suzhou Infrastructure 
Investm ent and M anagem ent C o. Ltd; (2) Suzhou N ew  District Econom ic  
D evelopm ent Group Head Co.
■  Suzhou increased its 
involvem ents in 
CSIPAC
Source: author compiled from the Suzhou Almanac of various years
However, in 1996, nine state-owned companies were brought to join with SIPEDC and 
JITIC in order to reorganize CSIPC. These nine companies had strong links with the 
Ministry of Economics and Trade (MOET), which was under the leadership of Li, who 
signed the ‘CSSIP Agreement’ on behalf of China and doubled then as vice PM and 
Minister of MOET.224 In other words, Suzhou interest was diluted by more capital 
coming from the central-linked companies. Moreover, the photograph of the ceremony 
signing the ‘CSSIP Agreement’ also offered the visual confirmation of marginalizing 
Suzhou (Thomas 2001). As Lee Sr. of Singapore and LI Lianqing of the then vice PM 
of China signed the ‘CSSIP Agreement’, the first two rows standing behind were the 
central and provincial officials of both governments. Suzhou officials were only in the 
third row (Figure 8-4).
224 Suzhou Almanac (1997), page40; also interview code: SO-02; SO-06.
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Figure 8-4: A photograph of the signature ceremony in 1994
Note: the representatives signing the ‘CSSIP Agreement’ were Lee Sr. o f Singapore and Li, the then vice 
PM o f China. The third and four left in the second row were the then PM of Singapore and China. The 
first right in the second row was CHEN, Huanyou, then Jiangsu governor. Zhang, the then mayor of 
Suzhou was only able to stand in the position of the first right o f the last row.
Source: http:// www.sipac.gov.cn
Suzhou only regained its position after the handover. In 2001, two more local 
heavyweight companies were added in to CSIPC: Suzhou Infrastructure Investment and 
Management Co. Ltd (SUM) and Suzhou New District Economic Development Group 
Head Co (Su Xin Group). The former is a wholly-owned company invested in solely by 
the Suzhou municipal. The latter is a wholly-owned company invested in solely by the 
Administrative Committee of Suzhou New District (SND), which is another national 
development zone in Suzhou city area.
The process o f  local obedience
When being marginalized by Singapore and diluted by the central government in 
Beijing, Suzhou behaved in the ways both of ‘local obedience’ and ‘local flexibility’. 
Two examples can be pointed out in the type of ‘local obedience’. First of all,
225 It must be noted that from the Singapore’s perspective, the local government in Suzhou did not obey 
the central government’s policy. They complained that the Suzhou government that promised 
wholehearted support to SIP beforehand actually failed to honour contractual undertaking to CSSIP to 
provide power substations, remove rubbish, dumps and relocate power pylons. The land tenure was also 
shorter than had been agreed to. The total amount in dispute was US$ 44 million. The message was in a
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Suzhou obeyed the concept of division of labour between CSSD and SIPAC. According 
to the ‘CSSIP Agreement’, Singapore rather than Suzhou shouldered the responsibility 
of international marketing. Therefore, organizationally, SIPAC was different from all 
other development zones that regarded business promotion as the top priority. Seven 
bureaus were set up in SIPAC by 1994, including Bureaus of Economic and Trade 
Development, of Planning and Construction (including specific committee on land 
development), of Social Affairs, of Taxation, of Organization and Personnel, of Local 
Development, and Office of Secretarial and Foreign Affairs. None of them was 
involved with business marketing.226 By then, CSSIP was mainly promoted by the 
Singapore-led CSSD in cooperation with Singapore’ Economic Development Board 
(EDB). One of reasons why Suzhou could be successfully promoted in the international 
markets was because of EDB’s global branches.227 Soon after the ‘CSSIP Agreement’ 
was signed, CSSD launched an international marketing by joining one of EDB’s regular 
marketing tours to Europe.228
Second, in the early 1990s, Suzhou actually disagreed with the Singapore’s concept to 
infill the lands but did not intervene (or was forced not to intervene) because Singapore 
firmly insisted on doing so. And the 1997 flood that generated large scale disasters in 
other Suzhou areas but not in CSSIP proved that the ‘local obedience’ resulted in a 
better outcome. In addition, also because of ‘local obedience’ to Singapore being in 
charge of construction, SIPAC and the Suzhou government did not (again, or might not
letter submitted to Far East Economic Review by Davia Lim, then CEO of CSSD. News source: Far East 
Economic Review (based in Hong Kong), 1999/09/16.
226 The Bureau of business promotion and marketing was established only after handover. Suzhou 
Almanac (1996), page78; and Suzhou Investment Guide (2003), page 8.
227 There was a list of all contact details o f the 17 branches of EDB in the CSSIP Investment Guide 
(1994) and (1997). Those who are interested in CSSIP were encouraged to get in touch with any of the 17 
worldwide offices for further information and discussion.
228 ZHOU Xuan, the vice director of SIPAC by then, joined the international marketing tour and 
admitted that without Singapore’s help, CSSIP and Suzhou would be very difficult to market themselves 
in front of many multinational companies. Suzhou Almanac (1995), page 49.
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be able to) seek for other extrabudgetary (or extra extrabudgetary) revenues as 
innovative but legally-ambiguous infrastructure financing channels for CSSD in 
particular and CSSIP in general. There was a clear-cut business relationship between 
CSSD and Suzhou local government. CSSD not only bought the land lease but also 
paid the Suzhou government for almost all of the required electricity, water, and even 
public bus service (Pereira 2004b).
The process of local flexibility
The process of local flexibility means that local governments operate with a certain 
degree of local discretion toward central policies. Along with the types of 
‘marginalizing the local’ and ‘local obedience’, there is certain local flexibility in 
Suzhou to CSSIP due to local governments holding the implementation autonomy. The 
time lag of Provident Fund (PF) (proposing in 1994 but implementing it in 1997) is a 
case in point. PF was an innovation experimenting exculsively in CSSIP. The 
separation of pension scheme in CSSIP and other regions in Suzhou actually added the 
burden of Suzhou’s original social welfare program, since employers in CSSIP were 
younger, productive and able to contribute more to the traditional security funds. 
Therefore, it took CSSIP three years to persuade and negociate Suzhou officials to 
legalize PF scheme, showing the dimension of ‘local flexibility’ to CSSIP in the 1990s 
(Liao 2001).
In addition, in the 1990s Suzhou did not exactly follow the policy of ‘CSSIP as the 
priority among all priorities’, but paid quite a lot of attention to Suzhou New District 
(SND), which it presented as one of the most economically globalized development 
zones (Table 6-9 above). In the late 1980s, the downtown of Suzhou was overdeveloped 
with many polluted industrial factories. With a strategy of ‘developing new district for
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protecting old downtown {bao hu gu cheng, kai fa  xin qu)\ SND was a locally initiated 
project established by Suzhou in 1990 and then granted national- status as a High and 
New Technological Industrial Zone in 1992, which means that CSSIP was endorsed as 
a national zone two years after SND. By 1993 there had been 51 factories already 
moving to SND from the downtown of Suzhou.
When Singapore conducted a feasible study in 1993, SND was one of the options 
offered by Suzhou. But Singapore did not take it. By then, Singapore thought that 
SND was a less competitive industrial estate locating only Tow end’, ‘labour intensive’, 
‘small scale’ manufacturing firms by overseas Chinese from Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Southeast Asia countries, while CSSIP could accommodate ‘high-end’, ‘technology­
intensive’, and ‘big-scale’ enterprises from European and American investments 
(Pereira 2001; 2004b). Even through CSSIP was regarded as one of the most important 
govemment-to-govemment project, Suzhou still carried on with SND. For example, in 
the 9th Five-Year Plan, Suzhou proposed a development strategy with a metaphor of ‘a 
body with two wings- SND in the west and CSSIP in the east’ (Wu 1997).
In other words, Suzhou executed CSSIP and SND together simultaneously. Due to the 
national status of both zones, it is better to understand Suzhou as acting in a way of 
‘local flexibility’. Compared to CSSIP, SND was actually poor at attracting realized 
FDI and contractual FDI (Figure 8-5), but relatively good at generating GDP and fiscal 
revenue prior to 2000 (Figure 8-6).
229 By then, Kunshan and other zones in Shanghai were also on the list. But those two were not under 
Suzhou administration. News source: lian he zao bao (based in Singapore), 2004/06/09. It was an 
interview transcript with PAN Xuan Hao. Pan was a secretary for ONG Teng Cheong, then vice PM of  
Singapore. Pan also had been staying in the board of CSSD since 1994.
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Source: Yearbook of Economic and Social Development for CSSIP (2002); and 
www.sipac.gov.cn/vqii/iifz/iizb: Suzhou Almanac of various years
Figure 8-6: GDP and fiscal revenue between CSSIP and SND
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Source: same as Figure 8-5
Suzhou implemented a different strategy of division of labour between the development 
company and the administrative committee in SND. In contrast to CSSIP where that 
there was a clear-cut relationship between CSSD and SIPAC, the SND administrative 
committee (SNDAC) established and wholly owned the Su Xin Group which was the 
key development company of SND. SND was started with RMB 20 million 
interest-free loan collateralised by the Suzhou city government as the only initial 
financial resource.230 However, with assistances from Suzhou, several innovative 
solutions were found through the Su Xin Group for infrastructure finance in SND. This
230 Interview code: YO-04.
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is the reason why SND could be in operation straightaway, despite the fact that its fiscal 
revenue in total only surpassed annual infrastructure costs after 1996 (Table 8-6).
Table 8-6: Infrastructure cost and fiscal revenue in SND by year
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
infrastructure cost 45 126 279 230 200 205 207 563
fiscal revenue n.a. n.a. 42 83 131 243 440 640
Unit: million RMB
Source: Suzhou New District Almanac (1999)
First of all, SNDAC was granted powers by Suzhou to provide a piece of land to Su 
Xin Group free of charge on condition that it had to take full responsibility for 
developing the land through to construction. With only limited company performance 
and property, Su Xin Group theoretically could not provide necessary security to 
borrow capital from banks. But local officials in Suzhou played an important role in 
persuading Suzhou banks to do so. Therefore, the Su Xin Group was able to easily 
borrow loans. Second, Suzhou High & New Company (Su Kao Xin), one of the holding 
enterprises of Su Xin Group, was funded in 1994 first and then listed in Shanghai Stock 
Exchange in 1996. Its initial public offering (IPO) collected 11.92 million RMB. In
1997, Su Kao Xin was ranked the top three among all listed companies in Shanghai. By
1998, Su Kao Xin issued shares and collected 180 million RMB.231 Third, the Su Xin 
Group also issued domestic bonds and overseas bonds. Su Xin Group issued one 
hundred billion corporate bonds in the United States denominated in US dollars in 1997. 
Fortunately, due to then weakening US bond market plus successful management of 
buying back, three years later Su Xin Group earned US$ 40 million. In other words, 
through successfully manipulating the Su Xin Group as a financial channel, SNDAC 
successfully collected sufficient capital for infrastructure construction.232
231 Suzhou Almanac (1997), page 47.
232 Su Kao Xin was even evaluated to be o f Qualification Baa3 by Mudy Company in October of 1997,
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Internal conflicts within Suzhou and Beijing
To sum up, the process of CSSIP development displays an example for understanding 
formation and transformation of ‘local implementation of centrally initiated projects’. 
During the Singapore-led era, the three mechanisms, that is, ‘marginalizing the local’, 
‘local obedience’ and ‘local flexibility’, operated simultaneously in the case of CSSIP. 
But under the context of CSSIP and SND, there were important internal political 
conflicts within both the central government in Beijing and the Suzhou local 
government, which need to be considered.
In terms of internal politics within Suzhou, some local politicians heavily supported 
CSSIP but others did not, or we may say, they tried to pay equal attention to both 
CSSIP and SND. Since SND performed better than CSSIP in terms of GDP and fiscal 
revenue (Figure 8-6 above), it made little sense that SND had to cease. The situation 
was embedded in the post-Mao China’s one-party political system where as well as the 
mayor being in charge of administration, the party secretary was another key local 
politician. The Suzhou Mayor, Zhang, who initiated the original idea of CSSIP to Lee 
Sr. of Singapore in 1992, later doubled as director of SIPAC and there was no doubt 
over his strong support of CSSIP. Indeed, it was reported that he seldom, if ever, visited 
Suzhou New District (SND), let alone promoting it (Lu 2001). However, the party 
secretary of Suzhou from 1994 to 1998, YANG Xiaotang, reportedly gave much less 
support to CSSIP than Zhang did.233
and chosen by Asia Week as one of top one hundred listed companies in China in the end of 1998. 
Interview code: SO-03; YO-04; YO-05; YC-01.
233 News source: lian he zao bao (based in Singapore), 2004/06/09. The report was an interview 
transcript with XU Wenyuan. Xu was then depute secretary of Ministry o f Trade and Industry of 
Singapore in the late 1990s, and led a Singaporean group to negotiate handover issues with Suzhou 
counterparts.
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Within Beijing, the fact that successive leaders in the centre restated the importance of 
CSSIP does not mean that all of the state apparatus would follow the decrees. A 
common phenomenon of different departments in the centre during the post-Mao period 
sometimes aborting and distorting reform policies in order to address their own 
interests has been portrayed as reflecting a ‘fragmented authoritarian’ regime 
(Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Lieberthal 1992). This affected SND and CSSIP since 
they were given the status of national zones under the administration of different 
departments of the State Council: SND belonged to the Department of Science and 
Technology (DST) and CSSIP was affiliated to the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Affairs (now the Ministry of Commerce). DST continuously supported SND. An 
example was the IPO process of Su Kao Xin when successful listing on the Shanghai 
Stock Market depended on DST’s help- since before 1999 this was based less on 
corporate performance than on obtaining a listing permit from quotas assigned to 
different ministry and provincial governments (Cooper 2003).234 Another example was 
in 1997 when SND was further assigned by the State Council as one of four APEC 
science parks in China, the only one in Yangtze Delta.235
The personnel movement of Yang and Zhang reflected the ambiguous attitude within 
Beijing toward CSSIP. After Zhang stepped down as Mayor in 1997, he was sent to 
Harvard University from 1998 until 2000, leaving Chinese politics completely for two 
years. Yang was then promoted as vice governor of Jiangsu, and then deputy president 
of the National Construction Bank. His upgrading in contrast to Zhang’s move abroad 
hinted the centre’s split attitudes towards the implementation of SND and CSSIP, with
234 Interview code: YQ-04; YO-05.
235 The other three were Hengfeng Economic Development Zone, X’ian Economic Development Zone, 
and Beijing Economic Development Zone. Suzhou Almanac (1998), page 54.
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several ministries supporting SND, despite CSSIP being accorded ‘the priority among 
all priorities’ by President Jiang.
8-4 Operations beyond Policy Innovations
Compromises between China and Singapore: same bedf different dreams 
CSSIP was an international cooperation between Singapore and China, but each side 
had their own priorities. For Singapore, to invest in Suzhou in particular, or in China in 
general, followed from its then development strategy of ‘Regionalization 2000’ (Perry 
and Yeoh 2000; Yeung 2000; Thomas 2001; Pereira 2004b). Singapore had developed 
rapidly by attracting FDI after its independence in the early 1960s. However, foreign 
investments moved toward other Southeast Asia countries in the 1980s. Hence, 
Singapore formulated the ‘Regionalization’ strategy in the early 1990s to encourage 
domestic and government- led enterprises to build up an external economy by 
participating in the growth of Asia.236 GOH Chok Tong, then PM of Singapore, stated 
in 1993 that:
‘...going regional [in Asia] is part of our long-term strategy to stay ahead. It is to 
make our national economy bigger, our companies stronger and some of them 
[become] multi-national...’ 37
In 1991-1992, some of the Singapore elite conducted several trips to India, China, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam for the ‘Regionalization 2000’ program. 
Apart from the belief that China was a huge manufacturing and consumer market, 
Singapore also realized that it could play an important ‘bridge’ role in helping western
236 For example, Lee Sr. of Singapore argued that ‘the investment [CSSIP] should not be a foreign loan 
or charity but a profitable activity.’ News source: Business Times (based in Singapore), 1995/08/30.
237 CSSIP Investment Guide (1997), page 22.
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investors to understand China and the culture of a 5,000 year old civilization, which is 
quite different from most western understandings. It is because Singapore regarded 
itself as a Chinese-based ethnic society which also had the legacy of British rule.238 
CSSIP in China was the most important and ambitious focus for this strategy, designed 
to accommodate a population of 600 thousands and a workforce of 360 thousands in the 
long term planned area of 70 km2. By 1998, the accumulated realized FDI in CSSIP 
reached US$ 3.1 billion, which was more than 10 times bigger than the second zone in 
the ‘Regionalization 2000’ program (Table 8-7) (Perry and Yeoh 2000).









Location Indonesia Indonesia China China
Scale o f projects (kmJj 5 40 70 10
Investm ent commitment U S$ 344  m illion U S $  100 m illion USS 3.1 billion U SS 600  m illion
No. of investors 84 24 105 50
Average investment value U S$ 4 .09  m illion U S$ 3.2 m illion USS 30.8 million USS 12 m illion
Source: Compiled from Perry and Yeoh (2000)
In contrast to Singapore, there were two opposing opinions in China about the project. 
Those who were for it argued that Singapore investment could be a channel of 
infrastructure financing for local economic development. Others saw it as a good 
opportunity to learn the so-called Singapore experiences. By the early 1990s, fast 
development since the late 1970s had given a rise to lots of problems such as 
urban-rural migration, housing, environment, transportation, social welfare, etc. In 
order to cope with these difficulties, some China leaders were eager to learn from other 
countries. Singapore was regarded as a role model for China of economic development 
combined with strict social order (Naughton 1993; Lee 2000; Thomas 2001)239.
238 For example, in CSSIP Investment Guide (1997, page 1) shows to the investors that ‘...[when] the 
huge Chinese market beckons but the unfamiliar environment is a concern, your most trusted business 
partner is ready to link you to this growth opportunity in an environment that you are familiar with: The 
Chinese Singapore Suzhou Industrial P ark ...’.
239 Deng Sr. said “Singapore enjoys good social order and is well-managed. We should tap on their
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However, those who were against it saw CSSIP as just another money-making idea to 
benefit speculative foreign land developers, who came from outside and negotiated to 
buy lands at low prince and resell at high to make profits.240 On top of that, some 
people even claimed that to give foreign governments permission to construct foreign- 
style towns in China was just like to allowing the foreigners to re-establish 
extraterritorial areas in China.241
As argued in the case of KETZ, a policy innovation can be understood as an outcome of 
compromises by different parties involved. The ‘CSSIP Agreement’ is a case in point. 
China agreed with Singapore to invest in CSSIP on condition that the profits of 
investment could not be monopolized by Singapore but had to be shared with China. 
Singapore took the majority of the land development company in charge of 
infrastructure and business promotion to produce the so-called ‘international/Singapore 
standard’. The Singapore-led CSSD could not get land for free but had to pay certain 
prices. And it was also agreed that the Singapore experiences in public management 
and development could be systematically transferred and adapted to Suzhou.
Economic decentralization
Economic decentralization is one of the key factors driving local economic 
development during post-Mao period. In the case of Kunshan, I argued that this 
decentralization could be understood in two different formats: on the one hand, local 
governments were granted more powers over economic activities, and on the other hand, 
lower-level governments were allowed to contact the central or provincial governments
experience, and learn how to manage better than them. CSSIP Investment Guide (1995), page 4.
240 For example, the then vice PM ZHU Rongji was reported to stand on this point at the beginning (Lee 
2000). Also news source: lian he zao bao (based in Singapore), 2004/06/09. The report was an interview 
transcript with XU Wenyuan.
241 News source: lian he zao bao (based in Singapore), 2004/06/09. The report was an interview 
transcript with PAN Xuan Hao.
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bypassing their direct upper-level governments. These two scenarios also can be found 
in CSSIP and Suzhou.
Regarding the former, SIPAC had been empowered to approve foreign investment 
projects without any upper limits as long as the projects complied with state industrial 
policy. 242 It was unique among all national-level development zones in China where a 
cap of US$30 million on project approval for FDI had been applied to all other national 
zones without exception. Moreover, CSSIP was allowed in 1996 to manage certain 
foreign affairs, such as to issue visa to foreign applicants and to approve overseas duty 
trips by Chinese citizens. This power could offer convenient and fast channels to the 
foreign investors entering China and Chinese staffs departing abroad for training and 
marketing. CSSIP also started to set up its own independent custom immediately after 
1994. Furthermore, CSSIP Customs operated in cooperation with Shanghai Customs. 
By contrast, KETZ only set an independent customs in 2001, nine years after it was 
granted status as a national zone.243
Concerning the latter, CSSIP was the only national zone in China to set up a 
management body directly involving by the centre. The China- Singapore Joint Steering 
Council (JSC) was co-chaired by vice PMs of both the China and Singapore 
governments with key related ministries represented, including: the Ministry of 
commerce, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Development and Reform Council, 
Ministry of Finance, the General Customs, Jiangsu Provincial Government, and Suzhou 
Municipal Government of China side, and representatives of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of National Development, Ministry of
242 Suzhou Almanac (1995),page 31-32.
243 Suzhou Almanac (1995), page 48; Kunshan Almanac (2001), page 171-172.
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Environment, and Economic Development Board of Singapore side. In addition, 
members of the JSC meeting also can be added in order to coordinate certain issues. 
For example, CSSIP had been a trial area for modem logistics and the pioneer in China 
in using electronic digital information for customs clearance in the bonded logistics 
Centre (Type B). In order to promote that, the General Customs was invited to be 
present at the JSC meeting.244 However, it must be noted that the importance of this 
joint body varies between different periods. JSC played a small role when Singapore 
and China struggled over solutions to delay the threatened bankruptcy of CSSD during 
1997-1998, with no meetings at all during the most controversial periods.
Territorial competition and CSSIP development
As argued, the operation of territorial competition is another dimension to understand 
local policy innovation in relation to improving the regulatory environments for growth, 
as well as infrastructure investment. Territorial competition not only took place in 
‘inter’ subnational localities but also ‘intra’ subnational places (Schroeder 1992). 
Development zones clearly competed in order to attract more FDI. The three in the 
Suzhou area were no exceptions. According to the records in Suzhou Almanacs, as 
early as 1989, KETZ had offered infrastructure with a standard ‘seven accesses with 
one levelling’, including electricity, telecom communication, water, road, sewage, 
steam, gas, and land levelling and infilling. By 1994, SND also reached the standard of 
‘seven accesses with one levelling’.245 Therefore, at the beginning by 1994, CSSIP was 
designed to provide only ‘six accesses with one levelling’ without steam.246 But by 
1996, CSSIP was further upgraded to present nine accesses with one levelling, 
including all seven accesses plus optical fibre and internet. By 1997, SIPAC had
244 Interview code: SC-02.
245 Suzhou New District Almanac (1995), page 10.
246 Suzhou Almanac (1995), page 48; (1997), page 39.
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reduced a list of administrative fee items from 300 to 27. And administrative fees were 
not randomly levied. In the same year, KETZ also reduced its administrative items. One 
year later (1998), CSSIP was to further reduce the load again to just 11 items of 
administrative fees. The length o f time to process applications was regulated to within 7 
days.247 As of January 2005, the average procedures of starting a business and dealing 
with licenses in China still needed 43 items in total, with 48 days starting a business 
and 235 days dealing with licenses (World Bank and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development 2006). From this perspective, territorial competition 
among these three zones was actually able to keep improving themselves to become 
more friendly environments for doing business in China.
With the Singapore standards of infrastructure, CSSIP targeted different investors from 
the ones that KETZ and SND wanted to attract. By 1996 the main customers in CSSIP 
were from Europe and America and Singapore (Table 8-2 above), while those in KETZ 
were mainly from Taiwan (in Chapter Seven), and in SND, they were principally from 
Japan (35.6%), and overseas Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan (25.2%), with small 
numbers from Europe (18%), America (11.6%), and Singapore (6.7%).248 After 1997 
the competition for foreign investments between CSSIP and SND became a more 
serious issue. The well-cited case was the so-called ‘Hamburg incident’ in 1997. By 
then, WANG Jinghua, then vice-mayor of Suzhou as well as the director of SNDAC, 
told a group of German investors that CSSIP was nothing special and the investment 
coming to SND would get preferential treatment. Singapore complained that there was 
a tug-of-war for investment between CSSIP and SND. 249 And, when in summer 1997,
247 CSSIP Investment Guide (1997), appendix, and Suzhou Almanac (1999), page 71 and 77.
248 Suzhou New District Almanac (1997), page 80-81.
249 Lee Sr. of Singapore challenged that the energy o f Suzhou local government is divided between two 
industrial estates; even he charged there was so municipal shenanigans done by Suzhou, for example, 
SND website address looks damagingly like CSSIP’s. However, CHEN Demin, then Suzhou mayor and
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a flood heavily hit SND, rather than offering sympathy, Singapore took it as an 
opportunity to promote CSSIP’s superiority (Pereira 2001).
The CSSIP process also shows another interesting issue of Chinese territorial 
competition in terms of the potential for coordination between rival zones. Whereas in 
the late 1990s SND and CSSIP were key competitors, after the handover, the Su Xin 
Group arranged to join the China consortium of CSSD (Table 8-5 above), reducing the 
divide in economic interests between the two zones.250 Moreover, partly because of the 
lack of local elections and partly because of one party control, the leaders of zones 
could be exchanged without any questions. Thus, after handover, the incumbent 
director of SIPAC was Wang, already director of SND AC and thus responsible for the 
rival zone to CSSIP (i.e. SND) and instigator of the controversial ‘Hamburg incident’. 
He now tripled as the vice Mayor of Suzhou, the director of CSSIP and the CEO of 
CSSD, playing a very important role in promoting CSSIP. Prior to CSSIP, Wang had 
established quite a sophisticated business networking, which he now brought to the 
benefit of CSSIP. He successfully persuaded Phillips to shift its new investment from 
SND to CSSIP.251 CSSIP also opened up more business promotion to Taiwanese and 
Japanese partly because of Wang’s networking.252 Just as with the earlier internal 
conflict in Suzhou, without the political condition that SND and CSSIP were both under 
the one-party control system of Suzhou administration, these new arrangements for 
coordination between two competing zones could not have occurred in the same way.
party secretary (1997 to 2002), replied in one interview by lian he zao bao that personally he thought the 
‘Hamburg incident’ was a misunderstanding. He did not believe that Wang would say so, and the most 
important thing is to seek for solutions on the future of CSSIP rather than to investigate what exactly 
Wang said in 1997. News source: Straits Times (based in Singapore), 1997/12/14; 1998/01/15; the 
Economist (based in London), 1998/01/01; lian he zao bao (based in Singapore), 1998/10/03.
250 News source: South China Morning Post (based in Hong Kong), 1999/07/03.
251 Phillips, a Dutch commercial commodity manufacture, had invested six factories in SND during 
Wang’s tenure. It was reported that its move to invest the 7th factory in CSSIP was persuaded by Wang.
252 Suzhou Almanac (2002), page 65.
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Career paths of Suzhou leaders
In outlining the ‘asymmetric decentralization’ framework, I argued that local policy 
innovations resulted in better economic development, which was to the benefit of the 
political promotion of local leaders. So these leaders have an interest in making 
innovations to promote policies able to generate more foreseeable outcomes on these 
indicators. The competition between SND and CSSIP is a case in point. First, as 
aforementioned, CSSIP was de facto governed by the Singapore-led CSSD before 
handover. The positive performances of CSSIP, if any, were likely to be categorized as 
contributions by Singapore rather than Suzhou itself. On the other hand, the 
performance of SND was directly linked to the careers of Suzhou leaders. Therefore, 
there is no doubt that Suzhou officials had more incentives to promote SND. On top of 
that, although contractual and realized FDI were important economic indicators in this 
context, so were GDP and fiscal revenues. In terms of the latter two items, SND tended 
to perform better than CSSIP did (Figure 8-6 above), which was the one of the main 
reasons why Suzhou continued building up SND even when Singapore requested them 
to stop.
In addition, due to Suzhou’s brilliant development since the 1990s, the career paths of 
the leaders were pretty promising.253 There have been five party secretaries in Suzhou 
since CSSIP initiated in 1994 (Table 8-8). Of them, YANG Xiaotang strove for the local 
interests by balancing both development of SND and CSSIP. He stepped down in 1998 
and was promoted to be a vice governor of Jiangsu, while, as already discussed, his 
counterpart Zhang, the then mayor of Suzhou, was arranged to leave China for two
253 Of course, there were five counties and seven districts under the Suzhou administration. And the 
economically globalized performances in Suzhou were not only attributed by CSSIP but also by other 
national zones, like KETZ and SND (Table 6-8 and 6-9 above). Therefore, it has to be noted that the 
career paths of Suzhou leaders were not only associated with the performance of CSSIP.
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years. For Singapore, Yang’s leaving symbolized a turning point of CSSD.254 He was 
replaced by LIANG Baohua, who served Suzhou from 1998 to 2000 and then was 
selected to be Jiangsu governor. Prior to office in Suzhou, Liang was the secretary of 
Jiangsu province who led a team to negotiate with Singapore since 1997, successfully 
reaching a compromise agreement to keep Singapore in the board of CSSD. And he 
also made brave and critical decisions to coordinate the territorial competition between 
SND and CSSIP. First, he moved Wang from SND to CSSIP; and second, he integrated 
the organizational interests between SND and CSSIP by arranging Su Xin Group to 
take stakes in the China consortium of CSSD.
Table 8-8: Party secretaries of Suzhou since 1994
Party secretary tenure period in Suzhou Main positions after office
YANG Xiaotang 1994/08-1998/06 vice governor o f Jiangsu, vice director o f 
National Development Bank
LIANG Baohua 1998/06-2000/12 vice governor and governor o f Jiangsu,
CHEN DeMing 1997/06-2000/12*
2000/12-2002/05
vice governor and governor o f Shannxi
WANG Min 2002/05-2004/10 vice governor and governor o f Jilin
WANG Rong 2004/10- present —
Note: * refers the period that CHEN served as Suzhou mayor. 
Source: author compiled
The successors of Liang were CHEN Deming (2000-2002) and then WANG Min from 
(2002-2004). Chen also helped Liang to negotiate with Singapore in the late 1990s, and 
was shifted to be vice governor of Shannxi first and then governor in 2004. Wang went 
rose even more quickly, leaving upgraded to become vice governor of Jilin in early 
2004 and the governor half year after. Of more than 300 prefecture-level cities in China, 
Suzhou is the only one to produce three provincial governors, namely, Jiangsu’s Liang, 
Shannxi’s Chen and Jilin’s Wang. This led to a catchphrase of ‘Suzhou phenomenon’ to
254 News source: lian he zao bao (based in Singapore), 2004/06/09. The report was an interview 
transcript with XU Wenyuan.
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describe the positive relationship between Suzhou’s outstanding economic 
performances and the bright records of career paths of the leaders.255
8-5 The Effectiveness of Policy Innovation
Transferring process from one way to return-round
As shown, the dramatic development of CSSIP has undoubtedly shown the local 
upgrading capacity of Suzhou over the past decade. Here the transfer of experience 
from Singapore to Suzhou in particular (and China in general) now is offered as the 
other more interesting and explicit evidence to understand its improvement of local 
capacity. In the 1990s, Suzhou officials were sent to Singapore to ‘learn from 
Singapore’. The spatial relationship between Suzhou and Singapore was more or less 
like a relationship between ‘pupil and tutor’. However, in May 2002, Suzhou municipal 
government and Singapore government signed a contract that Suzhou would help 
Singapore to establish a training program called ‘Human Resource in Asia Business’. 
Singapore started to send Singaporean young elite to work in Suzhou as interns to know 
more about China business and economic environment.256 It means that the spatial 
relationship between Suzhou and Singapore was much equal than before. The transfer 
program was changed from one-way (Singapore offering opportunities for Chinese to 
learn) to round-way (also China offering opportunity to Singaporeans).
255 News source: nan fan zhou mo (based in Guangzhos), 2004/11/18.
256 Annual Report of Economic and Social Development in CSSIP (2002), page 17; also interview code: 
SO-06; SO-07.
292
Unbalanced development in Suzhou
Similar to KETZ, CSSIP also faced some unbalanced development. Although Suzhou is 
one of the most globalized economy in Yangtze Delta in terms of FDI and GDP 
performance (Table 6-3 above), the disposal income per capita in Suzhou was not as 
stellar as the performance of GDP per capita- with the number less than many cities and 
regions in Zhejiang provinces whose economies were dominated not by big scale FDI 
but by small and medium size domestic private enterprises. Similarly, the fixed 
investment in total was also relatively underdeveloped (Table 8-9). Moreover, JIANG 
Renjie, a former vice mayor of Suzhou, was forced to step down in January 2005 
because he allegedly abused his powers by accepting bribes since 2001.257 These 
evidences clearly show that there was some unbalanced development behind the policy 
innovations in promoting globalized economy in Suzhou in general.
Table 8-9: Selected indicators by regions in the Yangtze Delta in 2003
GDP 
(billion RMB)






Yangtze Delta 1,912.5 25,262 642.0 10,361
Shanghai 540.8 (1) 40,646(1) 218.7(1) 13,250(1)
Suzhou 208.1 (2) 35,733 (2) 43.8 (5) 10,671 (8)
Nanjing 129.7 22,858 49.6 (4) 9,154
Zhenjiang 56.1 21,018 11.1 8,202
Wuxi 158.1 36,151 27.7 9,988
Changzhou 76.1 22,215 14.8 9,933
Nantong 88.7 11,356 15.1 8,640
Yangzhou 55.9 12,368 13.6 7,833
Taizhou 50.5 10,021 9.3 7,788
Hangzhou 178.2 28,150 76.9 (2) 11,778 (4)
Ningbo 150.0 27,541 60.1 (3) 12,970 (2)
Jiaxing 70.5 21,268 37.9 10,757(7)
Huzhou 42.3 16,454 20.0 11,388 (5)
Shaoxing 92.8 21,414 36.8 12,133 (3)
Zhoushang 14.6 14,910 6.5 10,985 (6)
Note:* data for 2002 
Source: same as Table 6-3
257 News source: China Daily (based in Beijing), 2005/01/11.
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8-6 Conclusion
With CSSIP as an in-depth study for policy innovations in the category of ‘local 
implementation of centrally initiated projects’, the chapter has tried to answer how, and 
under what circumstances such that the Singapore-style development zone could be 
institutionalized and evolved in order to deal with global business operating under 
market transition conditions in Suzhou. There were three key policy agents at different 
scales: Singapore as a foreign government; the central government in Beijing and the 
local government in Suzhou. CSSIP can be regarded as a policy innovation by these 
three parties which deployed this strategy as their respective responses to economic 
restructuring in Asia in the 1990s: while Singapore formulated its Regionalization 
Strategy to expand their economic influences to East Asia, China in general and Suzhou 
in particular were keen to attract foreign investments by all means. With a series of 
compromises and negotiations, the development of CSSIP can be divided into two 
stages. Before 2001, the Singapore-led CSSD dominated infrastructure and marketing 
of CSSIP, attracting some FDI but unfortunately resulting in budgetary and scheduling 
overrun of CSSD. After 2001, CSSIP was returned to the hands of China/Suzhou, and 
became one of the most successful development zones on many dimensions, including 
its high-tech industry development as well as the turnaround of CSSD from running 
deficits to making large profits.
In terms of local-central strategic interactions for policy innovations, the processes of 
‘marginalizing the local’, of ‘local obedience’, and of ‘local flexibility’ were operated 
in the development of CSSIP simultaneously. The local flexibility is specifically 
associated with the development of SND, the other national development zone in the
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Suzhou city area. Related to that is competition between SND and CSSIP which is 
embedded in the post-Mao ‘asymmetric decentralization’. Compared to SND, CSSIP 
was good in generating realized and contracted FDI but poor in producing fiscal 
revenues and GDP. Such ‘inconsistent’ economic performances constituted one 
important reason why there were diverse attention towards CSSIP between mayor and 
party secretary of Suzhou, and fragmented authoritarian operations within Beijing. Also 
because of one-party control, Suzhou could use it administrative powers to 
institutionally coordinate the interests and conflicts between SND and CSSIP after 
CSSIP was returned to China/Suzhou side since 2001.
The performance of CSSIP and Suzhou over the past ten years that successfully 
transformed Suzhou from a plot of arable lands to be a competitive high-tech industrial 
park clearly shows that CSSIP is a case of policy innovation, at least in terms of 
indicators of economic globalization. Because of its economically globalized 
performances, in Suzhou there was also a positive correlation between economic 
performance and leaders’ career paths, showing that the local officials’ careerism could 
function to promote innovation serving local economic development. However, certain 
evidences, such as less disposal income per capita, smaller amount of fixed investment, 
and corruption of one vice mayor, address that there are several unbalanced local 
development behind such brilliant performances, challenging the ‘real’ effectiveness of 
such globalized economy-oriented policy innovation process and calling for the need 
for more comprehensive assessments on such a policy innovation process.
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CHAPTER NINE
Understanding Local Policy Innovations of post-Mao China
‘brave to make innovations; audacious to take adventures; tolerance to understand failures;
and an attempt to seek for successes’ 
(yong yu chuang xin, gan yu mao xian, kuart rong shi bai, zhui qiu cheng gong) 258
9-1 Research Questions Reprised 
Review of research background
This thesis has focused on policy innovation in relation to local economic development, 
one of the most important topics in the academic fields of urban and development 
studies. In recent times, the traditional ‘dual state’ division of labour which put central 
governments in charge of production functions while local authorities taking care of 
social and reproduction functions has been challenged, both in the western liberal 
democratic and market societies and in post-Mao China. The Chinese government’s 
policy shifts to engage with globalization over the past two decades have led to rapid 
economic growth not only at national level but also more strikingly at local scale in 
particular city-regions. Many researches have shown that the successful economic 
transition of the post-Mao period has been in a large part promoted by active local 
governments. That is not to say that the centre in China did not play a role. But it is 
generally agreed that implementation of the new economic strategy depended on many 
local governments in the post-Mao periods innovatively introducing new projects, 
creatively negotiating with investors, flexibly shifting resource allocations, arbitrarily
258 It is the ‘spiritual slogan’ of Shenzhen High Technological Industrial Development Zone, which was 
established in 1996.
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reinterpreting policies or documentations, and so on. Without such flexible and 
innovative behaviours by local officials, whether China’s economic development could 
have become as dynamic so rapidly is very questionable.
In other words, under so-called decentralization, local governments made use of their 
additional powers to manage economic affairs, responding to crises from within (such 
as local fiscal deficits), from above (like weakening state capacities of central 
governments to cope with economic restructuring), from below (for example, 
unemployment in the local community), and from outside (such as coping with global 
mobile investors, the European Union or the WTO). I argue that most existing analyses, 
in both western researches and China studies, jump to the conclusions that local 
governments/ governances were naturally able to make such policy innovations in order 
to improve their regulatory environments for the purpose of better local economic 
development. These researches take the new phenomenon of local policy innovation for 
granted without further questioning: how, why and under what circumstances and by 
whom the process of innovations in local economic development policy actually 
evolved in different contexts in the period of globalization? This thesis is designed to 
fill that gap.
As mentioned in Chapter One, the concept of innovation refers to a process of 
introducing something new, generating good outcomes as a consequence, and coping 
with uncertainty during the process. From this perspective, the central questions I ask 
are particularly important to the post-Mao China context for two reasons. First, the 
post-Mao transition was a process from a communist centrally-planned structure to a 
market and quasi-capitalism framework. These two systems functioned on quite 
different ideological and operational bases, meaning that the transition toward
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marketization and liberalization as well as globalization actually involved major 
uncertainty. Such risks can be vividly described by a Chinese saying ‘crossing the river 
by touching stones (mo shi tou guo he)'. Compared to many other transition economies 
where there were political collapses with economic breakdown during the transition, 
China’s transformation over past two decades can be understood as a relatively 
successful case of institutional innovations. In other words, despite facing certain 
unpredictable risks of transition, China did formulate new policies and generate 
relatively stable and prosperous development as a consequence.
Second, compared to the west, where local-central relations tended to be regulated in 
their constitutions (as in the United States, Germany, and Italy) or by strong traditional 
norms (like the United Kingdom), in China local-central relation were largely of 
political dynamics. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China does declare 
that China is de jure a unitary state, but does not clearly regulate the central local 
interactions. Thus, at one time, the centre might decentralize powers, in order to 
motivate local enthusiasm, but later recentralize the powers to adjust local discretions 
as necessary. But, with ‘leeway’ left by the absence of constitutional regulation, local 
governments also could deploy varied strategies toward the centre and its policies, in 
order to strive for regional interests. As the Chinese saying goes: ‘policy from the top 
and coping strategy from below (shang you zheng ce, xia you dui ce)'. Local policy 
innovations operated in various ‘strategic’ ways, often at expense of interests of other 
regions or the centre. Taking these points together, it can be seen that successful cases 
of post-Mao local development not only involve a general trend of decentralization and 
globalization, but also undergo particular processes of marketization and liberalization, 
and strategic interactions between central and local governments. The complexity and 
risks of transitional environments with which local institutions had to cope in making
policy innovations for local economic development make the question of how they 
were able to achieve this particularly important to study.
The framework of research questions
In this thesis, I argue that the phenomenon of local policy innovation in post-Mao 
China can be analyzed by a theoretical framework of investigations with three 
dimensions. First, policy innovations can be understood as local responses to challenges 
represented by global economic restructuring like the transition process of 
fordist/socialist to post fordist/socialist (Chapter Three). The questions I ask here are: 
what are the characteristics of transition process in terms of mode of regulations and 
regimes of accumulations? How do cities and regions innovatively respond to these 
global environments in change? At the micro level of local responses, who dominate 
local development decision making and why do they want to do so? At the macro level 
of local responses, what are the effects of territorial competition on local governments 
for better development?
Second, I pay attention to the issue of policy innovation in relation to the stimulus of 
changing governmental structure, responsibilities and competences between central and 
local governments in general, and its asymmetric form in post-Mao in particular 
(Chapter Four). The topics open to debate here are: what were the main mechanisms of 
this asymmetric decentralization? How and why and under what circumstances did the 
Chinese Communist Party’s political centralization motivate local officials to 
implement policies of economic decentralization? And what were the regional and 
national consequences of development under the post-Mao China’s ‘asymmetric 
decentralization’ context?
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Thirdly, with focus on a unique phenomenon of de facto federalism operating within a 
de jure unitary state in post-Mao China, the dimension here is the relationship between 
policy innovation and local-central dynamic interactions (Chapter Five). Under the 
context that there is some interdependence between local and central governments, how 
did different policy agents strategically interact with each other, resulting in local policy 
innovations as a consequence? How many different types of local-central strategic 
interactions for local economic development are there? What are the operations and 
effectiveness of each type? And what are the significant commonalities and differences 
between these types?
Outline of research design: two national zones in Suzhou
The general analytic framework established in the theoretical chapters was applied to 
examination of my two empirical cases which I studied in the field. In Chapter Six, I 
argue that the fieldwork was important to obtain richer information for understanding 
not only who/ what are the actors, networks, and mechanism that are discussed in the 
theoretical framework, but also how these actors/ networks/ mechanisms actually 
presented and interacted in the specific time and spaces. The evidences of real 
operations and effectiveness of the actors/ networks/ mechanisms observed in the 
empirical cases allow me to forward the existing theoretical framework a bit further, 
either confirming the conclusions of the existing debates, or modifying them to make 
more original theoretical contributions.
In this thesis, the policy of national development zones in post-Mao China is selected as 
the focus of the local case studies. At the beginning of the thesis (in Chapter Two), I 
clearly state that the so-called ‘opening-up program’, including liberalization of trade 
and FDI, is an example of the post-Mao regime’s more successful policies, as
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evidenced by China’s sharply increasing shares of international trade and FDI from 
zero in the end of 1970s to one of the top in the world now. The policy of national 
development zones, defined as geographically bounded areas offering preferential tax 
policies and convenient administrative procedures for foreign investors and trade 
activities, is one of the core elements of the ‘opening-up program’. Despite many 
differences, a common theme among these national zones is their character in making 
local policy innovations in order to present better economically globalized 
performances. There are more than 150 national zones across China with different 
functionalities, from economic and technological development zone (ETDZ), high and 
new technological industrial development zone, bonded areas, and so on. The policy of 
ETDZ is represented in most zones and regarded as representing the overall task. Some 
ETDZ are located in the inner and laggard part of the country and some in the coastal 
and relatively developed regions. Compared to inner China, the coastal region 
contained the set of leading areas where a range of local policy innovations in relation 
to economic development were most likely to happen.
Two ETDZs located in Suzhou, one of the leading cities in the coastal Yangtze Delta, 
were selected as case studies: one was Kunshan Economic and Technological 
Development Zone (KETZ) (in Chapter Seven) and the other was China Singapore 
Suzhou Industrial Park (CSSIP) (in Chapter Eight). The choice of these cases reflected 
a ‘maximum variance strategy’ since these cases involved many policy actors across 
different spatial scales- central, local and foreign governments, and represented quite 
different types of local-central strategic interaction. KETZ/Kunshan represented a case 
of a ‘locally initiated projects’, while CSSIP/Suzhou was an example of ‘local 
implementation of centrally initiated projects’. Varied types of local-central strategic 
interactions are also found in these two cases. The types in the case of KETZ/Kunshan
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included ‘state- intention to tolerate’, ‘ex-post state endorsement’, and ‘ex-ante state 
adoption’. And in the case of CSSIP/Suzhou, three other types can be identified: 
‘marginalizing the local’; ‘local obedience’; and ‘local flexibility’.
Structure of the chapter
The rest of the chapter is designed to draw conclusions from the research which link 
theoretical ideas developed from a review of published research largely based on 
experiences in the west and the findings from my empirical research in China. Since the 
west and post-Mao China have very different legacies from past development as well as 
differing current political and economic mechanisms, this is not simply a matter of 
adding one further case to the literature. Beyond simply summarising the operations 
and effectiveness of the post-Mao China’s local policy innovations in relation to 
economic development, I need also more ambitiously to make some comparisons 
between processes found there and those discussed by western social scientists. For me, 
the point of China studies is not only to serve as an area study complementing so-called 
western theory, but to add a different theoretical dimension to understanding processes 
occurring in various political and economic contexts in the world.
Four parts organize the rest of this chapter. First, the perspective of structural changes 
in relation to local policy innovations is a focus. Three dimensions are discussed: China 
re-engaging globalization, changing local-central interactions, and serious territorial 
competition. Second, attention goes to the aspect of policy agents in actions to explain 
why there is the importance of local officials. In addition, various strategic behaviours 
of making policy innovations are deliberated. In the third section, the concept of 
‘asymmetric decentralization’ is addressed in order to understand how the careerism 
takes effect as political incentives for local officials making policy innovations. I
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summarily argue that the concept is a useful theoretical viewpoint to understand the 
particular phenomenon of post-Mao China’s local economic growth, namely, local 
policy-making taking place within an unbalanced social and environment development. 
In the fourth section, certain theoretical and empirical implications are noted as 
expanding research agendas for further studies.
9-2 Structure in Change
China re-articulation with the world
There are various kinds of definitions of globalization. In terms of interdependent 
development of foreign investments and international trades, China had also been 
involved in the world economy prior to 1949, but this was forcibly interrupted due to 
Mao’s political ideology, with further isolation in the 1960s because of the broken 
relationship with Russia. China was thus disconnected from the world economy until 
the death of Mao in the middle of the 1970s. By then, domestically, there was a 
development disaster in the wake of Cultural Revolution. Internationally, there was 
very limited FDI attracted or trade generated. China engaged with globalization again 
after the ‘opening-up’ policy started from 1978. Over the past two decades, it is 
generally agreed that the economically globalized development in China has grown by 
an unprecedented level.
The ways that the west and China evolved in the globalization since the 1980s were 
quite different, and to some extent were in the ‘complementary’ directions. Labelled as 
a transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, most of the major capitalist economies in 
the west seem to move away from routinization of production (especially in 
manufacturing), turning themselves to the technological-based, flexible-oriented and a
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small batch production of a variety of product types sold on the basis of distinctive 
qualitity. Domestically, firms in many sectors over there were forced to adopt more 
flexible technologies and organizational patterns with workfare scheme instead of 
welfare, meaning that fully employment became difficult to reach. Internationally, 
along with that were technology development for the flow of capital and the 
abandonment of the Bretton Woods agreement. Therefore, a more flexibility of global 
financial regulatory system in general and rapid transmissions of capital in particular 
were created, accentuating the growth of the economy at the same time also 
undermining the basis for stable development. Taken together, such transition made 
global and domestic environments less stable in the west than before.
By contrast, China re-engaged with globalization through industrialization to become a 
‘world factory’ for labour-intensive and standardized products. Development zones 
were experimented with first in a few places and then promoted nation wide in order to 
attract investors focusing on routinization of production, whose technology and 
investment came from the west. Mass-production therefore started up in China, giving 
rise to a prevalence of cheap ‘made-in-China’ products in the world. Moreover, China 
stood firmly at a careful and conservative attitude for certain financial issues like 
exchange rate pegged to US dollar and controlling the flow of capital and banking and 
financial industry to foreign investors, making the opening-up environment relatively 
stable. Therefore, China and the west played different roles in such a new international 
spatial division of labour. The former focused on the standardized mass productions for 
semi-products or end products, which was the main cause for pressures of either 
reindustrialization or deindustrialization facing the latter.
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There are two more noteworthy points. First, such industrialization through FDI and 
international trade in China highly involved global players, who directly invested with 
factories in China or placed orders to domestic and foreign assemblies located in China. 
Most of those international players were either from the overseas Chinese-background 
territories or the advanced capitalist economies (like Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, 
Europe and the United States and so on), where the business environments were 
different from the legacy of Mao’s communist ideology. Therefore, in the post-Mao 
period in general, and at the beginning of opening-up policies in particular, China to 
some extent was ‘strongly encouraged’ to make policy innovations in order to meet the 
demands required by global players.
A package of preferential tax rebate to FDI in most of development zones was a case in 
point. Then, whether to introduce foreign investments for development or to 
independently develop by domestic capitals was one of the hottest political debates. 
The opposing camp criticized that the preferential policies offered to foreign investors 
were liked the discrimination to domestic investors. In addition, such development 
strategies in favour for foreigners would also damage China’s independence. However, 
the supporters insisted that foreign investments were regarded as one of the most 
strategic development resources in the transition period. In order to achieve this goal, 
certain new conventions for international business environments (like tax rebate or land 
lease policy) were ‘necessarily’ introduced with the abandonment of old communist 
legacy. In other words, these policy innovations were just regarded as required local 
responses to chances of engaging with globalization. From this regard, it is 
understandable the process why and how Kunshan was (or was forced to be) ‘willing’ 
to propose to be the first county-level administration to experiment with then most
controversial land lease policies. The first foreign investor in Kunshan complained 
about this issue in the late 1980s when he considered whether or not to expand the 
investment. The investor, from Japan, felt too insecure to invest in the lands which 
belonged to the state without any right for lease, and strongly suggested Kunshan to 
adopt international conventions.
Second, the so-called global players were not only individual investors but also foreign 
politicians acting on behalf of interests of their countries. In many cases, the influences 
exerted to China might be in more gentle ways via their chambers of commerce, foreign 
aid, or even international organizations such as WTO and World Bank. But the case of 
CSSIP shows a different strategy by Singapore. Facing challenges of globalization with 
mobile capital flying out to other developing Asia countries, Singapore formulated 
‘Regionalization 2000’ program in the early 1990s to collectively and straightforwardly 
guide domestic and government-led enterprises to participate in the growth of Asia. 
From Singapore’s viewpoint, China was the most important target in ‘Regionalization 
2000’ not only because of its potential to be a world factory and consumption markets 
but also because of Singapore’s self-proclaimed belief that Singaporeans are overseas 
Chinese who at the same time understand the western culture due to the British legacy. 
Without such globalization pressures (foreign capital outflow) and opportunity (China’s 
open-up) facing Singapore, the development of CSSIP that was dominated by 
Singapore from 1994 to 2000 might be most unlikely, if not impossible, to happen.
Changing local-central relationship
Apart from the (re)linkage between China and the world, the post-Mao transition 
involved a changing local-central relationship, including more ‘opening-up’ economic 
and political spaces for local governments. Under Mao’s leadership, the centre tightly
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controlled local governments. After an oscillation between decentralization and 
recentralization, local governments in general were actually allowed to get more 
economic powers in the 1970s as compared to their counterparts in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Then, such economic decentralization was politically ignited by the centre, which 
judged which development models were right and what to do and how to do. And local 
governments had only limited powers to make different experimentation without 
permissions, needless to say to challenge, or even to resist, the directions and 
instruments from the centre.
In contrast, the local-central relationship has loosened since the 1980s. Local 
governments at each level were allowed more competences on economic affairs in 
general and fiscal revenues in particular. It can be observed in many dimensions. First, 
the leaders in the centre who did not have a clear picture about the reform agendas 
either ‘rationally’ chose some provinces and local areas as trial bases for certain then 
controversial opening-up policies, or ‘intentionally’ turned their blind eye to see the 
outcomes of locally initiated projects that was not permitted by the centre. Second, the 
market-oriented reformers of the centre were forced to expand their alliances by 
‘playing to the local’ when they politically struggled with the conservative-minded 
reformers in Beijing. Third, in order to sort out the fiscal crisis in the wake of the 
Cultural Revolution, local governments allowed to enjoy more fiscal revenues were 
also required to bear more responsibility for public expenditures formally belonging to 
the centre (or in the other way around, the centre was forced to transfer more 
expenditure duty to the local).
Fourthly, the fiscal arrangement in the 1980s on a basis of negotiation with the centre 
also encouraged local governments to bargain with Beijing in order to strive for their
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regional interests. The local governments even successfully resisted together the 
recentralization policy proposed by the centre after the 1989 ‘Tiananmen Incident’. 
Fifthly, there were many cases of jumping scale of decentralization, meaning that 
county-level administrations were officially or unofficially allowed to contact 
provincial governments, even the centre, directly bypassing their direct prefectural or 
provincial level governments. Sixthly, although post-Mao China is under one party 
control rather a multiple-party democratic system, the centre was not a pure 
authoritarian regime but one of ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ (Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg 1988; Lieberthal 1992). It means that even in the central government, 
different departments might actually have diversified rather than unified development 
goals. Such disharmony within the centre also created certain political leeway for local 
discretion.
The operations in KETZ and CSSIP clearly show that the local-central interactions 
were changed from close and totalitarian relationships during Mao’s time to more 
open-up in the post-Mao period. For example, in the case of KETZ, Kunshan 
established a development zone without any authorization of upper-level governments, 
which later offered a tacit agreement to Kunshan when KETZ was discovered. Instead 
of waiting for instruments from the centre, Kunshan even persuaded the central 
government to adopt its policy idea of ‘export processing zone (EPZ)’. As shown in 
CSSIP, internal conflicts within central governments leaves a certain political space for 
local actors to strive for local institutional innovations. While many central politicians 
addressed in public the importance of CSSIP, Department of Science and Technology 
continued to support the development of high and new technological development 
zones, one of which was SND, the so-called ‘rival’ zone to CSSIP. Under such context 
of the organizational opportunity by the ‘fragmented’ centre, Suzhou could develop
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both SND and CSSIP together, despite the strong objections of Singapore which 
dominated the construction of CSSIP at the beginning.
More competition among local governments
Along with globalization and changing local-central relationships, another major 
structural change is the intensive competition among local governments during the 
post-Mao period. Territorial competition in the western context can be traced back to 
the Renaissance city-state Italy, America since its independence, and the process of 
European integration since the 1960s. In China’s case, I argue that territorial 
competition emerged seriously after Mao’s death, and then developed rapidly within a 
close link to the dynamism of the national and local economic development. However, 
it does not mean that there were no territorial competitions prior to 1978. In Mao’s time, 
subnational authorities competed with each other in order to achieve unrealistic targets 
set up by the upper governments. In the 1960 and 1970s, the centre sanctioned a 
self-reliant policy with a hostile attitude towards foreign investments. The state capital, 
which focused on military priorities, were dictated form the centre without much space 
left for local authorities in pursuit of competitively-oriented policies.
By contrast, post-Mao China’s territorial competition was more serious. Implicitly, 
territorial competition in China can be demonstrated by the appendix attached to the 
most of yearbooks that contended comparative tables of economic performance 
indicators standing relative to other neighbouring jurisdictions. Explicitly, instead of 
specializing in their comparative advantages, localities in China competed with each 
other by importing state-of-the-art production lines or infrastructures that could easily 
expand the economy. For example, the phenomenon of nationwide 5,000 zones in total 
developed by sub-provincial officials without any permission from any upper-level
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governments was a case in point. In addition, there was duplicate investment in 
infrastructure construction, such as five international airports in Pearl Delta, including 
Hang Kong, Macao, Shenzhen, Guangdong and Zhuhai. While Nantong of Jiangsu 
planned to build a bridge across the Yangtze River, Shanghai considered to build 
another one 40 km downstream. Meanwhile, Shanghai was building a US$ 16 billion 
deepwater port on Yangshan Island, which is just 80 km from another deepwater port in 
Ningbo City in Zhejiang province.259 Similarly, in Jiangsu, twelve national-status 
zones had been established since the 1980s, and five of which, including KETZ and 
CSSIP, were located in the administration of Suzhou, causing serious competition 
among each other in bidding for FDI.
Policy innovation by local institutions was one consequence of territorial competition. 
One of the basic requirements to win in the territorial competition in bidding for mobile 
investment is to offer appropriate infrastructure. With limited budgetary revenue in 
general and scarcity in the item of revenue for construction in particular, huge amounts 
of extra-budgetary and extra extrabudgetary revenues were legally- ambiguous, 
then-controversially, or even illegally, created by local governments. For example, in 
the case of KETZ, the land lease policy, which was very controversial in the late 1980s, 
successfully helped Kunshan cope with the difficulty in collecting infrastructure finance. 
In the case of SND, a national zone supported under the context of ‘local flexibility to 
CSSIP’, several innovative financial channels, such as initial public offering in 
Shanghai stock market, US corporate bonds and so on, were also utilized for 
constructing SND.
259 News source: zhong guo shi bao (based in Taipei), 2003/02/22; South China Morning Post (based in 
Guangdong), 2004/04/13.
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The policy innovations in these two cases also can be found in the improvement of 
regulatory environments. On the one hand, there was the continuous improvement of 
regulatory environments in these two cases. For example, infrastructure standards are 
upgraded in both zones from five accesses (roads, electricity, telecom communication, 
water, and sewage) with one levelling (landing filling), to seven accesses (adding gas 
and steams) with one levelling, and then nine accesses (in additional optical fibre and 
internet) with one levelling. The list of administrative fees, presumably regarded as one 
of key sources for extra and extra-extra budgetary revenues, was also continuously 
reduced in both zones. Similarly, procedures and lengths of waiting for business 
registrations and conflict resolutions in these zones in the Yangtze Delta were also 
improved as compared to the national average of China. On the other hand, of course, 
these zones also competed in land pricing. In order to compete with other neighbouring 
zones, CSSIP lowered its land price immediately after CSSD turned over from the 
Singapore side to the China side. Similar situations of lowering prices for industrial 
lands also happened to Kunshan after 2000.
9-3 Agents in Actions
The importance of local officials and cadres
However, actions of policy innovation for local economic development do not simply 
or necessarily occur just because of structural functions in change. In many cases, thse 
actions are actually ignited by agents cross scales whose self-interests are highly 
involved in local economic development. In general, key members, of course, 
differently depending on case by case, include local and central officials, foreign and 
domestic businesspersons, politicians or staff from international organizations, civil 
society and so on. However, there are at least two differences between China and the
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west. At the beginning, in the west cases, local businesspersons, particularly estate and 
land developers, and active local non governmental organizations and civil societies 
played an important role in the politics of development coalitions. That is based on two 
institutional frameworks: on the one hand this facilitated by the existence of private 
property and land ownership, and on the other hand the involvement of civil society 
participating in the context of a pluralist market democracy. In China, however, due to 
the communist legacy, land was either owned by the governments (in the urban areas) 
or collectively owned by the committees (in the rural areas). Also because of 
asymmetric power relations between state and society, the development and 
participation of civil society was regulated under state-led development goals. 
Therefore, the decision making for development was mainly dominated by the local 
officials rather than shared with local businesspersons or civil society.
Apart from state-society relations, the second difference between the west and China is 
party-govemment relationship within the state. In the west, multiple-party competition 
is a key principle of the liberal democratic system. Despite the various systems between 
local mayors, city councils, city managers or so on, a general principle is that those who 
win elections will have powers to make local development policies and to mobilize 
resources. However, in China, with limited political development over the past two 
decades, Chinese Communist Party still tightly monopolized the political operations at 
each level of governments from the central down to the county-level. Because of 
one-party control, mayors or chiefs of administrative organizations, which are 
supposedly able to be representatives of localities in the western context, do not really 
have a final-say over the local economic decisions. There are powerful party secretaries 
who double as the speakers of corresponding local people’s congresses in many cases. 
Both party secretaries and mayors in theory have to cooperate together for local
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development, but in reality sometimes they compete or even struggle against each other. 
Also because of such a unified party-state system, regulatory frameworks in China 
consisted of not only law but also many other types of rules made by party 
documentations and regulations. These documentations played an important role in 
building consensus, formalizing personal preferences, and gaining ideological 
legitimacy.
The cases shown in the thesis support the arguments above. First, despite the 
importance of economic and technological development zones (ETDZs) contributing to 
economic growth, the only legal documentation issued by the centre was ‘the minutes 
of meeting with some coastal cities (yan hai bu fen cheng shi zuo tan hui chi y a o f  by 
1984. With an absence of centralized regulations, there is no doubt that ETDZs in 
various localities operated differently and innovatively, from frameworks of 
organizational structures to solutions for infrastructure finance. Second, Taiwanese 
(foreign) investors and Singaporean (foreign) politicians to some extent were highly 
involved in local economic development in Kunshan and Suzhou. Compared to that, 
there was very limited local civil society and domestic businesspersons actively in 
relation to public policy.260 However, local officials still retained important powers in 
their hands. Thus, Suzhou officials refused to comply with Singapore’s request to shut 
down SND when CSSIP faced budgetary and schedule overrun in the late 1990s. Third, 
there was an internal conflict within Suzhou in terms of CSSIP development. Then 
mayor Zhang, who initiated the proposal of CSSIP and served as a contact window in 
Suzhou for Singapore, fully assisted Singapore’s participation; while the other key
260 It is important to distinguish between participation by domestic private enterprises and domination of 
development decision-making by private sectors. It also may be because of selections of the cases that 
are based on its economically globalized nature, domestic manufactures and business became relatively 
insignificant in terms of participation. For example, in Zhejiang, private sectors played a more important 
role than FDI did (Unger and Chan 1999).
313
figure party secretary Yang supported SND and CSSIP more equally. This is the reason 
why Singapore’s proposal to shut down SND was refused by Suzhou. Yang, even he 
was the then mayor of Suzhou, was not the person who could make a final decision.
Strategic behaviours of making policy innovations
Generally speaking, policy actors who make innovations in formulating or 
implementing policies can be seen to face certain risks. Particularly in a transition 
process like that in China, policy agents, although theoretically ‘required’ by structural 
forces to make such innovation, in reality encountered major difficulty in knowing 
when and how to change (or even abandon) which part of the communist systems, and 
then how to selectively adopt new programmes of market operations. Four dimensions 
for understanding local strategies for ‘crossing the river by touching stones’ are 
observed in post-Mao China. The first, applying across China as a whole, is a gradualist 
attitude. One famous example distinguishing China’s transition from most other 
post-socialist economies is the so-called ‘dual track’ reform, a process of promoting 
part of products to adopt market track sectorally or geographically at the same time as 
maintaining other products on the planned track, but with the market track increasing in 
importance over time. Scholars still do not agree whether the gradualist approach was 
the choices of central reformers or just a compromise between market- and 
conservative- oriented reformers in the centre and localities. However, there is no 
denying that such approach seemed to reduce the uncertainty of transition, as compared 
to other transition economies where shock therapy resulted in immediate prices 
increases, and unemployment and other social-economic problems.
Second, as both my cases show, realisation of local policy innovations reflects 
compromises between key policy agents at different spatial scales with different
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priorities. In the case of KETZ applying for state recognition, I explain that one of the 
reasons why ultimately KETZ gained a distinctive national-status was because of 
negotiation between Kunshan and the centre. Most national zones at the time were 
entitled both to implement preferential policies for FDI and to enjoy a fiscal subsidy 
from the centre. However, KETZ was allowed to apply for the former without the latter. 
Kunshan faced particular difficulty in attracting FDI due to its county-level 
administrative standing and secret development status, making preferential FDI policy 
the greater priority. And the centre, suffering from fiscal crisis, was more willing to 
give locally initiated projects ‘preferential policy to investors than a fiscal subsidy’. 
After negotiation, two parties compromised to agree on the form of the application of 
national recognition. In the case of CSSIP, in order to compromise with detractors who 
argue that investment by foreign governments represent a new kind of ‘extraterritorial 
area’, an agreement was also reached with Singapore that CSSIP operate under 
effective control of Singapore via joint-venture form involving one China consortium 
(with 35% of shareholding) and one Singapore consortium (with 65%).
Third, to imitate and learn from successful development cases is a common strategy of 
making local policy innovations. Generally speaking, human beings as well as 
organizations tend to model themselves after the counterparts in their field that they 
perceived to be more legitimate or successful. And from the perspective of decision 
making, policy transfer is also recognized as one of the key solutions for social learning 
and policy innovations. The concept of development zone in China was basically 
modelled on successful experiences in many developing countries that facilitated 
geographical bounded areas to promote export-oriented FDI. During the early 1990s, 
China, facing several development problems generated by the 1980s’ speedy growth, 
launched a political campaign of ‘learning from Singapore’. For many leaders in China,
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Singapore was regarded as a model country, experiencing high speed of development 
without social disorders. This was the basic context for the CSSIP initiated in Suzhou. 
In the case of KETZ, in the mid 1980s Kunshan officials also started up 
industrialization via the so-called ‘Kunshan little industrial zone’ by mimicking the 
experience of Sheko, the origin of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. Also, in the late 
1990s the idea of an EPZ after Kunshan modelled the experiences of Taiwan, which 
had the first export processing zone in the world. In general, visiting-cum-leaming and 
face-to-face discussions were popular approaches to the mimetic process. In the case of 
promoting the idea of EPZ, Kunshan officials visited Taiwan six times to conduct 
interviews with relevant officials and to collect information on the latest development 
in establishing globally competitive Customs environments for high-tech 
manufacturing. In the case of CSSIP, Chinese staff of SIPAC were regularly and 
systematically sent to Singapore for visiting-cum-training and face-to-face 
conversations to understand the so-called Singapore standards of operations.
Fourthly, utilizing localities’ political stocks (which are based on personal relationship 
of local leaders) also played an important role in attracting investment in order to 
successfully facilitate local policy innovations. In the case of CSSIP, at the beginning 
the then Senior Mentor Lee Sr. did not believe that Zhang, the Suzhou mayor, could 
offer credible promises as a basis for development. He changed his mind and had 
second thoughts only because he saw Deng Jr., a son of Deng Sr.. Deng Jr.’s visit was 
arranged by Zhang, without whose networking, CSSIP might well not have happened. 
Moreover, in the case of KETZ, successful promotions to attract domestic and foreign 
investors were also based on the personal networks of either former Kunshan leaders, 
Kunshanese who worked in the central governments or outside Kunshan, or the 
pioneering foreign investors from Japan and Taiwan.
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To sum up, these empirical findings basically support the argument that local policy 
innovations can be understood under the context of strategic interactions between 
policy agents across spatial scales involving local economic development. These four 
strategic behaviours also address the important role of local entrepreneurial agents in 
the process of policy innovations. It can explain why local policy innovations happen in 
few but not all regions. Theoretically, all of the local authorities could utilize their own 
interdependent resources to strategically interact with other central and foreign agents 
and governments. In reality, however, the localities where local policy innovations take 
place more easily are actually governed by entrepreneurial leaders who are not only 
capable of these strategic behaviours for promotion of local development, but also 
willing to take responsibility of risks and not afraid of mistakes.
9-4 Summary: Asymmetric Decentralization in post-Mao China
Decentralization as an intermediate dimension
The central concern of the thesis is with the concept of local policy innovations: how 
and why and under what circumstances local institutions were encouraged to make 
innovations in policy formulating and implementing for better off economic 
development. In general, I argue that local policy innovations were able to be 
institutionalized when localities encountered structural changes, through a combination 
of agents pursuing their own self- interests by strategically interacting with other agents 
at different spatial scales in the context of dynamic inter-regional competition. In other 
words, both pressures/opportunities presented by global and domestic economic 
restructuring and actions operated by agents’ strategic interactions across different 
spatial scales both are partly adequate explanations of the cases where innovation was 
achieved in the west and in China.
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In the comparative terms, there are of course certain commonalities as well as 
differences between China and the west. The challenges of globalization, transitions in 
terms of modes of regulations and regimes of accumulations, competition among 
sub-national territories, and mimetic learning as a way of innovation are general both in 
the west and China. However, as demonstrated, there are major differences between 
China and the west on two dimensions of political operation: on the one hand China is 
still under one-party control; while on the other hand the local-central relationship in 
China is one of more political dynamics rather than of constitutional rigidity. Therefore, 
although the tendency that local governments are gaining more economic powers to 
deal with local development issues can be seen both in China and the west, the 
mechanisms and effectiveness for local policy innovations are distinctive in China as 
compared to those in western liberal democratic market systems. From this view, in 
order to specifically understand the mechanism of post-Mao local policy innovations, I 
further argue in this thesis that the effect of decentralization on political and economic 
perspectives, and the related political and materials incentives for local officials, 
reflects an important intermediate dimension between structures in change and agents 
in action.
In the western cases, economic decentralization generally takes place in the context of a 
liberal competitive democracy, with local leaders elected by the people (like the mayor 
of London and Paris, all governors of lander in Germany and of states in the USA). 
There, local politicians are motivated to utilize local resources and make policy 
innovations in promoting economic development in order to win the elections. However, 
without local election systems, the question why post-Mao local officials still had 
incentives to act in a similar way becomes crucial. Before readdressing the concept of
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asymmetric decentralization that I proposed in Chapter Four, I need to discuss two 
competing arguments about the role of incentives for post-Mao local officials to 
promote policy innovations: the first is a perspective of ‘ambiguous property right’; and 
the second is an aspect of ‘federalism, Chinese style’. These two are illustrated as 
follows.
Ambiguous property right vis-a-vis ‘federalism, Chinese style*
The perspective of ‘ambiguous property right’ is developed under the contexts of two 
types of economic decentralization: a fiscal one and a public ownership one. 
Concerning the former, local governments were granted more economic powers. 
Regarding the latter, many state-owned enterprises belonging to the centre were also 
transferred to the local governments. Therefore, township and village governments in 
particular and sub-national governments in general were de facto owners of public 
enterprises. Local leaders could either directly become managers and bosses of these 
decentralized public-owned companies; or they had the absolute right to appoint and 
dismiss managers of these companies, to make important investment decisions, to 
dispose of assets and even to claim part of the net profits. Under what has been called 
‘local state corporatism’ (Oi 1995; 1998), local ‘cadre/entrepreneurs’, including party 
secretaries and government officials at local levels whose economic interests directly 
tied to the ambiguous public/private property right, were simultaneously operating as 
shareholder and tax authority. Because personal income, bonuses and fringe benefits 
including luxury cars, travel and large expense accounts were pegged to local public 
revenue in relation to the performance of these public-owned companies, local officials 
therefore were expected to act innovatively like business-persons.
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This approach offers a dimension to understand the sources of economic incentives for 
local officials. Such a process, which was understood as one of key mechanisms for 
rural industrialization, was central to the situations of many township and village 
enterprises (TVEs) and its contributions to local development. However, the weakness 
of the approach is that it does not apply to many economically globalized situations 
where local development was highly triggered neither by TVEs nor public-owned 
companies but by FDI. Moreover, the approach is only useful to describe those local 
officials who directly operated business to raise fiscal revenue and to create 
employment. The approach fails to explain why other local officials promoted local 
development, by creating an environment conducive to growth rather than engaging 
themselves into business directly.
The second approach is to assert the operation of ‘de facto federalism’ as a perspective 
on local-central dynamics. In the west, federalism means that local governments have 
quite powerful economic competences under regulations of their constitutions with only 
limited powers conceded to the centre (principally national defence and foreign policy). 
The general political and social contexts also involve systems for protecting individual 
rights, including democratization of governor elections and political freedoms. From 
this perspective, post-Mao China could fit the economic conditions but not the political 
and social ones. On the one hand, there was indeed a limitation of control by the central 
government in Beijing over the local economic development issues along with a 
situation of serious competition among decentralized territories. But, on the other hand, 
neither local (except village levels) elections nor liberal democracy have been 
established. Leaders are still assigned by upper-level governments.
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Qian and Xu argue that this scenario can be regarded as a particular type of 
organizational operations: the ‘multidivisional-form (m-form)’, involving as an 
organization comprised of self-contained units where complementary tasks are grouped 
together, and units are designed to compete with each other. The leaders of units 
who have major powers to mobile the resources and decide personnel management 
within the units are selected by the headquarters of the corporation (Qian and Xu 1993a; 
1993b). From this view, China’s political operations can be understood in terms of three 
principles. First of all, there is a hierarchical structure with personnel control 
centralized in the hands of upper governments; government officials move up in an 
internal political labour market; and officials at a given level compete for promotional 
opportunities. Second, top provincial officials, like division managers in a 
multidivisional corporation, have the ultimate authority in allocating economic 
resources as well personnel arrangement in their provinces. Third, provincial top 
leaders have to be in charge of economic performance; and the economic performances 
under their jurisdictions are positively related to their career mobility. To some extent, 
such relationship between central and provincial governments also can be applied to the 
relationship between provincial and prefecture or even prefecture to county 
governments.
The main difference between the approach of ‘ambiguous property right’ and ‘m-form 
organization’ is that the former pays attention purely to economic incentives while the 
latter introduces the innovative mechanism of political incentives, particularly in the 
form of careerism among local officials. The perspective of ‘m-form organization’ 
actually offers a better understanding to comprehend local leaders’ incentives for policy
261 In contrast, a U-form (unitary form) organization is decomposed into specialized units where similar 
tasks are grouped together. These units are not self-contained in terms of final output (Qian and Xu 
1993a; 1993b).
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innovations. Under single party control, post-Mao local officials were assigned by the 
upper-level governments rather than elected by the people. And consideration for 
personnel promotion or demotion is mainly based on the performance-oriented 
management for economic development. Therefore, self-interested local actors in 
post-Mao situations who made policy innovation could be motivated by careerism as 
political incentives.
Various statistical studies relating upward mobility of subnational leaders and economic 
performance of their jurisdictions have shown that the greater economic development 
growth, the better the chances there for leaders to be promoted by upper-level 
governments. In this thesis, study of two cases provides more qualitative support for 
this argument. Naturally, politicians would tend to give as the ostensible reasons for 
making policy innovations public objectives like priority of the wealth of the people 
and development of their localities, rather than any of their individual self-interests, 
even if the later are crucial dimensions of their behaviours. For this reason, I focus on 
the ex-post career paths of local leaders to show the positive linkages between local 
economic performances and career advancement for local officials, which I argue them 
to be aware of and influenced by. Undoubtedly, KETZ/ Kunshan and CSSIP/Suzhou are 
now listed as top economically globalized zones in China. From Kunshan, two 
ex-leaders are now serving as vice governors of Jiangsu province. The other two 
ex-leaders were promoted with an abnormal two echelons. From Suzhou, three of the 
ex-leaders have now become provincial leaders. Such exceptional promotions of 
Kunshan and Suzhou leaders- or the so-called ‘Kunshan phenomenon’ and ‘Suzhou 
phenomenon’ - clearly endorse existing researches showing that leaders advancing 
economic development are better able to get promoted.
322
Advantages and limitations o f asymmetric decentralization
To sum up, the mechanism of political incentives in ‘federalism, Chinese style’ is 
political dimension of ‘asymmetric decentralization’, a term that I adopt in this thesis to 
describe the situation of ‘economic decentralization to local governments’ alongside 
‘political centralization under the party’. The former is popular in many countries 
across the world, while the latter is quite unique to China. I argue that the concept of 
this ‘asymmetric decentralization’ is key to understanding how post-Mao local 
governments were ‘politically’ encouraged to make innovation. With central- local 
dynamics as the political leeway, local officials like to do their best to utilize then- 
decentralized economic powers and resources for more development opportunities, in 
return for greater ‘political capital’ in relation to upper-level governments. Through this 
route, the personal prospects of local leaders come to depend on their ability to make 
policy innovation to boost economic performance of their jurisdictions during their 
tenures in office.
This perspective explains a more complicated example from my case studies, involving 
the competition between SND and CSSIP in Suzhou. As stated, the proposal ‘strongly’ 
suggested by Singapore in the late 1990s to shut down SND was strongly rejected by 
Suzhou, for reasons which involved both the ways career advancement is related to 
economic performances and internal political conflict within Suzhou associated with 
dual local power bases. During 1994-2000 period of Singapore- domination, Suzhou 
was very marginalized and hardly had any incentives to promote CSSIP. In addition, 
SND was able to contribute more to economic performances (like GDP and fiscal 
revenue) to Suzhou leaders than CSSIP did. Therefore, it is understandable why Yang, 
who took actions to support both SND and CSSIP when he was party secretary of 
Suzhou, was promoted to be vice governor of Jiangsu after he left Suzhou. In contrast,
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Zhang, who supported CSSIP on his capacity as Suzhou mayor, was removed from 
Suzhou/Jiangsu and stayed in Harvard for two years. According to the idea of careerism, 
it is understandable that Zhang’s studying abroad in Harvard was not a promotion, if 
not to actually a demotion, particularly compared to Yang’s posts.
I also show that asymmetric decentralization is a Janus-faced phenomenon generating 
both positive and negative effects at regional/local level and also at national level. At 
the national scale, two significant consequences are: relatively national stability 
(compared with other developing and transition economies where there was also higher 
economic decentralization) but in combination with inter-regional uneven development 
within the country. At a regional scale, policy innovations were enabled through the 
system of careerism among local officials who wanted to present better performance in 
order to get more attention from the upper-level government, but this has been at the 
cost of some unsustainable developments due to the system paying too much attention 
to narrow economic indicators for performance management. In both of my cases, the 
relatively low growth of income per capita as well as certain unsustainable social and 
environment development demonstrated that heavy emphasis on economic indicators, 
such as GDP, FDI and so on, as key criteria for performance management can also 
produce certain negative externalities.
These negative externalities remind us to reconsider more comprehensive judgments on 
the mechanism of asymmetric decentralization in relation to local economic 
development? Three particular theoretical and empirical implications can be made. First, 
economic performance management behind the career incentives are actually assigned 
by upper-level governments, challenging the concept of what is degree of local 
autonomy in post-Mao China’s context of economic decentralization. By re/setting the
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performance indicators, central or upper authorities still play a very important role in 
intervening and directing local development. Generally speaking, local officials who 
were interested in environment protection, cultural diversity and R&D and innovation 
in the 1980s and 1990s indeed faced difficulty in practicing their ideas because these 
issues were not on policy agenda of the centre. Local behaviours were changed 
following indicator items were reset. For example, Zhangjiang High-Tech Zone in 
Pudong of Shanghai changed their development focus from attracting FDI to settling 
down R&D institutions. It happened after their performances criteria were rearranged 
by the upper authority not purely on the growth of GDP but on the numbers of how 
many Zhangjiang or Shanghai branches of prestigious universities or engineering 
colleges could be relocated.262 Similarly, Zhouzhuang, a canal-village near Shanghai, 
also started to significantly preserve traditional waterways and landscapes, after 
performance indicators of Zhouzhuang were changed with more focus on ecological 
preservation and promotion of tourist industry.263
In other words, under the context of asymmetric decentralization where those indicators 
are basically designed by the centre, local and regional officials are to some extent 
forced to passively respond to the centre’s requirement. Localities have limited 
autonomy to initiate their real own development strategies, particularly those which are 
different from what upper-level governments want. On the bright side, of course, 
localities’ behaviours can be more easily influenced by the centre who is willing to 
promote certain important policies. But it must be noted that whether the system can be 
functional or not depends on one important precondition: that the central leaders 
selected need to really recognize what are the important policy agenda for China as a
262 Interview code: YO-16.
263 News source: xin hua wang (based in Beijing), 2005/08/08.
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whole, or for particular localities, in order to reset those performance indicators in the 
‘right’ time at the ‘right’ place.
Second, however, it does not mean that indicator performance/control is an effective 
(enough) governing mechanism. Political centralization under the party involves two 
kinds of political exercises: not only are local leaders assigned by upper governments, 
but there is also one party control over administration, legislation and the juridical 
system, with very limited and slow-growing political space for civil society and media. 
Without good institutions and governance requirements (like transparency, power check 
and balance, freedom of speech, environment for active NGO) at the local level, the 
operational system for local economic development can be based on the centre’s 
monitoring capacity or can rely on local leadership, or possibly both. However, while 
there are always some leaders that are entrepreneurial, honest and active, others will be 
passive, conservative, or even worse, predatory and corrupt. And there is some 
asymmetric information between the local and the centre with the former easily hiding 
some information from the latter. A common scenario is one of ‘cooking’ data leading 
to unreliability of statistics.
As such, in the best scenario, local policy innovation can take place resulting in better 
economic development as a consequence when there is a good leadership. But, in the 
worst scenario, when bad leadership is in office where good governance is lacking at 
the local level, local people and civil society have limited institutional channels to 
pursue reform or change, while the centre also needs plenty of time to find out these 
predatory or corrupt leaders, locking localities in a negative cycle of under­
development. This is a possible reason, for example, why anti-corruption campaigns at 
the local level are so difficult in China at the moment. Therefore, if China still
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maintains its scepticism toward the so-called western democracy model, from my view, 
combining the first point, how do upper level governments design a set of good 
indicators as career incentives in order to encourage local leaders to promote good 
governance is to become a necessary policy option.
Third, on the main topic of innovation, asymmetric decentralization in China offers 
limited institutional incentives to build tolerance of failure and rewards for long-term 
success, which are the key requirements for overcoming the uncertainty associated with 
all real innovations (Manso 2006). In contrast to an election system where tenure is 
strongly fixed at three to five years, post-Mao’s asymmetric decentralization gives local 
leaders no idea how long their tenure in office may be. In order not to promote localism, 
the average tenure of local leaders in the reform period was about two years, which was 
shorter than that prior to 1980 (Huang 1996b).
However, such the shorter tenure tended to discourage innovation for two reasons. First, 
to be tolerant of failure and be patient to wait for long term achievement are not 
encouraged. In order to prove as soon as possible (in one or two years) that they are 
capable of generating development and not making huge mistakes, leaders who bear 
their political career in mind naturally promote short-term construction and investments 
or simply copycat other regions without considering their own real niches, with a risk 
of damaging the chances of long-term local sustainable development. On top of that, 
innovations are better produced by sharing of tacit knowledge and trust between agents, 
which takes time to develop and accumulate. The frequent turnovers of local official 
leaders, who are the key agent in local policy decision, unintentionally weaken the 
possibility of establishing long-term face-to-face communication and interactions. For 
example, recently several Kunshan businesspersons complained about the frequent
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movements of local leaders in relation to slow improvement of local business 
environment.264 A crucial new task facing China is to balance longer term tenure, 
appropriate local policy innovation, and protection from localism.
9-5 Coda: Expanding Research Agenda
Moving on from the local/individual and national/aggregate levels on which I have 
concentrated in looking at the consequences of asymmetric decentralization for policy 
innovation, one useful direction for an expanding research agenda would be to focus on 
‘inter-regional’ development dynamics associated with local policy innovations. There 
are two topics that can be identified: one positive and one negative. The former is the 
diffusion of policy innovation capacity between regions, and the latter consists of 
copy-cat acts between regions resulting in isomorphism. I elaborate each as follows.
Diffusion of local experiences and geography ofpersonnel management
Performance-based promotions can be important not only in providing political 
motivations for local leaders to make policy innovation, but also as a new solution of 
diffusing those innovations. This is illustrated by cases of Kunshan and Suzhou. For 
example, experienced county-level leaders were promoted to other prefectures within 
provinces. WU Kechun was the first economic architect to upgrade Kunshan for 
dramatic industrialization in the 1980s. Because of his ability in attracting FDI for 
better local economic development, Wu was also the first vice director of 
Administrative Committee of CSSIP in charge of communication and negotiation with 
Singaporeans. JI Jianye, who served in Kunshan from 1997 to 2002, was promoted to 
Yangzhou where it was in the least-developed prefecture in the central Jiangsu with
264 Interview code: KC-04.
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limited FDI.265 Ji’s abnormal two-echelon promotion was said to have been decided by 
then President Jiang because he wanted Yangzhou, his hometown, to quickly adopt the 
Kunshan experiences through Ji’s promotion. According to the survey done by Taiwan 
Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association, in terms of the so-called 
‘recommended city’ for further investment, Yangzhou was ranked 36th out of China as a 
whole in 2001 to top 2nd in 2004.266 Moreover, those skilled prefecture leaders were 
upgraded to be provincial heads in China as a whole. In the case of Suzhou, LIANG 
Baohua (1998-2000), CHEN Demin (1997-2002), and WANG Min (2002-2004) were 
shifted to be provincial leaders of Jiangsu, Shannxi and Jilin provinces after leaving 
Suzhou. It is reported that Chen could bring some fresh ideas from Suzhou to Shannxi 
for the ‘Great West Development (kai fa  da xi buy and Wang could do so to Jilin for a 
project of ‘advancement for Northern East’ (zhen xin dong bei).267
Such promotion of course happened not only in Suzhou and Kunshan but also in other 
places in China.268 These empirical cases actually imply that the movement of
265 In 2001, Yangzhou, as prefecture-level city, had 451 million populations with US$ 10 billion of 
realized FDI. In Kunshan, there was one of ninth of population of Yangzhou with seven times of realized 
FDI.
266 Significant more Taiwanese investments came to Yangzhou after Ji was in the post. For example, one 
chemical production company from Taiwan decided to invest in Yangzhou because of Ji’s connection and 
reputation in the Taiwanese circle. News source: zhong guo shi bao (based in Taipei), 2002/04/22.
26 Due to the networking with Singapore during their tenure in Suzhou and CSSIP, more Singaporeans 
investors were invited to organize to pay a visit to Shannxi and Jilin after Chen and Wang moved there. 
For example, LI Yixian, a former vice CEO of CSSD and now director of Bureau o f International 
Enterpreneur Development, was invited as a senior economic consultant to Shannxi province by CHEN 
Demin in 2005. News source: nan fan zhou mo (based in Guangzhou), 2004/11/18; lian he cao bao 
(based in Singapore), 2005/05/25.
268 Zhangjiagang, and Kunshan and CSSIP were regarded as three role models of development in Suzhou. 
Therefore, JIANG Hongkuan, then party secretary, was promoted to be mayor of Nanjing, the provincial 
capital of Jiangsu. YU Youjun, the then mayor of Shenzhen (prior to 2003), was promoted to the vice 
governor and party secretary of Hunan first (2003-2005) and now transferred to be acting governor of 
Shanxi province (after 2005). Shenzhen was one of most active and powerful city in Guangdong with the 
establishment o f the first special economic zone since the late 1970s. And Hunan and Shanxi were 
currently two of poorest provinces in China. Moreover, JIANG Jufeng, the then mayor of Wenzhou of 
Zhejiang (prior to 2002), was also directly seated to be vice governor of Sichuan province (after 2002). 
QIAN Yuanlu, the then mayor of Wuhan of Hubei (prior to 1998), was also moved to be the leaders of 
impoverished Guizhou province (1998-2005) and then changed to Helongjiang (after 2005). Wenzhou 
and Wuhan are two of major developed cities during the reform periods. In addition, the incumbent party 
secretary of Jiangxi (after 2001), MENG Jiangzhu, was vice mayor of Shanghai (prior to 2001).
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experienced staff is used to serve as an additional function of diffusion of innovative 
policy capacity from developed regions to underdeveloped areas. Through the 
personnel movements of these experienced leaders, successful and innovative 
governing capacities in improving regulatory environments for better local economic 
development, which are attached with local leaders, were also shifted from certain 
developed places to puzzled or even underdeveloped areas.
More systematic survey on provincial leaders also supports the argument that 
experienced leaders could be transferred-cum-promoted from developed regions to 
underdeveloped areas. I use the dataset of bibliography of party secretary and governors 
of 31 provincial-level administrations (as of March 2006) to examine the careers paths 
of these local leaders tracing back to 2000.269 Three types of personnel movement can 
be identified: from the centre (namely, they served in ministry-level in Beijing before 
working as provincial leaders); from the neighbour (namely, they were moved from 
other provinces to the current post); and being veterans (namely, they stayed in the 
current provinces prior to 2000). Of 66 records on career paths of local leaders,270 21 
were type of from the neighbours along with 14 of from the centre and neighbour, and
269 The reasons why I just select party secretary and governor rather than to other vice posts is because in 
China every province has about ten or more vice party secretaries and vice governors together. Some of 
them are in charge of discipline committee or party management, which are not much directed to local 
economic development. Taking all of them into account would make the dataset just a little bit 
comprehensive but very difficult to examine. Therefore in here, I just focus on posts of party secretary 
and governor. The data is based on xin hua wang (based in Beijing), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-02/20/ content_ 476046.htm.
270 Every province produces two records: one of party secretary and one of governor. But four leaders 
changed their post twice. BAI Kerning, incumbent party secretary of Hebei since 2002, changed positions 
twice since 2000. His career path involve: Director of ren ming ri bao (based in Beijing) until 2001 -> 
party secretary of Hainan during 2001-2002 -> party secretary of Hebei. So he contributed two types of 
changes: from the centre and from the neighbour. Similarly, WANG Qisan, current mayor of Beijing, also 
changed the posts twice in past five years: director of Office for Institutional Innovation at the State 
Council until 2002, party secretary of Hainan during 2002-2003, and then Beijing mayor after 2003. YU 
Yujun, current party secretary of Shanxi, was then mayor of Shenzhen (until 2003), and vice mayor of 
Hunan (2003 to 2005). And SU Rong now works as party secretary of Gansu. Prior to that, he was vice 
party secretary of Jilin (until 2001) and party secretary of Qinghai (2001-2003). Therefore there are 66 
records (31*2 +1+1+1+1).
330
31 of being veterans. Among the 21 accounts of working experiences moving from 
provinces to provinces, I divide into two categories: move from high GDP per capita 
province to low GDP per capita (from rich to poor) or vice versa (from poor to rich). 
And the former fits into the idea of diffusion of experienced administrations from 
advanced regions to underdeveloped areas. The result is astonishing: 14 of from rich to 
poor with only 7 from poor to rich (Table 9-1).
Table 9-1: Geography of personnel movement of China’s local leaders
Name* Post changed since 2000
Type of 
movement
From** To** A*** Q***
JI Yunshi Jiangsu (prior to 02) Hebei (after 02) X
CHEN Deming Jiangsu (piror to 04) Shannxi(after 04) X
WANG Min Jiangsu (prior to 04) Jinlin (after 02) X
ZHANG Dejiang Zhejiang (prior to 02) Guangdong (after 02) X
Wang Jingsan Zhejiang (prior 02) Anhui (after 02) X
ZHANG Guoli Guangdong (prior to 00) Shandong (after 00) X





MENG Jianzhu Shanghai (prior 01) Jiangxi (after 01) X





BAI Sipei Qinhai (prior to 01) Yunan (after 01) X
CHEN Chengkuo Shandong (prior 02) Ningxia (after 02) X
KUO Jinglung Tibet (prior 04) Anhui (after 04) X
BAI Keming Hainan (01-02 Hebei (after 02)
WANG Chisan Hainan (02-03 Beijing (after 03)
LI Keqian Henan (prior to 04 Liaoning (after 04)
CHUBo Hunan (prior to 01 Inner Mongolia (after 01)
ZHANG Wenyue Xin jing ( prior to 01 Liaoning (after 01)
XI Jingpeng Fujing (prior 02 Zhejiang (after 02)
QIAN Yunlu Quizhou (prior 02 Helungjiang (after 02)
Note*: data is party secretary and governors as of March 2005 who had experienced personal movement 
from one province to another province once or more.
Note**: the posts in the ‘from’ column are either vice governors, vice party secretaries, governors or 
party secretaries, and the posts in the ‘to’ column custom are party secretaries or governors 
Note***: movement from rich province (higher GDP per capita) to poor one (lower GDP per capita) 
refers to A; vice versa refers to B
Source: author compiled
Of course, it must be noted that personnel management and movement of leaders 
involve many other considerations, such as education background, age, place of birth, 
political factions (or collective networking), individual personal relationship, stability
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of provincial leaderships, training programs of national leaders and so on (Li 2005; Li 
2006a; Li 2006b). More researches on different cases to show whether or not situations 
of provinces before and after experienced leaders entering offices really get better are 
needed to either confirm or modify the ‘hypothesis’ of geographic diffusions in policy 
innovation capacities. To sum up, geography of personnel movements of these leaders 
in relation to diffusion in capacities of local policy innovations certainly is one of the 
important and promising topics in further researches.
Local isomorphism as a common observation in China and the west 
Another phenomenon behind local policy innovation is that different localities which 
try to make policy innovations actually formulate similar, if not to say exactly the same, 
development strategies (like duplicate infrastructure construction and race to bottom of 
tax rebate programs). In theory, given that every locality has particular niches (or they 
are supposedly to have to find out or create their own competitive advantage), local 
policy innovations would lead to policy divergence, rather than merely development 
policy convergence or similarities. However, in reality, it is undeniable that several 
localities actually make policy innovation in the way of intentionally or unintentionally 
formulating similar or exactly same strategies as others do in different places. I call the 
phenomenon ‘isomorphism of local development policy’. For example, in terms of FDI 
policy, cities and regions often used to offer all manner of incentives to major 
corporations with similar concessions, such as tax abatements and the provision of 
physical infrastructure. In order to present imagination of globalization, many cities 
used to build up so-called iconic architectures, which are defined as builds and spaces 
that famous professional architects have special symbolic and aesthetic significances 
attached to them (Sklair 2005). To sum up, the phenomenon of local policy 
isomorphism is commonly observed not only in the west but also in China, but
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regrettably it was rarely documented and analyzed in the existing social science in 
general and urban and regional studies in particular. It means that there is a theoretical 
gap between policy innovation and policy isomorphism.
Inspired from organizational theory, isomorphism is defined as aggregations of 
organizations that are involved in similar activities due to inter-organizational 
interaction impacts upon organizational strategies and institutional change. In 
DiMaggio’s and Powell’s view (1991), many organizational fields show a tendency to 
institutional isomorphism, meaning that despite the emphasis on variety and innovation 
at the level of individual actors and organizations, in reality many organization fields 
present a strong tendency to increased homogeneity. Three typologies of isomorphic 
forces are identified: ‘under coercive pressure’; ‘for mimetic learning’; and ‘by 
normative involvement’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). First, coercive isomorphism 
results from formal and/or informal pressures (like legalized mandates, social 
expectations, and ritual of conformity) exerted on organizations. Second, mimetic 
learning refers to forces for isomorphic changes among organizations that derive from a 
sense of uncertainty. Particularly when goals are ambiguous and/or when environments 
created unpredicted risks, the safest ways to get rid of risk for organizations is to model 
themselves after other modelled organizations that are perceived as successful cases by 
borrowing organizations. A third source of isomorphic change is normative 
involvement stemming primarily from a so-called professionalism.271 Organizational 
convergence, therefore, take place via using similar professionalization sources for 
change when these professional members interact, reinforce and spread norms of 
behaviours with each other.
271 Professionalism is regarded as an occupation that is able to define the conditions and method of their 
work and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy (DiMaggio’s and 
Powell 1991).
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On the basis of the three types of isomorphic forces (for organization in general), five 
main decision making mechanism in relation to local isomorphic policy development 
are theoretically identified as follows (Table 9-2). First, localities formulate similar 
policy due to top-down policies from any upper governments. In the national scale, 
central governments can define specific functions and nullify the policies and decisions 
of the local governments. In the global scale, local governments are also able to be 
coerced to make some policy changes because they have to comply with conditionality 
of foreign aids or international treaties (Bennett 1991).
Table 9-2: Analytic framework on local policy isomorphism
Typology o f 




■ (CPI) Compulsory Regulation
Regions would be forced to develop in the 
way of isomorphism in some respects 
because they are under certain similar 
formal regulations or informal rituals.
■ (CP2) (Im)mobile Resource competition
Regions would formulate the similar 
policies because they seek for the immobile 
funding from the same authority
■ European cities are forced to make 
the same policy changes under EU 
context; or Japan that was forced to 
implement parliamentary democracy 
system after World War II.
■ Several local regeneration projects 
in UK adopt the new public-private- 
participation model in order to get 
the ‘Challenge Fund’; or Regions 
competing FDI by offering similar 




■ (ML1) Mimetic Learning
Regions would intimate other so-called 
successful regions when they face some 
uncertainty or ambiguous goals
■ Some cities facing traffic jam 
problems mimic London’s 





■ (N il) Consultancy Involvement
Regions would formulate similar 
development strategies when involved by 
professional consultancy companies or 
associations
■ (NI2) Personnel recruitment
Regions would make similar decision 
making when leaders of regions can be 
‘headhunted’ in the pool of the experienced 
mayors, chiefs or managers
■ Lord Richard Rogers promote 
sustainable development to most 
global cities; or the National 
Governors Association seeks to 
identify and share best policy and 
innovation. Media also can play an 
important role in benchmarking.
■ It is unlikely to happen in the liberal 
democracy system because most of 
the local leaders are elected directly. 
But China is practicing this.
Source: aut ior compiled
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Second, regions are ‘strongly’ encouraged to formulate resembling development 
strategies when they seek for similar subsidy, compete for same grants, or/and biding 
for mobile investments. Territorial competition for foreign investment is a case in point 
(Cheshire and Gordon 1995). In addition, Britain’s Challenged Fund was to strongly 
encourage local governments to formulate similar ‘public-private partnership’ policy 
for urban regeneration (Davies 2002). These first two scenarios are under coercive 
pressures. Third, regions imitate other so-called successful regions when they face 
some uncertainty or ambiguous development goals. It is because local policymakers 
facing complex problems are likely to seek decision-making shortcuts by learning 
alternatives which have been pursued and proved effective or promising in other state 
(Berry and Berry 1999). And this mechanism follows the mimetic-leaming isomorphic 
force.
The normative involvement force shed light on the fourth and fifth types of local policy 
isomorphism. In the fourth scenario, regions would formulate similar development 
strategies when they invite professional consultancy companies involved or their 
decision makers. International consultancy, such as global law firms, medias, banks, 
and professional architects and planners are able to play an integral role in the 
transnational creation of global flows of expertise, ideas, images, technology, capital, 
human and development models (Rimmer 1991; Molotch 1993; Olds 2001; McCann 
2004). Another examples are the National Governors Association and the Centre for 
Best Practices at National Conference of State Legislature (Bennett 1991; Berry and 
Berry 1999). Fifthly and finally, regions formulate similar policies because leaders of 
regions are selected in the pool of the experienced mayors, chiefs or managers, rather 
than elected through the democratic process. It means that certain knowledge of local
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economic development can be transferred with the politicians or government officials 
shifted from ‘experienced regions’ to other ‘learning regions’.
To sum up, I argue that the phenomenon of local development policy isomorphism can 
be divided into five different but not mutually exclusive mechanisms, that is, (CPI) 
compulsory directions from top; (CP2), competition for subsidy and/or investments; 
(ML1), mimetic learning; (Nil), professional networking; and (NI2), personnel 
movement. However, it must be noted that these mechanisms are theoretically 
distinctive but empirically intertwined. Therefore, decision making for local economic 
development is better understood as a mixture of several mechanisms.
Back to post-Mao China’s context, I do not aim to downplay the importance of 
mechanism of mimetic learning (ML1) when individuals making decision, of mobile 
capital (CP2) under the general context of globalization, and of personnel movement of 
experienced leaders (NI2). As discussed, these three undoubtedly played an important 
role in the China’s particular background of ‘asymmetric decentralization’. However, I 
wish to bring other constituent mechanisms for trying to sophisticatedly understanding 
policy isomorphism into the whole pictures. For example, the policy of development 
zone to expand to 14 cities and regions in the mid 1980s could be understood as the 
mechanism of compulsory direction (CPI). It is because then leaders of some areas 
(like Nantong of Jiangsu) were quite conservative-minded and cast their doubt on 
opening-up programs. They were forced to carry out such central directions (Zweig 
1999). Regarding consultancy involvement (N il) cross spatial scales, Olds (1997) 
noted elite non-Chinese professional consultants in planning and urban design played a 
role of knowledge transfer from outside to Shanghai. In addition, Chinese Association 
o f Development Zone also helps formation and transformation of development zones,
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for example, by organizing ‘learning and adopting CSSIP’ conferences to promote 
CSSIP experience across China. To conclude, the notion of five mechanisms has just 
been proposed as the first step towards conceptualising the complexity of policy 
isomorphism embedded policy innovation. Based on that, further researches would be 
more easily conducted in order to theoretically and empirically advance our 
understanding the complicated situations of policy isomorphism and policy 
innovations.
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Appendix: Information about the Interviewees
In KETZ and Kunshan
KQ-01, a high-level official of KETZ administrative committee (KETZAC), 2002/01
KO-02, an assistant to vice director of KETZAC, 2003/01
KO-03, vice director of Kunshan EPZ administrative committee, 2003/09
KO-04, an official in business promotion in KETZAC, 2003/09
KO-05, an official in labour resource in KETZAC, 2003/09
KO-06, a veteran official of KETZAC, 2003/09
KO-07, another veteran official in Kunshan, 2003/10
KO-08, an official in human resources in Kunshan City Government (KCG), 2003/10 
KO-09, an official in finance in KCQ 2003/10 
KO-10, an official in planning in KCG, 2003/10
KC-01, a manager of a glove-making company in KETZ, 2003/09 
KC-02, a manager of a laptop-assembling company in Kunshan EPZ, 2003/09 
KC-03, a manager of a DVD Rom company in Kunshan EPZ, 2003/09 
KC-04, vice director of Kunshan Association of Taiwanese Investors, 2003/09 
KC-05, a manager of an IT component company in Kunshan, 2003/09 
KC-06, a manager of a Kunshan office of Taiwanese Bank, 2003/10 
KC-07, a manager of an IT component company in KETZ, 2005/07 
KC-08, a manager of an IT component company in KETZ, 2005/07
In CSSIP
SO-01, an official in finance and taxation of CSSIP Administrative Committee (SIPAC), 
2003/01
SO-02, an official in marketing of SIPAC, 2003/09
SO-03, an official in joint venture of SIPAC 2003/09
SO-04, vice director in charge of finance and taxation of SIPAC, 2003/10
SO-05, a high-level official of SIPAC (China side), 2003/09
SO-06, a high-level official of SIPAC (Singapore side), 2003/10
SO-07, an official in business marketing of SIPAC (based in Singapore), 2004/12
SO-08, an official in business promotion of SIPAC, 2005/07
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SC-01, a manager in an electronic industry company in CSSIP, 2001/06 
SC-02, a manager in an IT supporting company in CSSIP, 2001/06 
SC-03, a manager in an IT monitor company in CSSIP, 2001/06 
SC-04, a manager in an IT component company in CSSIP, 2001/06 
SC-05, a manager in an IT supporting company in CSSIP, 2002/06 
SC-06, a manager in a telecom materials company in CSSIP, 2003/01
SP-01, a scholar in development study (based in Singapore), 2004/12 
Suzhou and Other regions in Yangtze Delta
YO-01, an official in investment promotion of SND Administrative Committee 
(SNDAC), 2002/06 
YO-02, another official in investment promotion of SNDAC, 2002/12 
YO-03, an official in planning of SNDAC, 2003/01 
YO-04, an official in finance of SNDAC, 2003/01 
YO-05, an official in SND AC-owned company, 2003/01 
YO-06, an official in economic development of SNDAC, 2003/10 
YO-07, an official in human resource of SNDAC, 2003/10 
YO-08, vice director of Xiangcheng (a district-level) development zone of Suzhou, 
2003/01
YO-09, an official in economic coordination of Suzhou City Government (SCG), 
2003/10
YO-10, an official in finance of SCG 2003/10 
YO-11, an official in planning of SCQ 2003/10
YO-12, an official in land development of Wujian (a county-level) development zone 
Administrative Committee of Suzhou (WUAC), 2003/09 
YO-13, an official in labour resources of WUAC, 2003/09 
YO-14, an official in party and government office of WUAC, 2003/09 
YO-15, an official in economic development of WUAC, 2003/09 
YO-16, an official in Shanghai Zhangjiang High-Tech Zone, 2003/09
YC-01, a manager of an IT company in SND, 2001/06
YC-02, a manager of an IT company in Suzhou, 2003/01
YC-03, a high-level manager of a laptop company in Shanghai, 2003/09
YC-04, a high-level manager of an IC foundry in Shanghai, 2003/09
YC-05, a manager of an IT component in Shanghai, 2003/09
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YC-06, a manager of a mobile set company in Shanghai 2003/09
YC-07, a manager of an IT company in Wujian (county-level) of Suzhou, 2003/09
YC-08, a manager of an IT company in Wujian, 2003/09
YP-01, a researcher in Shanghai library, 2002/12
YP-02, an architect in Shanghai, 2003/01
YP-03, a project manager in architecture in Shanghai, 2003/10
YP-04, a manager of a planning consultant, 2003/10
YP-05, a scholar in Shanghai Academic of Social Science, 2003/10
YP-06, another scholar in Shanghai Academic of Social Science, 2003/10
YP-07, an official in Shanghai City Development Research Centre, 2003/10
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